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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This Executive Summary condenses more than 460 pages of detailed analysis and economic 
modelling into a digestible brief. We consider the material available in this summary and the 
main report can be used to develop easily communicated messages for APEC members to 
promote further structural reform. We also hope the Executive Summary will entice officials 
to read the more detailed analyses, as they contain useful examples of structural reforms and 
lessons on how to implement them effectively. 
 
The study as a whole seeks to catalogue many of the substantial, tangible benefits for 
consumers and for small and medium businesses arising from APEC members’ structural 
reform efforts in recent years, focusing on the transport, energy and telecommunications 
sectors. As well, economic modelling was undertaken to provide empirical estimates of 
reform impacts in those sectors. 
 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND STRUCTURAL REFORM 
 
Structural reform in APEC economies refers to policy change related to ‘institutional 
frameworks, regulations and government policy [designed] so that barriers to market-based 
incentives, competition, regional economic integration and improved economic performance 
are minimized’. 
 
Infrastructure is a significant and quantitatively important determinant of growth and 
development. Economies with fully open telecommunications and financial services sectors, 
for example, grow up to 1.5 percentage points faster than other economies. Improving 
destination infrastructure by a factor of 16% reduces transport costs by an amount equivalent 
to a reduction of 6500 sea km or 1000km of overland travel. Better infrastructure also 
contributes to better health outcomes, including key indicators in the Millennium 
Development Goals. 
 
While competition in domestic markets and openness to foreign investors might usually be 
expected to lead to better quality services, the link is not straightforward in infrastructure 
industries where the nature of an asset that is essential in service delivery can cause market 
and competition failures. 
 
Where this occurs, the asset or infrastructure industries have natural monopoly 
characteristics. Their owners can seek to charge higher prices in the absence of competition 
or they may not allow others to use the infrastructure (e.g., a gas pipeline or a telephone 
cable) duct, at reasonable cost. Some infrastructure activities involve externalities (i.e., side 
effects which are not priced) so that market price signals may not convey the accurate 
information about the real cost and value of the activity to the economy as a whole. Noise and 
air pollution are examples. Even where market competition can deliver efficient outcomes, 
governments may distort efficiency by seeking to implement equity objectives. 
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The best way to achieve good outcomes is not only to design better policy, but also to match 
the most effective and least distorting policy instruments to the objectives being sought. Good 
microeconomic policy also requires policy coherence. The APEC Leaders’ Agenda to 
Implement Structural Reform is directed at exactly these issues. 
 
PROGRESS TO DATE 
 
Air transport 
 
In air transport the initial instances of competition often occur in domestic markets through 
the introduction of low cost carriers (LCCs). For example, in Korea fares fell by 20–30% as a 
result of the entry of LCCs in 2006. The LCC share of the domestic market in Korea is now 
25% and close to 30% on some routes. 
 
Reform of international markets, which involve sovereign treaties as well as operating 
airlines, moves more slowly than that in domestic markets, but there is a shift towards 
liberalisation. For example, in 2006 Korea and China entered a more liberalised agreement 
for routes between Korea and China’s Shandong province. As a result, fares fell by an 
average of more than 8% on these routes and traffic grew much faster (by a factor of 2) 
compared to other routes between the two economies. 
 
Other studies rank economies according to their degree of liberalisation in international 
markets. An economy moving from the bottom quarter of the ranking to the top quarter 
would see substantial benefits. Such a move would see traffic volumes between economies 
linked by direct air services increase by about 30%. Signing Open Skies agreements has 
lowered air cargo freight rates by 8%. 
 
Regulations remaining in APEC economies, particularly in international markets, maintain 
barriers to the entry of new airlines. Econometric analysis undertaken for this project finds 
that conversion to full openness in air transport would lead to an average reduction in 
margins for all APEC economies of 15%. Exporters able to reap such benefits from more 
competitive world aviation markets would be able to capture these reduced margins and pass 
them on to consumers. 
 
Rail transport 
 
In rail transport the separation of track (below-the-rail) and train (above-the-rail) operations 
and the introduction of competition between train operators provide significant benefits. Free 
entry of new operators and the resulting dynamics of competition are critical for better 
performance. One study found that free entry adds over three times as much to productivity 
as separation.  
 
The separation of track ownership and operations is increasingly common in APEC 
economies, along with the specification of regimes that provide access for new competitors. 
Financing challenges in relation to track investment, however, remain. Between 2001 and 
2008 the annual average rate of productivity growth in the rail sector for APEC members was 
3.5%. There is still room for improvement, since for non-APEC members, productivity grew 
by 4.8% a year over the same period. 
 
Tenders to operate the Auckland urban rail system were called in 2002. The track was owned 
and managed by a government enterprise. Traffic doubled between 2005 and 2010 under this 
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competitive model. Services more than doubled between 2005 and 2009. Reliability also 
improved. In March 2005 only 77% of trains arrived on time. This figure exceeded 85% for 
most of 2009. Over 5 years 21 of the 41 stations on the network were upgraded. There were 
more services, higher frequencies, greater punctuality and better trains. Under this model, the 
government continued to invest in the track. It also subsidised fares on the grounds of rail’s 
contribution to the reduction in road congestion. The subsidy was transparent. Modelling 
suggests that this subsidy per passenger could be halved if further investment, including 
electrification, adds to service quality and attracts more passengers. 
 
The process of privatisation in the New Zealand rail system in 1993 also had a significant 
effect on volumes and user satisfaction. Between 1994 and 1997 prices fell 7% per annum in 
the bulk goods sector and by more than 4% per annum for export goods. Significant 
improvements were found in customer satisfaction surveys, with recommendation rates 
improving from just over 30% to nearly 80%. Issues remained however in relation to 
investment in the rail track. 
 
In Chile fares were 40% lower after the government-owned rail corporation divested its 
southern operations. The track remained in the hands of the state organisation which provided 
maintenance and facilities.  
 
Road transport 
 
Regulation of passenger and freight transport by road must juggle conflicting demands of 
avoiding congestion, bringing home to users the costs of road use and damage created, 
funding investment in the network, meeting safety targets and providing access to services. 
The package of regulations that is created, however, may induce a market response that in 
turn illustrates the opportunities available from better policy.  
 
In Bangkok an opportunity was created for new entrants offering a differentiated passenger 
transport service at unregulated prices. When they began in the mid 1980s, these new 
services, or ‘vans’, were illegal, but later many were licensed. The vans were smaller than 
buses and charged higher prices but offered shorter and faster routes with guaranteed seats. 
Although passengers were required to go to terminals rather than usual bus stops, by 2008 
there were more than 6500 vans operating in Bangkok. They provided consumers with more 
variety and wider access to services. 
 
Freight rates fell by 20–30% when quotas on cross-border freight licences were removed 
between Thailand and Laos in 2004.  
 
For international road freight, as for trade more generally as tariffs are lowered, greater 
importance now attaches to infrastructure and other regulatory constraints, such as 
arrangements for customs clearance.  
 
Maritime transport 
 
Shipping services markets are now regarded as largely competitive, but residual regulation of 
maritime services remains in some economies. The emerging issue is access to port services – 
in particular, access to ancillary services required to berth, load and unload. 
 
Another common restriction in maritime services is that on cabotage rights. The Australian 
approach has been not to remove the regulation. Rather, the manner of its implementation has 
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been changed and greater flexibility is obtained through a permit system. Technological 
improvements and rationalisation of staffing scales resulted in a downward trend in real 
interstate non-bulk freight rates from the early 1980s. Regulatory changes sustained this 
trend. Rates were 40% lower in 2005 compared to the start of the 1990s. The Australian 
coastal fleet capacity was 60% lower in 2007 compared to 1999 but productivity more than 
doubled as a result of a rise in capacity utilisation. 
 
New econometric work undertaken in this study finds that a movement from the current 
policy regime to full liberalisation for all APEC economies would on average reduce 
maritime freight rates by about 20%. This saves real resources and provides benefits to 
shippers and their customers. 
 
Electricity 
 
Regulatory reform in OECD economies has contributed to lower industrial electricity prices. 
Competitive wholesale markets and retail competition also reduced prices significantly in the 
United States of America: retail competition reduced prices by 5–10% for residential 
customers and by 5% for industrial customers. 
 
Given the complexities involved, structural reforms that have taken place since 2004 in the 
energy sector in APEC economies have mostly been incremental – there have been few ‘big 
bang’ initiatives.  
 
Russia is an exception. The extent of reform of the Russian electricity sector is remarkable. 
There has been a complete transformation of the system to separation and a wholesale 
market. The Californian experience of reform, where blackouts followed measures to 
increase competition, has not been a deterrent in Russia, where the reforms have been 
designed with lessons learned from earlier international experience. 
 
The first stage of electricity reforms in Korea included the separation of generators from the 
distribution company. Utilisation of capacity increased: planned outages of 25 days across 
109 units of generators in 2000 dropped after restructuring to about 19 days across 117 units 
in 2003. Productivity also increased through a substantial rise in the capacity utilisation rate 
of coal-fired plants – from 75% in 1999 to 89% in 2003. 
 
Econometric analysis in this report shows that further structural reforms in APEC electricity 
markets would reduce prices and increase efficiency. In electricity markets:  
• the introduction of competition through a third party access regime would be associated 
with electricity prices being almost 5% lower than otherwise, on an indicative basis and 
holding all other factors constant;  
• the introduction of a wholesale electricity market would be associated with electricity 
prices being about 7% lower; and 
• unbundling of generation from transmission would be associated with a fall in electricity 
prices by more than 11%. 
 
This study estimates that the combined effect of all three of these initiatives would be 
electricity prices that are 23% lower than otherwise. 
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Gas 
 
In general, reforms in natural gas have been less extensive than in electricity. In part, this is 
because the scope for competition in natural gas production depends on the range of sources 
of supply. A remarkable development in China began in 2005 with reform to the system for 
pricing gas. Gas prices had been based on a cost-plus formula, but from 2005 they were 
‘hooked’ to the prices of other sources of energy. This began to correct the problem of 
pricing gas too low, which in 2009 had led to gas shortages.  
 
Econometric analysis in this report identifies the effects that further structural reforms in 
APEC gas markets would have on prices and efficiency. The introduction of retail 
competition would be associated with gas prices being about 15% lower than otherwise, all 
other things being constant. The unbundling of gas production/import from distribution 
would lower gas prices by more than 23%.  
 
Telecommunications 
 
Telecommunications reform, which embraces information and communications technology 
as well as traditional telephony, leads to productivity improvements. A contributor is the 
greater use of the Internet for business transactions. Productivity improvements reduce costs 
in supply chains and enable goods to move to market more quickly and more cheaply. 
 
As of 2009 the majority of APEC economies have adopted full market entry liberalisation. 
However, a common practice is to limit foreign investment from gaining dominant positions 
in fixed-line operators. This is a major issue in current telecommunications regulatory 
settings. As of 2009 all APEC economies have liberalised their mobile telecommunications 
sectors. In most economies new licences are granted based on market-oriented approaches 
unless limited by the availability of spectrum. APEC members have undertaken – as required 
by their respective General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) treaty commitments – to 
allocate spectrum in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory manner. 
 
A liberalisation program began in Chinese Taipei in 1997, first in mobile then in fixed-line 
services. The subsequent change in performance has been remarkable in comparison with its 
APEC peers. Fixed-line penetration in Chinese Taipei exceeded that of Australia and Japan in 
1998 and of the USA in 2003: it peaked at 65% in 2005. It has since been falling, as in many 
economies. Mobile penetration in Chinese Taipei exceeds 100%. Broadband penetration is at 
the same level as these comparator economies.  
 
Fixed-line development in Viet Nam is outstanding when compared with other APEC 
economies with similar levels of economic/telecommunications development. Prior to 2003 
Viet Nam had a similar level of fixed-line penetration as Indonesia and the Philippines of 
around 5%. Yet starting from 2003, access jumped. In fixed-line availability, Viet Nam is 
now at 35% and mobile penetration is at 80%. Monthly subscription charges for mobile 
services had fallen to zero by 2004, compared to $US17 in 1999. Structural reform efforts 
contributed to this outcome, including the establishment of the universal service fund.  
 
The introduction of competition into the mobile sector in PNG has led to universal coverage, 
following a rise of 700% in the number of mobile subscribers since mid 2007. Charges have 
fallen by 11% in the peak times for domestic calls and 51% in off-peak periods. In an 
economy like PNG with such a difficult terrain, the benefits cannot be underestimated. Social 
interaction, such as the rate of response to medical emergencies, is better, mobile banking 
initiatives are underway and market pricing information is more readily available. 
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THE NEXT STEPS AND THEIR EFFECTS 
 
What are ‘the next steps’ to achieve greater benefits still? A common theme for all sectors is 
the introduction of more competition: 
• air transport – through a range of reforms to air services agreements, to entry conditions 
for domestic and foreign carriers, and ownership; 
• maritime transport – by the dismantling of remaining entry restrictions, quotas or cargo 
sharing arrangements and the granting of domestic-vessel treatment to foreign-owned 
carriers located domestically; 
• rail transport – through free entry in freight operations in those economies that do not have 
them; 
• electricity and gas – by providing third party access, unbundling, wholesale prices set 
through market arrangements and/or retail competition in economies that have not 
implemented them; and 
• telecommunications – through the removal of remaining foreign equity limits. 
 
A package of reforms based on the measures outlined above would have a significant effect. 
Across the whole APEC region, USD175 billion a year in additional real income (in 2004 
dollars) could be generated relative to what would have accrued had these reforms not 
occurred. This is a snapshot of the gains projected after a 10-year adjustment period. 
 
The reforms can be translated into productivity effects, and the estimated first round impacts 
of these reforms suggest that they could lead to weighted average productivity improvements 
in the range of 2–14% across the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors. The 
largest productivity gains (above 10%) would occur in Indonesia; Malaysia; Mexico; the 
Philippines; Chinese Taipei; and Viet Nam. 
 
There is no compelling reason for an APEC economy to wait for others to start. In all 
economies an overwhelming proportion of these gains come from reforms domestically, 
rather than reforms in other economies. Of course, the gains from joint reforms are also 
considerable. 
 
APEC-wide, the projected gains from these structural reforms are almost twice as big as the 
gains from further liberalisation of merchandise trade. Yet the sectors where the structural 
reforms occur are less than a quarter of the size of those engaged in merchandise trade. When 
structural reforms lead to lower real production costs, even by half as much as is estimated 
here, they create a return to reform effort that is much greater than that from trade reforms.  
 
These findings, therefore, vindicate APEC Leaders’ decision to move beyond a ‘border’ 
focused trade reform agenda to one that focuses on ‘behind the border’ issues. Yet along with 
generating significant gains, structural reforms often require significant structural 
adjustments. These must be managed carefully and sensitively and often take a considerable 
transition period when implementing policy measures. 
 
The essence of a productivity improvement is that an industry can produce more with less. To 
ensure that efficiency gains are passed on to consumers, competition is required. Competition 
also allows dynamic gains to be achieved as new ways of doing things are found and best 
practice is transmitted more widely across market players. 
 
Employment effects of greater efficiency are always a concern to policy makers. Modelling 
work for this study indicates that sectors which show relatively high reductions in 
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employment do so not as a result of their own productivity improvements but because the 
domestic industries that use their services lose their position as other economies reform. In 
the extreme cases, modelling indicates relative losses in unskilled employment in a particular 
sector after 10 years can accumulate to upwards of 30%. But this modelling result needs to be 
kept in perspective. Employment changes occur over time and can be addressed through 
targeted structural assistance measures. Secondly, as long as an economy grows overall 
employment will increase, so the modelling shows that structural reforms may require 
significant relative shifts of labour across sectors over time. Thirdly, the model projects the 
generation of higher real wages for all workers in all economies. Modelling and real world 
examples demonstrate that displaced workers earn higher real wages in their new 
occupations. 
 
To reiterate, employment opportunities overall depend on the growth of an economy. Thus, 
one of the best ways that APEC economies can guard against any adverse employment 
effects of structural reform is to maintain healthy underlying rates of economic growth. 
Structural reform itself makes a contribution to this goal, since it adds to productivity, 
stimulates activity and increases the resilience of the economy, but prudent macroeconomic 
management is also crucial. 
 
A STRONGER AGENDA FOR APEC 
 
This research shows the value of the APEC Leaders’ adoption of an agenda to implement 
structural reform. It also reveals the importance of structural reform as providing strong 
bridges behind the border to capture the full benefits of improving regional economic 
integration. This study has found that: 
• structural reform is challenging because it takes time amid the economic and political 
complexities in all economies; 
• structural reform can create winners and losers but yields more inclusive development 
when it is carried out dynamically, with transitional measures and with other economic 
reforms; and 
• structural reform is worth undertaking and provides potentially greater gains than trade 
liberalisation and generates economic sustainability. 
 
These results suggest the scope to build an even stronger APEC agenda and work program. 
Structural reform is a vital process to achieve growth and to provide greater flexibility and 
resilience with which to deal with and withstand shocks, both domestic and external. 
However, it requires changes in economic structures, innovation and the adoption of new 
technologies and market responses to shape effective regulation as well as transform APEC 
economies and their current regulatory systems.  
 
Steady adaptation is required, not least because expectations will rise as development 
proceeds. Pressure from the rest of the world, both competition from other economies and 
new commitments for cooperation, creates further forces for change. APEC economies are at 
various stages of reform, and their experiences to date are valuable to other APEC members. 
The sharing of this experience remains a priority, not just to learn about what is possible but 
also about the strategies for implementation. This will enable economies to examine 
measures and strategies and then shape and adapt them to their own situation. 
 
To be effective, structural reform must be adopted for a purpose and specific outcomes 
should be the goal. Otherwise it is impossible to specify a method and explain its rationale in 
an often complex and sensitive environment. Another requirement to assess the impact of 
Executive summary xxv 
implemented policy measures is the design and implementation of reporting systems and 
monitoring arrangements for the progress of reform. The impacts of reform and their 
economy-wide effects are worthy of regular attention. Evidence of gaps between good 
practice, allowing for the varying stages of development, and the costs of those gaps are 
drivers of reform. But in the end what matters is the outcome. 
 
A reform program focused on structural reform will create new sources of growth. This 
growth will be driven by productivity. Often these new sources of growth are unable to be 
identified or forecast because it is the dynamics of competition, the near limitless imagination 
of enterprise and the innovative use of changing technology that gives rise to new beginnings. 
Reform at the border remains significant for the efficiency and growth of member economies 
but the empirical work here demonstrates the significance of the productivity effects of even 
a modest set of ‘next steps’, all primarily focused on the introduction of competition.  
 
Another consequence of reform will be economic resilience. More efficient market 
operations, macroeconomic stability and higher productivity all follow from structural reform 
and will contribute to higher standards of living. The concern with resilience and 
macroeconomic stability is even more relevant in the context of responding to the recent 
global financial crisis.  
 
Programs of structural reform in each economy, designed and implemented to suit the 
situation in that economy but which take into account lessons learned from other members to 
achieve clearly defined outcomes, can deliver new growth and economic resilience. Support 
in the APEC region through cooperation to learn these lessons and perhaps sequence reforms 
may also give rise to even more dynamic gains in APEC economies. 
 
 
  
Chapter 1 
 
THE IMPACTS AND BENEFITS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN 
THE TRANSPORT, ENERGY AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
SECTORS IN APEC ECONOMIES 
 
 
Christopher Findlay1
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
APEC Leaders committed to a program of work on structural reform in August 2004 when 
they endorsed a significant reform program in this area: the Leaders’ Agenda to Implement 
Structural Reform (LAISR). 
 
Structural reform in APEC, as defined by Leaders, relates to ‘institutional frameworks, 
regulations and government policy (designed) so that barriers to market-based incentives, 
competition, regional economic integration and improved economic performance are 
minimized’. The aim is to avoid ‘excessive regulation, poor economic legal infrastructure and 
governance arrangements (in both public and private sectors), unclear property rights and the 
lack of effective laws to foster competition’. 
 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate the benefits of structural reform and publicise a 
range of reforms in APEC economies. Strategies for success and bottlenecks to further 
progress are identified. It also develops a complementary program of work in APEC to 
support further reform. 
  
Structural reform matters across the whole economy, but the focus of this study is the 
transport, energy and telecommunications sectors. These are valuable choices, given the 
significant economy-wide impacts of reform on these sectors. The effects of the reforms in 
these sectors are identified and the extent of their effects estimated. This includes the benefits 
for both consumers and small and medium enterprises.  
  
The pace and success of reforms is expected to vary between economies and even between 
the three sectors within economies. It is useful to understand the reasons for the differences in 
degrees of success and degrees of impact on the key performance indicators. This 
understanding then helps define the ways in which APEC members may support each other in 
implementing and managing the reforms and improving their application in the three sectors. 
 
Officials in earlier work on these issues have stressed the political economy challenges to be 
overcome. There are losers from policy change who oppose and seek to prevent its 
implementation. Often they constitute advantaged parties who have a monopoly or an 
excessive market power position, which can detract from overall economic welfare. 
Therefore, assessments of the overall benefits and transparency of effects are important 
contributions to sustaining reform. 
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Against this background, this study reports a range of structural reforms in APEC and the 
impacts in terms of price, choice and quality for a range of stakeholders. The study is based 
on a series of steps – review, case studies, estimation and modelling. 
 
The first step was to review existing material on the foundations for structural reform, to 
identify the potential impacts and benefits of APEC’s structural reform agenda, to 
characterise different policy approaches and to discuss different measures of the contribution 
of structural reform to economic growth. 
 
The next step was the selection of sectors in APEC member economies for further study, 
based on evidence of actual reform in sectors of interest, along with geographical and 
developmental diversity. The work on the case studies (Box 1.1) was guided by 
questionnaires on structural reforms that have been developed from existing templates 
available in work carried out by the OECD (OECD 2005, Conway, Janod & Nicoletti 2005) 
and the Australian Productivity Commission (Findlay & Warren 2000, Doove et al. 2001). 
The questionnaires were designed to cover the scope of the structural reform agenda as 
specified in the Leaders’ Agenda, in particular regulation, competition policy and legal 
infrastructure. 
 
Box 1.1: Case studies. 
• Telecommunications in Viet Nam 
• Telecommunications in Chinese Taipei 
• Telecommunications in PNG 
• Gas in Thailand 
• Gas in China 
• Electricity in Russia 
• Electricity in Korea 
• Rail transport in Chile 
• Rail transport in New Zealand 
• Maritime transport in Australia 
• Maritime transport in the USA 
• Air transport in Korea and Northeast Asia 
• Road transport in Thailand 
• Logistics in Indonesia 
 
Initial impacts of the structural reforms on prices and productivity were also estimated. The 
use of econometric models for this purpose can correct for the influence of other changes that 
might have taken place at the same time as the structural reforms, and hence reduce the 
chance of incorrect attribution of impacts. Econometric models are already available for the 
air transport, maritime, electricity and telecommunications sectors (including Findlay & 
Warren 2000, Doove et al. 2001). New work was done here on air passenger traffic and 
freight, productivity in rail systems, cif/fob margins in international sea and air transport, 
penetration rates in telecommunications and prices and performance in electricity and gas. 
 
Use of a multi-country computable general equilibrium model to estimate the national and 
regional effects of sectoral productivity and price changes arising from structural reform 
initiatives is also an important step. This model was used to provide projected impacts on 
macroeconomic aggregates such as GDP and national income, as well as the projected 
patterns of sectoral adjustment. Importantly, this sectoral examination provides empirical 
evidence of sectors likely to expand, sectors of increased activity, business opportunities and 
employment as a result of structural reform.  
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The case for structural reform is outlined in section 1.2. Following that is a discussion of key 
issues that confront policy makers working on the infrastructure sectors followed by a review 
of the main results for the sectors targeted in this report. General messages for managing 
structural reform programs are outlined and the results of the modelling of the cross-sectoral 
effects are presented. The report concludes with a discussion of some areas for stronger 
cooperation among APEC members. 
 
1.2 THE STRUCTURAL REFORM FRAMEWORK 2
 
 
Effective structural reform requires two things. 3
 
 The first is a commitment to the 
entrenchment of well functioning markets and to letting market competition determine 
economic outcomes in all circumstances where competition is appropriate. The second is 
good regulations (rules) to guide economic outcomes when competition is not effective.  
The choice of the rules will not be ‘black and white’ and will not involve the immediate 
adoption of something some may define as ‘global best practice’: it will depend on the 
circumstances of the economy involved. There will be a continuum of options and the 
important target will relate to the trajectory of the evolution of policy as development 
proceeds. The options will depend not only on domestic considerations but also on emerging 
ideas in the rest of the world, and in the context of events in the rest of the world. 
 
The forces of competition can exert powerful pressure on producers to find the least costly 
way of serving customer needs and to innovate, in order to better serve those needs. 
Individual producers can benefit from any cost savings they make in the form of higher 
profit, and consumers and downstream using industries can also benefit as competition from 
other producers squeezes those profits and drives prices down towards costs. This dynamic 
process leads to prices that reflect production costs, and to costs that are as low as possible. 
Both types of efficiency ensure the highest possible levels of income. Not only do falling 
costs and prices matter but so too do choice, variety and quality. Many consumers always 
look for new options and better delivery. 
 
Competition helps to maximise income levels, and in an administratively efficient way. 
Similar patterns of production and consumption could be achieved through a system of 
centralised decision-making. But the administrative requirements for such central planning 
are burdensome, and the information requirements for doing it successfully are prohibitive. 
By contrast, the market place achieves these outcomes as a result of the direct interaction 
between many producers and consumers. No bureaucrat needs to decide which individuals 
should run which companies producing which products at what price. For those economies 
where regulatory capacities are scarce, there can be significant benefits from letting the 
market place decide. 
 
But there are administrative or legislative requirements for market competition to succeed. 
Basic laws are needed to set the boundaries of that competition (e.g., corporation law is 
needed to allow for limited liability companies), thus limiting the downside risks to 
shareholders from poor corporate performance. Accounting standards, disclosure 
requirements and good systems of corporate governance are all needed so that equity holders 
and creditors can assess the economic performance of companies in a transparent way. 
                                       
2 Readers not interested in this overview of the reasoning that underlies structural reform might best go to 
section 1.3: Structural reform of infrastructure industries. 
3 This discussion and that in the next section are based on Dee 2009. 
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Bankruptcy laws are needed so as to limit the downside risks to outside creditors from poor 
corporate performance. But once these legal foundations are set, no case-by-case decisions 
are needed about which producers should survive and which should go out of business. 
 
Another benefit of competition and decentralised decision making is that it can make an 
economy more flexible and robust to external shocks. Producers used to out-guessing rivals 
on a daily basis will be better placed to react to adverse global market developments than 
producers who have no rivals, or are used to being told what to do by bureaucrats. 
Furthermore, producers with rivals will have a financial incentive to be better informed about 
likely global market developments than those rivals. In contrast, bureaucrats have no legal 
profit motive to collect such information. Finally, producers with rivals are likely to be the 
best placed to respond to adverse shocks, because competition is likely to have weeded out 
the poorer performers. Small economies in particular need to be relatively open to global 
markets, because they do not have the variety of resources to produce everything at home. 
Flexibility is the key to protecting themselves from the variability of global markets. And 
competition can enhance flexibility.  
 
Potential rivals are as important as actual ones. Even a monopoly supplier will be unable to 
inflate costs or profits on a sustained basis if this attracts the entry of a competitor who can 
produce at lower cost or with a smaller profit margin. So long as it is possible for a 
competitor to enter at any time with few irreversible costs, this will discipline an incumbent’s 
behaviour. So the number of actual competitors may be less important than the absence of 
barriers to entry and exit. Contestability, or the potential to compete, is the key to effective 
competition. 
 
In summary, effective structural reform means protecting competition, not protecting 
particular competitors. The difference is crucial. The benefits of competition will only 
emerge if firms and workers have the incentive to enter into or exit out of specific activities. 
Entry, exit or survival of any particular player should not be preserved by administrative 
means. There is a growing body of empirical literature that supports the idea that the entry 
and exit of firms is a key determinant of productivity in developing economies (Roberts & 
Tybout 1997). 
 
Foreign competition can play an important part. It can come from allowing cross-border trade 
to occur in an unimpeded fashion or it can come from allowing foreign direct investment, so 
that foreign suppliers set up a permanent local presence. The latter sort of competition can 
bring additional benefits, in the form of new capital, technologies and business processes. But 
any attempt to ‘manage’ the process by allowing only a specific number of foreign players, 
rather than allowing free entry and exit of foreign players, is an instance of protecting 
particular competitors rather than protecting competition. Further, creating managed 
competition risks handing over existing monopoly profits from domestic to a few foreign 
players, with little benefit to domestic consumers and users in the form of lower prices. It also 
creates a net loss to the economy as a whole. 
 
Competition from domestic new entrants is arguably even more important than foreign 
competition. A recent study examined the empirical evidence, from among a group of East 
Asian economies, of the relative importance of discriminatory barriers to foreign competition 
and non-discriminatory barriers to any new competition. The results were striking. The gains 
to the region from unilaterally reforming the non-discriminatory restrictions on competition 
in seven selected services sectors were almost six times those from forming an East Asian 
preferential trade area, and three times those from a successful Doha Round (Dee 2007). The 
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Asia-Pacific region need not fear that unleashing the forces of competition would see their 
economies overrun by foreign multinationals. The critical barriers to competition are often 
those protecting incumbents against domestic new entrants. 
 
Promoting competition is a much broader agenda than putting in place narrowly defined 
competition law. Anti-trust legislation is about ensuring that abuses of monopoly power by 
private players do not occur. Competition policy, broadly defined, is about removing the 
barriers to entry and exit so that positions of monopoly power do not persist. 
 
Structural reform is therefore about competition policy in its broadest possible sense. The 
policy agenda includes the six items in Box 1.2. 
 
Box 1.2: The six item structural reform agenda. 
1. Removing barriers to the entry of domestic new entrants, and allowing existing firms to exit the 
marketplace in an orderly fashion if the market dictates that they cannot survive. 
2. Removing barriers to foreign competition, be it from cross-border trade or from foreign direct investment, 
and not just for particular trading partners. 
3. Ensuring that the minimum regulation exists to guide economic outcomes in those circumstances where 
markets alone may not deliver the most efficient outcomes. 
4. Ensuring that the right institutions are in place to review and remove the unnecessary impediments to the 
functioning of markets. 
5. Ensuring that the right institutions are in place to design, implement, enforce and review the functioning of 
more appropriate regulation. 
6. Developing transparency of institutional processes, including public sector management, so as to better 
serve the public good. 
 
1.3 STRUCTURAL REFORM OF INFRASTRUCTURE INDUSTRIES 
 
A well-functioning and open infrastructure sector is an important determinant of economic 
growth and improving living standards. Infrastructure is a significant and qualitatively 
important determinant of transport costs and bilateral trade flows (Limao & Venables 2001). 
Improving destination infrastructure by factor of 16% reduces transport costs by an amount 
equivalent to a reduction of 6500 sea km or 1000km of overland travel. Openness in two key 
infrastructure services – telecommunications and finance – influences long run growth 
performance (Mattoo, Rathindran & Subramanian 2001). Economies with fully open 
telecommunications and financial services sectors grow up to 1.5 percentage points faster 
than other economies. Infrastructure affects three child-health outcomes related to the 
Millennium Development Goals – the infant mortality rate, the child mortality rate and the 
prevalence of malnutrition (Fay et al. 2003). Apart from the traditional determinants (income, 
assets, education and direct health interventions), better access to basic infrastructure services 
has an important role in improving health outcomes. But infrastructure industries include 
areas where competition may not lead to the most efficient economic outcomes. 
 
Some technologies in infrastructure industries have natural monopoly characteristics. This 
means that a single firm can produce all the output(s) that the market requires more cheaply 
than could two or more firms – so-called economies of scale. This poses the following policy 
dilemma: introducing competition by allowing more than one firm may lead to productive 
inefficiency, so that total costs per unit of service are not at their lowest, but in the absence of 
competition (actual or threatened), the incumbent firm has an incentive to exploit its 
monopoly position by restricting output and inflating prices above costs. 
 
Some infrastructure activities involve unpriced spillovers or externalities, so that market price 
signals do not convey the required information about the value of the activity to the economy 
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as a whole. For example, the pollution generated by transport or energy activities can create 
negative externalities, because the pollution is disposed of using a medium (the air) the use of 
which is unpriced. Also, traffic congestion can create negative externalities, because drivers 
fail to take into account their impact on other drivers. Where spillovers are unpriced, there 
may be a need for intervention; for example, to establish a form of pricing mechanism or 
incentive to encourage efficient behaviour. But this is not a case where efficiency is promoted 
by limiting competition.  
 
Even where market competition can deliver efficient outcomes, governments may have 
additional policy objectives besides economic efficiency. They often have equity objectives – 
either a concern for the overall distribution of income, or of particular services (such as 
telephone, Internet) or a concern for certain vulnerable groups. They may also have concerns 
about safety, diversity or any number of other objectives. They may also have concerns about 
adjustment costs associated with policy reform. 
 
The overriding principle of structural reform is to match the number of policy instruments to 
the number of economic objectives. Only then can more than one objective be achieved 
simultaneously. Partly as a corollary, successful structural reform requires that if there is a 
policy problem (either a current market failure or suboptimal regulation), the first-best policy 
response is to fix the problem directly, rather than redirecting a less suitable policy 
instrument towards that end. 
 
However, successful structural reform also requires policy coherence to ensure that: 
• different elements or levels of government are not pursuing mutually inconsistent 
objectives; 
• elements or levels of government each have control of, or access to, the policy 
instruments that best deal with the economic problems under their responsibility; 
• policy instruments designed to meet one problem do not unintentionally cut across the 
achievement of other objectives; and 
• each policy area has the appropriate enforcement strategies. 
 
These principles and requirements are specific to the infrastructure sector and to the services 
which that sector provides. They are also consistent with the principles of good public sector 
management, including: 
• rule of law; 
• transparency; 
• accountability – oversight and control; 
• performance management; 
• public sector ethics and probity – the culture and values; and 
• responsiveness to stakeholders. 
 
1.4 SECTORAL PROGRESS AND IMPACTS 
 
This section includes an outline of the progress of certain structural reforms across APEC 
economies, some assessment of business trends in APEC and a discussion of the challenges 
involved. Quantitative analysis of the impacts of these reforms undertaken for this study is 
reviewed and some aspects of the reforms are illustrated by material from the case studies. 
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1.4.1 Transport 
 
1.4.1.1 Air transport 
 
Air services have typically been heavily regulated. At the international level, a system of 
bilateral air services arrangements between the authorities of economies has regulated various 
aspects of aviation production and trade for more than 50 years. However, the political 
bilateral system has also created various limits on competition and trade in aviation services. 
The progress of APEC reform is summarised in Table 1.1. The items are rated from open to 
restrictive and a darker colour indicates a more restrictive regime (details are in Chapter 4). 
 
There are some features which are relatively open, including the use of Open Skies 
agreements and the presence of low cost carriers (LCCs). Some items are either ‘on’ or ‘off’ 
(e.g., the use of liberal cargo arrangements) and within others there is more variation (e.g., 
privatisation). Interestingly, there is more likely to be less restriction on foreign equity in 
domestic carriers (the ASA rules inhibit foreign investment in international airlines). 
 
Table 1.1: Structural reform in air transport. 
APEC member 
Privatisation of 
the national 
airline 
Foreign equity 
allow
ed in 
dom
estic airlines 
Presence of low
 
cost airline(s) 
Ease of entry of 
new
 operators 
U
se of m
ultiple 
designation of 
international 
carriers 
Extent of use of 
O
pen Skies 
agreem
ents 
U
se of 7
th 
freedom
 cargo 
rights 
Australia        
Brunei         
Canada        
Chile        
China         
Hong Kong, 
China 
       
Indonesia        
Japan         
Korea         
Malaysia        
Mexico        
New Zealand        
Peru        
Philippines        
Russia        
Singapore        
Chinese Taipei        
Thailand        
United States        
Viet Nam         
Source: Chapter 4 
 
Many economies in this sample are relatively liberal in their aviation sector, measured by our 
indicators. However, considerable variation remains. Structural reform has also extended to 
domestic factors, including as noted in the figure the extent of competition in domestic 
markets. In some economies, this is extended to the operation of airports (not included in the 
indicators in Table 1.1), so that restrictions on access to flight and gate slots at airports do not 
act as barriers to competition in air transport services.  
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Even though substantial regulation exists, many air transport markets show high levels of 
competitive behaviour, such as price and service competition. The regulatory system in that 
situation is not likely to be imposing a wedge that lifts prices for consumers. 
 
There is competition, for example, not only between the bilaterally designated operators but 
also between routes, and the latter becomes more intense as traffic density rises. Also some 
regions like the European Union (EU) and, more recently, the combination of the USA and 
the EU are moving to integrate markets. Their airlines face a wider set of competitors but also 
benefit from the wider access and the network flexibilities those integrated markets provide. 
The efficiencies these carriers gain may spill over as greater competitiveness in other markets 
in which they operate, or may be expected to enter. This leads to further pressure for reform, 
as is happening in Northeast Asia (Box 1.3). 
 
Box 1.3: Air transport market integration in Northeast Asia. 
Korea has signed a series of Open Skies agreements. Of particular interest is an agreement with China that 
opened routes to Shandong. Traffic grew much faster on those routes compared to other routes between Korea 
and China (by a factor of 2) and fares fell by an average of more than 8%. This experience and the potential 
for growth in traffic between Korea, China and Japan, for both passengers and freight, have led to further 
discussion about a common approach to Open Skies. The idea is to build an integrated Northeast Asian market 
for air transport. There is further urgency for this effort as carriers there expect a ‘competition spillover’ from 
the efficiency-enhancing effects of the open arrangements between the USA and the EU. 
Source: Chapter 9 
 
Some airlines themselves are now arguing for regulatory reform. Their international 
representative body (the International Air Transport Association) uses the term ‘pillars of 
stagnation’ when talking about the regulatory system (along with its ownership rules, which 
are used to establish eligibility for access to markets, and the concern of competition 
authorities about the anti-competitive effects of mergers) (Findlay & Round 2006).  
 
A further source of competition for established carriers is the new business model – that of 
the LCCs. Box 1.4 illustrates its impact in Korea. 
 
Box 1.4: Low cost carriers in Korea. 
The low cost carriers (LCCs) began to enter domestic routes in Korea in 2006 in response to the growth of 
domestic tourism in 2005 and a change in regulation. The full service carriers faced competition from high-
speed trains which began in 2004 and the use of the LCC model was a competitive response. Another driver 
was the interest of regional governments willing to invest and to develop their local airports. Six were set up 
and four remain in operation (and there are recent reports that one may resume this year). Most charge fares of 
up to 30% lower than the full service operator or the fare prior to their entry. Two of the airlines are 
subsidiaries of the established carriers and two are not. The LCC share is now 25% of the domestic market, 
with Korean Air having 48% and Asiana Airlines 27%. The LCC share is close to 30% on some routes, such 
as Gimpo-Jeju. Clearly the established full service carriers see the LCCs as a threat. Recently the Korean 
competition authority, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) ruled as anti-competitive some practices of 
the full service carriers, including offering loyalty rebates to travel agents. The KFCT also warned against Full 
Service Carriers (FSCs) asking agents to restrain sales of tickets on LCCs by threatening access to fewer seats 
on FSCs at peak times or on certain routes. The Korean experience of the impact of LCCs on domestic routes 
is also evident in other APEC economies. 
Source: Chapter 9 
 
Econometric analysis of the impact of reform on passenger traffic and transport margins finds 
that further reform in APEC would have a significant effect. Reductions in the degrees of 
restrictiveness led to significant increases in passenger traffic and cargo growth (Chapter 4) 
and to a reduction in air freight rates (Chapter 3): a conversion to full openness according to 
the set of indicators in Table 1.1 would lead to average reduction in those rates for APEC 
economies by 15%. 
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Other studies, reviewed in Chapter 2, have also quantified the cost of some of the more 
restrictive provisions of these agreements, including provisions that designate only one airline 
from each economy on a particular route, and provisions that restrict capacity and airfare 
competition: an increase in the degree of liberalisation from that in the bottom quarter of 
economies (as measured by indicators of reform) to the top quarter would increase traffic 
volumes between economies linked by direct air services by about 30%. Other work has 
found that an improvement in airport infrastructure by the same extent reduces air transport 
costs by 15% while a similar improvement in the quality of regulation reduces air transport 
costs by 14%. Open Skies agreements further reduce air transport costs by 8%. 
 
1.4.1.2 Rail transport 
 
Rail services consist of the construction, ownership and maintenance of railway track, the 
purchase, ownership and maintenance of railway rolling stock (carriages etc.), and the 
operation of railway rolling stock along railway lines to provide passenger and freight 
transportation services. As with many other forms of physical infrastructure, the track 
displays the characteristics of a natural monopoly up to the point at which is becomes 
congested. So, prior to the point of congestion, the aim of economic regulation should be to 
ensure its capacity is utilised effectively – a problem of static efficiency. Beyond the point of 
congestion, the aim of economic regulation should be to ensure an efficient level of 
investment in new track infrastructure – a problem of dynamic efficiency. 
 
One way to ensure the efficient use of rail track infrastructure is to encourage competition in 
the provision of ‘above-the-rail’ rail passenger and freight services. However, historically, 
rail services in many economies have been provided by a single, integrated, often 
government-owned monopoly. Thus structural reform of rail services has tended to proceed 
by encouraging private sector participation in the provision of rail services, while making use 
of the existing track infrastructure, through contractual arrangements. Sometimes reform has 
also involved the privatisation of the incumbent service provider and/or the structural 
separation of the ownership and maintenance of track infrastructure from the provision of rail 
transport services. The rationale for structural separation is to reduce conflicts of interest – 
otherwise the owner of the track infrastructure would have an incentive to use its control of 
that infrastructure to thwart competitors. 
 
APEC members differ significantly in the importance of freight and passenger volumes on their 
rail networks. Separation between track ownership and operations is increasingly common, 
with the specification of associated access regimes. These are summarised in Table 1.2. 
 
The regimes in different economies are described in terms of whether they separate track and 
service operators (separation in the vertical dimension) and their treatment, whether there is 
tendering in passenger markets and whether freight operators can enter the tracks of other 
operators. 
 
Rail in New Zealand, one of the case studies, provides an interesting example. The railways 
were run by a government department until 1982 when they were converted to a corporate 
management system, although retained in government ownership, and required to make a 
profit. In 1990 work began to prepare the ‘core rail operations’ for privatisation, which then 
occurred in 1993. The business changed to another private owner in 2004, with the 
understanding it would sell the track to the government for NZD1, which would then reinvest 
in the infrastructure but with the private firm maintaining operations. However, both track 
and operations returned to government ownership in 2008. Regulation therefore moved in a 
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Table 1.2: Main features of the APEC members’ rail networks. 
APEC 
member 
Vertical dimension Horizontal dimension 
Integrated 
monopoly 
Competitive 
access 
Vertical 
unbundling 
Franchising 
system 
Entry new 
operators 
Australia      
Canada      
Chile      
China      
Indonesia      
Japan      
Korea      
Malaysia      
Mexico      
Peru      
Philippines      
Russia   1 2 1 
Chinese Taipei       
Thailand       
USA      
Viet Nam      
1 Implemented in 2003; 2 Implemented in 2006 
Source: Chapter 5 
 
full cycle. Control of fares, without subsidies and restrictions on exit, is not consistent with a 
sustainable role for private operators, especially in a situation where the features of the 
transport to be provided may not suit the use of rail. However privatisation was associated 
with some improvements in performance (Box 1.5) and the introduction of tendering for rail 
services in Auckland was associated with higher patronage and improved service quality 
(Box 1.6). 
 
Box 1.5: Effects of rail privatisation in New Zealand. 
The process of privatisation in the NZ rail system did have a significant effect on performance. Marketing 
research led to an improved understanding of customer needs. Volumes for the bulk goods segment increased 
by 5.5% p.a. over 1994–97 in response to price falls of 7% p.a. In the export goods segment volumes grew at 
12% p.a. in response to price falls of 4.4% p.a. Significant improvements were found in customer satisfaction 
surveys conducted in 2000 and 2003, with positive responses to the question ‘Would you recommend (the 
operator) to another potential customer?’ improving from just over 30% to nearly 80%. The operator 
improved productivity and returned the first operating profits for rail in many years. Costs were reduced, 
including by cutting uneconomic services. Freight volumes grew, peaking in 2000 and rail’s share of the land 
freight market peaked at 29% in 1998. However, over this period profits were not covering the cost of capital 
and debt was increasing, while track maintenance was falling. The constraints were the combination of the 
underlying economics of rail and the constraints on operations imposed by the government. This led 
eventually to the return of the track to the government. 
Source: Chapter 10 
 
Box 1.6: City rail in Auckland, New Zealand. 
In 2002 tenders were called for the operation of the Auckland urban rail system. The government retained 
ownership of the track and provided subsidies for fares (which were NZD7-8 per trip). However, the winning 
tenderer also improved service quality with more services, higher frequencies, greater punctuality and better 
trains. Services increased from 635 per week in 2005 to 1475 in 2009. In March 2005 only 77% of trains 
arrived on time and this figure was over 85% for most of 2009. Over 5 years 21 of the 41 stations on the 
network were upgraded. Patronage doubled between 2005 and 2010. The fare subsidies (in part offsetting, it 
was argued, the lack of congestion pricing for roads) were able to be combined with better performance. Now 
being planned is how to electrify the track. This is expected to increase patronage and lower the subsidy per 
passenger. 
Source: Chapter 10 
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The decision to vertically separate network businesses is not straightforward, since it can lead 
to the loss of the advantages of economies of joint management. Integrated rail operators 
make better choices about investments in tracks compared to those in operations. They are 
more aware of the trade-offs involved. The advantage of separation is that it changes the 
incentives of the track operator to favour volumes of traffic. There is no incentive to hold 
back competitors. If separation is not undertaken, then some mechanism to avoid the bad 
effects of that decision on competition has to be identified, contracts for access to track by 
competitors for example. 
 
Work reviewed in Chapter 2 on the European rail system found that combining vertical 
separation and horizontal competition provides significant benefit and that efficiency and 
productivity levels in economies that only introduced vertical separation are similar to those 
in economies that did nothing. Free entry of new operators is critical for better performance. 
In this respect, the experience of reform in southern Chile is reported in Box 1.7. 
 
Box 1.7: Rail freight in southern Chile. 
The government-owned rail corporation in Chile sold its southern operations to the private sector. Later a 
second private operator entered the market, prompted by a change in sanitary and environmental regulations 
that prohibited truck transport of sulphuric acid through urban areas, thus leading a major mining operation to 
transfer the service to the private railway. These carriers had non-exclusive 20-year contracts or ‘concessions’ 
that allow free entry of carriers to facilities and require the payment of fixed and variable tariffs for the use of 
the infrastructure. The track remained in the hands of the state organisation, which was required to provide 
maintenance and facilities. Tariffs after concessioning were around 40% lower than those prevailing before 
privatisation, indicating a substantial benefit to consumers. Both private carriers operated by exploiting 
market niches rather than providing a full range of services to the general public. They concentrated their 
business on the transport of bulk commodities in large volumes (paper pulp, iron ore etc.) and not in general 
freight, where competition from trucks was intense. Although traffic volumes did not increase in the initial 
years after privatisation, revenue and traffic per worker increased markedly. The slow beginning was the 
result of numerous issues relating to labour and line rehabilitation. After a decade of operations traffic and 
revenue per worker expanded markedly. Determining the fixed and variable fees for track use has been 
controversial. The track operator has noted that trucks are not charged the marginal social cost of their use of 
roads, labelling this unfair competition.  
Source: Chapter 11 
 
The work relating to the European rail system has been extended in this study to a limited 
group of APEC members and it was found that, on average, the productivity, efficiency and 
technical changes are slightly lower for APEC rail systems (Chapter 5). In particular, the 
average rate of productivity change for APEC rail systems rose by 3.5% per year, while for 
non-APEC economies productivity rose by 4.8%. Russia; Viet Nam; and China show the 
highest rates, while Chinese Taipei and Korea have the lowest. However, China; Japan; and 
the USA are efficient during the whole period. In any case, we observe again that, on average 
and excepting Viet Nam, APEC rail systems did not improve the efficiency scores while non-
APEC economies improved the efficiency scores by 1.4% per year. Finally, APEC 
economies improved, on average, their rate of technical change by 3.2%, while non-APEC 
economies improved by 3.7%. 
 
1.4.1.3 Road transport 
 
Studies of the economic characteristics of road transport suggest that there is little need for 
intervention by government to ensure efficient allocation of resources, except to ensure that 
there is competition and that safety, environmental and other externality considerations are 
taken fully into account. In particular, there is little evidence of economies of scale in either 
trucking or bus operations. 
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Nevertheless, the damage that vehicles do to roads rises dramatically with increasing axle 
weight.4
 
 A key rationale for regulating road freight and passenger services is therefore to 
limit road damage, to provide a mechanism for recovering the maintenance costs of the 
damage that is done and sometimes (as in the case of toll roads) to recover construction costs. 
Another rationale is to deal with road congestion. 
In some economies, licensing requirements, price controls and other regulatory restrictions 
can extend beyond those required for legitimate purposes, and can be used to restrict entry 
into and limit competition within the industry, to the benefit of existing road service 
providers. Sometimes such entry barriers and price restrictions are imposed and/or enforced 
by professional bodies or representatives of trade and commercial interests, rather than by 
governments. In these cases, structural reform can follow naturally from systematic reviews 
of anti-competitive regulation. 
 
In other economies, overly restrictive road transport regulations may arise from the desire to 
give protection to railways and/or bus operators. It may be possible to phase out such road 
transport regulations following structural reforms in rail that improve the productivity of the 
rail transport sector. 
  
Another source of inefficiency in some economies is the over-exploitation of road transport 
as a source of revenue (through licence fees, charges for trip permits etc.) for regional and 
local levels of government, in the absence of more efficient revenue sources, as well as road 
transport being a source of informal payments to police and other agents. Thus reform of road 
regulation may be contingent on better systems of public sector management as well as 
broader anti-corruption strategies.5
 
 
A further issue is price control, with caps on fares designed to achieve higher levels of access 
for poorer households or those living further from city centres. However, these controls can 
lead to market responses. The case of passenger vans in Bangkok is reviewed in Box 1.8. 
 
Box 1.8: Passenger vans in Bangkok. 
The bus service in Thailand had a feature that is familiar in regimes with fare control – demand exceeded 
supply. This created the opportunity for new entrants at unregulated prices. These new services, or ‘vans’, 
were strictly illegal at first in the mid 1980s, but later were licensed. The vans charged higher prices but 
offered shorter faster routes with guaranteed seats, although they were also smaller vehicles than buses, and 
required passengers to go to terminals. The vans competed with buses and were eventually brought within a 
licensing system with a cap on the number of licenses available (although many continue to operate outside 
that system). However, the initial stage of their development could be regarded as an experiment with 
deregulation. The dynamic force that was created which led eventually to re-regulation is not surprising. 
When the vans were licensed, the fees charged for access to the terminals and for their use were also increased 
by the investors in those facilities, attempting to capture some of the profits that re-regulation made possible. 
Source: Chapter 12 
 
There are in addition continuing concerns about the lack of pricing for congestion in Thailand 
and also in the freight sector for the costs of road usage by heavy trucks. The entry of the 
vans described in Box 1.8 added to road congestion in Bangkok, and while the vans are not 
supposed to stop at bus stops or elsewhere to pick up, they do so if the police fail to enforce 
                                       
4 Damage being related to axle loads and not total loads means that vehicle design and load limits are critical 
components to designing and maintaining roads. 
5 A good assessment of some of the more common problems with road transport regulation is available at 
www.worldbank.org/transport/roads/rdt_docs/annex2.pdf. 
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that requirement. This further slows down the traffic flow. While congestion pricing has an 
advantage of allocating available space in the road system more efficiently, there is a problem 
if the authority collecting the congestion pricing revenue is also the constructor of the road 
system. The incentives in that case are to under-invest in the road capacity and collect 
revenue from the congestion charges. 
 
APEC economies are similar in the application of road transport licensing systems, most of 
which are managed by governments and come with safety requirements. Lower levels of 
government also have regulations which might also affect operations (e.g., requirements for 
trip permits and rules on vehicle size), and which are often more burdensome than national 
government policy. 
 
Opportunities for cross border trade and the rules on foreign investment in local trucking 
companies are important issues. Policy may also differ between markets; for example, where 
a different policy is adopted on international routes compared to domestic routes. The 
experience of reform on routes between Thailand and Laos PDR is noted in Box 1.9. 
 
Box 1.9: Road freight to Laos PDR. 
Thailand has land connections with many neighbours but generally cross-border freight transport is not open 
to competition. An exception is transport to Laos PDR. Following the removal of quotas on cross-border 
licenses in 2004 freight rates fell by 20–30%. More important now are infrastructure constraints and other 
regulatory constraints, such as arrangements for customs clearance. There is a risk that the gains from 
deregulation, and also the construction of new infrastructure, will be captured and retained at other points in 
the overall transport and logistics system. 
Source: Chapter 12 
 
1.4.1.4 Maritime transport 
 
As in other network industries, key rationales for regulating maritime services are to minimise 
the damage from natural monopoly and to meet safety requirements. The port facilities in a 
particular location may have natural monopoly characteristics, depending on the scale of the 
port facilities relative to traffic. However, it may be possible to encourage competition between 
ports as well as to encourage competition for the right to operate existing port facilities. 
 
Because there are economies of scale from coordinating international ship movements (e.g., 
to avoid the movement of empty ships on one direction, even if maritime trade between two 
economies in unbalanced in volume terms), a variety of arrangements have also developed 
over time to facilitate such coordination. But as with bilateral air service agreements, many of 
the arrangements in maritime transport have been seen to unduly limit competition. Examples 
are various cargo sharing arrangements, which include bilateral agreements as well as the UN 
Liner Code. Another example is liner shipping conferences, which are private sector 
arrangements among major liner shipping companies, ostensibly to facilitate coordination but 
which have at times included restrictive agreements on both capacity and pricing. 
 
As with most collusive and cartel arrangements, both cargo sharing and conference 
arrangements are hard to sustain when competitive pressures encourage defection. 
Nevertheless, they have at times been costly to the economies imposing them. The general 
assessment is that the provision of maritime services is now competitive in international 
markets. The bottleneck in the provision of maritime services is then more likely to be 
associated with the provision of port services. 
 
Another arrangement common in maritime services is restrictions on cabotage rights. 
Cabotage is the transport of goods or passengers between two points in the same economy. 
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Many economies reserve such domestic shipping either for domestically owned ships or for 
ships that fly the APEC member’s flag. Such cabotage restrictions clearly reduce 
competition, although they have proved resistant to reform through WTO trade negotiating 
channels. They have nevertheless been shown to be costly, especially for developing 
economies, as in research reviewed in Chapter 2. This remains the major issue in APEC. 
 
In many economies, the provision of port services was reserved as a state-owned monopoly. 
Not only was there no competition in providing port services but many port services (e.g., 
pilotage, towing, tug assistance, use of navigational aids, use of berthing services, waste 
disposal, anchorage and casting off) were deemed to be mandatory, meaning that ships 
visiting a port had to pay for them whether they used them or not. Finally, some APEC 
economies have restrictive regulations governing access to ports (e.g., determining which 
ships and which cargoes can visit which ports). These arrangements too have proved to be 
costly. The case studies on Australia (Chapter 13) and the United States (Chapter 14) identify 
current issues in port reform in those economies (Boxes 1.10 and 1.11). 
 
Box 1.10: Cabotage in Australia. 
The Australian approach to cabotage has been not to remove the regulation but to change the manner of its 
implementation. The use of a permit system, introduced in the 1990s, has had two effects. At first, it sustained 
a downward trend in real interstate non-bulk freight rate which was already underway since the early 1980s 
due to technological factors and to rationalisation of manning scales introduced by the Australian government. 
The impact of the change in coastal shipping policy is clear from the mid 1990s, when the decrease of the 
freight rate for journeys between east and west Australia accelerated despite rising fuel prices. Rates were 
40% lower in 2005 compared to the start of the 1990s. A second effect was that the size of the Australian fleet 
decreased in deadweight tonnage (carrying capacity) by almost half between 1999 and 2007, with a much 
larger decrease in the coastal fleet. At the same time capacity utilisation increased and productivity more than 
doubled. 
Source: Chapter 13 
 
Box 1.11: Cabotage in the USA. 
Only vessels owned by a US corporation can carry freight on domestic routes – a company’s maximum 
foreign equity is 25%, 75% of its employees must be US citizens and cabotage is reserved for ships built in 
the US. Any domestic leg of an international journey is covered by these rules. Subsidies are also provided to 
US shipyards to make this policy feasible. However, the higher cost of domestic freight by this mode has led 
to a move to other transport modes and the volume of domestic freight by sea has fallen, as has the size of the 
USA fleet. The shipbuilding sector has also declined. Businesses which consign freight have been lobbying 
against the regulation but have not been effective compared to the concentrated influence of the remaining 
shipping companies (now a duopoly). The complexity of the policy package and the lack of transparency 
make its assessment more difficult. 
Source: Chapter 14 
 
APEC members’ policies are summarised in Table 1.3, where darker cells indicate a more 
restrictive arrangement. There has been little change in policy over the last decade, as 
generally, in the transport sectors, economies at later stages of development have more open 
regimes. Yet the story is mixed for maritime transport, with some high income economies 
having relatively closed regimes, including: 
• not applying competition policy to maritime transport; 
• the use of rules on nationality of staff and directors; and  
• restrictions on cargo allocations (for only a few economies). 
 
Lower income economies are more likely to have restrictions on foreign investment. New 
econometric work was undertaken for this study (see Chapter 3). It finds that a movement to 
full liberalisation in the dimensions shown in Table 1.3 for all APEC economies would on 
average reduce maritime freight rates by about 20%. 
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Table 1.3: Structural reform in maritime transport. 
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Australia 
        Canada 
        Chile 
        China 
        Hong Kong, China 
     
n.r. 
  Indonesia 
        Japan 
        Korea 
        Malaysia 
        Mexico 
        New Zealand 
        Peru 
        Philippines 
        Russia 
        Singapore 
     
n.r. 
  Chinese Taipei 
        Thailand 
        United States 
        Viet Nam 
        Source: Chapter 13 
 
1.4.2 Energy 
 
1.4.2.1 Electricity 
 
While electricity transmission (and perhaps retail distribution) may possess natural monopoly 
characteristics, industry performance can be enhanced by encouraging competition in 
electricity generation (and perhaps retail distribution). Recent technological advances, such as 
cogeneration (of electricity and usable heat) have changed the economics of generating 
electricity and created options for competitive supply. A regulatory regime that encourages 
competition in electricity generation would: 
• unbundle those activities that are considered to be competitive (generation and 
retailing) from those that are thought to be natural monopoly activities (transmission), 
so as to avoid conflicts of interest in promoting competition; 
• allow third party access by guaranteeing open and non-discriminatory access for all 
generators to the transmission grid (subject to available transmission capacity); and 
• introduce a wholesale pool, or spot market, for electricity (either mandatory or 
optional) to overcome limitations associated with the use of direct (bilateral) contracts 
between generators and retailers. 
 
These characteristics of regulatory reform contributed to lower industrial electricity prices in 
OECD economies, correcting for a number of economy-specific features, according to work 
reviewed in Chapter 6: competitive wholesale markets and retail competition reduced prices 
(relative to their absence) significantly in the USA, with retail competition reducing prices by 
5–10% for residential customers and 5% for industrial customers. 
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In a wholesale price pool there is the possibility of dominant generators using their market 
power to play a ‘game’ by manipulating the bidding system to deliver electricity at prices that 
are still above cost. Thus, while the United Kingdom established a wholesale electricity 
market in March 1990, the ‘gaming’ problem led to the pool’s being replaced by a system of 
bilateral contracts in March 2001. It was not clear that the alternative price setting mechanism 
would deliver lower prices than a wholesale pool, as the underlying problem was the same in 
both regimes – the market power of the generators. In any event, there are vertical economies 
between generation and retail. To the extent that vertical integration of these activities 
increases the proportion of wholesale transactions that are intra-firm transactions, it may 
mean that explicit wholesale markets will tend to be thin. For this reason, the use of a 
wholesale price pool rather than long term contracts may be contentious. 
 
Other, less controversial, aspects of a pro-competitive regulatory regime include: 
• allowing new generators to enter the market and new sources of supply generally, 
such as wind, solar and demand management mechanisms; 
• allowing customers (sometimes large customers such as retailers or large industrial 
users, sometimes all retail customers) to purchase electricity directly from the 
generator or retailer of their choice; and  
• introducing a regulator independent of industry players and day-to-day political 
influence. 
 
Previous research has confirmed the benefits of true retail competition, which includes both 
choice of generator and choice in billing and contract terms. However, retail competition is 
only likely to be as extensive as competition in generation, because vertical economies mean 
that non-integrated retail companies have little chance of success at any reasonable scale.  
Generally, the structural reforms that have taken place since 2004 in the energy sector in 
APEC economies have been incremental – there have been few big-bang initiatives. Korea 
made a start. But, for reasons discussed in Box 1.12, these stalled. However, according to 
some studies the partial reforms had some effect on productivity. Russia is another exception, 
where a successful reform program is reviewed in Box 1.13. 
 
Box 1.12: Electricity in Korea. 
Korean reforms in electricity established in 2000 led to the separation of the generators from the distribution 
company. Little progress has been made since then. The original company continued to own the generators, 
even though the next step in the reform had been their sale. The reforms stalled because of resistance, 
especially from labour unions, coinciding with a new government which was not committed to the original 
reform plan. The partial reforms may have created some efficiency gains, though researchers continue to 
debate their significance and there are conflicting conclusions. Some indicators show positive results. 
Reliability improved as planned outages, which required 25.0 days across 109 units of generators in 2000, 
dropped to 19.4 days across 117 units in 2003 after restructuring. The heat efficiency of the generation 
facilities and the maintenance of frequency and voltage seem to have also improved after restructuring. There 
was a substantial rise in the capacity utilisation rate of coal-fired plants and a subsequent reduction in 
generation cost after the divestiture. The utilisation rate surged from 74.8% in 1999 to 89.0% in 2003. The 
gains arise from improved management after the divestiture. A pattern of cross-subsidies (including from 
profits from constructing generation capacity) keeps industry-user prices low but this reduces incentives for 
those preferred in this way to support a resurgence of reforms. It may also not be sustainable with 
expectations of falling greenhouse gas emissions. 
Source: Chapter 15 
 
In electricity generation, the lack of ‘big bang’ initiatives is partly because introducing 
competition into generation and retail is a highly complex regulatory process. In electricity, the 
‘product’ is completely non-storable. New capacity needs to be brought on stream in a way that 
does not overload or risk system stability in the network, which would result in a reduction in 
quality of supply. The regulatory requirements for competitive new producers and/or 
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Box 1.13: Electricity in Russia. 
The extent of reform of the Russian electricity sector is remarkable. There has been a complete transformation 
of the system to separation and a wholesale market. The motivation was the urgency to mobilise investment in 
capacity. Demand for electric energy had been rising with an upturn in economic activity since 1999 but 
capacity was not expected to be sufficient. Reform was conceived around the idea of maintaining government 
regulation over the natural monopoly components of the sector, while introducing competition and private 
investment in the generating segment. The stated goals of the reform included: Increase in efficiency through 
restructuring and private ownership (2003–08); price deregulation according to a schedule and full 
competition in generation (by 2011); and competition by ensuring third party access to network infrastructure. 
The consequence was significant increases in capacity from 2008 onwards. Unfortunately, in part because of 
the effects of the global financial crisis, increases in capacity have not met expectations. But expansion is 
continuing. Price regulation remains to 2015 for retail consumers. With a rising share of sales procured in the 
wholesale market, the shortfall had to be made up and this was done via connection fees, which fell as the 
level of economic activity fell. The 2010 Russian budget commits to further electricity tariff increases to 
reduce the extent of the subsidies. The Californian experience of reform has not been a deterrent in Russia, 
where the reforms have been designed with its lessons in mind. 
Source: Chapter 16 
 
wholesalers to gain access to existing transmission and distribution networks need to be 
compatible with the technical requirements for the safety and physical integrity of the system. 
 
Table 1.4 identifies the member economies which have unbundled generation, provide third 
party access to the distribution system and operate a wholesale pool. 
 
Table 1.4: Summary of current regulation in APEC electricity markets, 2009. 
APEC member Unbundling generation Third party access Wholesale pool 
Australia    
Canada    
Chile    
China    
Hong Kong, China    
Indonesia    
Japan    
Republic of Korea    
Malaysia    
Mexico    
New Zealand    
Peru    
Philippines    
Russia    
Singapore    
Chinese Taipei    
Thailand    
United States    
Viet Nam    
      Source: Chapter 6 
 
Econometric analysis used in Chapter 6 identifies the effects that further structural reforms in 
APEC electricity and gas markets would have on prices and efficiency. In electricity markets:  
• the introduction of a third party access regime would be associated with about 4.7% 
lower electricity prices than otherwise, on an indicative basis and holding all other 
factors constant; 
• the introduction of a wholesale electricity market would be associated with about 
7.2% lower electricity prices; and 
• unbundling of generation from transmission would be associated with 11.1% lower 
electricity prices. 
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The combined effect of all three initiatives would be electricity prices estimated to be 23% 
lower than otherwise. 
 
The econometric results also suggest that wholly private ownership of electricity operators 
would be associated with prices that were 23.1% higher than if ownership were wholly public 
(with no other changes in policy). One reason is that, as studies have noted, private ownership 
can make it difficult to get reforms under way. Furthermore, and as might be expected, the 
positive relationship between price and private ownership is strongest when there is a 
monopoly provider – private sector monopolists might be more likely to pursue higher profits 
than government monopolists, and hence to raise electricity prices by exploiting their market 
power. This effect is unlikely to persist over time as reform efforts continue.  
 
1.4.2.2 Gas 
 
The rationale for structural reform in gas is similar to that for electricity. While high-pressure 
transmission pipelines and (perhaps) lower pressure distribution pipelines have natural 
monopoly characteristics, efficiency can be improved by promoting competition in the 
production and import of gas and in gas retailing, that is, competition for supply into the 
pipeline system and in the extraction from that system. An additional benefit of retail 
competition is that it allows retailers to offer bundles of services, such as combined electricity 
and gas services. 
 
Traditionally, natural gas markets were either local – the gas was used where it was produced 
– or bilateral – gas consumption and production occurred at either end of a gas pipeline. Now 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) technology has made it possible to ship gas from a single source 
to multiple markets. The international market for gas can thus be expected to become much 
more competitive over time, in the same way that oil markets have become ‘thick’, making it 
easier for importing economies to shop around. On the one hand, this can be expected to 
promote competitive importing. Arrangements for access to pipeline systems also allow LPG 
to be replaced by reticulated LNG. On the other hand, LNG terminals are themselves 
expensive and highly capital intensive, and may display natural monopoly characteristics, 
depending on their capacity relative to market size. Thus, in the future, competitive importing 
may require arrangements that allow users other than the owners to have access to LNG 
facilities as well as for pipelines. These are called third party regimes. 
 
In general, reforms in natural gas have been less extensive than in electricity. In part, this is 
because the scope for competition in natural gas production depends on the range of sources 
of supply. Indeed, many of those economies with extensive reserves had already undertaken 
significant reform prior to 2004. Boxes 1.14 and 1.15 review China’s progress towards price 
reform and the reform so far in Thailand; Table 1.5 contains a summary, and further economy 
detail is included in Chapter 6. 
 
Box 1.14: Gas in China. 
A remarkable development in China was the reform which began in 2005 to the system for pricing gas. 
Previously gas prices were based on a cost-plus formula. From 2005 they were ‘hooked’ to the prices of other 
sources of energy, although the application of this formula varied according to the gas field. City gas prices 
then varied because of the different sources of gas and the distance to gas fields. The hooking mechanism did 
begin to correct a problem of pricing gas too low which in some cities led to gas shortages in 2009. However 
gas prices remain low relative to world levels. Growing demand, environmental pressures and rising world or 
LNG prices are not likely to permit this situation to continue and further pressure for price rises is expected. 
The mechanism for arranging those changes has been established. 
Source: Chapter 17 
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Box 1.15: Gas in Thailand. 
A gas market reform plan was developed in the late 1990s which would have separated the gas transmission 
pipeline from the retail trading operations and from production. However, when implemented, following a 
change of government, the main change was the privatisation of the gas company. There was no separation, 
nor was an independent regulator established as had been planned. The goal had become the mobilisation of 
funds to invest in the network. In this the change was remarkably successful, and offshore gas fields were 
connected. A side effect was that domestic capacity increased so quickly that imports fell. There were no 
evident efficiency gains, prices remained controlled and questions remain about the quality of gas relative to 
global benchmarks. Prices remained relatively low, despite the lack of competition in the market. But this was 
due to access to low cost gas from domestic sources and government subsidies. As growth continues and local 
sources are used up, this situation is not likely to continue. 
Source: Chapter 18 
 
Table 1.5: Summary of current regulation in APEC gas markets, 2009. 
APEC member Unbundling transmission Third party access Retail competition 
Australia Yes Yes Yes 
Canada Yes Yes Yes 
Chile Yes   
China   Yes 
Hong Kong, China    
Indonesia Yes Yes  
Japan  Yes Yes 
Republic of Korea    
Malaysia    
Mexico  Yes Yes 
New Zealand Yes Yes Yes 
Peru Yes Yes  
Philippines    
Russia    
Singapore Yes Yes Yes 
Chinese Taipei    
Thailand Yes Yes  
United States Yes Yes Yes 
Viet Nam    
Source: Chapter 6 
 
Econometric analysis for this study, reported in Chapter 6, identifies the effects that further 
structural reforms in APEC gas markets would have on prices and efficiency. In gas markets 
the introduction of retail competition would be associated with gas prices being about 15% 
lower than otherwise, all other things being constant, and the unbundling of gas 
production/import from other segments of the market would be associated with about 23.4% 
lower gas prices. Both these percentages would be lower if initial gas prices were higher than 
the average in the OECD sample, as they are currently. 
 
As noted, these results are indicative only and are not fine-tuned to the individual 
circumstances of each APEC economy. However, they do suggest that the slow, incremental 
approach to reform of APEC energy markets is worth reviving or continuing, despite the 
considerable burdens imposed on regulatory capacity. APEC economies can learn by doing, 
they can learn from the general lessons of reform in other economies and they can learn from 
close interaction and cooperation among industry regulators. APEC processes are well-tuned 
to providing the sort of experience sharing and capacity building that can make the regulatory 
burden easier. Gains to industrial users, and by inference to households, would be 
considerable.  
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1.4.3 Telecommunications 
 
One key rationale for regulating telecommunications is to avoid the abuse of market power, 
when at least some elements of the telecommunications network have the characteristics of a 
natural monopoly and where the exercise of that monopoly power would create greater 
damage than the cost of regulatory mistakes. Another key objective is often to regulate to 
ensure that the industry meets universal service obligations, that is, to meet community 
expectations of the level of access to services of particular quality. 
 
Technology changes very rapidly in this sector and so judgements about which elements may 
constitute a natural monopoly also change rapidly. But the current consensus is that there is 
little in mobile technology that is a natural monopoly, while in fixed-line networks the ‘last 
mile’ (the copper wire connection, and the ducts or infrastructure associated with it, between 
an individual subscriber and the first switch in the network) may still have natural monopoly 
characteristics. The regulatory challenge is to prevent the economic waste associated with 
duplication of the bottleneck facility (the ‘last mile’) while encouraging competition 
elsewhere in the network. One of the common regulatory approaches to this problem is to 
establish an access regime, whereby other providers pay a wholesale charge for access to the 
incumbent’s bottleneck facility, so they can offer retail services (e.g., retail telephony or ISP 
services) that use this facility. If the access charge is set appropriately, this can encourage 
competition in retail services while discouraging inefficient duplication of the ‘last mile’. If 
the access charge is set too high, retail competition will be thwarted and there will be an 
incentive for inefficient duplication of the ‘last mile’, but if the access charge is set too low, 
the incumbent will have little incentive to invest to maintain or extend the bottleneck facility. 
A common regulatory solution is to price access at long run incremental cost – a charge that 
includes a capital component towards maintenance and eventual replacement of the asset, but 
does not include any ‘super normal’ profits for the incumbent. 
 
Nevertheless, other aspects of the regulatory regime may still thwart competition indirectly. 
Typically, subscriber access charges were kept low to encourage participation by the poor, and 
usage charges were too high, particularly on long-distance calls, to compensate. Universal 
service obligations such as these were traditionally met in many economies by cross-subsidies 
in this form which were built into the incumbent’s retail pricing structure. But when 
competition is introduced, entrants are attracted to the high-profit parts of the market and the 
cross-subsidies cannot be sustained. The failure of some developing economies to find ways 
other than cross-subsidisation to fund universal service obligations is still thwarting the 
development of effective competition in telecommunications, even where the economies have 
made commitments to do so. 
 
The direct benefits of effective competition in telecommunications markets are reviewed in 
Chapter 7 and found to be considerable. To illustrate, an effect of telecommunications 
reform, which embraces information and communication technology as well as traditional 
telephony, is productivity improvements as a result of greater use of the Internet for business 
transactions. One study found that this could reduce the gap between wholesale and retail 
prices from 19.6% to 5% of prices.  
 
Nevertheless, there is considerable uncertainty about what the prevailing next-generation 
technologies will be. This in turn implies considerable uncertainty about where the natural 
monopoly elements (if any) will be in the future, and therefore what the appropriate future 
regulatory responses should be. Certainly regulation should not be designed to be specific to a 
particular technology and it should be designed to facilitate competition between technologies. 
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As of 2009 most APEC economies have adopted full market entry liberalisation. Some APEC 
economies allow full foreign ownership for fixed-line operators and these economies impose no 
restrictions on legal forms either. Others do not allow foreign investment in their fixed-line 
networks at all. The common practice is to limit foreign investment from gaining dominant 
positions in fixed-line operators (i.e., below the 50% threshold). The efficiency restrictions this 
FDI requirement places on telecommunications is a current major issue in this sector. 
 
As of 2009 all APEC economies have liberalised their mobile sector. In most economies new 
licences are granted based on market-oriented approaches unless limited by the availability of 
spectrum. The scope of regulatory reform is summarised in Figure 1.1. There is little 
variation in the role of the independent regulator but greater variation in the measures in the 
table blue represents implemented, green partially done or under consideration and red is not 
yet implemented. 
 
The growth of the telecom sector itself adds to GDP, but the initial impact of liberalisation on 
competitive market entry is often a contraction of the workforce. This is partly a response to 
competitive pressures by the incumbent to become more efficient. More importantly, over 
time it is a response by the incumbent to accelerate the adoption of new digital technologies, 
which are far less labour intensive. New technologies are associated with innovation in 
services in two ways: through more effective delivery channels (such as DSL and IP-based 
mobile cellular etc.) and through new services (e.g., converged services such as IPTV and 
mobile TV). As new entrants make their mark, users become more aware of the benefits and 
availability of telecoms and new services create new markets, so employment in the sector 
grows again. Further details of the experiences of reform in Chinese Taipei; Viet Nam; and 
PNG are presented in Boxes 1.16, 1.17 and 1.18. 
 
Figure 1.1: Summary of APEC economies’ implementation of the WTO regulatory principles. 
Regulatory elements APEC performance 
Establishing an access regime 
 
Implementing rules on interconnection 
 
Making licensing criteria publicly available 
 
 Source: Chapter 7 
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Box 1.16: Telecommunications in Chinese Taipei. 
A liberalisation program began in Chinese Taipei in 1997, first in mobile then in fixed-line services. The 
subsequent change in performance was remarkable in comparison with its APEC peers. Fixed-line, mobile 
and broadband service penetration were significantly improved over the last two decades, while price has been 
decreasing rapidly over the same period. In terms of accessibility performance, fixed-line penetration in 
Chinese Taipei exceeded that of Australia and Japan in 1998 and of the USA in 2003. Broadband penetration 
is also performing well compared to these economies. Mobile penetration in Chinese Taipei represents the 
most direct link between structural reform and performance. A sharp increase in mobile penetration took place 
around 1998 when competitive 2G operators began, surpassing many pioneer economies in the region, such as 
the USA; Australia; and Japan. This trend of rapid development continued until it reached its saturation point 
in 2004. The entry of 3G mobile operators in 2003 is likely to be the reason for a rebound in penetration since 
2005. In relation to the change in price, performance in Chinese Taipei also demonstrates a positive 
relationship between structural reform and performance. A significant reduction in charges for mobile service 
connection and monthly subscription charges, as well as the connection charge for fixed-line services, took 
place around the beginning of the structural reform period. Of note is that the average connection and monthly 
subscription charges for mobile services reduced to zero since 2004, after the introduction of 3G mobile 
services. This pricing model facilitates access to services, while suppliers recoup costs through use charges. 
Source: Chapter 19 
 
Box 1.17: Telecommunications in Viet Nam. 
Fixed-line development in Viet Nam seems modest compared to mobile growth, yet it is outstanding when 
compared to other APEC economies with similar levels of economic/telecom developments. Prior to 2003 
Viet Nam shared a similar level of fixed-line penetration rate with Indonesia and the Philippines of around 
5%. Yet starting from 2003, access jumped. In fixed-line availability Viet Nam is now at 35% and mobile 
penetration is at 80%. Monthly subscription charges for mobile services had fallen to zero by 2004, compared 
to $US17 in 1999. Structural reform efforts contributed to this outcome, including the establishment of the 
universal service fund (VTF). There was also a relatively transparent and predictable regulatory environment 
to foster competition and network investment. Further, the growth of Viet Nam’s Internet subscribers (from 
zero in 2002 to 6% in 2008) offers yet another good example of the correlation between reform and 
performance. Two primary reform initiatives are responsible for the sharp increase in Internet subscription: 
the first, the Internet services sector was liberalised and the VTF was established, which includes public 
Internet access as part of the universal service scheme. In relation to price, the experience in Viet Nam 
demonstrates a positive relationship between market liberalisation and performance. Monthly subscription 
charges for mobile services have been reduced from nearly USD17 in 1999 to zero in 2004. For the average 
tariff of a 3-minute off-peak mobile call, as at 2005 Viet Nam was the highest of the three sample economies, 
yet by 2008 it became the economy with the lowest rate. 
Source: Chapter 20 
 
Box 1.18: Telecommunications in PNG. 
While the fixed-line service remained in the hands of a government enterprise, competition was introduced into 
the mobile sector when entrant Digicel joined the incumbent B-Mobile. The number of mobile phone 
subscribers (through B-Mobile) was estimated to be between 130 000 and 140 000 prior to the entrance of 
Digicel in July 2007. The firms now claim to have over 500 000 customers each, which suggests a remarkable 
700% growth in the number of mobile phone subscribers. This result could be regarded as universal coverage. 
Average peak and off-peak domestic call billing rates have fallen by 11% for peak times and by 51% for off-
peak times since the introduction of Digicel. Average peak and off-peak international call rates have fallen by 
40% and 38%, respectively. As well, calling rates for both carriers and for both domestic and international calls 
have moved from 30-second billing increments to per second billing increments. Digicel has a wide range of 
market products and services such as a prepaid handset pack, 24/7 customer care, post-paid price plans, 
international text messaging, missed call alerts, and other promotional products such as ‘talk-for-free’ and 
‘Happy Fridays’. It claims to have provided employment opportunities to some 300 people of whom 90% are 
Papua New Guineans and indirect employment for about 500 people through dealer stores, top-up vendors, 
distributors etc. Furthermore, it has committed itself to a busy community relations program. In a land with a 
terrain as difficult as PNG’s, the benefits to the many remote communities of being able to interact with other 
people cannot be underestimated. Already the availability of mobile phone services has done much for social 
interaction as well as being helpful in medical emergencies. Moreover, the mobile banking initiatives now 
underway will be enormously helpful because, hitherto, banking services in rural areas have been very limited. 
Further, the provision of market pricing information through mobile phone services will be very helpful because 
the livelihood of the bulk of the population is from agricultural and fishing activities. 
Source: Chapter 21 
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1.5 TEN LESSONS OF REFORMS TO DATE 
 
In this section, ten general lessons of the reform in APEC economies to date are put forward. 
The themes of these lessons include the value of transparency, of having a clear view about 
goals and of having the expectation of continuing change. In other words, the process of 
reform is continuous. 
 
1.5.1 Competition is more important than ownership 
 
Generally the result of the review of reform to date stresses the value of competition and 
contestability and the value of preceding changes in ownership by the introduction of 
competition. Most important is competition, since privatisation without it can lead to the 
continuation of the same problems under a new owner. At least competition for the market or 
regulation of the critical infrastructure, whose owners might otherwise capture the gains from 
trade, is required. This is illustrated for instance in the case studies on markets for gas 
electricity, as well as reform of the international road freight sector in Thailand. Whether or 
not different stages of the production of the services are separated (independent of 
ownership) – and there is debate about the value of separation – the focus should be on the 
introduction of competition.  
 
At the same time, there may be some concerns about introducing competition. For example, 
the result may be market structures in which a small number of firms compete, that is, 
oligopolies, or foreign firms might enter, try to drive out competitors by lowering prices, that 
is, demonstrated predatory behaviour, and highlight the lack of capacity of local firms to 
compete. If that is a problem, options include a regulatory response and capacity building or 
support to market failure problems related to research and development or training skilled 
staff. Complementary reforms in other sectors help with adjustment costs, and there is value 
in packaging and sequencing reform. Predatory behaviour is also more rewarding to 
producers but not consumers. Therefore, it is more likely in the presence of remaining entry 
barriers, to which constant attention should be given. 
 
1.5.2 Take a forward looking view and provide a leadership commitment 
 
A forward looking view that is regularly and clearly explained helps avoid a trajectory to 
landing in an ‘undesirable equilibrium’, becoming stuck at that point because of the 
emergence of new vested interests. One example might be in an urban transport system where 
not acting might result in the system descending into congestion from which a number of 
vested interests extract significant benefit. The situation with urban transport in Bangkok is 
an example. Another is undertaking a partial reform, such as privatisation in gas or electricity 
but then not proceeding past that point. The experiences of gas in Thailand and electricity in 
Korea highlight the challenges. Along with this, it is important that there is a commitment by 
leaders to structural reform (e.g., to a set of national development goals) and that they have 
the ability to explain structural reforms. 
 
1.5.3 Be aware of ‘the gap’ in regulatory practice 
 
It is important to have some sense of ‘the gap’, that is, how far away the current regime is from 
relevant ‘good practice.’ This level of performance is not the same as ‘best practice’ in global 
terms but it is the regulatory process that would be regarded as efficient at the state of 
development. APEC has a key role to play in sharing this experience, as discussed with 
reference to the material on gas markets in the previous section. Reform in electricity is also 
complex, and concerns remain about the Californian experience where reform, which later was 
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argued to be incomplete, was followed by blackouts and by attempts by suppliers to extract 
higher prices from newly created markets. The designers of electricity reform in Russia, for 
example, drew on advice and experience from the rest of the world to design a new system. 
 
1.5.4 Know the costs of the current regime 
 
For reform to proceed it is important that the community has some sense of the costs of the 
gap, which might be poor performance and choice in various dimensions, for example, low 
quality services or prices too high. High prices are not the only cost of incorrect choices or a 
lack of action. It could be, as in many energy markets where the sustainability of policy is 
critical in environmental terms, that prices are too low. Gas markets provide examples of this. 
 
Other points that help make the case for change are: 
• the scope for efficiency gains, like those available from electricity reform, or even a 
partial reform, as in Korea; 
• the capacity to respond to other shocks or developments, such as responding to 
climate change, an emerging pressure in markets for gas in China for example; 
• the easing of otherwise tightening fiscal constraints and interests from within the 
industry itself, such as its capacity to raise finance, which was a driver of reform in 
Russia; 
• technological change which leaves some interests ‘stranded’, as is becoming more 
apparent in air transport markets and in telecommunications; and 
• environmental impacts which are getting worse, including congestion, which may be 
worsened by inappropriate regulation, as in the case of Bangkok despite its otherwise 
beneficial effects. 
 
Reform driven by efficiency gains to the general public may be important in terms of 
economic welfare but the dilemma is that reforms of this type may be very difficult to 
implement and manage. How can it be done? Is this a case where compensation is required? 
How could efficiency gains be presented as a benefit to the public or small business? Some 
more appealing communication of the challenges as well as the likely gains will be important. 
The cases in this study include instances where service quality also improved because of 
reform, for example, the van market in Bangkok and the Korea–China air routes. 
 
1.5.5 The commitment to structural reform is continuous and never stops 
 
Structural reform is a dynamic process resulting in dynamic benefits. Yesterday there may 
not have been a performance gap of note but as times change, gaps will re-emerge. For 
example, investment in capacity lags behind the growth in demand – this was a driver of 
reform in the electricity sector in Russia where a key figure in the industry played a lead role 
in identifying that ‘gap’. Markets will continue to anticipate where momentum exists. They 
will respond to regulation and changes in costs and benefits: the reaction of markets to 
cabotage rules in Australia and the USA illustrates this process, as does the impact of 
competition in air transport markets. New technologies may also provide new sources of 
competition and undermine the rationale for existing regulation, as in telecommunications. 
Equally, new bottlenecks may emerge because of technological change and demand attention, 
so the regulatory focus has to shift. In maritime transport, for example, a key issue is no 
longer the anti-competitive behaviour of shipping companies but the management of ports, as 
the Australian and USA cases illustrate. 
 
The choice, therefore, is not simply one between good and bad practice in a static sense. There 
is a need to adjust the regime as new gaps to good practice emerge. This is not easy. Also, since 
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structural reform is dynamic (as are its benefits), it is important to avoid the problems of 
‘reform indigestion’, that is, a build-up a valuable reforms which are not implemented. 
Monitoring of performance and reporting on it is part of the process to avoid indigestion. 
 
1.5.6 Promoting engagement from within 
 
Is there pressure from the regulated businesses within a sector or constrained businesses in a 
contestable position? And when can it work as a source of pressure for reform? Relevant 
factors might be: 
• reform to help correct an internal weakness and improve performance; 
• pressures from shareholders; 
• pressure from competitors (who might operate in a different regulatory environment, 
for example, the same market in technical terms providing substitute services but a 
different institutional setting);  
• financing constraints; and 
• pressure from downstream sectors which place flow-on pressure. 
 
Reform happens faster when motivated from within. A clearly defined end point is required 
for a particular reform initiative. Otherwise, incumbents can recapture a process. But, due 
recognition needs to be paid to the need to keep up with competitive and regulatory 
benchmarks set by others. It will be interesting to see if there is a change in regulation in 
international aviation as interests shift and attitudes to the current regime change: the lively 
discussion about options in air transport in Northeast Asia is an illustration of this. 
 
It is easier to prevent special pleading from particular regulated industries if structural reform 
is taken as a package across all state owned enterprises, or at least a group of them. It also 
helps to establish structural reform as part of a better governance campaign or a budget 
‘clean-up’ based on good principles. It need not be simultaneous but it can be a rolling 
reform. 
 
1.5.7 The use of experiments 
 
Experiments can be useful to demonstrate the value of reform. In air transport, for example, 
the experience with the result of deregulation in the freight sector and the introduction of 
LCCs has been vital for wider progress. The ‘testing’ going on at present in Northeast Asia 
with regional reform is very influential. The experience of the passenger van market in 
Bangkok, although not originally officially sanctioned and later re-captured by regulation, is 
an example of a market-led, natural experiment that grew out of the regulation itself. 
Experiments can be useful to break bottlenecks to change – they demonstrate benefits in 
smaller areas, even regions, or parts of markets. Criteria for selection (or acceptance) might 
be the extent of change required or the capability to execute change and the capacity to 
quantify effects. Complementary research efforts are important to capture the experience end 
distribute the messages. 
 
1.5.8 The value of independent evaluation for designing options 
 
Independent evaluation can be very important, either in the formal sector or utilising the 
second track. Those organisations help to offset the lobbying efforts of the vested interests. 
They also can challenge the ‘good performer’ myth, that a structure looks to be working well 
because it is profitable (perhaps too much so) or financing its own investment and 
maintaining capacity (to too great an extent). To some extent, this is an issue in the progress 
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of reform in the gas market in Thailand. These agencies are also important in that they 
identify options, engage the stakeholders in a process to choose between options, maintain 
attention on the efficiency case, then propose a reform plan, publicise targets, monitor reform 
and report back on progress. Researchers working on air transport in Northeast Asia have 
played a key role in driving change there. 
 
To facilitate the conduct of voluntary reviews of institutional frameworks and processes for 
structural reform, the APEC Policy Support Unit has prepared a guidance manual that sets 
out in a single document the objectives, scope and desired outcomes of the reviews. It is 
designed to assist reviewers, volunteering economies and their respective agencies and other 
interested stakeholders to prepare for and participate in the reviews.6
 
 
1.5.9 Coordination and when it matters 
 
Some problems demand coordination across infrastructure services for a solution, for 
example, in public transport where coordination across modes is important to avoid 
congestion. This is also relevant to logistics, as illustrated in the case of Indonesia where 
policy across a number of modes of transport has to be coordinated. It is illustrated in the case 
of Thailand with respect to investment in road networks. According to experience to date, the 
Indonesian case study provides a checklist of action items for success in setting up and 
managing this coordination. Critical activities include: 
• establishing a formal process in which all relevant parties are involved; 
• providing funding for it; 
• providing the process with relevant powers to make changes to policies and practices; 
• including all the stakeholders, not just suppliers but also users of the services – public 
and private – from the beginning; 
• having a functional organisation; and  
• monitoring progress. 
 
Other examples of the value of coordination include setting up integrated ticketing systems, 
which requires as much coordination as does network wide traffic signal coordination. It is 
important to recognise this as it has beneficial efficiency impacts. To say how it has or has 
not been dealt with can be, but it is not always, critical. Other structures are easier to operate 
on their own account, for example, railways and highways. However, when co-ordination is 
critical, the question is how to get it done? This requires leadership and external advice. 
 
1.5.10 Universal service obligations 
 
Viet Nam in the telecommunications sector demonstrates yet again the value of dealing with 
universal service obligations directly. To embed them in the commitments of incumbents 
creates a disincentive for reform. Separating them makes the cost transparent. 
 
1.6 THE NEXT STEPS 
 
1.6.1 Effects of further reform 
 
Chapter 2 examines the economy- and region-wide effects of prospective structural reforms 
in the transport energy and telecommunications sectors of APEC economies. What are the 
next steps to complete the programs of structural reform already begun in these sectors? 
                                       
6 The PSU manual is available at http://publications.apec.org/publication-detail.php?pub_id=960. 
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The theme of these next steps is the introduction of competition into each sector. This implies 
a series of changes, such as in:  
• air transport, a range of reforms to air services agreements, to entry conditions for 
domestic and foreign carriers, and to ownership; 
• maritime transport, the dismantling of remaining entry restrictions, quotas or cargo 
sharing arrangements and the granting of national treatment to foreign-owned carriers 
located domestically; 
• rail transport, vertical separation and free entry in freight operations in those 
economies that do not yet have them; 
• electricity and gas, third party access, unbundling, wholesale markets and/or retail 
competition in economies that have not yet implemented them; and 
• telecommunications, the removal of remaining foreign equity limits. 
 
The study uses modelling work to assess the implication of this package of ‘next steps’ in 
structural reform. The modelling assumes no privatisation of incumbents in rail, electricity or 
gas. Key results, discussed in more detail in Chapter 2, include the following four points. 
 
Firstly, this package of reform would have significant effects. They can be translated into 
productivity effects, and the estimated first-round impacts of these reforms suggest that they 
could lead to weighted average productivity improvements in the range of 2–14% across the 
sectors involved. The most extensive reform effort, and the largest productivity gains (i.e., 
above 10%), are projected to occur in Indonesia; Malaysia; Mexico; the Philippines; Chinese 
Taipei; and Viet Nam. 
 
Secondly, economy-wide gains can also be estimated, as there is strong correlation between 
the size of the reform tasks and the economy-wide gains they generate. Furthermore, in all 
economies, an overwhelming proportion of these gains come from reforms at home, rather 
than reforms in other economies. Thus, while the gains from joint reforms are considerable, 
there is no compelling reason for each APEC economy to wait for others to start. 
 
Thirdly, while most APEC economies are also projected to reap small gains from reforms 
elsewhere, this is not a foregone conclusion, because productivity improvements elsewhere 
are a two-edged sword. The income and price effects of productivity gains in other 
economies on the home economy work in opposite directions, and very often the adverse 
price effects dominate. The difference here is that structural reforms in other economies also 
reduce the cost of transporting merchandise exports from the home economy. In most cases, 
this restores the balance in favour of the home economy.  
 
Fourthly, across the APEC region, structural reforms in transport, energy and 
telecommunications as outlined above are projected to generate USD175 billion a year in 
additional real income (in 2004 dollars), relative to what would have accrued had no reforms 
occurred. This is a snapshot of the steady state gains after a 10-year adjustment period, during 
which smaller gains accrue. 
 
1.6.2 Gains from structural reform compared to other agendas 
 
APEC-wide, the projected gains from these structural reforms are almost twice as big as the 
gains from further liberalisation of merchandise trade. Yet the sectors where the structural 
reforms occur are less than a quarter of the size of those engaged in merchandise trade. When 
structural reforms lower real production costs, even by half as much as is estimated here, they 
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generate a ‘bang for the buck’ that is much greater than from trade reforms. However, cost 
bases can also contribute to further trade gains. Exporters which capture benefits can use cost 
advantages to decrease the costs of the products they export. 
 
The findings of Chapter 2, therefore, vindicate the decision of APEC Leaders to move 
beyond a ‘border’ agenda to one that focuses on behind-the-border reforms. Yet structural 
reforms to generate significant gains are also likely to generate significant structural 
adjustment costs. The expected size and extent of those adjustments has also been examined. 
 
At the sectoral level, the projected output gains tend to be in the services sectors undergoing 
reform, and in the sectors that use their services intensively. These can include metals 
(intensive users of electricity), chemicals (intensive users of gas), wood and paper products 
(intensive users of domestic transport services), and a range of industries (meat and livestock, 
forestry and fishing, grains, dairy, other manufacturing) that are intensive users of 
international transport services. Construction is typically also projected to gain slightly from 
the additional impetus given to industry investment.  
 
The sectors projected not to gain (and, therefore, could be viewed as losing in relative terms) 
are typically those that do not fall into the above categories. They suffer indirectly from higher 
wages and rates of return, effects that are induced primarily by the expansions in overall 
activity. Industries typically losing in this way include textiles and clothing, motor vehicles, 
other transport equipment, electronic equipment and other machinery and equipment.  
 
The relative losses in industry output in these sectors are relatively minor, however. And they 
are even smaller when reforms in other APEC economies are taken into account. Thus, 
structural reforms in other APEC economies can play a useful role in helping to cushion the 
adjustment costs of reforms at home, even if they do not add greatly to the overall gains from 
reform. 
 
The employment effects of structural reforms can be significant. The essence of a 
productivity improvement is that an industry can produce more with less. As a result, input 
usage can fall, even when output rises. Sectors which according to the modelling lose 
employment to a relatively large extent do so not as a result of their own productivity 
improvements but because the home industries that use their services lose their position as 
other economies reform. 
 
In the extreme cases, modelling indicates relative losses in unskilled employment in a 
particular sector after 10 years can accumulate to upwards of 30%. But this modelling result 
needs to be kept in perspective. Employment changes occur over time and can be addressed 
through targeted structural assistance measures. Secondly, as long as an economy grows, 
overall employment will increase so the modelling shows that structural reforms may require 
significant relative shifts of labour across sectors over time. Thirdly, the model projects 
higher real wages for all workers in all economies. Modelling and real world examples 
demonstrate that displaced workers earn higher real wages in their new occupations. 
 
To reiterate, employment opportunities overall depend on the growth of an economy. Thus, 
one of the best ways that APEC economies can guard against any adverse employment 
effects of structural reform is to maintain healthy underlying rates of economic growth. 
Structural reform itself makes a contribution to this goal, since it adds to productivity, 
stimulates activity and increases the resilience of the economy, but prudent macroeconomic 
management is also crucial. 
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1.6.3 The LAISR agenda 
 
The importance of structural reform in APEC economies and how it is conducted cannot be 
overestimated. This research shows the value of the APEC Leaders’ adoption of an agenda of 
structural reform.  
 
The case studies and the associated research also reveal the importance of structural reform as 
providing strong bridges behind the border to the benefits of regional economic integration. 
This study has found that: 
• structural reforms are very challenging and require balanced reform and political 
commitment amid the economic and political complexities in all economies; 
• structural reforms can create winners and losers but yield more inclusive development 
when they are carried out dynamically and with other economic reforms; and 
• structural reforms are worth undertaking and provide much greater gains than trade 
liberalisation and generate economic sustainability. 
 
These results suggest the need for APEC to build an even stronger structural reform agenda 
and work program. Structural reform will be a continuing process, as growth, changes in 
economic structures, new technologies and market responses to existing regulation continue 
to change the situations in which APEC economies and their regulatory systems operate. 
Steady adaptation is required, not the least because expectations will rise as development 
proceeds. Pressure from the rest of the world, both competition from other economies and 
new commitments for cooperation, create further forces for change. APEC economies, as the 
tables and figures in this report illustrate, are at various stages of reform and their experiences 
to date are valuable to other members. The sharing of this experience remains a priority as 
they assist to learn about what is possible. But, what is most important, are the strategies for 
implementation and starting the reforms – turning shared experiences into concrete actions. 
 
Effective structural reform is adopted for a purpose and to achieve a stated outcome. A key to 
progress is first to be clear about that purpose and the outcomes sought. Another area of 
cooperation is the design and implementation of reporting systems and monitoring 
arrangements for the progress of reform. The impacts of reform and their economy-wide 
effects are worthy of regular attention. Evidence of gaps between good practice, given the 
stage of development, and the costs of those gaps are drivers of reform. The pace of reform is 
important. But in the end what matters is the outcome. 
 
More efficient market operations, greater resilience, macroeconomic stability, higher 
productivity that follow from structural reform contribute to growth and thereby to higher 
standards of living. The concern with resilience and macroeconomic stability is even more 
relevant in the context of the response to the global financial crisis.  
 
A reform program focused on structural reform will create new sources of growth. The new 
growth will be driven by productivity. Reform at the border remains significant for efficiency 
and growth of member economy but the empirical work here demonstrates the significance of 
the productivity effects of even a modest set of ‘next steps’, all primarily focussed on the 
introduction of competition. New growth, more dynamic economies and a stronger APEC 
would be the result. 
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Chapter 2 
 
MODELLING THE BENEFITS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
IN APEC ECONOMIES 
 
 
Philippa Dee1
 
 
 
• A general equilibrium model is used to assess the effects of a package of structural 
reforms, focused on the introduction of competition into markets for transport and 
energy. 
• APEC-wide, the projected gains are significant and almost twice as big as the gains 
from further liberalisation of merchandise trade. 
• At the sectoral level, the projected output gains tend to be in the services sectors 
undergoing reform, and in the sectors that use their services intensively. 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Structural reform in transport, energy and telecommunications is not synonymous with 
deregulation but with better regulation. Nor is privatisation the key. The critical aim of 
structural reform is to encourage as much competition as is appropriate in these sectors, while 
configuring the regulation targeted at other legitimate economic and social objectives so that 
it does least damage to that competition, and therefore to economic efficiency. Competition 
can be a powerful method of squeezing excess profits and driving producers to find lower 
cost ways of doing business. Ownership matters primarily to the extent that it affects the 
incentives of producers to respond in these ways to competitive pressures, and government-
owned enterprises can respond quite adequately to private sector competition if they are 
adequately capitalised and operate under appropriate governance structures. As will be seen, 
there can be significant gains from structural reforms in some of these sectors, even when 
they continue to operate with current ownership structures. 
 
The appropriate level of competition depends on the sector in question. Many of these 
activities involve networks – of railway lines, of electricity transmission and distribution 
lines, of gas transmission and distribution pipelines and of telecommunications transmission 
and distribution lines. At least some components of these networks have the characteristics of 
a ‘natural monopoly’, meaning that it is less costly for their operation to be carried out by a 
single producer using a single set of facilities, rather than having two or more operators with 
duplicate facilities. 
 
The structural reforms in these sectors are typically aimed at introducing competition into 
those parts of the production chain that are not natural monopolies. This requires the 
competitive suppliers to have access to those parts of the network that are natural 
monopolies. Successful reform also requires that the restructuring be done in such a way that 
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the benefits of competition in the competitive sectors outweigh the loss of any economies of 
scope that may have prevailed when the monopoly and competitive activities were operated 
together under single ownership. 
 
In maritime and air transport, the natural monopoly elements are more likely to be at the ports 
or airports than in the transport operation per se. But maritime and aviation networks operate 
across national boundaries, and in both activities a degree of regulatory cooperation may be 
required to ensure safety and coordination along international routes. But such regulation 
should not unduly impede competition, nor should competition be unduly stifled in the 
interests of promoting or protecting ‘national champions’. 
 
This paper draws on studies in this report that have identified the types of regulatory 
structures that unduly impede competition and have quantified their first round impact on 
economic performance in the sectors in question. The purpose of the paper is to go one step 
further: to quantify the effects of reforming those regulatory structures, not just on the sectors 
in question but also on sectors that might use these services, on whole economies, and 
ultimately on the region as a whole. It also aims to quantify the adjustment costs that these 
prospective reforms might generate. 
 
2.2 THE REFORM AGENDA 
 
2.2.1 Air transport 
 
International air services are governed by a system of bilateral air services agreements. While 
these agreements cover a wide range of topics that would be deemed legitimate targets of 
regulation (such as aviation security, incident investigation, immigration and control of travel 
documents), they also include seven key features that have been identified by the WTO 
Secretariat as restricting scheduled air passenger services (WTO 2006): 
• Designation 
Governs the right to designate one (single designation) or more than one (multiple 
designation) airline from the home economy to operate the agreed services between 
the two economies. 
• Withholding 
Defines the ownership conditions required for the designated airline(s) of the foreign 
economy to be allowed to operate the agreed services. The most restrictive conditions 
require substantial ownership and effective control to be vested in the designating 
economy or its nationals. The most liberal regime (principal place of business) 
removes the substantial ownership requirement but still requires the designated airline 
to be incorporated in the designating economy and to have its principal place of 
business there. This falls far short of the relatively generous ‘rules of origin’ typically 
written into services trade agreements. These would typically require only ‘substantial 
business’ in the designated economy, irrespective of ownership. 
• Grant of rights 
Covers the rights to provide air services between two economies. The dimensions in 
which air services agreements are generally being liberalised is in the granting of the 
5th, 6th and 7th freedoms and cabotage. The 5th freedom is the freedom to carry 
passengers between two economies by an airline of a third economy on a route with 
origin or destination in its home economy. The 6th freedom is the freedom to carry 
passengers between two economies by an airline of a third economy on a route that 
goes via its home economy. (Note that 6th freedoms can also be constructed via a 
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combination of the 3rd and 4th freedoms from different bilateral agreements, and so 
are rarely specified explicitly.) The 7th freedom is the freedom to carry passengers 
between two economies by an airline of a third economy on a route with no 
connection to its home economy. Cabotage is the freedom to carry passengers within 
an economy by an airline of another economy on a route with origin or destination in 
its home economy. 
• Capacity clause 
Determines the capacity of an agreed service, where capacity refers to the volume of 
traffic, frequency of service and/or aircraft type. 
• Tariff approval 
Refers to the fare setting regime. Under the most restrictive regime, the aeronautical 
authorities of both economies have to approve a fare before it can be applied. Under 
the most liberal regime, fares are not subject to the approval of either authority. 
• Statistics 
Establishes rules on the exchange of statistics between economies or their airlines. If 
an exchange of statistics is or can be requested, it is a sign that the parties intend to 
monitor the performance of each other’s airline and is thus viewed as a restrictive 
feature of an agreement. 
• Cooperative arrangements 
Defines the rights of the designated airlines to enter into cooperative marketing 
arrangements such as code sharing and alliances. This right is considered a liberal 
feature because it provides a means to rationalise networks in the absence of 
liberalisation of the ownership clause. 
 
These restrictive features of air services agreements have been shown to impose costs by 
raising international airfares and restricting international traffic. Gonenc and Nicoletti (2000) 
and Doove et al. (2001) found a positive and significant effect of the restrictiveness of air 
services agreements on passenger air fares. For example, Doove et al. (2001) estimated that 
the restrictive provisions of the agreements in place at the time had inflated international 
airfares from Indonesia and the Philippines by over 20%, and from Malaysia, Singapore and 
Thailand by 16–18%. Piermartini and Rousová (2008) found that an increase in the degree of 
liberalisation from the 25th to the 75th percentile would increase passenger traffic volumes 
between economies linked by a direct air service by about 30%. In particular, they found that 
the removal of restrictions on the determination of prices and capacity, cabotage rights and 
designation were found to be the most traffic-enhancing provisions. 
 
The restrictive provisions of air services agreements also impose costs on air freight services. 
Most air freight is carried in the belly of passenger aircraft and is thus affected by exactly the 
same provisions as passenger traffic. Freight-only flights are generally also governed by the 
same provisions as passenger flights, although in some instances they are granted more 
liberal traffic rights. Grosso (2008) found a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between relaxing restrictions and the value of merchandise trade. Achard (2009) found a 
significant correlation between liberal air services agreements and the volume of air cargo. 
 
In recognition of such costs, a growing number of economies are negotiating more liberal air 
services agreements. The typical ‘open skies’ agreement grants 3rd, 4th and 5th freedom 
rights and removes restrictions on designation, capacity, frequencies, code-sharing and fares. 
Open skies agreements typically do not grant cabotage rights or lift foreign ownership 
restrictions on domestic airlines. Seventh freedom rights are sometimes included, but often 
restricted to cargo-only traffic. 
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Increasingly, economies have also liberalised their domestic aviation services, which they can 
do on a unilateral basis. Such liberalisation has typically included allowing additional 
domestic and foreign entry on domestic routes, particularly by low cost carriers, and freeing 
up restrictions on domestic air fares. Sometimes, liberalisation has also included the full or 
partial privatisation of government-owned carriers. 
 
The index of policy restrictions compiled by Zhang and Findlay (2010) covers some of the 
key measures affecting both domestic and international aviation: the privatisation of national 
airlines, foreign equity participation in domestic airlines, the existence of low cost carriers, 
the number of effective passenger airlines (indicating ease of entry), whether there is multiple 
designation on international routes, whether there are more than two open skies agreements 
and whether 7th freedom cargo rights are granted to at least some foreign carriers.  
 
Table 2.1 shows the index and its components, where an index value of 1 indicates full 
restrictiveness, a value of 0 denotes no restriction, and intermediate values denote partial 
restrictions. (See the original paper for details, noting that the analysis is restricted to APEC 
members that have been included in the computable general equilibrium model, based on data 
available from the GTAP model database [Hertel 1997]. It therefore excludes Brunei and 
Papua New Guinea.) 
 
The table indicates that China; Viet Nam; the Russian Federation; the Philippines; and 
Chinese Taipei currently have the most restrictive regulatory regimes among APEC 
economies. The United States of America; Australia; Singapore; Malaysia; and Thailand have 
the least restrictive regimes. 
 
Table 2.1: Index of policy restrictions in air transport. 
APEC member Privatised Foreign equity 
Low 
cost 
airline 
Effective 
competitors Designation 
Open 
skies 
7th 
freedom 
Total 
score 
Australia 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 
Canada 0 0.75 0 1 1 0 0 2.75 
Chile 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
China 0.67 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 1 4.17 
Hong Kong, China 0 0 0.5 1 1 0 1 3.5 
Indonesia 1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 3 
Japan 0 0.75 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 2.75 
Republic of Korea 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 3 
Malaysia 0.67 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 1.67 
Mexico 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 2.5 
New Zealand 0.67 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 2.17 
Peru 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 
Philippines 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 1 3.5 
Russia 0.67 0.75 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 3.42 
Singapore 0.67 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 1.17 
Chinese Taipei 0.67 0.5 1 0.5 0 0.5 0 3.17 
Thailand 0.67 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 1.67 
United States 0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 
Viet Nam 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0 4 
Source: Zhang & Findlay 2010. 
Note: 0 = no restriction, 1 = full restriction 
 
2.2.2 Maritime transport 
 
McGuire, Schuele and Smith (2000) surveyed the maritime policy regimes in several APEC, 
Latin American and European economies. They described the key restrictions affecting 
shipping services as follows: 
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• Right to fly the national flag 
Requires ships to be registered or licensed to provide maritime services on domestic 
and international routes. The conditions on registration may include legitimate 
requirements, such as meeting seaworthiness and safety requirements, but may also 
include restrictions, such as the ship having a commercial presence in the domestic 
economy and being built and/or owned domestically. 
• Cabotage restrictions 
These restrict shipping services on domestic and coastal routes to vessels that meet 
certain conditions. Shipping services between domestic ports may be required to be 
carried out by domestically owned, operated, built and/or crewed ships. 
• Conferences 
Private sector arrangements between shippers that are held out to facilitate the 
planning and coordination of shipping traffic but typically also include anti-
competitive provisions. Governments that have enacted general competition laws 
usually permit the existence of conferences through exemptions from the price setting 
and collusion provisions of their domestic competition legislation. 
• UN Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (UN Liner Code) 
Stipulates that conference trade between two economies can allocate cargo according 
to the 40:40:20 rule, whereby 40% of tonnage is reserved for the national flag lines of 
each economy and 20% is allocated to liner ships from a third economy. 
• Cargo sharing 
Other types of arrangements that stipulate the allocation of cargo on particular routes 
between parties to bilateral and multilateral agreements. 
• Bilateral agreements 
Agreements between two economies that primarily restrict the supply of shipping 
services and the allocation of cargo. Some bilateral agreements also restrict the use of 
port facilities. 
 
Many developing economies do not have general competition laws or any legislative 
framework for regulating the behaviour of shipping conferences. However, in recent times 
conferences have been subjected to increasing competition. They no longer dominate shipping 
routes and are no longer regarded as the impediments to maritime performance that they once 
were. PDP Australia and Meyrick and Associates (2005) note that within ASEAN, cargo 
reservation measures have been very significantly reduced and in many cases completely 
abandoned. Similarly, a growing number of economies have ‘open’ ship registries, which 
means that local ship registration is no longer tightly tied to local ownership of the shipping 
company. This leaves cabotage restrictions, along with inadequate and aging infrastructure, as 
the main impediments to economic performance in shipping services in many economies. 
 
These regulatory restrictions on shipping services have been shown to be costly, particularly 
to developing economies. Kang (2000) found that the maritime restrictions imposed by goods 
exporting economies appear to have a much greater impact on bilateral shipping margins (as 
measured by cif/fob ratios) than those imposed by importing economies. He also found that 
in exporting economies, lowering restrictions such as cabotage and port services restrictions 
had a greater effect on margins than reducing restrictions on the commercial presence of 
foreign suppliers. In several applications of these findings, the sum total of restrictions on 
shipping and port services was found to have inflated shipping costs by around 30% in 
Morocco (Dee 2006) and by around 26% in Indonesia (Dee 2008). 
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The index of regulatory openness compiled by Bertho (2010) covers some of the key 
measures affecting maritime transportation. Table 2.2 shows the index and its components, 
where an index value of 1 indicates full openness, a value of 0 denotes full restrictiveness and 
intermediate values denote partial restrictions (see the original paper for details). The index 
covers cabotage restrictions, cargo handling restrictions, quotas for private or government 
cargo, the availability of exemptions for carrier agreements from competition law and the 
existence of an independent regulatory authority. It also covers measures that fall squarely 
into the category of barriers to services trade – foreign equity limits, limits on the legal form 
of establishment (branches, subsidiaries) of foreign greenfield operations, whether foreign 
operators can take a controlling stake in existing private or public entities and whether there 
are nationality requirements on the employees or boards of directors of foreign companies. 
 
The table confirms that cabotage restrictions are the predominant restrictions on maritime 
services among APEC economies. Hong Kong, China is the most liberal APEC member, 
followed by Chile; New Zealand; and Australia. The least liberal is Viet Nam, which does not 
have a deep sea port, so most goods are transported to Singapore and Hong Kong, China 
before going on to final destinations. Foreign firms usually provide cross-border services via 
a Vietnamese (wholly domestic) agency, which does everything on behalf of foreign 
suppliers in Viet Nam and earns a commission from the foreign partners (Dee 2010a).  
 
2.2.3 Rail transport 
 
Rail can be a very efficient means of transporting cargoes, especially bulky ones, once they 
are loaded onto the trains, but the loading and unloading is costly. By contrast, road freight 
transport may be less efficient in moving large cargos but it can operate door-to-door, often 
avoiding a cycle of loading and unloading. Similar tradeoffs apply in the economics of rail 
passenger transport. Furthermore, rail operating costs make it more economic than road for 
moving freight over longer distances, while over short distances road transport dominates. 
For these reasons, rail transport plays a surprisingly minor role in many economies’ transport 
networks. For example, in Indonesia rail transport accounts for only 7% of passenger 
transport and less than 1% of freight transport (Dee 2008). 
 
In rail services the natural monopoly elements are the track bed, while rolling stock (railcars) 
can be leased or bought by competitors and operated on the incumbent’s rail tracks (subject to 
an adequate access regime, timetabling and safety standards). ‘Horizontal separation’ is the 
term given to competition in the market (e.g., via the free entry of freight operators) or for the 
market (e.g., via tendering or franchising arrangements for passenger services). However, to 
promote effective competition, it may be necessary to require the track operator to become a 
separate corporate entity without any interest in passenger or freight operations (‘vertical 
separation’). Without such an interest, the track operator will have an incentive to maximise its 
revenue by maximising traffic. With such an interest, it may have an incentive to restrict the 
access of competitors to promote the profitability of its own passenger or freight operations.  
 
Cantos, Pastor and Serrano (2010a) examined the effects of horizontal and vertical separation 
in European railways. They found that the reforms had been beneficial in terms of efficiency 
(allowing laggards to catch up to leaders) and productivity (also incorporating the benefits of 
technical change through innovation). Key drivers of both types of benefits were vertical 
separation and the free entry of new freight operators. No significant effects on either efficiency 
or productivity were found for the introduction of tendering systems in passenger traffic. 
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Table 2.2: Index of policy openness in maritime transport. 
APEC member Quotas Competition law exemptions 
Form of 
ownership 
Percentage 
of 
ownership 
Acquisition 
domestic 
entity 
Nationality 
reqt 
employees 
Nationality 
reqt BOD Cabotage 
Cargo 
handling 
Independent 
regulatory 
authority 
Simple 
average 
Australia 1 0 0.5 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0.75 
Canada 1 1 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 na 1 0.61 
Chile 1 1 1 1 1 na na 0 na 1 0.86 
China 1 1 0.5 0.49 0 1 1 0 1 0 0.60 
Hong Kong, China 1 1 1 1 na na na nr 1 na 1.00 
Indonesia 0.5 1 0.5 0.49 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.65 
Japan 1 0 0.5 1 1 na 0 0 1 1 0.61 
Republic of Korea 1 0 0.5 1 1 0 1 0 na 1 0.61 
Malaysia 1 1 1 0.3 0 na na 0 na 1 0.61 
Mexico 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 na 0 0.67 
New Zealand 1 0 0.5 1 1 na na 1 1 1 0.81 
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 na 0 0.56 
Philippines 0 1 0.5 0.4 na 1 0 0 0 1 0.43 
Russia 0 1 0.5 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0.65 
Singapore 1 0 0.5 1 na na na nr 1 na 0.70 
Chinese Taipei 1 0 1 na na na na 0.5 0 0 0.42 
Thailand 0.5 1 1 0.49 0 1 0 0 0 0 0.40 
United States 0 0 0.5 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0.45 
Viet Nam 1 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 
Source: Bertho 2010. 
Note: na = not available; nr = not relevant; 0 = close, 1 = open. 
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The index of policy openness compiled by Cantos, Pastor and Serrano (2010b) covers some 
of these elements of rail regimes in APEC economies. Table 2.3 shows their index 
components (some values available when this study was undertaken are provisional), where 
an index value of 1 indicates openness, and a value of 0 denotes restrictiveness. The index 
covers vertical separation, free entry into freight operations and franchising in passenger 
services. 
 
The table indicates that Australia; Chile; Mexico; Peru; and Russia have regimes that are 
most conducive to competition in rail services. The most restrictive regulatory regimes are in 
many of the East Asian members of APEC. 
 
Table 2.3: Index of policy openness in rail transport. 
APEC member 
Vertical separation of 
infrastructure and 
operations 
Free entry in freight 
operations 
Franchising in passenger 
services 
Australia 1 1 1 
Canada 0 0 1 
Chile 1 1 1 
China 0 0 0 
Hong Kong, China nr nr nr 
Indonesia 1 0 0 
Japan 0 1 1 
Republic of Korea 1 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 
Mexico 1 1 1 
New Zealand 0 1 1 
Peru 1 1 1 
Philippines 0 0 0 
Russia 1 1 1 
Singapore nr nr nr 
Chinese Taipei 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 
United States 0 1 1 
Viet Nam 0 0 0 
Source: Cantos et al. 2010b. 
Note: nr = not relevant; 0 = close, 1 = open. 
 
2.2.4 Electricity 
 
The production of electricity involves generation, transportation over high voltage lines 
(transmission), transportation over low voltage lines (distribution) and marketing to retail 
consumers (supply). Transport operations are considered to be natural monopolies and 
typically remain regulated, even after structural reform. But generation is seen as a 
competitive activity and is generally the first activity to be opened to competition, followed 
by wholesale trading and retail supply. However, retail prices may remain regulated in some 
economies, even after structural reform. 
 
Doove et al. (2001) describe the broad outlines of the structural reform agenda in electricity as: 
• structurally separating (unbundling) the competitive activities (particularly generation, 
but sometimes also retailing) from the natural monopoly elements (particularly 
transmission, but occasionally sometimes also distribution); 
• dividing existing generation capacity among a number of different generation 
companies, who then compete with each other (horizontal separation); 
• allowing new generators to enter the market; 
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• guaranteeing open and non-discriminatory access for all generators to the 
transmission grid (subject to available capacity), so they can sell directly to 
downstream suppliers or users rather than to the incumbent (third party access); 
• establishing a wholesale price pool, or spot wholesale market, for electricity (either 
mandatory or optional), so that new entrants are not obliged to enter both the 
generation and retailing sector at the same time, thus lowering entry costs;  
• regulating natural monopoly activities to prevent any abuse of market power; 
• introducing a regulator that is independent of industry players and day-to-day 
influence, and typically separate from the system operator; 
• enabling large customers (retailers and sometimes large industrial users) to buy 
electricity directly from the generator of their choice; 
• introducing competition into metering and billing activities and contract terms, thus 
allowing retail customers the freedom to choose among different electricity suppliers; 
• providing a full range of tradable financial instruments (e.g., futures contracts and 
options); 
• undertaking partial or complete privatisation or corporatisation of publicly-owned 
assets; 
• introducing cross-ownership restrictions, especially between competitive and natural 
monopoly activities; 
• liberalising restrictions on foreign investment and ownership; 
• mandating service quality standards; and 
• allowing retailers to introduce innovative services (e.g., the ability to switch retailers 
over the Internet or providing electricity jointly with other services such as telephony 
and gas).  
 
One of the first empirical assessments of the effects of electricity reform was Steiner’s (2000) 
study of OECD members over the 1986–96 period. She found that unbundling of generation, 
third party access and the introduction of wholesale electricity markets were all associated 
with lower electricity prices. However, she found that private ownership was not necessarily 
associated with increased competition. Nevertheless, both private ownership and unbundling 
of generation and transmission were found to be associated with a higher rate of utilisation of 
existing generation capacity, and with reserve plant margins that were closer to optimal. 
 
Two other recent studies have been less definitive. Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) undertook a 
similar study of OECD members over the slightly later period of 1987–99, although their 
measurement of variables (particularly prices) was different. They found that giving customers 
access to alternative suppliers (which they argue is highly correlated with third party access) 
was associated with lower prices. However, unlike Steiner, they did not find a significant effect 
of unbundling or the introduction of a wholesale spot market on prices. Nagayama (2007) 
undertook a broadly similar study of 83 economies over the 1985–2002 period. He found that 
neither unbundling nor the introduction of a wholesale pool market on their own would 
necessarily reduce electricity prices. In fact, contrary to expectations, there was a tendency for 
the price to rise. However, coexistent with an independent regulatory, unbundling could work 
to reduce prices. He also found that privatisation, the introduction of foreign independent 
producers and retail competition could lower electricity prices in some regions, but not all.  
 
To some extent these mixed results are a sign that in some economies reforms may not have 
been taken far enough. Either the reforms were not taken far enough to have any real effect or 
there were not enough reforms in the chosen samples for econometric techniques to discern 
any significant effects. Dee (2010b) found more evidence of significant benefits from 
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structural reforms among OECD members, over a period of more active reform associated 
with the European Union’s Second Electricity Directive. 
 
The index of policy openness compiled by Dee (2010b) covers some key dimensions of 
electricity regimes in APEC economies. Table 2.4 shows the index components, where an 
index value of 1 indicates openness and a value of 0 denotes restrictiveness. The index covers 
unbundling, third party access and the existence of a deregulated wholesale electricity market.  
 
APEC economies with regimes that are most conducive to competition in electricity 
generation are Australia; Chile; the Republic of Korea; New Zealand; the Russian Federation; 
and Singapore. The most restrictive regulatory regimes are in Indonesia; Hong Kong, China; 
Malaysia; Mexico; Chinese Taipei; and Viet Nam. 
 
Table 2.4: Index of policy openness in electricity. 
APEC member Third party access Wholesale price pool Unbundling 
Australia 1 1 1 
Canada 1 1 0 
Chile 1 1 1 
China 0 1 1 
Hong Kong, China 0 0 0 
Indonesia 0 0 0 
Japan 1 1 0 
Republic of Korea 1 1 1 
Malaysia 0 0 0 
Mexico 0 0 0 
New Zealand 1 1 1 
Peru 1 0 1 
Philippines 0 0 1 
Russia 1 1 1 
Singapore 1 1 1 
Chinese Taipei 0 0 0 
Thailand 0 0 0 
United States 1 0 1 
Viet Nam 0 0 0 
   Source: Dee 2010b. 
   Note: 0 = closed, 1 = open. 
 
2.2.5 Gas  
 
Natural gas is found in underground reserves, often in combination with oil and condensate 
products. Exploration and production is generally done by oil companies, and there are few 
synergies between this and other activities in gas markets. In economies without indigenous 
production, however, the primary supply activity is undertaken by importers, who may also 
be involved in downstream activities. 
 
In many economies, gas importation, transmission and storage was traditionally undertaken by 
a single monopolist, or several companies with regional monopolies. Sometimes the monopoly 
importer also sold to end users, or else these sales were handled by downstream monopolies. 
 
Like electricity, structural reform of gas markets involves allowing new entrants into the 
potentially competitive segments of the market, without requiring them to be vertically 
integrated. This can involve new companies producing gas or importing it from external 
sources, in competition with the incumbent(s). It can involve new shipper/suppliers buying gas 
on wholesale markets, arranging for its transportation with the network company and signing 
Modelling the benefits of structural reforms in APEC economies 41 
retail contracts with consumers. It can also involve pure traders buying and selling on 
wholesale markets to take advantage of arbitrage opportunities (European Commission 2007). 
 
These new activities rely on the development of functioning wholesale markets and on third 
party access to transmission and distribution networks. To reduce the possibility of 
incumbents using their control over pipeline or terminal facilities to thwart competition, both 
transmission and distribution can be unbundled into separate transmission system operators 
and distribution system operators. When such operators are sufficiently independent from 
incumbents, they have an incentive to maximise, rather than restrict, the amount of gas sold 
through their networks, thus facilitating competition. 
 
Thus the broad features of structural reform in gas markets are similar to those in electricity 
markets, though the scope for competition in primary production/importing is somewhat 
more limited than in electricity generation. 
 
There are relatively few studies of the effects of structural reform in gas markets. Jamasb, 
Pollitt and Triebs (2008) studied the effects of United States regulatory reform on 
productivity and found that encouraging competition has been rather successful in raising 
productivity. Hawdon (2003) found evidence that the types of reforms introduced in the 
United Kingdom are associated with higher levels of efficiency, good utilisation of labour 
and levels of underutilisation of capital sufficient to support the development of competitive 
markets. Nevertheless, Brakman, van Marrewijk and van Witteloostuijn (2009) warn that lack 
of competition and capacity constraints in gas production/import can prevent these gains 
being passed on to consumers. 
 
The index of policy openness compiled by Dee (2010b) covers some of these key dimensions 
of gas regimes in APEC economies. Table 2.5 shows the index components, where an index 
value of 1 indicates openness and a value of 0 denotes restrictiveness. The index covers 
unbundling of production/import, unbundling of supply, third party access, the absence of 
entry restrictions and the presence of retail competition.  
 
APEC economies with regimes that are most conducive to competition in gas markets are 
Australia; Canada; New Zealand; and the USA. The most restrictive regulatory regimes are in 
Hong Kong, China; the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Russian Federation; Chinese 
Taipei; and Viet Nam. 
 
2.2.6 Telecommunications 
 
As reflected in the WTO Reference Paper on telecommunications, the reforms of the 1990s 
recognised that efficiency gains could be had by introducing competition into those 
components of the telecommunications network that were not natural monopolies. However, 
competitors would need access to the monopoly elements (typically the ‘last mile’) in order 
to provide a full retail service. According to the Reference Paper, access regimes should 
provide competitors with access to essential facilities at access charges that were cost-based 
and non-discriminatory. The appropriate regulation of access charges is a complex issue, 
although sometimes made more complex than necessary when access charges (as a single 
policy instrument) are used to pursue multiple objectives (Dee & Findlay 2008). 
 
A related requirement for promoting contestability was to ensure the general interconnectivity 
of the facilities of various competitors, whether or not they constituted essential facilities. This 
was required so the subscribers of one provider could make calls to subscribers of all other 
providers, irrespective of the ownership of the various network components involved. Various 
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Table 2.5: Index of policy openness in gas. 
APEC member 
Third 
party 
access 
Retail 
competition 
Absence of 
entry 
restrictions 
Unbundling of 
production/import 
Unbundling 
of supply 
Australia 1 1 1 1 0 
Canada 1 1 1 1 1 
Chile 0 0 1 1 0 
China 0 1 1 0 1 
Hong Kong, China 0 0 0 0 0 
Indonesia 1 0 1 1 0 
Japan 1 1 0 0 0 
Republic of Korea 0 0 0 0 0 
Malaysia 0 0 0 0 1 
Mexico 1 1 0 0 0 
New Zealand 1 1 1 1 0 
Peru 1 0 0 1 0 
Philippines 0 0 0 0 0 
Russia 0 0 0 0 0 
Singapore 1 1 0 1 0 
Chinese Taipei 0 0 0 0 0 
Thailand 1 0 0 1 0 
United States 1 1 1 1 1 
Viet Nam 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Dee 2010b. 
Noted: 0 = closed, 1= open. 
 
regulatory principles were also developed to ensure that interconnection charges were not 
used by the incumbent to preserve network dominance (Economides, Lopomo & Woroch 
1996, ITU 2000).  
 
A further component of these reforms was ensuring number portability, so that retail 
subscribers could take their original phone number with them if they switched providers. This 
was necessary to reduce the cost of ‘shopping around’, and thus to increase the competitive 
pressures on providers. 
 
A key supporting component of these pro-competitive reforms was to revise the ways in 
which universal service obligations were met. To that point these obligations had often been 
met by cross-subsidies built into the retail prices of telecommunications services that 
provided competitors with a chance to cherry-pick the lucrative long-distance parts of the 
market and left incumbents with fewer options to cover their fixed costs. Their response was 
often to inflate the wholesale access prices charged to competitors for access to the essential 
facility. Of course, this worked to defeat the introduction of competition. A key reform 
component of the 1990s, therefore, was to ‘rebalance’ retail prices to remove the cross-
subsidies and ensure that fixed costs were covered, and to find other ways to fund universal 
service obligations – typically either directly from the government budget or through an 
industry levy imposed on all service providers. 
 
Since then, a number of technological advances have in some ways radically transformed the 
industry. The first key development has been the phenomenal growth of mobile telephony. 
This technology has few natural monopoly elements, so it has allowed extensive entry by 
new providers. To the extent that mobile services provide a close substitute to fixed-line 
services, competition from this source can discipline the behaviour of fixed-line service 
providers and reduce the need for regulatory intervention or oversight. The two services are 
close substitutes for individuals and perhaps even households. But businesses of any size 
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typically also need fixed-line connections to meet the sheer volume of their voice and data 
needs. Most governments have therefore retained the kind of regulatory structures described 
in the WTO Reference Paper. 
 
A second key development has been the growth of internet services, particularly broadband. 
These services, which combine developments in the size and nature of the ‘pipe’ with 
developments in switching and signal transmission technology, have made it technologically 
meaningless to distinguish voice from data traffic. This is the essence of ‘convergence’. So 
now there is an imperative for regulatory structures to acknowledge this convergence. The 
key way in which this is happening is in the move from ‘individual’ to ‘general’ or ‘class’ 
licensing, not just for carrier licences but also for licences to access the spectrum required for 
mobile and fixed wireless technologies. Typically, individual licences were not only attached 
to a particular technology, they were also attached to a particular service. General licences are 
less tied to particular services, and will often allow both voice and data transmission, 
although most governments are not yet ready to include broadcasting services in the bundle.  
 
The proliferation of delivery technologies for broadband services (such as ADSL, fibre optic, 
fixed wireless) has also provided an imperative for regulatory structures to be ‘technology-
neutral’. This is also facilitated by the move from ‘individual’ to ‘general’ or ‘class’ 
licensing, since general licences are typically no longer tied to a particular technology. 
 
But there are limits on the extent to which regulatory structures can be completely 
technology-neutral. This is because a key rationale for regulatory intervention remains 
dealing with ‘natural monopoly’ components of the network, and the nature and extent of the 
natural monopoly problem depends on the particular technology in question. Thus, given the 
rapid development and proliferation of technologies, there may be no ‘one-size-fits-all’ best 
approach to regulation. The most recent ITU survey of trends in reform (ITU 2008) stresses 
the importance of ensuring interconnectivity across all technologies and all providers, in 
order to maximise the use that will be made of any particular facility. The report is subtitled 
‘Six Degrees of Sharing’, and notes (p. 1): 
In a way, many regulatory practices can be viewed as sharing. What is new and 
innovative is their application to meet the needs of developing economies. What is the 
same is that they use time-tested, pro-competitive tools, such as the regulation of 
essential or bottleneck facilities, transparency, and the promotion of collocation and 
interconnection. 
Nevertheless, there is considerable current uncertainty about which technologies may become 
dominant in the future, and as noted, the scope of such regulation depends on the technology. 
Economies may not necessarily be sure to ‘pick the best winner’ but they can at least ensure 
that their regulatory regimes are internally consistent. For example, economies making a 
serious commitment to fibre optic technologies could need to put more regulatory effort into 
access regimes than economies relying more on mobile and fixed wireless technologies. 
 
As well as technological developments, services trade reform has also been an important 
vehicle for promoting the contestability of market, and the potential benefits have been 
shown to be significant. Mattoo, Rathindran and Subramanian (2001) estimated that 
economies with fully open telecommunications and financial sectors grow up to 1.5 
percentage points faster than other economies. The analysis of Warren (2000) suggested that 
in the ASEAN 5, the regulatory restrictions then affecting domestic new entrants would have 
raised the prices of their services by an average of over 10%, while the additional 
discrimination (including foreign equity limits) against foreign-invested suppliers would have 
raised the cost of their services by more than 80%. 
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The overall coherence of regulatory regimes can ultimately be judged according to whether 
they have engendered a competitive market structure. An index of policy openness has been 
compiled for this paper, using information from Lee, Ure and Lee (2010) and ITU sources. It 
focuses mainly on market structure and is based on that used by Warren (2000). Tables 2.6 
and 2.7 show the index components, where a higher value denotes more openness and a 
 
Table 2.6: Index of policy openness in fixed-line telecommunications. 
APEC member Number of competitors 
Comp. 
- local 
Comp. 
- long 
dist. 
Comp. - 
internat. 
Comp. 
- data 
Comp. 
- 
leased 
lines 
Portion 
incumb. 
privat-
ised 
Max % 
FDI in 
comp. 
carriers 
Australia 3 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.5 1 
Canada 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.46 
Chile 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
China 3 1 1 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.49 
Hong Kong, China 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indonesia 3 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 1 0.5 0.3 
Japan 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Republic of Korea 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.49 
Malaysia 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.49 
Mexico 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.49 
New Zealand 3 1 0.5 1 0.5 1 1 1 
Peru 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Philippines 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.4 
Russia 2 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0 0.5 0 
Singapore 2 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 1 
Chinese Taipei 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0.6 
Thailand 3 1 1 1 1 1 0 0.49 
United States 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Viet Nam 3 1 1 1 1 1 0.5 0 
Source: Based on Chapter 7 in this report and ITU sources. 
Note: 0 = close, 1 = open. 
 
Table 2.7: Index of policy openness in mobile telecommunications. 
APEC member Number of competitors Competition 
Portion incumbent 
privatised 
Max % FDI in 
competitive carriers 
Australia 3 1 0.5 1 
Canada 3 1 0.5 0.46 
Chile 3 1 1 1 
China 3 1 0.5 0.49 
Hong Kong, China 3 1 1 1 
Indonesia 3 1 0.5 0.3 
Japan 3 1 1 1 
Republic of Korea 3 1 1 0.49 
Malaysia 3 1 0.5 0.49 
Mexico 3 1 1 0.49 
New Zealand 3 1 1 1 
Peru 3 1 1 1 
Philippines 3 1 1 0.4 
Russia 2 1 0.5 0 
Singapore 2 1 0.5 1 
Chinese Taipei 3 1 0.5 0.6 
Thailand 2 1 0 0.49 
United States 3 1 1 1 
Viet Nam 3 1 0.5 0 
Source: Based on Lee, Ure & Lee 2010 and ITU sources. 
Note; 0 = closed, 1= open. 
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lower value denotes less. The tables give the number of competitors in fixed and mobile 
markets (where more than three competitors receive a score of three). They record the state of 
competition in the mobile market and various segments of the fixed-line market, and record 
the portion of fixed and mobile incumbent operators that are privatised (where any type of 
partial privatisation receives a score of 0.5), and the portion of foreign ownership that is 
allowed in competitive carriers in fixed and mobile markets. 
 
The results confirm that fixed and mobile markets in most APEC economies are now fully 
competitive. Despite this, there are residual restrictions on foreign ownership in most APEC 
economies. These are hard to rationalise, given the extent of competition that already exists. 
 
2.3 QUANTIFYING THE FIRST ROUND EFFECTS OF REFORM  
 
The policy indexes are arbitrary but they are not important by themselves. Instead, they 
provide inputs into econometric exercises that quantify the first round effects of policy 
restrictions on measures of economic performance in the sectors in question, while 
controlling for all the other factors that affect economic performance in those sectors. This 
methodology has been developed in the context of measuring and evaluating barriers to 
services trade (e.g., Findlay & Warren 2000), and can also be used to evaluate the effects of 
structural reforms. The performance measures used in the econometric exercises are often 
prices or price-cost margins, but sometimes quantities or costs.  
 
The econometric estimates of the effects of policy indexes on these measures of performance 
can be used to construct the counterfactual – what economic performance would be in the 
absence of the regulatory restrictions, holding all other factors constant. This counterfactual 
comparison gives the first round effects of structural reform. It can be seen as a ‘tax 
equivalent’ if the restrictions have raised price-cost margins, or a ‘productivity equivalent’ if 
the restrictions have raised real resource costs. Ideally, the econometric exercises should 
include a rich enough menu of performance measures to be able to determine which of these 
applies (Dee 2005). 
 
2.3.1 Air and maritime transport 
 
In this paper the first round effects of structural reforms in air and maritime transport have 
been derived from the econometric study by Sourdin (2010). She estimated the effects of 
policy restrictions in these sectors using the policy indexes presented in the previous section. 
Her measure of economic performance was the ad valorem transport costs incurred in 
shipping goods internationally using air or sea transport. She made use of data from four 
APEC economies – Australia; Brazil; Chile; and the USA – that compile detailed (6-digit), 
consistent data on import values on both a fob (free on board) and a cif (cost, insurance, 
freight) basis. Her measure of ad valorem transport costs was the percentage difference 
between cif and fob valuations, calculated separately (by commodity and source economy) 
for imports transported by air and by sea. Her controls in the estimation were the value of 
total imports between the economy pairs, the distance between them, the value-to-weight 
ratio of the particular import shipment and a product-specific fixed effect. Her estimated 
semi-elasticity of air transport costs with respect to the air transport restrictiveness index was 
0.055, meaning that a 0.1 unit reduction in the openness index would reduce transport costs 
by 0.55%. Her estimated semi-elasticity of maritime transport costs with respect to the 
maritime transport openness index was -0.487, meaning that a 0.1 unit increase in the 
openness index would reduce transport costs by 4.87% 
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Given further structural reforms in air and maritime transport in each APEC economy, it is 
assumed that the air restrictiveness indexes would all reach a value of zero, and the maritime 
openness indexes would all reach a value of unity. In air transport, this implies a range of 
reforms to air services agreements, to entry conditions for domestic and foreign carriers, and to 
ownership. In maritime transport, it implies the dismantling of any remaining entry restrictions, 
quotas or cargo sharing arrangements, and the granting of national treatment to foreign-owned 
carriers located domestically. The above semi-elasticities can be used to calculate the resulting 
percentage changes in air and maritime transport costs for each APEC economy. 
 
One key question for modelling purposes is whether to interpret these prospective cost 
changes as coming about because the price–cost margins of transport operators would be 
squeezed or because the real resource cost of shipping goods by air or sea would fall. Should 
the first round effects be interpreted as ‘tax equivalents’ or ‘productivity equivalents’? As 
will be seen, this difference in treatment can have a marked effect on the projected economy-
wide effects of structural reform. By itself, however, Sourdin’s (2010) econometrics does not 
resolve the issue. 
 
The issue is decided on a priori grounds. Price–cost markups are only likely to be inflated for 
significant periods of time if regulatory restrictions prevent entry – otherwise the excess profits 
are likely to be eroded by the entry of new service providers. But many kinds of regulatory 
restrictions are likely to raise real resource costs, particularly regulations that lead to shipping 
delays or prevent transport operators from configuring their transport routes to achieve network 
economies. In air transport, restrictive designation provisions can limit the entry of any new 
carriers on international routes, but other provisions, such as restrictive traffic rights, can 
prevent the achievement of network economies. In maritime, cabotage restrictions limit foreign 
but not domestic entry on domestic routes. Quotas and cargo handling restrictions can lead to 
shipping delays that add significantly to shipping costs.  
 
Overall, it is judged that the regulatory restrictions in air and maritime transport are likely to 
have raised transport costs rather than inflated the price-cost margins of international 
transport operators. So the first round effects of structural reform are interpreted as 
productivity improvements. They are shown for each APEC economy in Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
Nevertheless, this assumption is subjected to sensitivity testing in the next section, by 
assessing the economy-wide effects of an alternative treatment whereby half the first round 
impact is assumed to fall on price–cost margins. 
 
A second key question for modelling purposes is whether the first round impacts would fall 
only on the cost of shipping goods internationally or whether they would also affect the costs 
of domestic maritime and air services. Sourdin (2010) only measured the first effect. 
Nevertheless, the policy indexes for both air and maritime include regulatory restrictions that 
would also be expected to affect domestic services. Accordingly, in the modelling of the next 
section, the first-round productivity effects are assumed to fall on international air and sea 
transport margins, as well as on the domestic production of air and maritime transport 
services. Further, the effects are assumed to fall equally on domestically owned and foreign-
owned service providers, even though a few components of the indexes would be expected to 
affect foreign-owned carriers more than domestic ones. 
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Figure 2.1: Productivity improvements from structural reforms in air transport (%). (Source: Table 2.1 
and Sourdin 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Productivity improvements from structural reforms in maritime transport (%). (Source: 
Table 2:2 and Sourdin 2010). 
 
2.3.2 Rail transport 
 
The first round effects of structural reform in rail transport have been derived from the 
econometric study by Cantos, Pastor and Serrano (2010a). They estimated the effects of 
horizontal and vertical separation on the efficiency and productivity of rail operations, using 
data on 16 European railway systems from 1985 to 2005. In measuring efficiency and 
productivity, they used a production structure that recognised two outputs (passenger and 
freight transport) and four inputs (employees, passenger train supply, freight train supply and 
railway infrastructure). In examining the determinants of efficiency and productivity, they 
controlled for the share of passengers in the total transport task, measures of the size and 
density of the network, measures of passenger and freight occupancy, and individual and time 
fixed effects. 
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Their measured impacts of structural reforms on efficiency indicate how structural reforms 
can encourage railway operators to move towards the production frontier from a point inside 
it (typically by making better use of existing infrastructure facilities). The measured impacts 
on productivity also show how structural reforms can encourage technical progress in rail 
operations, moving the production frontier outwards (typically by encouraging better 
infrastructure facilities). In the context of rail operations in contiguous European economies, 
one of the ways in which technical progress could be achieved is via investments that lead to 
more seamless international rail services. This option is less easily available to APEC 
economies, which are spread around the Pacific Rim. In recognition of this, the current paper 
only makes use of the estimates of the effects of structural reforms on efficiency. Cantos, 
Pastor and Serrano (2010a) estimate the semi-elasticity of efficiency with respect to vertical 
separation as 0.025 and the semi-elasticity of efficiency with respect to free entry in freight 
operations as 0.083. Thus, free entry has a greater effect on efficiency than vertical separation 
(the relative impacts on productivity are the reverse).  
 
Given further structural reforms in rail transport in each APEC economy, it is assumed that 
the rail openness indexes would all reach a value of unity. This implies vertical separation 
and free entry in freight operations in those economies that do not yet have them. It does not 
necessarily imply any change in ownership. 
 
The above semi-elasticities can be used to calculate the resulting percentage changes in 
‘productivity’ (a term now used more broadly than by Cantos, Pastor and Serrano 2010a) in 
rail operations for each APEC economy. These are shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Productivity improvements from structural reforms in rail transport (%). (Source: Table 2.3 
and Cantos, Pastor & Serrano 2010b). 
 
2.3.3 Electricity and gas 
 
The first round effects of structural reforms in electricity and gas have been derived from the 
econometric study by Dee (2010). She estimated the effects of policy restrictions in these 
sectors using the policy indexes presented in the previous section. Her measures of economic 
performance were electricity and gas prices to industrial users in OECD economies over the 
1990–2008 period. Her controls for electricity prices were per capita GDP, the rate of 
urbanisation, the shares of hydro and nuclear in total generation and a linear time trend. Her 
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controls for gas prices were per capita GDP, the rate of urbanisation, pipeline length and a non-
linear time trend (to capture the upward movement of gas input costs). Looking only at the 
policy coefficients that were significantly different from zero, the coefficients measuring the 
impact on electricity prices (measured in USD PPP/kWh) of third party access, a wholesale 
price pool and unbundling were -0.0032, -0.0049 and -0.0075 respectively. This means that 
the introduction of third party access, a wholesale price pool and unbundling would reduce 
electricity prices by USD0.32, 0.49 and 0.75 per kWh, respectively. The coefficients measuring 
the impact on gas prices (measured in USD PPP/10e+7 kcal) of retail competition and the 
unbundling of production/import were -30.446 and -47.5065 respectively. This means that the 
introduction of retail competition and unbundling would reduce gas prices by USD30.45 and 
USD47.51 per 10+e7kcal, respectively. 
 
Given further structural reforms in electricity and gas in each APEC economy, it is assumed 
that the electricity and gas openness indexes would all reach a value of unity. This implies 
third party access, unbundling, wholesale markets and/or retail competition in economies that 
have not yet implemented these. It does not imply any change in ownership. 
 
The above coefficients can be used to calculate the resulting percentage changes in electricity 
and gas prices. It remains to decide whether these price changes would come about through 
changes in price-cost margins or through changes in productivity, because the econometrics 
does not resolve the issue. Consistent with the presumption of Steiner (2000), and with 
anecdotal evidence in economies such as Australia that have undergone significant reform, it 
is assumed that structural reforms would manifest primarily as productivity improvements. 
The estimated improvements are shown in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. This assumption is tested later 
via sensitivity analysis. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Productivity improvements from structural reforms in electricity (%) (Source: Table 2.4 and 
Dee 2010b) 
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Figure 2.5: Productivity improvements from structural reforms in gas (%). (Source: Table 2.5 and Dee 
2010b) 
 
2.3.4 Telecommunications 
 
The first round effects of structural reforms in telecommunications have been derived from 
an updated version of the econometric study by Warren (2000) (see Dee 2005). The main 
contribution of the updated study was to use a database with a slightly expanded coverage of 
economies, and to enter the subcomponents of the policy indexes separately into the 
econometric estimation. The database covered many more economies than just APEC 
members. The performance measures were the number of mainlines per 100 inhabitants and 
the number of cellular phones per 100 inhabitants. The controls in the fixed-line estimation 
were GDP per capita, household density, the percentage of mainlines connected to digital 
exchange and waiting lists as a percentage of mainlines. The controls in the mobile 
estimation were GDP per capita and population density. In both cases the relationship with 
per capita GDP was assumed to be cubic, to allow for ‘saturation’ levels of penetration. The 
policy variables were combinations of the indexes shown in Tables 2.6 and 2.7. Separate 
weighted average indexes of market access and national treatment for fixed and mobile 
telephony were calculated as in Warren (2000), where these indexes ranged between zero and 
one. The coefficients of fixed-mainline penetration with respect to market access and national 
treatment were 2.892 and 3.529 respectively, meaning that the full introduction of market 
access and national treatment would raise fixed-line penetration by 2.892 and 3.529 
percentage points respectively. The coefficients of mobile penetration with respect to market 
access and national treatment were 1.898 and 1.075 respectively, meaning that the full 
introduction of market access and national treatment would raise mobile penetration by 1.898 
and 1.075 percentage points respectively. 
 
Given further structural reforms in telecommunications in each APEC economy, it is 
assumed that the telecommunications indexes of market access and national treatment would 
all reach a value of unity. These reforms would predominantly involve the removal of 
remaining foreign equity limits. 
 
The above coefficients can be used to calculate the small percentage changes in fixed and 
mobile penetration. With the same price elasticity of -1.2 as assumed by Warren (2000), the 
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quantity effects can be converted to equivalent changes in price. It remains to be decided 
whether these changes would come about through changes in price–cost margins or through 
changes in productivity. In previous exercises, when strict licensing requirements limited 
entry, it was reasonable to assume that reforms would squeeze price–cost margins (e.g., Dee 
& Hanslow 2001). By now, most such entry requirements have been relaxed. Accordingly, 
the remaining small price reductions are assumed to accrue through changes in productivity, 
though once again this assumption is tested via sensitivity analysis. But as in previous 
exercises, the impact is assumed to be greater on foreign-invested than on domestic operators, 
because a greater portion of the limitations on market access and national treatment apply to 
them. The estimated improvements for foreign-invested operators are shown in Figure 2.6. 
The values for domestic operators are not shown, but are smaller. 
 
 
Figure 2.6: Productivity improvements from structural reforms in telecommunications (%). (Source: 
Tables 2.6–2.7 and Dee 2005). 
 
2.3.5 Summary 
 
In order to get an overall picture of the prospective reform task, Figure 2.7 presents an 
output-weighted average of the productivity improvements across all sectors in each APEC 
economy. The weighted average productivity improvements fall roughly in the range of 2% 
to 14%. The most extensive reform effort, and the largest resulting productivity gains (i.e., 
above 10%), are projected to occur in Indonesia; Malaysia; Mexico; the Philippines; Chinese 
Taipei; Thailand; and Viet Nam. 
 
To put these projected first round impacts of structural reform in perspective, Figures 2.8 and 
2.9 show the simple average tariff rates on agriculture and food and on manufacturing in each 
APEC economy. These would be the targets of further ‘at-the-border’ trade reforms. (Trade 
reform in agriculture and food would also target explicit subsidies on output and exports, and 
implicit subsidies on inputs, though these measures are not shown here.) The tariff estimates 
are derived from version 7 of the GTAP model database (Hertel 1997). The model’s tariff 
estimates are import weighted when aggregating from GTAP’s 57 sectors to the 25 sectors 
used in the current model. Simple averages are then taken when aggregating from 25 sectors 
to the two broad sectors shown in Figures 2.8 and 2.9. The average tariffs on manufacturing 
are in the same order of magnitude as the prospective productivity improvements from 
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Figure 2.7: Weighted average productivity improvements from structural reforms in transport, energy 
and telecommunications (%). (Source: Figures 2.1–2.6 and GTAP model database, version 7 in Hertel 
1997).  
 
structural reforms – up to 13%. In strictly numerical terms, the average tariffs on agriculture 
and food in some economies are far higher – up to 45%.  
 
The relative numerical magnitudes do not indicate relative economic significance, however. 
Tariffs induce large transfers from consumers to producers but much smaller welfare losses 
to the economy as a whole. By contrast, foregone productivity gains are a pure loss to the 
economy, so the welfare costs are much greater than those of a tariff of equivalent numerical 
size. The relative sizes are examined further in Section 2.4. 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Simple average tariffs on agriculture and food (%). (Source: GTAP model database, version 7 
in Hertel 1997) 
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Figure 2.9: Simple average tariffs on manufacturing (%). (Source: GTAP model database, version 7 in 
Hertel 1997) 
 
2.4 QUANTIFYING THE ECONOMY AND REGION-WIDE EFFECTS OF 
STRUCTURAL REFORMS 
 
The economy and region-wide effects of structural reforms have been projected using FTAP, 
a computable general equilibrium model of the world economy that is described in Box 2.1, 
documented fully in Hanslow, Phamduc and Verikios (1999), and is available for download 
at http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/staff/pdee.php. This model differs from the GTAP model 
(from which it is derived) by including a treatment of foreign direct investment, an important 
mode by which services are delivered.  
 
The measure of welfare in the FTAP model takes into account not just changes in the level of 
activity generated in each economy but changes in the amount of income from that activity 
that is retained by the residents of each economy. The distinction is important in a long-run 
context. One of the possible impacts of productivity-enhancing reforms is that they make 
each economy a more attractive destination for foreign direct investment. Not all the income 
from that investment will necessarily stay in the economy. However, the model has a fully 
articulated treatment of savings, investment and capital accumulation, so it takes into account 
how much of the return on foreign investment is repatriated overseas, and how much is re-
invested. Thus, the measure of economic well-being is related to the concept of gross national 
product (the income earned by residents of a region) rather than gross domestic product (the 
income generated in region). Hanslow (2000) has a good general treatment of welfare 
measures and welfare decomposition in computable general equilibrium models. 
 
The version of FTAP used here contains 20 regions – 19 APEC regions (excluding Brunei 
and Papua New Guinea, which are not represented in the underlying GTAP database) and a 
single ‘Rest of the world’ region. It contains 25 sectors, shown in Table 2.8. 
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54 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
Box 2.1: The FTAP model – GTAP with foreign direct investment. 
The FTAP model is a computable general equilibrium model incorporating services delivered via FDI. It was 
developed by Dee and Hanslow (2001). It differs in turn from GTAP (Hertel 1997), the ‘plain vanilla’ model 
from which it was derived, in three important respects.  
 
Firstly, because many services are delivered primarily via commercial presence, the modelling framework 
includes foreign direct investment and covers the production and trading activity of foreign multinationals 
separately. In other words, GTAP, the conventional multi-economy model, is split out by ownership as well as 
location. In the current version of FTAP, foreign ownership shares are estimated in the following way. 
International data on FDI stocks by sector and source economy have been compiled and extrapolated where 
necessary by the Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales (CEPII). Provisional estimates 
were kindly made available at the GTAP level of aggregation by Terry Walmsley. These data are scaled up from 
FDI stocks to the output of foreign affiliates, using FDI to sales ratios obtained from the United States 
International Trade Commission, and derived from the detailed statistics on the activities of foreign affiliates 
collected by the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. These estimates of the output of foreign affiliates by sector 
and source economy are then used to split out their costs and sales structures on a simple pro rata basis. 
Unfortunately, even the best statistics on the activities of foreign affiliates would not support a much more 
sophisticated derivation of costs and sales structures than this, and few economies collect such statistics. 
 
Secondly, by virtue of foreign ownership, at least some of the profits of foreign multinationals will be 
repatriated back to the home economies. Thus the profit streams in the conventional multi-economy model have 
to be reallocated from the host to the home economy, after provision is made for them to be taxed in either the 
home or host economy. This reallocation leads to a distinction between GDP – the income generated in a region 
–and GNP – the income received by residents of a region. The latter forms the basis of (although is not identical 
to) the welfare measure in FTAP. The information on profit repatriation comes from the Balance of Payments 
Statistics of the IMF. 
 
Finally, not all profits of foreign multinationals need be repatriated to the home economy. Some may be 
reinvested in the host economy. To account for this phenomenon and to allow for the effect that regulatory 
reform may have on both domestic and foreign direct investment more generally, the model makes provision for 
savings and capital accumulation. This is particularly important, since some regulatory barriers are aimed 
directly at limiting domestic or foreign equity participation. It is therefore important to capture how regulatory 
reform will affect not just foreign ownership shares, but also the total amount of productivity capacity available 
to an economy. National savings rates are derived from the macroeconomic data in the International Financial 
Statistics and Balance of Payments Statistics of the IMF. Government savings rates are derived from the 
Government Finance Statistics of the IMF. Household savings rates are calculated as a residual. 
 
The FTAP model also differs from GTAP in other respects. In particular, it allows for firm-level product 
differentiation, economies of scale and large-group monopolistic competition. This is also important, since 
services tend to be highly specialised, being tailored to the needs of individual customers. In the current version, 
economies of scale are assumed to be regional for services and global for all other sectors (Dee 2003). 
 
Source: Based on Dee & Hanslow 2001. 
 
Table 2.8: FTAP model sectors. 
Agriculture and food Other primary Manufacturing Services 
Grains Forestry and fishing Textiles and clothing Electricity 
Livestock and meat Mining Wood and paper products Gas 
Dairy  Chemicals Construction 
Other agriculture and food  Metals Trade 
  Fabricated metal products Other transport 
  Motor vehicles Water transport 
  Other transport equipment Air transport 
  Electronic equipment Communication 
  Other machinery and equip. Other services 
  Other manufacturing  
Source: FTAP model.  
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The first round impacts of prospective structural reforms in each economy are modelled via 
the productivity improvements to the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
shown in Figures 2.1 to 2.6. In each sector the productivity improvements are applied to 
domestic production, whether domestically owned or foreign invested, although as noted 
above the productivity shocks to domestic telecommunications firms are smaller than those to 
foreign-invested firms. In the case of rail transport, the productivity improvement can only be 
applied to a bigger ‘Other Transport’ sector, which also includes road transport and storage. 
Detailed input–output data available for the USA and Australia suggest that the rail industry 
could account for about 14% of this bigger aggregate, so 14% of the productivity 
improvements from Figure 2.3 is applied to the bigger sector.  
 
In air and maritime transport the productivity improvements are also applied to the 
international air and maritime transport margins used to transport merchandise out of each 
economy. In the model, as in the real world, such transport margins could be provided by 
transport operators in the source economy, the destination economy or any third party. As the 
econometrics of Sourdin (2010) demonstrates, the regulatory restrictions in these sectors 
currently penalise all these transport providers. 
 
In an alternative treatment of structural reform, half of the domestic gains are modelled as 
accruing in the form of productivity gains and half as reductions in the price-cost margins of 
domestically located service providers. This treatment is more in line with recent findings for 
the insurance sector, where licensing restrictions on entry still apply (Dee & Dinh 2008). It is 
not possible to provide a comparable ‘split’ treatment of the impact on international transport 
margins, because the FTAP model, like its GTAP source, does not allow for ‘taxes’ on 
international transport margins. In this alternative treatment, the initial ‘tax equivalents’ of 
regulatory restrictions on domestic producers are injected into the model’s database in as 
neutral a fashion as possible while maintaining database balance (using an FTAP analogue of 
GTAP’s Altertax procedure, Malcolm 1998), before being eliminated via a policy simulation. 
In the FTAP theoretical structure, the rents from such ‘tax equivalents’ in services accrue to 
producers rather than to the government. 
 
The FTAP model provides a long-run snapshot of how different each economy would look 
about 10 years after the reforms, compared to the situation at that same point in time if the 
reforms had not taken place. During the 10-year adjustment period, many other changes 
would affect each economy but they are not taken into account in the current analysis. For 
this reason, the results should not be interpreted as indicating the likely changes that would 
occur over time – this would require all changes, not just those in regulatory restrictions, to 
be taken into account.  
 
The distinction is important to keep in mind. Sometimes, to aid fluency, the results are 
couched as if key indicators ‘rise’ or ‘fall’. This does not mean that the indicators would be 
higher or lower than they are now. It means that at some future time they would be higher or 
lower than they would otherwise be. In both cases, in a growing economy, they could be 
higher than they are now. 
 
2.4.1 The economy and region-wide effects of structural reforms 
 
The projected effects of the structural reforms, undertaken jointly, on each APEC economy 
are shown in Figure 2.10, where to normalise for economic size, the absolute welfare gain in 
each economy has been expressed relative to its initial GDP. As noted, welfare changes give 
the effects on the economic well being of the residents in each economy, while real GDP 
56 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
measures the effects on its level of activity. Figure 2.11 also shows the projected effects on 
real GDP, measured as the percentage deviations from baseline, 10 years after the structural 
reforms. 
 
 
Figure 2.10: Welfare gains from structural reforms, relative to initial economic size (%). (Source: FTAP 
model projections) 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Gains in real GDP (% deviation from baseline). (Source: FTAP model projections) 
 
In both cases, not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between the gains from reform 
and the size of the reform task. The biggest gains in both welfare and real GDP, at about 5%, 
are projected to occur in Viet Nam, where the reform task is largest. Across all APEC 
economies, the simple correlation coefficient between the welfare gains in Figure 2.10 and 
the average productivity improvement in Figure 2.7 is 0.75. The correlation between the real 
GDP gains in Figure 2.11 and the average productivity improvements in Figure 2.7 is 0.71. 
The latter is slightly smaller than the former because economic activity in each economy is 
affected, more so than welfare, by reforms in other economies, not just reforms at home.  
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Modelling the benefits of structural reforms in APEC economies 57 
To get an initial indication of the extent of these ‘cross’ effects, Figure 2.12 shows the 
proportion of the welfare gain in each economy that is attributable to reforms at home, 
relative to reforms in all other APEC economies. The first observation is that, in all 
economies, an overwhelming proportion of the gains come from reforms at home rather than 
reforms in other economies. Thus, while the gains from joint reforms are considerable, there 
is no compelling reason for each APEC economy to wait for others to start. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Contribution to welfare from own and others’ structural reforms (% of total). (Source: 
FTAP model projections) 
 
The second observation is that in most APEC economies there are small gains to be had from 
the reforms of others. This is not a foregone conclusion, because productivity improvements 
are typically a double-edged sword – while they increase incomes in other economies and can 
encourage them to buy more from the home economy, they also improve the price 
competitiveness of other economies and induce substitution away from the home economy. 
Typically in these types of simulations, the latter effects dominate. The difference here is that 
structural reforms in other economies also reduce the cost of transporting merchandise 
exports from the home economy, because in most APEC economies a large portion of that 
transport task is undertaken by foreign rather than domestic transport operators. So this 
restores the balance in favour of the home economy. 
 
The three APEC economies that are not projected to gain from reforms elsewhere in the APEC 
region – Hong Kong, China; Japan; and the Russian Federation – all experience gains from 
their own reforms. Because Hong Kong, China is already an efficient and substantial supplier 
of maritime transport services to the rest of the region, it is projected to lose its relative position 
as others become more efficient in maritime services. Russia is already relatively efficient in 
electricity generation, having undertaken a virtual revolution in the organisation of its 
electricity sector in recent years, but it is projected to lose from more intensive competition in 
energy-intensive products as others become more efficient in electricity generation. Japan is 
also projected to lose from reforms in the gas sector in other economies. As will be seen later, 
one of the sectors that is often ‘crowded out’ in relative terms from these reforms is the motor 
vehicle sector, and Japan is a significant producer of motor vehicles, not only at home but also 
via its foreign direct investments elsewhere in the region. Figure 2.13 confirms these sectoral 
sources of loss to each of these economies. 
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Figure 2.13: Contribution to welfare from structural reforms in each sector (% of total). (Source: FTAP 
model projections) 
 
More broadly, Figure 2.13 gives the percentage contributions to the overall gains in each 
economy from the structural reforms in each sector. The biggest gains tend to come from 
reforms in air and maritime transport, because as Figures 2.1–2.6 demonstrate, this is where 
the biggest reforms tend to occur.  
 
2.4.2 Putting the gains in perspective 
 
Across the whole APEC region, structural reforms in transport, energy and 
telecommunications are projected to generate USD175 billion a year in additional real 
income (in 2004 dollars) relative to what would have accrued had no reforms occurred. This 
is a snapshot of the gains after a 10-year adjustment period. 
 
These gains can be put in perspective by comparing them to the potential gains from further 
at-the-border trade reform. Complete liberalisation of all remaining trade barriers in 
agriculture and food, other primary products and manufacturing by all APEC economies is 
projected to generate real income gains of just over USD100 billion a year after about 10 
years. These gains would be generated in sectors that currently produce about 
USD16 300 billion in output annually. This compares with the output of USD 3700 billion 
annually in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors that are undergoing the 
structural reforms.  
 
APEC-wide, therefore, the projected gains from the structural reforms are almost twice as big 
as the gains from liberalisation of merchandise trade. Yet the sectors where the structural 
reforms are occurring are less than a quarter of the size of those engaged in merchandise 
trade. When structural reforms lower real production costs rather than just squeeze profit 
margins, they can generate a ‘bang for the buck’ that is much greater than from trade reforms. 
 
As noted, however, it is not always certain that the structural reforms considered here would 
have their first round effects on productivity levels rather than price–cost margins, although 
there are a priori arguments in favour of this treatment. As a sensitivity test, half of the 
domestic gains are modelled as accruing in the form of productivity gains and half as 
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reductions in the price–cost margins of domestically located service providers. For technical 
reasons, the impact on international transport margins continues to accrue as a productivity 
gain, as before. In this alternative treatment, the APEC-wide real income gains from 
structural reforms are smaller, at USD116 billion a year. Part of this accrues from the 
domestic impacts of reform, which are now about 60% of those previously (about 
USD86 billion a year rather than USD145 billion a year). The remaining gains accrue from 
the impacts on international transport margins, which are the same as before (about 
USD30 billion a year). 
 
2.4.3 Adjustment costs 
 
As the term suggests, structural reforms cannot generate significant gains without also 
generating significant structural adjustments. 
 
Computable general equilibrium models can help to identify and quantify the extent of 
structural adjustments, measured by the relative gains and losses to sectoral output and 
employment in each economy. However, in a model with 20 regions and 25 sectors, the 
amount of detail that could potentially be presented is considerable (full detail is available on 
request from the author). In an attempt to condense the detail, Figures 2.14 and 2.15 show the 
output-weighted average, across all APEC economies, of the projected deviations from 
 
 
Figure 2.14: Deviation from baseline in sectoral output from own structural reforms – weighted average 
of all APEC economies (%). (Source: FTAP model projections) 
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baseline in sectoral output in each economy. Figure 2.14 shows the ‘typical’ (in this sense) 
sectoral response to an economy’s own reforms. Figure 2.15 shows the ‘typical’ response in 
one economy to reforms by all APEC economies. Obviously, the percentage deviations from 
baseline in at least some individual economies are more severe than the weighted averages. 
The extremes are examined shortly, in the context of employment changes rather than output 
changes. 
 
 
Figure 2.15: Deviation from baseline in sectoral output from all structural reforms – weighted average of 
all APEC economies (%). (Source: FTAP model projections) 
 
In the typical response to ‘own’ reforms, the sectors with output higher than otherwise are the 
services sectors undergoing the reforms. Their output deviations tend to be in direct 
proportion to their reform effort. Other sectors to gain in relative terms are those that are 
heavy users of these services. They tend to be metals (an intensive user of electricity), 
chemicals (an intensive user of gas) and wood and paper products (an intensive user of 
domestic transport services). Construction also typically gains slightly from the additional 
impetus given to industry investment. 
 
The sectors projected to lose in relative terms from an economy’s own structural reforms are 
typically those that do not fall into the above categories. They suffer indirectly from higher 
wages and rates of return, effects that are induced primarily by expansions in overall activity. 
Industries typically losing in this way include textiles and clothing, motor vehicles, other 
transport equipment, electronic equipment and other machinery and equipment. The relative 
losses in industry output in these sectors are relatively minor, however. 
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When reforms in other APEC economies are taken into account, the deviations from baseline 
in sectoral output are typically smaller than for ‘own’ reforms. Thus structural reforms in 
other APEC economies can play a useful role in helping to cushion the adjustment costs of 
reforms at home, even if they do not add greatly to the overall gains from reform.  
 
Furthermore, a slightly wider set of industries are projected to gain in relative terms, 
including sectors that are intensive users of international transport margins and that benefit 
from transport reforms elsewhere. They can include meat and livestock, forestry and fishing, 
grains, dairy and other manufacturing. The relative output losses are therefore concentrated in 
a smaller set of industries, but are typically not as severe as with own reforms because of the 
gains from reforms elsewhere.  
 
Figures 2.14 and 2.15 give an indication of the typical industry output responses to reforms. 
But they do not show the full extent of adjustment costs. They show average responses rather 
than extreme ones and in sectors undergoing productivity improvements the employment 
effects can be much more severe than the output effects. The essence of productivity 
improvement is that an industry can produce more with less and, as a result, input usage can 
fall even as output rises. 
 
To capture the full extent of adjustment costs, Figure 2.16 shows, for each industry, the 
biggest relative gain and the biggest relative loss in sectoral employment of unskilled labour 
projected in any of the APEC economies. In air transport, for example, Figure 2.16 shows 
that the biggest relative gain in unskilled employment is projected to be about 150% (Hong 
Kong, China) while the biggest relative loss in unskilled employment is projected to be about 
10% (the USA). In water transport the biggest relative gain is shown to be about 90% 
(Thailand), while the biggest relative loss is almost 50% (Hong Kong, China). In dairy the 
biggest projected gain is over 70% (Malaysia, from a very small base), while the biggest 
relative loss is around 4% (Chinese Taipei). As the examples show, the particular economies 
in which the minimums and maximums occur can vary from sector to sector. The 
corresponding diagram showing the minimum and maximum changes in employment of 
skilled labour is similar, so is not shown here. 
 
By far the biggest relative losses in unskilled employment are projected to occur in the gas 
industry in Singapore (67%), the water transport industry in Hong Kong, China (46%) and 
the electricity industry in Chinese Taipei (34%). The first two cases are where substantial 
reform in the home economy has already taken place. These sectors lose employment, not as 
a result of their own productivity improvements but because the electricity or gas using 
industries in these economies lose their position as other economies reform. 
 
These relative employment losses need to be kept in perspective. If unskilled employment in 
maritime transport in Hong Kong, China is projected to be 46% lower than otherwise after 10 
years, then annual economic growth of 6.2% a year over each of those 10 years would ensure 
that the relative loss did not translate into an absolute one. Such a growth rate is not 
unreasonable for Hong Kong, China’s economy, particularly with the added boost to 
economic activity arising from reforms in other sectors. Similarly, if unskilled employment in 
electricity in Chinese Taipei is projected to be 34% lower than otherwise after 10 years, then 
annual economic growth of just over 4% a year would ensure that the relative loss did not 
translate into an absolute one. Perhaps the only sector that might experience an absolute 
employment loss as a result of the reforms considered here would be the gas industry in 
Singapore (where annual growth of over 9% would be required to prevent this outcome). 
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Figure 2.16: Deviation from baseline in unskilled employment from all structural reforms – APEC 
minimum and maximum (%). For clarity of presentation, the biggest relative employment gains in 
water and air transport, which are projected to occur in Viet Nam, are suppressed. If the more than 
four-fold increase in unskilled employment in these sectors were shown, it would unduly compress the 
results for other sectors. (Source: FTAP model projections) 
 
A further consideration is that while structural reforms may require significant reallocations of 
unskilled labour between sectors, they also generate higher real wages for unskilled workers. 
Figure 2.17 shows projected increases in real wages of unskilled labour of up to 6% as a result 
of structural reforms throughout the APEC region (the increases in skilled wages are similar). 
 
One of the best ways that APEC economies can guard against the adjustment costs associated 
with structural reforms is to maintain healthy underlying rates of economic growth. To some 
extent, structural reforms provide their own reward, in terms of stimulating activity and 
increasing the resilience of the economy, but prudent macroeconomic management is also 
crucial. 
 
For the particular structural reforms considered here, there is not much prospect that 
adjustment costs could be cushioned by accompanying the structural reforms with trade 
reforms. The reasons were hinted at earlier – the sectors that tend to lose in output terms from 
these structural reforms include textiles and clothing and motor vehicles, sectors that would 
also be penalised in at least some economies from trade reforms. However, there are 
prospects that a wider set of structural reforms could be more complementary with trade 
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reforms, in terms of cushioning adjustment costs. Such offsets are more likely if reforms 
targeted at the traded goods sectors are combined with reforms in sectors that cater more to 
the needs of households (e.g., Dee 2008). 
 
 
Figure 2.17: Deviation from baseline in real wages of unskilled labour arising from all structural reforms 
(%). (Source: FTAP model projections) 
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has examined the economy- and region-wide effects of prospective structural 
reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors of APEC economies. Key to 
these reforms is the introduction of additional competition into each sector. 
 
In air transport this implies a range of reforms to air services agreements, to entry conditions 
for domestic and foreign carriers and to ownership. In maritime transport it implies the 
dismantling of any remaining entry restrictions, quotas or cargo sharing arrangements and the 
granting of national treatment to foreign-owned carriers located domestically. In rail transport 
it implies vertical separation and free entry in freight operations in those economies that do 
not yet have them. In electricity and gas it implies third party access, unbundling, wholesale 
markets and/or retail competition in economies that have not yet implemented them. Note 
that no privatisation of incumbents is assumed in rail, electricity or gas. In 
telecommunications, the reforms predominantly involve the removal of remaining foreign 
equity limits.  
 
The estimated first round impacts of these reforms suggest that they could lead to weighted 
average productivity improvements in the range 2% to 14% across the sectors involved. The 
most extensive reform effort, but the largest productivity gains (i.e., above 10%), are projected 
to occur in Indonesia; Malaysia; Mexico; the Philippines; Chinese Taipei; and Viet Nam. 
 
There is strong correlation between the sizes of the reform tasks and the economy-wide gains 
they generate. Furthermore, in all economies, an overwhelming proportion of the gains come 
from reforms at home rather than in other economies. Thus, while the gains from joint 
reforms are considerable, there is no compelling reason for each APEC economy to wait for 
others to start. 
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Nevertheless, most APEC economies are also projected to reap small gains from reforms 
elsewhere. This is not a foregone conclusion, because productivity improvements elsewhere are 
a double-edged sword. The income and price effects on the home economy work in opposite 
directions, and very often the adverse price effects dominate. The difference here is that 
structural reforms in other economies also reduce the cost of transporting merchandise exports 
from the home economy. In most cases, this restores the balance in favour of the home 
economy.  
 
Across the whole APEC region, structural reforms in transport, energy and telecommunications 
are projected to generate USD175 billion a year in additional real income (in 2004 dollars), 
relative to what would have accrued had no reforms occurred. This is a snapshot of the gains 
after a 10-year adjustment period. 
 
APEC-wide, the projected gains from these structural reforms are almost twice as big as the 
gains from further liberalisation of merchandise trade. Yet the sectors where the structural 
reforms occur are less than a quarter of the size of those engaged in merchandise trade. When 
structural reforms lower real production costs, even by half as much as is estimated here, they 
generate a ‘bang for the buck’ that is much greater than from trade reforms. The findings of 
this paper therefore vindicate the decision of APEC leaders to move beyond a ‘border’ 
agenda to one that focuses on behind-the-border reforms. 
 
Yet structural reforms cannot generate significant gains without also generating significant 
structural adjustments. This paper has also examined the expected size and extent of those 
adjustments. 
 
At the sectoral level, the projected output gains tend to be in the services sectors undergoing 
reform and in the sectors that use those services intensively. These can include metals 
(intensive users of electricity), chemicals (intensive users of gas), wood and paper products 
(intensive users of domestic transport services), and a range of industries (meat and livestock, 
forestry and fishing, grains, dairy, other manufacturing) that are intensive users of 
international transport services. Construction is typically also projected to gain slightly from 
the additional impetus given to industry investment. 
 
The sectors projected to lose in relative terms are typically those that do not fall into the 
above categories. They suffer indirectly from higher wages and rates of return, effects that are 
induced primarily by the expansions in overall activity. Industries typically losing in this way 
include textiles and clothing, motor vehicles, other transport equipment, electronic equipment 
and other machinery and equipment.  
 
The relative losses in industry output in these sectors are relatively minor, however, and they 
are even smaller when reforms in other APEC economies are taken into account. Thus, 
structural reforms in other APEC economies can play a useful role in helping to cushion the 
adjustment costs of reforms at home, even if they do not add greatly to the overall gains from 
reform.  
 
The employment effects of structural reforms can be significant. The essence of a 
productivity improvement is that an industry can produce more with less. As a result, input 
usage can fall, even when output rises. Sectors which according to the modelling lose 
employment to a relatively large extent do so not as a result of their own productivity 
improvements but because the home industries that use their services lose their position as 
other economies reform. 
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In extreme cases, modelling indicates that relative losses in unskilled employment in a 
particular sector after 10 years can accumulate to upwards of 30%. But this modelling result 
needs to be kept in perspective. Employment changes occur over time and can be addressed 
through targeted structural assistance measures. Secondly, as long as an economy grows 
overall employment will increase, so the modelling shows that structural reforms may require 
significant relative shifts of labour across sectors over time. Thirdly, the model projects 
higher real wages for all workers in all economies. Modelling and real world examples 
demonstrate that displaced workers earn higher real wages in their new occupations. 
 
To reiterate, employment opportunities overall depend on the growth of an economy. Thus, 
one of the best ways that APEC economies can guard against any adverse employment 
effects of structural reform is to maintain healthy underlying rates of economic growth. 
Structural reform itself makes a contribution to this goal, since it adds to productivity, 
stimulates activity and increases the resilience of the economy, but prudent macroeconomic 
management is also crucial. 
 
 
66 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
2.6 REFERENCES 
 
Achard, P 2009. ‘The Regulation of International Air Cargo Services’, Mimeo, Sciences Po, Paris.  
 
Bertho, F 2010. ‘Maritime transport in Australia’, Chapter 13 in APEC Policy Support Unit, The Impacts and 
Benefits of Structural Reforms in the Transport, Energy and Telecommunications Sectors in APEC 
Economies, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
 
Brakman, S, C van Marrewijk & A van Witteloostuijn 2009. ‘Market Liberalisation in the European Natural Gas 
Market: The Importance of Capacity Constraints and Efficiency Differences’, CESifo Working Paper No. 
2697, CESifo Group, Munich. 
 
Brons, M, E Pels, P Nijkamp & P Rietveld 2001. ‘Price Elasticities of Demand for Passenger Air Travel: A 
Meta-Analysis’, Tinbergen Institute Discussion Paper TI2001-047/3, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam. 
 
Cantos, P, JM Pastor & L Serrano 2010a. ‘Vertical and horizontal separation in the European railway sector and 
its effects on productivity’, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, 44(2), pp. 1–25. 
 
Cantos, P, JM Pastor & L Serrano 2010b, ‘Quantifying the benefits from structural reforms in railway transport 
markets in APEC economies’, Chapter 5 in APEC Policy Support Unit, The Impacts and Benefits of 
Structural Reforms in the Transport, Energy and Telecommunications Sectors in APEC Economies, APEC 
Secretariat, Singapore. 
 
Dee, P 2003. ‘Modelling the policy issues in services trade’, Économie Internationale, 94–95, pp. 283–300. 
 
Dee, P 2005. ‘A Compendium of Barriers to Services Trade’, prepared for World Bank, available at 
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/pdf/Combined_report.pdf. 
 
Dee, P 2006. ‘The Economy-wide Effects of Moroccan Services Sector Reforms’, paper prepared for the World 
Bank, The Australian National University, Canberra. 
 
Dee, P 2007. ‘East Asian economic integration and its impact on future growth’, The World Economy, 30:3, 
pp. 405–23. 
 
Dee, P 2008. ‘Benchmarking and Assessing Indonesia’s Regulation of Services’, paper prepared for the World 
Bank, The Australian National University, Canberra. 
 
Dee, P 2010a. ‘Services Liberalisation toward the ASEAN Economic Community’, paper prepared for report on 
Tracing the Progress toward the ASEAN Economic Community, Economic Research Institute for ASEAN 
and East Asia (ERIA), Jakarta, forthcoming. 
 
Dee, P 2010b. ‘Quantifying the benefits from structural reforms in electricity and gas markets in APEC’, 
Chapter 6 in APEC Policy Support Unit, The Impacts and Benefits of Structural Reforms in the Transport, 
Energy and Telecommunications Sectors in APEC Economies, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
 
Dee, P & H Dinh 2008. ‘The Sectoral Impact of Barriers to Trade in Insurance: A Cost- and Profit-based 
Approach’, Mimeo, Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, 
Canberra. 
 
Dee, P & C Findlay 2008. ‘Trade in Infrastructure Services: A Conceptual Framework’, in A Mattoo, R Stern & 
G Zanini (eds), A Handbook of International Trade in Services, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 338–
55.  
 
Dee, P & K Hanslow 2001. ‘Multilateral liberalisation of services trade’, in R Stern (ed.), Services in the 
International Economy, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, pp. 117–39. 
 
Doove, S, O Gabbitas, D Nguyen-Hong & J Owen 2001. ‘Price Effects of Regulation: International Air 
Passenger Transport, Telecommunications and Electricity Supply’, Productivity Commission Staff Research 
Paper, Ausinfo, Canberra. 
 
Modelling the benefits of structural reforms in APEC economies 67 
Economides, N, G Lopomo & G Woroch 1996. ‘Regulatory pricing rules to neutralise network dominance’, 
Industrial and Corporate Change, 5:4, pp. 1013–28. 
 
European Commission 2007. ‘DG Competition Report on Energy Sector Inquiry’, SEC(2006) 1724, 
Competition DG, European Commission, Brussels. 
 
Findlay, C & T Warren (eds) 2000, Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy Implications, 
Routledge, London and New York. 
 
Gonenc, R & G Nicoletti 2000. ‘Regulation, Market Structure and Performance in Air Passenger Transport’, 
Working Paper No. 254, ECO/WKP(2000)27, Economics Department, Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, Paris. 
 
Grosso, MG 2008. ‘Liberalising Air Cargo Services in APEC’, GEM Working Paper, Sciences Po, Paris. 
 
Hanslow, K 2000. ‘A General Welfare Decomposition for CGE Models’, GTAP Technical Paper No. 19, Centre 
for Global Trade Policy Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette IN. 
 
Hanslow, K, T Phamduc & G Verikios 1999. ‘The structure of the FTAP model’, Research Memorandum, 
Productivity Commission, Canberra, December, available at http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/staff/pdee.php. 
 
Hertel, T 1997. Global Trade Analysis: Modelling and Applications, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
 
Hattori, T & M Tsutsui 2004. ‘Economic impact of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry: a panel 
data analysis for OECD countries’, Energy Policy 32, pp. 823–32. 
 
Hawdon, D 2003. ‘Efficiency, performance and regulation of the international gas industry – a bootstrap DEA 
approach’, Energy Policy 31, pp. 1167–78. 
 
ITU (International Telecommunications Union) 2000. ‘Fixed-Mobile Interconnection Workshop’, Document 
WFMI/04, ITU New Initiatives Program 20–22 September 2000, International Telecommunications Union, 
Geneva. 
 
ITU (International Telecommunications Union) 2008. Trends on Telecommunication Reform 2008, International 
Telecommunications Union, Geneva. 
 
Jamasb, T, M Pollitt & T Triebs 2008, ‘Productivity and Efficiency of US Gas Transmission Companies: a 
European Regulatory Perspective’, Cambridge Working Papers in Economics CWPE 0812, University of 
Cambridge.  
 
Kang, J 2000. ‘Price impact of restrictions on maritime transport services’, in C Findlay & T Warren (eds), 
Impediments to Trade in Services, Measurement and Policy Implications, Routledge, London and New 
York, pp. 189–200. 
 
Lee, R, J Ure & HC Lee 2010. ‘Quantifying the impacts of structural reforms in telecommunications markets in 
APEC economies’, Chapter 7 in APEC Policy Support Unit, The Impacts and Benefits of Structural Reforms 
in the Transport, Energy and Telecommunications Sectors in APEC Economies, APEC Secretariat, 
Singapore. 
 
Malcolm. G 1998. ‘Adjusting Tax Rates in the GTAP Database’, GTAP Technical Paper No. 12, Centre for 
Global Trade Policy Analysis, Purdue University, West Lafayette IN.  
 
Mattoo, A, R Rathindran & A Subramanian 2001. ‘Measuring Services Trade Liberalisation and its Impact on 
Economic Growth: An Illustration’, World Bank Working Paper No. 2655, World Bank, Washington DC. 
 
McGuire, G, M Schuele & T Smith 2000. ‘Restrictiveness of international trade in maritime services’, in C 
Findlay & T Warren (eds), Impediments to Trade in Services, Measurement and Policy Implications, 
Routledge, London and New York, pp. 172–88. 
 
68 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
Nagayama, H 2007. ‘Effects of regulatory reforms in the electricity supply industry on electricity prices in 
developing countries’, Energy Policy 35, pp. 3440–62. 
 
PDP Australia Pty Ltd and Meyrick and Associates 2005, ‘Promoting Efficient and Competitive Intra-ASEAN 
Shipping Services’, REPSF Project No. 04/001, Final Report, ASEAN Secretariat, Singapore. 
 
Piermartini, R & L Rousová 2008. ‘Liberalisation of Air Transport Services and Passenger Traffic’, Staff 
Working Paper ERSD-2008-06, Economic Research and Statistics Division, World Trade Organization, 
Geneva. 
 
Sourdin, P 2010. ‘Quantifying the impacts of structural reforms on international transport margins’, Chapter 3 in 
APEC Policy Support Unit, The Impacts and Benefits of Structural Reforms in the Transport, Energy and 
Telecommunications Sectors in APEC Economies, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
 
Steiner, F 2000. ‘Regulation, Industry Structure and Performance in the Electricity Supply Industry’, Working 
Paper No. 238, ECO/WKP(2000)11, Economics Department, OECD, Paris. 
 
Warren, T 2000. ‘The impact on output of impediments to trade and investment in telecommunications 
services’, in C Findlay & T Warren (eds), Impediments to Trade in Services: Measurement and Policy 
Implications, Routledge, London and New York, pp. 85–100. 
 
WTO (World Trade Organization) 2006. ‘Second Review of the Air Transport Annex: Developments in the Air 
Transport Sector (Part Two), Quantitative Air Services Agreements Review (QUASAR)’, Volumes I and II, 
Note by the Secretariat, S/C/W/270/Add.1, World Trade Organization, Geneva. 
 
Zhang, S & C Findlay 2010. ‘Quantifying the impacts of structural reforms on air traffic flows in APEC 
economies’, Chapter 4 in APEC Policy Support Unit, The Impacts and Benefits of Structural Reforms in the 
Transport, Energy and Telecommunications Sectors in APEC Economies, APEC Secretariat, Singapore. 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
QUANTIFYING THE IMPACTS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSPORT MARGINS 
 
 
Patricia Sourdin1
 
 
 
• Transport costs using sea and air freight are assessed using data on the difference 
between cif and fob prices of imported goods in a number of economies where those 
data are available. 
• The differences or ‘margins’ are explained by a variety of factors, including distance 
and the characteristics of the goods. 
• Having removed the influence of those factors, the maritime and air transport policy 
environments are significant explanators of variations in margins – more open 
environments lead to lower margins. 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Transport costs are often viewed as technologically determined but in practice they vary 
considerably across different bilateral trade flows. Some of the variation is due to distance 
and other geographical constraints and some reflects commodity composition of trade. 
However, port infrastructure and corrupt customs officials are policy-related trade barriers, 
while other determinants of transport costs may be indirectly policy related. For example, a 
lack of competition among shippers may be due to low volumes or to the non-implementation 
of an anti-monopoly policy. Variations related to institutional settings such as poor law 
enforcement increase trade risks and hence affect insurance rates and inventory costs. 
 
Understanding better what determines trade costs stems from their impact on international 
trade flows. Higher trade costs significantly impede trade for some, and since the major 
component of trade costs is undoubtedly the transport component, a better understanding of 
its determinants ensures policy makers are equipped with the best instruments with which to 
reduce them. 
 
This paper attempts to identify the major determinants of air and maritime transport costs for 
exports from APEC members towards four major trading partners – Australia; Brazil; Chile; 
and the United States of America (USA) – using commodity level data at the 6-digit level of 
aggregation of the Harmonised System (HS).2
 
 
The paper is organised as follows: Section 3.1 presents the background, Section 3.2 describes 
the data and presents some summary findings and trends, Section 3.3 discusses the 
determinants of transport cost, Section 3.4 presents the econometric analysis and results and 
Section 3.5 presents some conclusions. 
                                       
1 patricia.sourdin@gmail.com. 
2 The author is grateful to the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) for generously 
making the data available. 
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3.2 DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
The dataset used in all the analyses consists of import data collected by the customs agencies 
of four importing economies – Australia; Brazil; Chile; and the USA – at the 6-digit level of 
aggregation of the HS. The data contain detailed records of import value, weight, cost, 
insurance and freight (cif) values and free on board (fob) values and commodity codes for the 
years 1990–2008. In this section of the paper the trends in ad valorem transport costs over 
time are analysed as well as trends across exporting APEC members for 1990–2008. Ad 
valorem transport costs are calculated from the data as the difference between the cif and fob 
values divided by the fob value ((cif-fob)/fob) for each importer/exporter, year and 6-digit 
product combination. 
 
Trends in transport costs over time are calculated and analysed in the following ways: 
aggregate, ad valorem and import-weighted transport costs calculated for each exporting 
APEC member for each year by mode of transport. In addition, and following Hummels 
(2007) and Moreira, Volpe and Blyde (2008), ad valorem transport costs are calculated and 
adjusted for commodity composition and changes in the value to weight ratio over time. This 
is achieved by regressing 6-digit ad valorem transport costs on the value to weight ratio and 
year dummies and economy-pair-product fixed effects. The exponentiated, predicted ad 
valorem transport costs by year are the adjusted values which control for changing 
commodity composition and trade partners over time. 
 
Tables A1 to A3 (Annex 3) report the import-weighted ad valorem transport costs overall and 
by mode of transport for each APEC member to all four pooled importers. (The importers are 
pooled to alleviate the problem of a small number of transactions for some of the smaller 
APEC economies.) Table A1 highlights the fact that, in 2008, Mexico; Singapore; Malaysia; 
Canada; and Japan had the lowest value of ad valorem transport costs. Low values are also 
evident for Brunei and Papua New Guinea. However, the small number of trade flows from 
these two economies renders the values less statistically reliable. Overall, several APEC 
members had a reduction in transport costs of over 50% over the period under consideration. 
These include Chile; Mexico; New Zealand; Peru; the Russian Federation (where data is only 
available since 1992); Papua New Guinea; and Brunei. For ocean transport, the economies 
with a greater than 50% reduction in transport costs are Mexico; Chile; and Brunei, while for 
air transport they are Canada; China; Indonesia; Korea; and Chinese Taipei. 
 
Analysing trends by importing economy, Figures A1–A4 (Annex 3) graph average, import-
weighted ad valorem transport costs for each of the importing economies in the dataset. For 
the USA (Figure A1), the trend is downward for air transport costs, but otherwise there is not 
a great decline for sea transport or for APEC members in general. Australian imports, on the 
other hand, show a clear downward trend for all four series (Figure A2). Chilean and 
Brazilian imports (Figures A3 and A4) are more volatile but the trend is downward overall. 
Pooling the four importers in Figure A5 (Annex 3), shows a clear downward trend for air 
freight charges and significantly less so for sea freight, APEC freight costs and overall freight 
charges. 
 
Once we adjust for commodity composition, the changing value to weight ratios and changes 
in trading partners over time, the average overall transport costs are higher and exhibit 
smaller percentage declines over time (Table A4, Annex 3). The individual APEC 
economies’ adjusted transport costs are graphed in Figures A6a–A6c (Annex 3). 
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3.3 DETERMINANTS OF TRANSPORT COSTS 
 
There is an extensive literature which has examined the determinants of transport costs. 
Several factors have been found to have robustly and significantly influenced transport costs. 
 
Higher volumes of bilateral trade on routes allow shippers to take advantage of scale 
economies and thus lower freight charges. This is most likely to influence ocean shipped 
goods more than air shipped goods. Related to volume are trade imbalances, where high 
volumes of trade in one direction are not matched by the volumes of trade on the return leg. If 
vessels are forced to return empty, this will be reflected in the price charged for shipping. On 
some routes there are significant differences in the prices of hauling containers on eastbound 
and westbound directions of a unique route. When the trade imbalance is very high, such as 
the USA–Asia and Asia–USA routes, the price of transporting a container one way can be 
close to double the price of hauling it back (Containerisation International 2010). 
 
An obvious determinant of transport costs is geography, especially distance. Transport costs 
are increasing in distance but there are clearly non-linearities in this relation due to high fixed 
costs. Distance is strongly positively correlated with time, and increasingly, time costs 
influence the ability for exporters to fit into global supply chains which crucially depends on 
timely delivery. 
 
The presence of market power and lack of competition on routes will adversely affect freight 
charges. Similarly, restrictive regulatory policies related to transport services would 
significantly raise prices above marginal cost if they act to impede the competitive 
environment in which the transport sector operates. A measure of competition is the number 
of carriers servicing a particular economy as well as measures of restrictive regulatory 
environments. The number of carriers is obtained from UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping 
Connectivity Index (LSCI) which lists the number of liner companies operating on a route. 
For the general regulatory environment in the air and ocean transport sectors, two constructed 
indices are used – one for air and one for sea. Table 3.1 shows the values for APEC for the 
year 2008. China; the USA; and Hong Kong, China are the economies which have the highest 
number of liner companies operating on the route, which is to be expected given the large 
volumes of containerised trade for these economies. Table 3.1 also reports the values of the 
restrictiveness indexes for air and sea transport. For the sea index, higher values are 
associated with fewer restrictions while for the air index, higher values are indicative of a 
greater degree of restrictiveness. These policy indices were prepared as part of this project, by 
Bertho (Chapters 13 and 14) for sea transport and Zhang and Findlay (Chapter 4) for air 
transport. Annex 3 provides more detail on all the data and Chapter 4 includes a more 
detailed discussion of the air policy index. 
 
Higher quality infrastructure, higher quality of logistics services and improvements in and 
implementation of trade facilitation measures also play significant roles in lowering transport 
costs. Port and airport infrastructure affect transport costs in several ways. For example, 
technological advances mean that cargo can be loaded and unloaded more rapidly and thus 
create gains in efficiency. Infrastructure levels are highly correlated with economic 
development and GDP per capita. The World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness 
Report surveys enterprises regarding port and airport infrastructure and efficiency in 135 
economies (Porter & Schwab 2008). Among APEC members, Singapore and Hong Kong, 
China are ranked 1st and 2nd respectively with respect to port and airport infrastructure 
quality. Of the APEC members, only Australia; Canada; Hong Kong, China; and Singapore 
rank in the top 20 for airport infrastructure, while Canada; Hong Kong, China; Malaysia; 
Singapore; and Chinese Taipei rank in the top 20 for port infrastructure (Table 3.2). The GCR 
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survey assigns economies a score on a scale of 1 to 7, with a score of 1 for underdeveloped 
infrastructure and 7 for infrastructure that is as developed as the world’s best, and then ranks 
them according to the results. 
 
Table 3.1: Measures of restrictiveness and competition for APEC members, 2008. 
APEC member Liner companies Air index Sea index 
China 88 4.17 0.599 
USA 84 0.75 0.45 
Singapore 80 1.17 n.a. 
Hong Kong, China 70 3.5 n.a. 
Korea 69 3 0.611 
Malaysia 68 1.67 0.614 
Japan 65 2.75 0.611 
Chinese Taipei 49 3.17 n.a. 
Thailand 46 1.67 0.399 
Viet Nam 41 4 0.25 
Indonesia 38 3 0.649 
Australia 37 1 0.75 
Russian Federation 36 3.42 0.75 
Canada 35 2.75 0.611 
Mexico 30 2.5 0.667 
New Zealand 27 2.17 0.813 
Philippines 26 3.5 0.39 
Peru 23 2 0.556 
Chile 21 3 0.857 
Brunei 6 4 n.a. 
Papua New Guinea 6 n.a. n.a. 
Source: Number of liner companies: UNCTAD, Liner Shipping Connectivity  
Index – Index values based on Bertho (2010) and Zhang & Findlay (2010) 
Notes: For air index, a higher number signifies a less restrictive environment. 
For sea index, a higher value indicates more restrictive. 
 
Table 3.2: Global Competitiveness Report infrastructure rankings. 
APEC member Airport Rank Port Rank 
Australia 20 42 
Brunei 39 36 
Canada 18 15 
Chile 25 37 
China 75 55 
Hong Kong, China 2 2 
Indonesia 76 105 
Japan 50 26 
Korea 27 30 
Mexico 57 95 
Malaysia 21 16 
New Zealand 24 24 
Peru 95 128 
Philippines 90 101 
Papua New Guinea n/a n/a 
Russian Federation 89 77 
Singapore 1 1 
Thailand 29 49 
Chinese Taipei 33 19 
Viet Nam 93 113 
USA 13 12 
Source: Porter & Schwab 2008 
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General institutional quality and corruption is another potentially important determinant of 
transport costs. Where there is a known problem of bribe taking by customs officials at port 
or at airport level or where there may be uncertainty or risk to the merchandise being 
transported, transport firms will pass some of these costs on to exporters, so transport costs 
will be higher from those destinations. Sequiera and Djankov (2008) provide detailed 
evidence from two African ports. An indicator of corruption is the Corruption Perceptions 
Index (cpi) (Transparency International 2008). This is a general perceptions index of the level 
of public and political sector corruption and bribe taking which may impact on transport 
costs. The cpi relates perceptions of the degree of corruption and ranges between 10 (highly 
clean) and 0 (highly corrupt). APEC members range between 2 and 9.3 for 2008 (Table 3.3). 
For 2008 the cpi is highly correlated with air and port infrastructure (0.82 for port and 0.79 
for air). 
 
Table 3.3: APEC rankings in the Corruption Perceptions Index, 2008. 
Source: Transparency International 2008. 
 
Transport costs are influenced by a good’s value-to-weight ratio, since heavy, low value-
added items are more expensive to transport than are light, high value-added ones. In part, 
this is due to higher insurance charges, which are included in the transport cost variable ((cif-
fob)/fob) but are generally proportional to the value of the goods, since higher value-added 
goods may also attract higher quality freight services. There is a trend for goods to become 
lighter with technological advances, so that changes in the value-to-weight ratio (increasing) 
over time means that air transport becomes more attractive and less costly. Consequently, we 
expect the share of air shipped goods to be increasing over time. Figure 3.1 graphs the air 
share of imports for Australia; Brazil; Chile; and the USA between 1990 and 2008. The air 
share of imports from APEC economies by value and by reporter is not exhibiting any clear 
trend over the period 1990–2008. For Australia; Brazil; and Chile there was an increase in the 
share of imports in the mid to late 1990s, while for the USA the rise in the share commenced 
earlier. All four economies have experienced a reduction in the air share of their imports 
since around 2000. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Air share of imports by value for Australia; Brazil; Chile; and the USA, 1990–2008. 
 
New Zealand 9.3 Chile 6.9 Thailand 3.5 
Singapore 9.2 Chinese Taipei 5.7 Viet Nam 2.7 
Australia 8.7 Korea 5.6 Indonesia 2.6 
Canada 8.7 Malaysia 5.1 Philippines 2.3 
Hong Kong, China 8.1 China 3.6 Russian Federation 2.1 
Japan 7.3 Mexico 3.6 Papua New Guinea 2 
USA 7.3 Peru 3.6 Brunei n/a 
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3.4 ESTIMATING A MODEL OF TRANSPORT COSTS 
 
3.4.1 Determination of freight costs 
 
In this section, the determinants of air and sea transport costs for APEC member exports to 
four large economies – Australia; Brazil; Chile; and the USA – are analysed econometrically. 
The modelling approach incorporates as many of the factors identified above as possible. 
 
As the previous discussion has highlighted, there are many factors contributing to the 
determination of freight costs. Our modelling strategy follows earlier studies (e.g., Micco & 
Serebrisky 2006, Clark, Dollar & Micco 2004, Fink, Mattoo & Neagu 2002, Wilmsmeier & 
Hoffmann 2008, Hummels 2007, Hummels, Lygovysky & Skiba (forthcoming), Micco & 
Perez 2002, Mirza & Habib 2009, Moreira, Volpe & Blyde 2008 and Wilmsmeier, Hoffmann 
& Sanchez 2006) where we incorporate as many of the determinants as possible. Since many 
of the variables are highly correlated, it is not possible to include them all in one model as 
this leads to unstable coefficients across specifications. The modelling strategy begins with a 
baseline specification in which the main determinants of transport costs are considered. 
Several additional models are estimated which specifically control for factors such as those 
affecting competition on a route, factors related to infrastructure and efficiency and those 
which capture the general quality of the exporting economy’s institutions. 
 
For each transport mode, the baseline specification models transport costs in the following way: 
 
 
ln f ijkt( )= β0 + β1 ln dist( )ij + β2 ln importsijt( )
                             + β3 ln
val
wgt
 
  
 
  ijkt
+ αk + γ t + uijkt
 (1) 
where i indexes partner economies, j indexes reporting economies, k indexes commodities 
imported by economy j disaggregated at the 6-digit level of the Harmonised System, and t 
indexes time. The dependent variable, 
 
ln f ijkt( ), is the log of ad valorem freight charges. The 
baseline determinants of freight include 
 
ln importsijt( ) which is the log of the value of total 
imports from economy i to economy j in period t for each transport mode, 
 
ln
val
wgt
 
  
 
  ijkt
 is the 
log of the unit value of each good shipped and 
 
ln dist( )ij  is the log of distance between each 
economy pair. Distance is from Centre d’Etudes Prospectives et d’Information 
Internationales (CEPII) and is measured as the distance between two economies based on 
bilateral distances between the biggest cities of those two economies, those inter-city 
distances being weighted by the share of the city in the economy’s overall population. In 
addition, a product specific fixed effect 
 
αk  is included and 
 
uijkt is the idiosyncratic error. The 
product-fixed effects capture any commodity-specific features which influence freight costs 
but are difficult to quantify and not explicitly included in the models. For instance, these 
effects control for such things as the fact that bulky goods have higher transportation costs in 
every period than, say, shipping shoes. Freight costs are expected to be positively related to 
distance and negatively related to the value of imports since there exist economies of scale in 
transport, but this is perhaps more important for ocean freight. The value of imports may be 
endogenous in the model since imports also depend on transport costs. Ignoring this 
endogeneity may lead to biased estimates of the model parameters. When the models were 
estimated by two-stage least squares using GDP as an instrument, this resulted in implausible 
estimates with incorrect signs. 
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In the second specification, the focus is primarily on factors that affect the level of 
competition on shipping routes. For this, the baseline specification is augmented in turn with 
several variables which capture either a restrictive regulatory environment or the presence of 
market power. For these specifications, the baseline model for ocean freight is modified by 
the addition of sea index and airfreight for air freighted goods. These indexes capture the 
degree of restrictions in force on a route. Additional models for ocean-freighted imports are 
estimated, which include elements to capture the competitive features of the route (see Data 
sources in Annex 3). These second set of market power models include such things as 
number of carriers, number of ships or liner services operating on a route. These variables 
make up a composite index – the Liner Services Connectivity Index (LSCI) – compiled by 
UNCTAD – which is also included on its own. 
 
The third focus is on institutional quality in the exporting economy. To capture this feature, 
we include the cpi for the exporting economy (Transparency International 2008). This 
index is a general ‘catch-all’ variable which is expected to be negatively related to freight 
charges – that is, the higher the index, the better the institutional quality and the lower the 
transport charge. 
 
The final focus of this study accounts for the quality of infrastructure and trade facilitation 
measures. For these specifications, the baseline model is augmented by two measures to 
capture these features. The first infrastructure variable included is an index of port 
infrastructure quality (for ocean transport) in the exporting economy and a measure of air 
infrastructure quality (for air transport), both obtained from Porter and Schwab (2008). For 
trade facilitation quality, we include the Enabling Trade Index (eti) for the exporting 
economy also from Porter and Schwab. Table 3.4 summarises the expected direction of the 
relationships between the various determinants and transport costs. 
 
Table 3.4: Expected sign of determinants of transport costs. 
Determinants Expected sign 
Value total imports (–) 
Value/weight (+) 
Distance (+) 
LSCI and components (–) 
Port/air infrastructure (–) 
Enabling trade index (–) 
Corruption perception index (–) 
 
3.4.2 Results 
 
The results from estimating transport cost models for ocean and air freight are presented in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The positive relationship between distance and ad valorem transport costs 
is as expected, with robustly estimated elasticities ranging between 0.26 and 0.4. 
 
The negative relationship expected between import volumes and transport costs is evident in 
the econometric results: depending on the model specification and other things being equal, 
the estimated elasticity is between -0.036 and as high as -0.07 for ocean freight (Table 3.5) 
and between -0.084 and -0.120 for air freight (Table 3.6). In comparing model results, this is 
partly due to greater economies of scale on routes. Note that the coefficient on imports loses 
all of its explanatory power and changes signs when estimated within models with the LSCI 
competition variables included (models 4 and 5), and so has been omitted. 
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Table 3.5: Transport cost regressions for ocean shipped goods. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (4a) (4b) (4c) (5) (6) (7) 
Years covered 1990-2008 2007-2008 1990-2008 2004-2008 2004-2008 2004-2008 2004-2008 2004-2008 2008 1998-2008 
Log(dist) 0.268*** 0.304*** 0.280*** 0.322*** 0.323*** 0.319*** 0.328*** 0.315*** 0.305*** 0.273*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.004) 
Log(sea imports) -0.068*** -0.036*** -0.071***      -0.041*** -0.040*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)      (0.002) (0.001) 
Log(value/wgt) -0.390*** -0.403*** -0.386*** -0.423*** -0.429*** -0.430*** -0.418*** -0.431*** -0.410*** -0.396*** 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) 
eti  -0.019***         
  (0.004)         
Sea index   -0.487***        
   (0.013)        
Log(ships)    -0.046***       
    (0.003)       
Log(liner services)     -0.024***      
     (0.003)      
Log(liner companies)      -0.033***     
      (0.005)     
Log(max ship size)       -0.027***    
       (0.008)    
LSCI        -0.000***   
        (0.000)   
Port infrastructure         -0.002  
         (0.003)  
cpi          -0.010*** 
          (0.001) 
R-squared 0.271 0.200 0.279 0.214 0.236 0.239 0.210 0.239 0.202 0.244 
N 1156239 137035 942441 217018 275996 284779 63115 284779 69601 713108 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Year dummies included but output suppressed. All models estimated by fixed effects with product-fixed effects. Robust standard errors 
in parentheses. R-squared value is from the ‘within transformation’ of the data in the fixed effects regression. Models 4 and 5 are estimated for containerised shipments 
only as the LSCI relates to containerised traffic only. 
 
.
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Table 3.6: Transport cost regressions for air shipped goods 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Years covered 1990-2008 2007-2008 2008 2008 1998-2008 
Log(distance) 0.394*** 0.257*** 0.239*** 0.250*** 0.338*** 
 (0.003) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.004) 
Log(air imports) -0.084*** -0.108*** -0.117*** -0.120*** -0.102*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) 
Log(value/wgt) -0.362*** -0.304*** -0.278*** -0.271*** -0.333*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
eti  -0.030***    
  (0.005)    
airindex   0.055***   
   (0.004)   
Air infrastructure    -0.099***  
    (0.006)  
cpi     -0.036*** 
     (0.001) 
R-squared 0.274 0.178 0.166 0.170 0.257 
N 931667 113728 58054 47516 479416 
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Year dummies included but output suppressed. All models estimated by fixed 
effects with product-fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses. R-squared value is from the ‘within 
transformation’ of the data in the fixed effects regression. 
 
Port infrastructure is found to have no significant effect on maritime transport costs. These 
results are somewhat surprising, since other studies have found this variable significant (e.g., 
Micco & Perez 2002 and Clark, Dollar & Micco 2004). 
 
Using an alternative measure of port infrastructure (maximum ship size), we find the impact 
of the size of ships that ports can accommodate has a strong negative impact on shipping 
costs. The coefficient is not high but is statistically significant. This result has implications 
for economies of scale and potential cost savings for economies that can take advantage of 
technological improvements. Ship size and port infrastructure are highly correlated with the 
total level of imports: if imports are high then ship size is generally larger.  
 
As expected, the components of the LSCI (models 4 and 4b) which capture the competitive 
environment in which the exporting economy is operating, all have a negative and 
statistically significant impact on shipping costs. Similarly, including the LSCI on its own 
also negatively impacts shipping charges but the effect is very small. 
 
Turning to the restrictiveness index for ocean freight, the coefficient is negative and 
statistically significant. That is, a higher sea index is associated with a less restrictive 
environment and we would expect shipping costs to be lower. The estimated coefficient 
indicates that a one unit increase in the index would see ad valorem transport costs fall by 
approximately 48%, ceteris paribus (APEC index values are about 0.6 at present, on 
average). For air freight, the air index is found to have a statistically positive effect on ad 
valorem freight: higher values of the index indicate a greater degree of restrictiveness on a 
route and therefore higher ad valorem air transport costs. 
 
Institutional quality, captured by the cpi, has more than three times the estimated impact on 
transport costs for air freight compared to ocean freight. This is plausible if higher value 
goods, which are generally shipped by air, attract more bribe-taking behaviour. The eti also 
has a greater negative impact on air freighted goods compared to ocean-freighted goods, 
suggesting that improvements in trade facilitation measures may be better directed at airport 
procedures, where the benefits would be greater. 
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3.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Transport costs are important and amenable to reduction by technical progress and by policy 
measures. The richness of the customs data for Australia; Brazil; Chile; and the USA allows 
us to break down transport costs into the various determinants. However, transport costs 
remain a significant component of the wedge between the prices of domestic and imported 
goods. 
 
Transport costs depend on more than distance or bulk or scale, and the role of the 
determinants vary by mode of transport. Transport costs are related to distance and to weight. 
 
Sea freight is cheaper than air per kilogram but imports arriving by air have lower ad valorem 
trade costs because air freight is used for higher value goods. The choice of transport mode is, 
however, more complex than simply having more valuable and lighter goods shipped by air. 
Air transport will be favoured when speed is important, and for such goods in poor exporting-
economy institutions this may be a particularly significant obstacle. 
 
The econometric results reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6 indicate that distance and bulk have 
the expected relationship to transport costs, and that transport costs fall with the volume of 
trade. The distance and weight variables are statistically significant for both modes, but the 
coefficients are larger and confidence intervals tighter for sea than for air. Good institutions, 
as measured by the cpi (Transparency International 2008), are associated with lower trade 
costs, but the impact is greater for air freight. 
 
There are caveats to our conclusions. With just two modes there is an important feedback 
mechanism because the choice of mode is not simple and it is related to the impact of 
exporting-economy institutions. There is also an endogeneity concern related to the vicious 
cycle of high transport costs reducing trade flows and low trade volumes being a cause of 
high transport costs. Moreover, by focusing only on dollar values of transport costs we do not 
directly address the role of time, which some authors (Hummels 2001) identify as more 
important than financial costs, at least for some goods. 
 
Using indicators of restrictiveness in transport services sectors, the econometric results 
highlight the importance of competitive environments for reducing transport costs for both air 
and sea transport. 
 
The relevance of research on trade and transport costs is on how transport costs impact on 
trade flows. Future research should focus on the analysis of the effect of transport costs on 
exports of the APEC member economies to reporting economies such as USA; Australia; 
Chile; and Brazil. Since similar detailed customs level data exist for other economies, notably 
New Zealand and a selection of Latin American economies through Asociación 
Latinoamericana de Integración (ALADI), future research should focus on the analysis of 
APEC export flows to these economies. 
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ANNEX 3 
 
Data sources 
 
Figures A1–A6 
Figure A1: Imports to the USA. 
Figure A2: Imports to Australia. 
Figure A3: Imports to Chile. 
Figure A4: Imports to Brazil. 
Figure A5: Imports to the USA; Australia; Chile; and Brazil. 
Figure A6a: Average adjusted ad valorem transport costs, selected APEC members. 
Figure A6b: Average adjusted ad valorem transport costs, selected APEC members. 
Figure A6c: Average adjusted ad valorem transport costs, selected APEC members. 
 
Tables A1–A5 
Table A1: Import weighted ad valorem transport costs, APEC members’ exports to the USA; 
Australia; Brazil; and Chile. 
Table A2: Import weighted ad valorem transport costs by sea, APEC members’ exports by sea. 
Table A3: Import weighted ad valorem transport costs by air, APEC members’ exports by air. 
Table A4: Average ad valorem transport costs adjusted for commodity composition.  
Table A5: Weighted and adjusted ad valorem freight to the USA; Australia; Brazil; and Chile. 
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DATA SOURCES 
 
This study makes use of detailed customs data as available. These data record the export (fob) 
value of goods, the cost of freight and insurance and the corresponding import (cif) data for all 
imports from all destinations at the product level by mode of entry (ship, air or rail). In this 
way, the transport and insurance costs of only those imports that have arrived by ship can be 
analysed. The detailed customs data available are used to calculate ad valorem transport costs 
(USD paid in freight charges per $ of merchandise import value [fob]) at the product level. 
 
The Enabling Trade Index (eti) from the World Economic Forum. The eti is designed to 
measure the ‘institutions, policies, and services facilitating the free flow of goods over 
borders and to final destinations’. The index is composed of four sub indexes to capture the 
main enablers of trade: (1) market access, (2) border administration, (3) transport and 
communications infrastructure, and (4) the business environment. We use the 2009 index 
which is the latest available and relates to the year 2008. A higher value of the index indicates 
higher quality trade enabling measures in place.  
 
The measure of overall infrastructure quality is taken from the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report (Porter & Schwab 2008). The port infrastructure index and 
the air infrastructure index are two of the components of the Global Competitiveness Index. 
A higher index is indicative of higher quality infrastructure. 
 
The Corruptions Perceptions Index (cpi) is obtained from Transparency International (2008) 
and indicates the degree of public sector corruption as perceived by the business community 
and economy analysts. The cpi is measured on a scale of 0–10, with a higher number 
indicating less corruption. 
 
UNCTAD’s Liner Shipping Connectivity Index (LSCI) is a composite index composed of 
liner shipping connectivity between the importing economy and the exporting economy. In 
the empirical analysis of the paper, different aspects and components of the LSCI were used. 
The LSCI is derived from principal component analysis and includes the following elements 
of connectivity: number of carriers, TEU deployed, number of vessels, shipping opportunities 
and maximum size (TEU) of a ship on a specific route. 
 
The abbreviated names of the APEC member economies are: 
Australia AUS Japan JPN The Republic of the Philippines RP 
Brunei Darussalam BD Republic of Korea ROK The Russian Federation RUS 
Canada CDA Malaysia MAS Singapore SIN 
Chile CHL Mexico MEX Chinese Taipei CT 
People’s Republic of China PRC New Zealand NZ Thailand THA 
Hong Kong, China HGC Papua New Guinea PNG United States USA 
Indonesia INA Peru PE Viet Nam VN 
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Figure A1: Imports to the USA. 
 
 
Figure A2: Imports to Australia. 
 
 
Figure A3: Imports to Chile. 
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Figure A4: Imports to Brazil. 
 
 
Figure A5: Imports to the USA; Australia; Chile; and Brazil. 
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Figure A6a: Average adjusted ad valorem transport costs, selected APEC members. 
 
 
Figure A6b: Average adjusted ad valorem transport costs, selected APEC members. 
 
 
Figure A6c: Average adjusted ad valorem transport costs, selected APEC members. 
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Table A1: Import weighted ad valorem transport costs, APEC members’ exports to the USA; Australia; Brazil; and Chile. 
Year AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HGC INA JPN ROK MAS MEX NZ PNG PE RP RUS SIN CT THA USA VN 
1990 0.085 0.072 0.048 0.160 0.074 0.051 0.102 0.042 0.045 0.050 0.049 0.096 0.017 0.061 0.074  0.030 0.054 0.059 0.073 0.072 
1991 0.082 0.073 0.039 0.143 0.073 0.051 0.102 0.042 0.045 0.047 0.054 0.092 0.009 0.063 0.071  0.028 0.054 0.057 0.076 0.127 
1992 0.086 0.056 0.036 0.143 0.070 0.050 0.085 0.036 0.043 0.041 0.055 0.091 0.013 0.062 0.063 0.086 0.025 0.051 0.055 0.079 0.085 
1993 0.086 0.056 0.035 0.144 0.071 0.049 0.083 0.034 0.043 0.038 0.056 0.090 0.027 0.067 0.059 0.066 0.023 0.050 0.054 0.079 0.076 
1994 0.088 0.036 0.040 0.122 0.069 0.050 0.079 0.032 0.041 0.035 0.050 0.086 0.033 0.067 0.055 0.067 0.023 0.048 0.050 0.073 0.087 
1995 0.088 0.045 0.053 0.112 0.067 0.050 0.073 0.033 0.035 0.032 0.053 0.085 0.032 0.058 0.052 0.064 0.021 0.044 0.046 0.074 0.067 
1996 0.082 0.042 0.046 0.128 0.059 0.044 0.067 0.027 0.034 0.031 0.043 0.084 0.033 0.063 0.042 0.057 0.017 0.040 0.043 0.072 0.077 
1997 0.077 0.040 0.046 0.126 0.055 0.042 0.066 0.028 0.035 0.031 0.046 0.078 0.035 0.053 0.036 0.060 0.018 0.037 0.039 0.068 0.073 
1998 0.071 0.063 0.044 0.134 0.058 0.042 0.070 0.030 0.042 0.031 0.049 0.078 0.041 0.052 0.033 0.051 0.019 0.040 0.043 0.061 0.079 
1999 0.067 0.069 0.039 0.113 0.074 0.047 0.081 0.030 0.043 0.033 0.041 0.074 0.036 0.056 0.038 0.040 0.022 0.047 0.059 0.053 0.065 
2000 0.065 0.062 0.031 0.120 0.076 0.048 0.082 0.031 0.039 0.035 0.032 0.069 0.025 0.060 0.039 0.034 0.022 0.045 0.062 0.051 0.069 
2001 0.059 0.072 0.033 0.133 0.071 0.046 0.080 0.028 0.041 0.036 0.028 0.069 0.034 0.073 0.040 0.046 0.023 0.044 0.059 0.050 0.084 
2002 0.059 0.058 0.036 0.140 0.067 0.049 0.074 0.029 0.040 0.032 0.028 0.069 0.022 0.073 0.041 0.050 0.024 0.042 0.061 0.048 0.071 
2003 0.059 0.061 0.039 0.149 0.072 0.051 0.074 0.030 0.040 0.032 0.033 0.067 0.019 0.066 0.043 0.059 0.027 0.046 0.061 0.049 0.077 
2004 0.064 0.070 0.040 0.124 0.072 0.053 0.081 0.032 0.039 0.035 0.033 0.063 0.018 0.054 0.049 0.066 0.027 0.048 0.062 0.054 0.084 
2005 0.061 0.047 0.036 0.103 0.069 0.049 0.079 0.031 0.043 0.032 0.032 0.063 0.018 0.048 0.050 0.061 0.028 0.047 0.059 0.054 0.080 
2006 0.054 0.043 0.033 0.066 0.064 0.045 0.069 0.031 0.043 0.030 0.021 0.061 0.020 0.041 0.047 0.051 0.026 0.044 0.055 0.049 0.072 
2007 0.056 0.035 0.035 0.071 0.061 0.046 0.064 0.031 0.042 0.031 0.020 0.056 0.015 0.044 0.045 0.048 0.026 0.043 0.047 0.050 0.067 
2008 0.053 0.036 0.033 0.075 0.058 0.044 0.059 0.034 0.043 0.032 0.021 0.049 0.013 0.041 0.047 0.046 0.028 0.043 0.047 0.059 0.066 
% change -36.94 -50.11 -31.16 -53.07 -21.38 -14.45 -41.82 -19.07 -5.44 -36.42 -56.75 -48.80 -26.24 -32.28 -35.97 -46.04 -5.76 -20.69 -19.38 -19.81 -7.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A2: Import weighted ad valorem transport costs by sea, APEC members’ exports by sea. 
Year AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HGC INA JPN ROK MAS MEX NZ PNG PE RP RUS SIN CT THA USA VN 
1990 0.092 0.080 0.059 0.166 0.068 0.042 0.097 0.040 0.043 0.064 0.051 0.101 0.071 0.073 0.084  0.040 0.048 0.065 0.090 0.071 
1991 0.090 0.073 0.048 0.152 0.066 0.040 0.097 0.039 0.043 0.056 0.057 0.097 0.071 0.078 0.078  0.036 0.048 0.061 0.099 0.127 
1992 0.095 0.057 0.044 0.159 0.064 0.040 0.079 0.034 0.044 0.049 0.059 0.099 0.046 0.070 0.070 0.113 0.037 0.047 0.059 0.095 0.084 
1993 0.096 0.053 0.043 0.158 0.065 0.041 0.078 0.032 0.045 0.044 0.060 0.098 0.046 0.074 0.068 0.081 0.035 0.048 0.059 0.091 0.075 
1994 0.099 0.042 0.058 0.133 0.064 0.042 0.074 0.031 0.048 0.041 0.054 0.097 0.046 0.075 0.065 0.077 0.039 0.047 0.054 0.085 0.086 
1995 0.096 0.042 0.091 0.116 0.063 0.046 0.069 0.033 0.049 0.041 0.056 0.096 0.040 0.063 0.066 0.074 0.033 0.045 0.051 0.085 0.065 
1996 0.091 0.034 0.081 0.135 0.055 0.038 0.062 0.025 0.045 0.039 0.045 0.091 0.043 0.071 0.056 0.070 0.027 0.041 0.047 0.080 0.072 
1997 0.086 0.032 0.085 0.130 0.050 0.037 0.061 0.027 0.046 0.041 0.050 0.086 0.045 0.059 0.051 0.070 0.030 0.038 0.041 0.078 0.070 
1998 0.090 0.075 0.090 0.134 0.054 0.038 0.072 0.030 0.057 0.046 0.054 0.084 0.058 0.069 0.053 0.064 0.036 0.043 0.047 0.071 0.076 
1999 0.079 0.067 0.082 0.110 0.072 0.044 0.080 0.030 0.059 0.054 0.045 0.078 0.046 0.059 0.065 0.055 0.040 0.056 0.067 0.064 0.060 
2000 0.074 0.055 0.063 0.117 0.075 0.047 0.081 0.032 0.055 0.058 0.035 0.074 0.033 0.050 0.073 0.048 0.041 0.056 0.071 0.063 0.064 
2001 0.068 0.070 0.063 0.125 0.070 0.044 0.080 0.028 0.051 0.056 0.031 0.072 0.048 0.063 0.067 0.062 0.041 0.051 0.066 0.060 0.079 
2002 0.064 0.052 0.062 0.130 0.065 0.042 0.073 0.027 0.049 0.050 0.028 0.071 0.039 0.062 0.064 0.055 0.040 0.048 0.063 0.056 0.058 
2003 0.066 0.059 0.060 0.138 0.074 0.050 0.077 0.030 0.052 0.056 0.033 0.069 0.042 0.059 0.069 0.063 0.043 0.054 0.070 0.059 0.065 
2004 0.071 0.067 0.059 0.116 0.077 0.051 0.082 0.031 0.050 0.065 0.034 0.063 0.040 0.058 0.072 0.070 0.046 0.058 0.074 0.064 0.074 
2005 0.068 0.045 0.048 0.096 0.075 0.048 0.079 0.031 0.052 0.066 0.032 0.064 0.029 0.052 0.071 0.065 0.049 0.055 0.075 0.064 0.073 
2006 0.062 0.043 0.043 0.060 0.071 0.046 0.069 0.032 0.051 0.062 0.020 0.062 0.033 0.038 0.063 0.053 0.048 0.052 0.066 0.058 0.066 
2007 0.065 0.034 0.042 0.063 0.066 0.046 0.064 0.032 0.050 0.054 0.019 0.056 0.024 0.037 0.059 0.051 0.044 0.052 0.057 0.058 0.062 
2008 0.060 0.036 0.037 0.070 0.062 0.047 0.059 0.035 0.053 0.048 0.020 0.049 0.025 0.037 0.062 0.049 0.036 0.049 0.056 0.065 0.062 
% change -34.61 -55.33 -37.20 -57.75 -9.98 10.51 -39.53 -10.41 22.74 -24.62 -61.34 -51.69 -64.18 -49.16 -25.72 -56.70 -10.12 2.40 -14.62 -27.93 -12.48 
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Table A3: Import weighted ad valorem transport costs by air, APEC members’ exports by air. 
Year AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HGC INA JPN ROK MAS MEX NZ PNG PE RP RUS SIN CT THA USA VN 
1990 0.036 0.012 0.014 0.145 0.130 0.065 0.172 0.055 0.054 0.028 0.030 0.074 0.001 0.033 0.052  0.023 0.089 0.041 0.053 0.166 
1991 0.036 0.091 0.014 0.109 0.137 0.068 0.160 0.053 0.052 0.030 0.028 0.071 0.001 0.035 0.054  0.022 0.087 0.043 0.050 0.297 
1992 0.034 0.025 0.012 0.092 0.123 0.065 0.171 0.044 0.043 0.027 0.027 0.063 0.000 0.042 0.050 0.012 0.019 0.071 0.042 0.059 0.251 
1993 0.037 0.075 0.013 0.101 0.121 0.060 0.156 0.040 0.037 0.028 0.030 0.060 0.001 0.049 0.043 0.013 0.018 0.059 0.039 0.060 0.157 
1994 0.043 0.029 0.012 0.088 0.115 0.061 0.148 0.035 0.028 0.025 0.029 0.054 0.001 0.051 0.038 0.013 0.018 0.053 0.039 0.056 0.240 
1995 0.052 0.079 0.016 0.102 0.102 0.056 0.123 0.034 0.018 0.022 0.035 0.053 0.002 0.050 0.034 0.014 0.017 0.041 0.035 0.057 0.243 
1996 0.046 0.087 0.012 0.118 0.091 0.052 0.108 0.031 0.018 0.022 0.031 0.055 0.003 0.043 0.027 0.011 0.014 0.038 0.034 0.057 0.218 
1997 0.042 0.095 0.015 0.135 0.091 0.048 0.103 0.031 0.019 0.023 0.029 0.050 0.004 0.038 0.024 0.012 0.014 0.035 0.035 0.056 0.156 
1998 0.025 0.023 0.014 0.158 0.086 0.048 0.060 0.030 0.020 0.018 0.029 0.057 0.008 0.025 0.020 0.008 0.015 0.035 0.031 0.048 0.208 
1999 0.033 0.118 0.013 0.137 0.090 0.051 0.084 0.029 0.022 0.019 0.028 0.057 0.005 0.048 0.021 0.007 0.018 0.034 0.041 0.041 0.246 
2000 0.035 0.176 0.012 0.158 0.083 0.049 0.083 0.027 0.019 0.019 0.022 0.050 0.003 0.095 0.020 0.006 0.017 0.033 0.039 0.039 0.260 
2001 0.029 0.123 0.011 0.209 0.074 0.051 0.075 0.025 0.023 0.020 0.019 0.054 0.003 0.117 0.021 0.006 0.017 0.034 0.038 0.039 0.298 
2002 0.038 0.158 0.012 0.229 0.079 0.060 0.079 0.033 0.025 0.020 0.027 0.056 0.003 0.109 0.027 0.016 0.019 0.035 0.054 0.037 0.247 
2003 0.035 0.159 0.014 0.253 0.062 0.053 0.057 0.032 0.021 0.017 0.031 0.060 0.003 0.089 0.024 0.016 0.020 0.035 0.039 0.037 0.229 
2004 0.036 0.158 0.015 0.245 0.055 0.055 0.072 0.035 0.021 0.015 0.030 0.061 0.003 0.053 0.027 0.011 0.018 0.033 0.037 0.040 0.216 
2005 0.034 0.150 0.015 0.206 0.050 0.050 0.077 0.032 0.025 0.015 0.028 0.060 0.004 0.043 0.026 0.008 0.016 0.032 0.030 0.040 0.204 
2006 0.025 0.082 0.016 0.137 0.045 0.044 0.068 0.030 0.024 0.014 0.027 0.055 0.003 0.049 0.029 0.010 0.015 0.030 0.032 0.037 0.169 
2007 0.027 0.119 0.022 0.160 0.045 0.046 0.072 0.027 0.023 0.017 0.029 0.056 0.002 0.084 0.027 0.010 0.015 0.029 0.029 0.039 0.134 
2008 0.027 0.090 0.023 0.133 0.047 0.040 0.064 0.030 0.022 0.019 0.031 0.051 0.002 0.067 0.027 0.008 0.018 0.030 0.031 0.047 0.122 
% change -23.64 647.87 58.73 -8.03 -63.90 -39.33 -62.69 -45.36 -59.80 -32.43 5.60 -31.72 42.92 103.58 -47.63 -37.69 -21.42 -66.05 -24.23 -10.30 -26.27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A4: Average ad valorem transport costs adjusted for commodity composition.  
YEAR AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HGC INA JPN ROK MAS MEX NZ PNG PE RP RUS SIN CT THA USA VN 
1990 0.066 0.084 0.059 0.094 0.088 0.077 0.109 0.078 0.084 0.079 0.077 0.087 0.087 0.082 0.084   0.066 0.085 0.082 0.097 0.14 
1991 0.067 0.071 0.06 0.09 0.091 0.08 0.117 0.08 0.088 0.079 0.074 0.083 0.104 0.086 0.085   0.066 0.088 0.083 0.102 0.199 
1992 0.069 0.059 0.062 0.083 0.091 0.078 0.112 0.076 0.086 0.079 0.074 0.083 0.114 0.085 0.084 0.08 0.064 0.086 0.084 0.102 0.187 
1993 0.07 0.05 0.063 0.088 0.095 0.082 0.117 0.073 0.085 0.076 0.074 0.078 0.11 0.081 0.08 0.087 0.065 0.085 0.086 0.102 0.141 
1994 0.07 0.068 0.065 0.086 0.096 0.08 0.107 0.068 0.085 0.076 0.074 0.078 0.097 0.075 0.079 0.081 0.063 0.082 0.083 0.1 0.139 
1995 0.069 0.056 0.069 0.075 0.09 0.077 0.1 0.065 0.08 0.074 0.078 0.078 0.085 0.071 0.078 0.069 0.057 0.078 0.08 0.098 0.122 
1996 0.066 0.05 0.065 0.075 0.077 0.069 0.092 0.059 0.073 0.067 0.076 0.071 0.087 0.07 0.073 0.062 0.054 0.071 0.071 0.092 0.115 
1997 0.063 0.048 0.063 0.072 0.079 0.07 0.086 0.06 0.073 0.064 0.075 0.072 0.087 0.069 0.068 0.059 0.053 0.071 0.071 0.092 0.105 
1998 0.061 0.052 0.059 0.071 0.079 0.071 0.089 0.059 0.076 0.065 0.071 0.069 0.075 0.07 0.068 0.053 0.052 0.072 0.077 0.088 0.108 
1999 0.058 0.059 0.056 0.068 0.082 0.068 0.09 0.057 0.075 0.066 0.065 0.064 0.067 0.069 0.07 0.06 0.051 0.075 0.08 0.077 0.106 
2000 0.056 0.049 0.057 0.075 0.085 0.07 0.091 0.055 0.073 0.067 0.065 0.061 0.071 0.072 0.072 0.054 0.054 0.074 0.081 0.077 0.105 
2001 0.056 0.063 0.055 0.078 0.082 0.069 0.086 0.053 0.07 0.066 0.064 0.061 0.066 0.069 0.069 0.056 0.05 0.072 0.078 0.08 0.099 
2002 0.06 0.059 0.055 0.076 0.083 0.068 0.086 0.054 0.071 0.063 0.063 0.062 0.065 0.068 0.069 0.059 0.05 0.069 0.076 0.074 0.089 
2003 0.059 0.072 0.06 0.074 0.086 0.069 0.086 0.054 0.072 0.063 0.065 0.062 0.07 0.063 0.07 0.055 0.047 0.071 0.078 0.072 0.087 
2004 0.056 0.057 0.06 0.078 0.092 0.074 0.092 0.054 0.075 0.067 0.063 0.06 0.073 0.064 0.074 0.054 0.052 0.074 0.08 0.07 0.095 
2005 0.056 0.045 0.06 0.073 0.093 0.073 0.09 0.054 0.072 0.066 0.063 0.059 0.067 0.063 0.073 0.048 0.052 0.075 0.08 0.069 0.093 
2006 0.055 0.044 0.059 0.071 0.085 0.067 0.082 0.053 0.068 0.061 0.061 0.056 0.074 0.062 0.067 0.049 0.047 0.068 0.074 0.068 0.083 
2007 0.056 0.044 0.065 0.069 0.086 0.065 0.079 0.054 0.065 0.063 0.06 0.057 0.062 0.06 0.068 0.044 0.05 0.071 0.074 0.067 0.083 
2008 0.054 0.044 0.069 0.068 0.087 0.065 0.079 0.054 0.066 0.065 0.066 0.056 0.074 0.059 0.069 0.042 0.05 0.071 0.074 0.075 0.082 
% change -18.18 -47.62 16.95 -27.66 -1.14 -15.58 -27.52 -30.77 -21.43 -17.72 -14.29 -35.63 -14.94 -28.05 -17.86 -47.50 -24.24 -16.47 -9.76 -22.68 -41.43 
 
 
 
Quantifying the impacts of structural reforms on international transport margins 87 
 
 
Table A5: Weighted and adjusted ad valorem freight to the USA; Australia; Brazil; and Chile. 
Year 
Adjusted air 
freight# 
Adjusted sea 
freight# 
Import-weighted 
air freight* 
Import-weighted 
sea freight* 
APEC 
Adjusted 
air freight 
Import-weighted 
air freight 
Adjusted 
sea freight 
Import-weighted 
sea freight 
1990 0.141 0.084 0.043 0.055 0.18 0.05 0.088 0.05 
1991 0.144 0.084 0.041 0.055 0.19 0.049 0.09 0.049 
1992 0.148 0.082 0.039 0.051 0.193 0.044 0.09 0.047 
1993 0.15 0.082 0.038 0.052 0.201 0.042 0.091 0.046 
1994 0.149 0.079 0.037 0.051 0.195 0.038 0.086 0.046 
1995 0.156 0.076 0.037 0.053 0.193 0.035 0.084 0.048 
1996 0.143 0.072 0.032 0.047 0.183 0.032 0.08 0.043 
1997 0.145 0.069 0.032 0.047 0.186 0.033 0.077 0.043 
1998 0.144 0.068 0.03 0.05 0.18 0.031 0.078 0.046 
1999 0.135 0.066 0.03 0.051 0.169 0.031 0.079 0.051 
2000 0.131 0.068 0.028 0.051 0.163 0.03 0.078 0.052 
2001 0.13 0.067 0.027 0.051 0.161 0.03 0.076 0.05 
2002 0.135 0.063 0.03 0.048 0.168 0.036 0.069 0.048 
2003 0.139 0.061 0.029 0.052 0.167 0.034 0.069 0.054 
2004 0.137 0.062 0.03 0.054 0.168 0.035 0.073 0.056 
2005 0.136 0.062 0.029 0.052 0.166 0.034 0.073 0.055 
2006 0.132 0.058 0.028 0.048 0.164 0.032 0.067 0.051 
2007 0.141 0.054 0.028 0.045 0.177 0.033 0.065 0.05 
2008 0.154 0.053 0.029 0.043 0.197 0.035 0.064 0.048 
Notes: # Ad valorem freight rate adjusted for commodity composition and value to weight. Includes economy-pair-product effects.  
*Ad valorem freight weighted by imports. Pooled data from the USA; Australia; Chile; and Brazil. 
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QUANTIFYING THE IMPACTS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS ON 
AIR TRAFFIC FLOWS IN APEC ECONOMIES 
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• More liberal arrangements for freight, passenger charters, designation of international 
airlines, code sharing and ground handling are common among APEC members. 
• Restrictions on foreign ownership and on cabotage remain. 
• Further reform would have a significant effect on traffic flows. 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Air transport services are provided within a structure of a network of bilateral agreements. 
These agreements are similar to free trade agreements but they apply to only one service. A 
typical air service agreement specifies the rights of access to the terms of the agreement, that 
is, they allocate to airlines designated by the signatories the rights to fly across borders 
between APEC member economies and around the globe. Designation usually applies only to 
the airlines owned and controlled by residents of the economy making the designation. As a 
result, airlines from third parties are discriminated against: they either cannot fly on the 
routes between the economies involved in the bilateral agreement or they have only restricted 
access. Some bilateral agreements also restrict the capacity and frequency of the services 
which the designated airlines provide. 
 
Some agreements that do not have so many restrictions are called ‘Open Skies’ agreements. 
However, even these agreements have restrictions on access to routes by third parties. In the 
past, agreements have also attempted to control fares but that now is rare. In fact, the control 
of fares is redundant in the context of the control of capacity. The International Air Transport 
Association’s (IATA’s) Director General once labelled the bilateral system, the ownership 
rules and the attitude of competition authorities towards airline mergers and alliances as ‘the 
three pillars of stagnation’ for they have hindered the modernisation of air transport industry.3
 
 
The interest of this paper is the impact of air transport policy on the performance of the 
markets in which air transport services are provided. This has been prompted by the 
apparently highly restrictive regimes operating under a series of these bilateral agreements in 
which economies exchange rights of access to markets. These arrangements might be 
expected to raise costs and prices, and possibly also to raise profits, leading to a ‘tax’ on the 
movement of goods and people and inhibiting the extent of international integration. The 
severity of these effects is the question, the answers to which can be used to make the case 
                                       
1 School of Accounting, Economics and Finance, University of Southern Queensland, Toowoomba, Qld 4350, 
Australia (shane.zhang@usq.edu.au). 
2 School of Economics, University of Adelaide, South Australia 5005 (christopher.findlay@adelaide.edu.au). 
3 See http://www.iata.org/pressroom/speeches/Pages/2003-08-06-02.aspx, accessed on 1 February 2010. 
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for reform. Options for reform were explored by Findlay and Round (2006), and as an 
extension of their analysis, this paper examines the policy environments in the APEC 
economies in air transport and provides empirical evidence of the cost of the restrictions to 
liberalisation – a significantly lower level of movement of people and goods.  
 
Section 4.2 provides a brief overview of the current policy and recent reforms that have 
occurred in the major APEC economies. This is followed by a methodology for converting 
the policy information into a series of quantitative measures that can be compared across 
economies. The impact of the policy on route traffic flows between the major capital cities of 
APEC economies is then illustrated using a gravity model. The final section contains some 
summary remarks. 
 
4.2 LIBERALISATION OF AIR SERVICES 
 
APEC was founded in 1989 with a commitment to pursuing cooperation and economic 
prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region. However, its members are not bound by any treaty 
obligations and decisions within APEC are made on a consensus basis and implemented 
voluntarily. The Bogor Goals specify APEC objectives for free and open trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region by 2010 for industrialised economies and 2020 for 
developing members. The fast economic growth in many APEC economies is powered by 
fast increasing international trade and the rapidly growing tourism industry, both of which in 
turn need the support of well developed air transportation systems.  
 
At their meeting in Auckland in 1999, reforms in the air transport sector were endorsed by 
the APEC leaders. The Eight Options for More Competitive Air Services with Fair and 
Equitable Opportunity reforms include air carrier ownership and control, doing-business 
matters, air freight, multiple airline designation, tariffs, charter services, cooperative 
arrangements between airlines and market access. The Eight Options were prioritised as high, 
medium and low, based on their ease of implementation. It was acknowledged that the 
member economies could have their own ways to achieve the goals set in the Eight Options 
and in fact there have been some successes. 
 
The single aviation market between Australia and New Zealand was created in 1996, and the 
domestic air market has subsequently been opened up to the airlines of the other side of the 
Tasman Sea. A formal Open Skies agreement was signed in 2002, further eliminating the 
limitation of beyond rights and allowing the international airlines of both economies to 
operate from any international airport in Australia and New Zealand to third economies for 
cargo services (7th freedom rights, see Box 4.1 for the details of the nine freedoms and an 
illustration of the aircraft movements involved).  
 
In 2004 the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) adopted the Roadmap for 
Integration of the Air Travel Sector (RIATS) and the Action Plan for ASEAN Air Transport 
Integration and Liberalisation 2005–2015, with the aims ‘to advance the full liberalisation of 
air transport services in ASEAN, to achieve the ASEAN Leaders’ vision of Open Sky in the 
ASEAN region’. 4
 
 Full liberalisation will be achieved through a staged and progressive 
approach. The RIATS encourages two or more members to negotiate and sign liberal bilateral 
or multinational agreements on a sub-regional basis in the move to full liberalisation. 
                                       
4 See http://www.aseansec.org/16666.htm, accessed on 1 March 2010. 
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Box 4.1: Freedoms of the air. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In 2003 Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Viet Nam concluded a Multilateral Agreement on 
Air Transport of the Sub-region consisting of air transport liberalisation and comprehensive 
cooperation among the four economies, and in 2004 Brunei; Singapore; and Thailand signed 
a Multilateral Agreement (MA) on the Liberalisation of Passenger Air Services in Bangkok, 
which allowed for unlimited flights among the three economies. It is expected that an Open 
Skies pact with no limitations on 5th freedom traffic rights for the capital cities will be signed 
by the ASEAN members in 2010.  
First Freedom of the Air – the right of over-flight 
Second Freedom of the Air – the right to land for non-traffic purposes 
Third Freedom of the Air – the right to put down traffic originating from the carrier’s home base 
Fourth Freedom of the Air – the right to pick up passengers bound for the carrier’s home base 
Fifth Freedom of the Air – the right to put down or pick up passengers from or bound for third locations on a 
flight either bound for or originating at the carrier’s home base 
Sixth Freedom of the Air – the right to transport, via the home base of the carrier, traffic moving between two 
other locations 
Seventh Freedom of the Air – the right to transport traffic between two other locations without stopping at or 
having a connection to the home base of the carrier (i.e., the right to base aircraft offshore) 
Eighth Freedom of the Air –the right to carry traffic between two domestic points within another economy on 
a flight bound for or originating at the carrier’s home base 
Ninth Freedom of the Air – ‘stand alone’ cabotage, that is, carrying traffic between domestic points offshore 
without any connection to the carrier’s home base 
 
 
Based on ICAO (2004): graphic provided by Dr Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Department of Global Studies and 
Geography, Hofstra University (permission provided). 
http://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch3en/conc3en/airfreedom.html 
First Second
Home
Third
Fourth Fifth Sixth
Seventh Eight Ninth
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In 2001 Brunei; Chile; New Zealand; Singapore; and the United States of America (USA) 
signed a multilateral Open Skies agreement including the 7th freedom rights. However, this 
agreement was amended in 2004 for freight services only. By the end of 2009 twelve APEC 
economies had concluded agreements with the USA – Singapore; Chinese Taipei; New 
Zealand; Chile; Thailand; Malaysia; Brunei; Peru; Korea; Indonesia; Canada; and Australia 
(see Table 4.1). 
 
Table 4.1: Open Skies agreements signed by APEC economies. 
APEC member Economies with which Open Skies agreement signed (year signed) 
Japan Partial with Korea (2007), Thailand (2007) (Tokyo excluded) 
Korea USA (1998), Mexico (2008), partial with Japan (Tokyo excluded) (2007), Shandong 
province, China (2006), Malaysia (2007)  
China  Hainan (2003) and Shandong (2006) provinces 
Singapore  More than 30 economies, including USA, 15 European economies, Thailand (2004), 
Brunei (2004) 
Thailand Singapore (2004), Brunei (2004), USA (2005), partial with Japan (2007), Kuwait (2008) 
Malaysia Sri Lanka (2005), USA (1997), Chinese Taipei (1997), Korea (2007), New Zealand 
(1997), Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Yemen, Scandinavian economies, USA 
Indonesia USA (2004) 
Philippines  Cargo Open Skies in two international airports (2003) 
Brunei Singapore (2004), Thailand (2004), USA (2001), New Zealand (2001), Hong Kong, 
China  
Viet Nam USA (2008) cargo only 
Australia New Zealand (2002), USA (2008). No restrictions on capacity with Singapore and UK 
United States Over 90 economies and regions as of 2009 
Canada More than 34 economies, including USA and European Union 
Mexico UAE (2007), Korea (2008), Hong Kong, China 
Hong Kong, 
China 
Mexico, Brunei 
Chinese Taipei USA (1997), Malaysia (1997) 
Chile  Singapore (2001), New Zealand (2001), Brunei (2001), USA (2001), Uruguay (2003), 
Paraguay (2005), Finland (2005), United Arab Emirates (2005), UK (2008) etc. 
Peru USA (1998), Singapore (2009) 
 
There have been regular meetings among the aviation authorities of the three Northeast Asian 
economies. Korea is keen to pursue an Open Skies deal in this region, given its relatively 
small domestic market and its close cultural and economic links with China and Japan. The 
signing of an Open Skies agreement between Japan and Korea has lifted restrictions on 
frequency, capacity and destinations, with the exception of the congested Tokyo airports, 
covering both cargo and passenger services. Chinese aviation authorities acknowledge the 
need for liberalisation but prefer a progressive approach, especially when the major Chinese 
airlines are still less competitive than their foreign counterparts. Interestingly, the local 
provincial governments are always keen to push for more liberal arrangements as they 
understand the benefits to their local economies. 
 
China opened 5th freedom rights to all foreign airlines in Hainan Province in 2004. The effect 
of this unilateral Open Skies policy on the tourism industry has been tremendous. In 2002 
Hainan Province received less than 400 000 overseas tourists but this figure had increased to 
about 1 million in 2008. Open Skies arrangements have also been implemented between 
Chinese Shandong province and Korea since 1996. As a result, fares on the routes between 
Seoul and Shandong’s major cities have now decreased. 
 
APEC Air Services Sub-group published the Second Eight Options survey outcomes in 2009, 
providing progress on the Eight Options for Liberalisation of Air Services from the first 
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survey in 2006 to the second survey in 2008.5
• Substantial ownership and effective control remains the most common barrier in most 
economies. 
 The main points of this can be summarised as 
follows: 
• Although double approval of tariffs remains in places, the filing requirement has been 
eased. In reality, market forces play key role in determining fares. 
• Most economies are relaxing the restrictions on ground handling services and 
competition is being introduced. Airlines including foreign carriers are allowed to 
offer ground handling services at some airports. 
• A significant number of economies have open freight arrangements with their partners 
in APEC. 
• Multiple designation provisions have become common in the new bilateral 
agreements. 
• The majority of APEC economies are willing to approve charter services as 
supplements and complements to the scheduled services. 
• Code sharing and airline alliances are becoming common with little opposition from 
authorities. 
• Significant progress has been made in terms of relaxing 3rd and 4th freedoms. 
However, 5th freedoms operations and 7th in cargo services are less common, but are 
increasing in number. Cabotage remains rare in the APEC region.  
 
4.3 METHODOLOGY AND THE POLICY INDICES 
 
The air transport sector around the world has been undergoing significant changes towards 
liberalisation over the past three decades. As a result of deregulation and the emergence of 
the low cost carriers, productive efficiency in the industry has increased and fares have 
declined. Fares on most domestic and international routes are largely determined by market 
forces and, although most bilateral agreements still restrict outputs such as frequency and the 
number of seats offered, these restrictions have been largely relaxed. In some instances the 
agreed capacity and frequency are so large that the designated airlines do not use their full 
allocation. Occasionally, 5th freedoms have been granted to a foreign carrier even though the 
two economies have not signed an Open Skies agreement. 
 
The main elements of an Open Skies agreement include free determination of the frequency 
of services and fares, no restrictions on engaging in code-sharing, pro-competitive doing-
business provisions and grant of the 5th freedom – allowing the other economy’s airline to 
carry traffic to a third economy.6
 
 However, the so-called Open Skies agreements are not as 
open as people imagine. A typical agreement does not touch the issues of relaxing foreign 
ownership restrictions or the adoption of ‘principal place of business’, nor does it mention 
cabotage rights. 
Regulatory systems that impede entry and discriminate among suppliers would be expected to 
have some impact on the costs of air transport and the profits of the incumbents. Since air 
transport is an input into other traded sectors, this system reduces the volume of trade and of 
people movement and therefore the extent of integration among economies. Higher costs of 
air transport add to the costs of international trade and reduce international demand for the 
                                       
5  See http://www.apec-tptwg.org.cn/new/Modal-Expert-Groups/Aviation/AEG-SRV/air-services-group.htm, 
accessed on 25 June 2010. 
6 See http://www.state.gov/e/eeb/rls/fs/2009/119760.htm for Open Skies agreement highlights, accessed on 15 
March 2010. 
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exports of the tourism sector and other sectors dependent on people movement – education or 
health services, for example. 
 
The steps in the work examining regulation cost are first to characterise the policy environment 
in a number of economies (preferably over time) and then to relate that index to indicators of 
performance such as the price/quantity of the services provided (Hoekman 1995). Even better is 
to infer the effects on markets from the effects on the costs and profits of firms operating in 
those markets. There are special challenges in the case of air transport, since firms operate in 
more than one jurisdiction and are subject to different policy environments. However, with 
sufficient data, the contribution of different policy regimes could be identified. 
 
There have been some studies of the impact of these regulatory arrangements. Doove et al. 
(2001) extended earlier work by the OECD (Gonence & Nicoletti 2001) to examine the 
impact of the agreements on prices. Other studies have examined the effect of Open Skies 
agreements. In a study of freight routes from the USA, Micco and Serebrisky (2006) found 
that signing an Open Skies agreement reduced air transport costs by 9% and increased by 7% 
the share of imports arriving by air. Using the Air Liberalisation Index (ALI) – the sum of the 
points obtainable by a given Air Services Agreement (2005 database), prepared by the WTO 
(2006), Geloso Grosso (2008) and Geloso Grosso and Shepherd (2009) – evidence showed 
that there is a positive relationship between the openness of the bilateral agreement and 
passenger movement and bilateral trade in APEC. Piermartini and Rousova (2008) provides a 
similar conclusion, using a sample of 184 economies. However, the ALI values used by these 
studies were based on incomplete and outdated bilateral agreement data.  
 
This study seeks to build on and improve this method by constructing policy indices using the 
most up-to-date information, but not generated from bilateral agreements, and by addressing 
the same problem from a slightly different perspective. The construction of the indices has 
been guided by APEC’s Eight Options, with a focus on areas covered by a typical Open Skies 
agreement as well as indicators that can reflect the aviation authorities’ attitude towards 
domestic and international market liberalisation. Although to some extent the coverage of the 
indices is restricted to items for which comparable data are available, the indicators of 
restrictiveness are closely linked to deregulation in market access.  
 
The components of the first set of indices are shown in Table 4.2. They include ownership 
conditions (for private equity and for foreign equity), the existence of established low cost 
carriers and the number of effective passenger airlines (reflecting the ease of entry in the 
domestic market), multiple designation of local airlines on international routes, the presence 
of Open Skies agreements and the grant of the so-called 7th freedom rights for cargo services. 
The information for various components comes from the economies’ aviation authorities and 
relevant airlines’ websites and was valid to mid 2009. 
 
There are good reasons for the inclusion of these indicators in constructing the policy index. 
The first is that it is important not to underestimate the cost of restrictions on ownership. 
Findlay and Round (2006, p. 259) point out that concern about ownership rules has been 
made more intense by the emergence of a new low cost carrier business model in air 
transport: ‘the incumbent full service operators can respond to that threat by stressing their 
network advantages and will be assisted by a relaxation of ownership rules’. The ability of 
airlines to enter markets for air transport services, or to enter markets for inputs to air 
transport, is increased by foreign investment in air transport that they host. The current 
regulatory system impedes that investment, which denies opportunities to both incumbents 
and newcomer suppliers. 
94 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
Table 4.2: Policy indicators. 
Aviation market regulations and 
liberalisation constraints 
 Score 
Ownership Government does not have majority ownership control, nor retain 
‘golden share’ veto right  
0 
Government does not control the majority of the ownership, but 
retains ‘golden share’ veto right 
0.33 
Government controls the majority of the ownership 0.67 
No 1 
Foreign equity participation in 
domestic airlines 
No cap: domestic market open to foreign investment/adopt 
principal place of business 
0 
A cap greater than 50% 0.25 
A cap between 35% and 50% (inclusive) 0.5 
A cap less than 35% 0.75 
Foreign investment in airlines not allowed 1 
Existence of low cost carriers 
(reflecting ease of market 
access and fair competition) 
Has an established low cost carrier which has actively engaged in 
both domestic and international service provisions 
0 
Has a relatively new/small sized low cost carrier  0.5 
No low cost carrier 1 
Number of effective passenger 
airlines (reflecting ease of 
entry) 
More than 5 0 
3 to 5 (inclusive) 0.5 
2 or fewer 1 
Multiple designation on 
international routes 
Private airlines allowed to fly 
international routes 
2 or more carriers, including private carriers roughly have the 
equal right in being designated for flying international routes 
0 
The flag carrier (usually government-owned) has priority in 
gaining international rights over domestic private carriers; or 
domestic private carriers are not eligible to fly international routes 
before fulfilling some conditions such as servicing domestic 
market for a certain period of time 
0.5 
The flag carrier is predominantly the designated airline servicing 
international routes 
1 
Open Skies agreement  Number of Open Skies agreements is greater than 2 0 
Number of Open Skies agreements is 2 or fewer 0.5 
Not yet signed any Open Skies agreement  1 
7th freedom rights (cargo) 7th freedom rights (cargo) are granted to some foreign carriers 0 
No 1 
 
Secondly, it is quite often difficult to observe an economy’s policy on market access by low 
cost carriers. In some economies it has been argued that conditions on the launch of a new 
carrier are not transparent.7 Some anti-trust authorities do not treat the incumbent and new 
airlines equally when enforcing the anti-trust laws, so low cost and new private airlines would 
find it difficult to survive in such an environment. For example, price-fixing activities and price 
wars among Chinese major airlines have never received any serious investigation, while a new 
low cost airline was fined for selling cheap tickets. A government’s favouring of incumbents 
would be a significant barrier preventing new airlines from accessing lucrative domestic and 
international markets. The existence of the established low cost carrier and the number of 
effective passenger airlines can be used as a proxy to represent an economy’s policy towards 
new carriers.8
                                       
7A call for clear air transport policy in Malaysia is available at http://www.mmail.com.my/content/38500-tan-
sri-abdul-aziz-abdul-rahman-urgent-need-air-transport-policy, viewed on 13 August 2010. 
 It is believed that fairness and openness will encourage competition and thereby 
8 Effective passenger airlines are defined as airlines that have at least five aircraft and provide regular services. If 
one airline is wholly owned by another airline in the same economy, such as Dragonair and Cathay Pacific in 
Hong Kong and Jetstar and Qantas in Australia, they are not regarded as effective competitors in this study 
even though they operate separately. However, we acknowledge that competition in economies with a small 
population may not be less than those with a large population and thus this indicator may underestimate the 
openness of the small economies. The results need to be interpreted bearing this limitation in mind. 
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foster more efficient and effective competitors. Multiple designation rules would not be an 
issue if there were no discrimination against the new and private airlines. Two issues should be 
distinguished regarding multiple designation: multiple designation provisions in the Air 
Services Agreements (ASAs) and the allocation of the negotiated capacity to the carriers of an 
economy. The former is no longer a significant issue in many economies, including Hong 
Kong, China; Australia; and New Zealand, because most of the ASAs allow for multiple 
designation. This study focuses on whether the flag and non-flag airlines have been treated 
equally in allocating the negotiated traffic rights. 
 
Finally, despite criticism of the USA version of Open Skies agreements (e.g., the exclusion of 
the ownership issue), that model has been widely accepted and pursued by many economies. 
It is also expected access to 7th freedom rights will be the next step in reform towards a more 
liberal air transport regime. The number of Open Skies agreements signed clearly 
demonstrates an economy’s resolution to pursue liberalisation and can be used as an indicator 
to reflect an economy’s openness in air transport. For the same reason, the 7th freedom 
(cargo only) has been included as an indicator in the construction of the policy index. 
Excluded are the very rare 7th freedom rights for passenger services. 
 
The scores for each component of the index can be found in Table 4.3. The components can 
be added up to form an overall index, values of which range from 0 to 7. The higher the 
score, the higher is the level of restrictiveness.9
 
 
Table 4.3: Scores of the policy index components. 
APEC 
member 
Privatised Foreign 
equity 
Low 
cost 
airline 
Effective 
competitors 
Designation Open 
Skies 
7th 
freedom 
Total 
score 
Australia 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 
Brunei 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 
Canada 0 0.75 0 1 1 0 0 2.75 
Chile 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3 
China 0.67 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 1 4.17 
Hong Kong, 
China 
0 0 0.5 1 0.5 0 1 3 
Indonesia 1 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 0.5 0 3 
Japan 0 0.75 0.5 0 0 0.5 1 2.75 
Korea 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 3 
Malaysia 0.67 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 1.67 
Mexico 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 1 2.5 
New 
Zealand 
0.67 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 2.17 
Peru 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0 0 2 
Philippines 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.5 1 1 3.5 
Russia 0.67 0.75 0.5 0 0.5 0 1 3.42  
Singapore 0.67 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 1.17 
Chinese 
Taipei 
0.67 0.5 1 0.5 0 0.5 0 3.17 
Thailand 0.67 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0 1.67 
United 
States 
0 0.75 0 0 0 0 0 0.75 
Viet Nam 1 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 0.5 0 4 
                                       
9 The index values reported so far are based on the sum of the component values without any weights being 
assigned. A factor analysis approach could be used to give statistical weight and to avoid the subjectivity of 
using expert judgement for weight assignment (see Nicoletti et al. 1999, Doove et al. 2001). However, given 
the small sample in this study, it is inappropriate to use this method. 
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Figure 4.1 presents the total scores for each of the 20 economies under study. Measured by 
the abovementioned indicators, many economies in this sample are relatively liberal in their 
aviation sector. It is not surprising that the USA is the leader in pursuing more liberal policies 
but it is not a leader in relaxing foreign ownership limits, when most of the other economies 
have already allowed a participation in domestic airline equity of up to 49%. The debate of 
increasing the limit to 49% has been going on for many years but it still remains at 25%. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: The aviation regulation and liberalisation restrictiveness indices for APEC economies. 
 
A related issue is a clause which is embedded in almost all bilateral agreements, even the 
‘liberal’ ones, which requires that the designated airline must be ‘substantially owned and 
effectively controlled’ by the designating economy. Hong Kong, China; and Chile are the 
only two economies in this region to have accepted the ‘principal place of business’ in place 
of this clause. In fact, for all the policy indicators used to construct the index, ownership is 
central. Once ownership control has been loosened, it is likely that government interference 
will be reduced and further liberalisation measures would be expected to follow. It would 
then be no longer necessary to restrict the 5th and 7th freedom rights as well as the cabotage 
rights. 
 
Canada’s ‘Blue Sky’ policy states that it will proactively pursue Open Skies arrangements 
similar to the one negotiated with the USA in 2005. However, it excludes the possibility of a 
cabotage right in the negotiation. The CEO of Air Canada was reported to have lobbied the 
government for relief in 2008, claiming that job and service cuts would be lost as he criticised 
Emirates Airlines’ service expansion plan in Canada although the provincial government and 
tourism and trade groups were in favour of it (Vancouver Sun 2010). Similar reports have 
appeared in Australia. Although some may argue that a particular market is not big enough to 
support more than one carrier10
 
, the market in which an airline can provide services would 
expand if more liberal bilateral and multilateral arrangements are pursued. 
Australia and Singapore have the most liberalised environment in the Asia-Pacific region. 
Although Australia still retains a 49% cap on foreign investment in Australian international 
airlines it has allowed 100% foreign investment in domestic airlines (i.e., right of 
establishment, which also applies in New Zealand). Singapore has signed more than 30 Open 
                                       
10 See, for example, the view expressed by Air Canada’s former president, Hollis Harris, at 
http://www.canadianencyclopedia.ca/index.cfm?PgNm=TCE&Params=M1ARTM0010589, accessed on 15 
August 2010. 
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Skies agreements and has even called for more liberal arrangements than its current Open 
Skies framework. Thailand and Malaysia are two leaders in liberalising their aviation sector 
in ASEAN. These economies have well established aviation industries and their airlines, 
including the low cost airlines, are relatively competitive in this region. 
 
The three Northeast Asian economies are in the middle ranking position. Arrangements have 
been made that allow the flights linking Shanghai, Seoul and Tokyo to use those three cities’ 
domestic airports (i.e., Shanghai Hongqiao, Kimpo and Haneda) to reduce travel time and 
cost. As noted earlier, even without any formal pre-set procedures, these economies are 
moving towards greater liberalisation in air transport. In the meantime, as can be seen from 
Table 4.1, both Japan and Korea have struck partial Open Skies deals with several ASEAN 
economies. China has also expressed interest in inking an Open Skies deal with ASEAN. 
 
Since 2008, apart from a handful of busy cities, there have been no restrictions on the 
frequency of flights and the number of airlines flying between mainland China and Hong 
Kong, China. Restrictions on the frequency of flights to busy cities like Shanghai have made 
fares artificially high, and many passengers have complained (Yang 2010). In mid 2009, after 
several years of charter flight services, scheduled flights were finally launched between 
mainland China and Chinese Taipei. The integration of air transport in these three economies 
will be an interesting research topic in the next few years. 
 
Some people may argue that there is a big change in performance once an airline is in private 
hands, but this is not so evident if the government controls the majority share, no matter what 
percentage it commands. It has also been argued that the competition outcome does not differ 
greatly when the number of competitors in a market increases from two to three. Following 
these arguments, and to test the sensitivity of the results to changes in the design of the index, 
changes to the scores assigned to some of the policy indicators are shown in Table 4.4.  
 
Table 4.4: The alternative policy index indicators. 
Aviation market regulations 
and liberalisation 
constraints 
 Score 
Ownership Government does not have a majority ownership control 0 
Government controls the majority of the ownership 1 
Foreign equity participation 
in the domestic airline 
A cap greater than 50%; domestic markets open to foreign 
investment/adopt principal place of business 
0 
A cap less than 50%(inclusive) 1 
Existence of low cost carriers Has an established low cost carrier which has actively engaged in 
both domestic and international service provision 
0 
No effective low cost carriers/small in size with limited services 1 
Number of effective 
passenger airlines 
3 or more 0 
2 or fewer 1 
Multiple designation on 
international routes 
Private airlines allowed to fly 
international routes 
2 or more carriers including the private carriers roughly have the 
equal right in being designated for flying international routes 
0 
The flag carrier (usually government-owned) has priority in 
gaining international rights over domestic private carriers; or 
domestic private carriers are not eligible to fly international routes 
before fulfilling some conditions such as servicing domestic 
market for a certain period of time  
0.5 
The flag carrier is predominantly the designated airline servicing 
international routes 
1 
Open Skies agreement Number of Open Skies agreements is greater than 2 0 
Number of Open Skies agreements is 2 or fewer 0.5 
Not yet signed any Open Skies agreement 1 
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As the 7th freedom rights, although optional, are frequently granted when an Open Skies 
agreement is concluded, this indicator has been dropped in the new policy index (hereinafter 
called the alternative policy index). Details can be found in Table 4.5 and observed in Figure 
4.2. The results of the two sets of indices are consistent. Figure 4.2 shows that while 
Australia; the USA; and Singapore remain the leaders in liberalisation, Australia has 
overtaken the USA to be first. The alternative policy index will also serve as a sensitivity test 
of our gravity model to be discussed below. 
 
Table 4.5: Scores of the alternative policy index components. 
APEC member Privatised Foreign 
equity 
Low cost 
airline 
Effective 
competitors 
Designation Open 
Skies 
Total 
score 
Australia 0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 
Brunei 1 0 1 1 1 0 4 
Canada 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 
Chile 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 
China 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 4.5 
Hong Kong, China 0 0 1 1 0.5 0 2.5 
Indonesia 1 1 1 0 0.5 0.5 4 
Japan 0 1 1 0 0 0.5 2.5 
Korea 0 1 1 0 0 0.5 2.5 
Malaysia 1 1 0 0 0.5 0 2.5 
Mexico 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 
New Zealand 1 0 1 0 0.5 0 2.5 
Peru 0 1 1 0 0.5 0 2.5 
Philippines 0 1 1 0 0.5 1 3.5 
Russia 1 1 1 0 0.5 1 4.5 
Singapore 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Chinese Taipei 1 1 1 0 0 0.5 3.5 
Thailand 1 1 0 0 0.5 0 2.5 
United States 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Viet Nam 1 1 1 0 1 0.5 4.5 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: The alternative policy indices. 
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4.4 IMPACT OF POLICY ON TRAFFIC FLOWS 
 
A relationship is expected between passenger and cargo traffic flows and the policy 
environment, other things being equal. More restrictive regimes would be associated with low 
traffic movement. This relationship has been estimated using a gravity model which is widely 
used for predicting bilateral trade flows. The form of the model used in this study is: 
 
ln(traffic)=β0+ β1ln(GDPpc1)+ β2ln(GDPpc2)+ β3ln(pop1)+ β4ln(pop2)+ β5ln(area1)+ β6 
ln(area2)+ β7 ln(distance)+ β8index1+ β9index2+ other dummies +ε 
 
Due to difficulty in gathering the traffic data at the economy level, the 2008 ICAO city-pair 
passenger and cargo traffic data has been used. The dependent variable is air traffic 
(passenger numbers and cargo volume respectively) carried from the capital city of economy 
1 to that of economy 2. The capital cities can be either a political centre or a major 
commercial centre of an economy. As major political and commercial centres are usually the 
gateways through which an economy’s residents travel internationally, it is appropriate to use 
an economy’s GDP per capita in the model with 1 denoting the departure economy and 2 
denoting the destination economy. Likewise, pop1 and pop2 denotes the populations of the 
original economy and arrival economy respectively, representing the sizes of the economies. 
The GDP and population data are from the World Development Indicators Database, World 
Bank (July 2009).11 It is expected that GDP per capita and population variables are positively 
linked to the traffic flows. Land area variables (area1 and area2) are also included on the right 
hand of the equation. In large economies, there are usually two or more international cities, 
and the use of traffic flows between the major capital cities may underestimate the movement 
of people and goods. Therefore, land area variables should have negative signs. The land area 
data can be found in the CIA World Factbook.12
 
 
The distance variable is also included and should have an inverse relationship with the traffic 
flow in a typical gravity model. The departure and arrival economies’ air transport policy 
indices (index1 and index2 respectively) developed earlier in this paper, which are the main 
interest of this study, are included together with the following regional dummy variables: 
Northeast Asia, North America and ASEAN. The Northeast Asia dummy represents traffic 
movement between cities within China; Korea; and Japan. Similarly, the North America 
dummy takes value 1 when the traffic is carried between two cities within the USA; Canada; 
and Mexico. The ASEAN dummy is used to see if the traffic flows within the Southeast 
Asian region are higher or lower than other regions, ceteris paribus. An FTA dummy is 
included if two economies have signed a Free Trade Agreement. As with many other studies 
using gravity models, a common border dummy is used in the equation. 
 
The estimation results are reported in Table 4.6. Robust standard errors are reported to 
accommodate a possible heteroskedasticity problem. The effects of the policy indices are 
statistically significant at the 5% level with expected negative signs, that is, higher 
restrictiveness in aviation policy leads to lower levels of movement of people and goods 
between international cities. The impact of the policy on cargo flows is greater than on the 
movement of people. On average, if the policy value of the departure economy were to 
decrease by 1 point at the current values of the policy index and of passenger flows, the 
passenger traffic would increase by 36%, whereas the decrease in policy value of the 
                                       
11 Available at http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS/0,,contentMDK:2053528 
5~menuPK:1192694~pagePK:64133150~piPK:64133175~theSitePK:239419,00.html, accessed on 16 March 
2010. 
12 Available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/, accessed on 1 March 2010. 
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Table 4.6: Impact of the policy index (the first set). 
 Dependent variable: passenger Dependent variable: cargo 
Coefficient Robust std. err. Coefficient Robust std err 
Constant  11.773*** 1.663 16.573*** 4.094 
pop1 0.274*** 0.043 0.593*** 0.119 
pop2 0.248*** 0.046 0.436** 0.115 
GDPpc1 0.131 0.108 -0.188 0.147 
GDPpc2 0.267*** 0.096 0.145 0.156 
area1 -0.172*** 0.020 -0.451*** 0.063 
area2 -0.152*** 0.024 -0.358*** 0.051 
index1  -0.358*** 0.098 -0.797*** 0.173 
index2 -0.230** 0.109 -0.685*** 0.164 
Distance  -0.403*** 0.110 -0.543** 0.256 
Northeast Asia 0.472 0.277 1.301** 0.483 
North America -0.470*** 0.159 -1.384*** 0.483 
ASEAN -0.786** 0.345 -1.936*** 0.449 
FTA 0.185 0.134 0.008 0.274 
Border 0.015 0.209 -0.320 0.457 
R2 0.55 0.63 
Observations 152 146 
All variables except index1, index2 and dummies are expressed in natural logarithms. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
destination economy by 1 point leads to an increase in passengers carried by 23%. The 
magnitudes are 80% and 69% respectively for the transport of freight at current values of 
both the index and freight volumes. This shows that both departure and arrival economies’ air 
transport policies matter in promoting the movement of people and goods. When the index1 
and index2 variables take logarithmic form, the coefficients are 0.64 and 0.44 for passenger 
movement equation and 1.44 and 1.32 for cargo movement, all with negative signs.13 The 
elasticities of policy indices show that the cargo flows are more sensitive to the change in 
policy.14
 
  
The variables of population, land area and distance also have the expected signs and are 
statistically significant at the 5% level for both passenger and cargo traffic models, as can be 
seen from Table 4.4. Destination economy’s GDP per capita is significant in the model, using 
passenger traffic as the dependent variable. However, the FTA and common border dummies 
are not significant for both models – in fact, the common border dummy is not consistently 
significant in other studies such as Geloso Grosso (2008). 
 
Interestingly, cargo movement within Northeast Asia is significantly higher (at the 5% level) 
after other variables are controlled for, indicating the close economic ties between those three 
economies. It is a different story for the North America and ASEAN dummies, where the 
coefficients are significant but with negative signs. The possible explanation might be that in 
North America there are many international cities and the choice of looking at the traffic 
between the major capital cities in this study (Vancouver, Toronto, New York, Los Angeles, 
Chicago and Mexico City only) obviously understates the true traffic movement in this 
region. Surface transport also plays an important role in this region. The negative sign for the 
ASEAN dummy might suggest that there is room for taking action to promote the movement 
of people and goods in Southeast Asia. 
                                       
13 The coefficients of other variables are similar to those in Table 4.6, but are not reported here. They can be 
provided on request.  The elasticity magnitude is greater than estimated by Geloso Grosso (2008) whose index 
is based on the ICAO Air Services Agreements.  
14 It is worth noting that the use of the 2008 traffic data may underestimate the effects of the air transport policy. 
The long-run effect could be even higher. 
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The regression was re-estimated by replacing the first set of policy index with the alternative 
policy index (variables aindex1 and aindex2) and the results are reported in Table 4.7. For 
both regressions, the indices of departure and arrival economies are statistically significant. 
However, the magnitudes do not too greatly differ from those reported in Table 4.6, although 
the scales of the two sets of policy indices are different (only six indicators in the alternative 
index). The coefficients of other control variables are largely consistent. 
 
Table 4.7: Impact of the alternative policy index. 
 Dependent variable: passenger Dependent variable: cargo 
Coefficient Robust std err Coefficient Robust std err 
Constant  11.479*** 1.590 16.945*** 4.156 
Pop1 0.273*** 0.046 0.608*** 0.117 
Pop2 0.255*** 0.042 0.450*** 0.116 
GDPpc1 0.176** 0.072 -0.212 0.173 
GDPpc2 0.193** 0.084 0.019 0.169 
area1 -0.162*** 0.020 -0.429*** 0.085 
area2 -0.149*** 0.020 -0.341*** 0.051 
aindex1  -0.224*** 0.059 -0.688*** 0.181 
aindex2 -0.284*** 0.065 -0.728*** 0.152 
Distance  -0.387*** 0.114 -0.531* 0.262 
Northeast Asia 0.372 0.283 1.029** 0.524 
North America -0.553*** 0.150 -1.571*** 0.454 
ASEAN -0.645* 0.350 -1.551*** 0.459 
FTA 0.265** 0.124 0.138 0.267 
Border 0.146 0.191 -0.070 0.438 
R2 0.54 0.63 
Observations 152 146 
All variables except index1, index2 and dummies are expressed in natural logarithms. *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.  
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has summarised the air transport policies of 20 APEC economies by constructing 
two sets of policy indices. The policy measures show wide variation between economies and 
in some cases the data indicate that the policy regimes are relatively restrictive. Our gravity 
model using cross-sectional data suggests that liberalisation is significantly and positively 
associated with the movement of people and goods. Passenger travel is clearly hampered by 
restrictive air transport policies. 
 
It is important in future work to break down the cost and profit effects of policy reform, since 
their relative sizes affect the welfare gains from reform. Because of the restrictions imposed 
by current arrangements on network design, the cost effect of restrictions in air transport is 
likely to be significant. This adds to the gains from reform, compared to that of reform of 
measures that act mainly as barriers to entry and create profits. This analysis is vital in the 
next stages of policy design. It can help build the momentum for change and provide 
guidance on its direction. The creation of the EU single aviation market and the recent 
development of ASEAN’s single aviation market suggest that the likely next steps in reform 
will be plurilateral, which will be especially valuable if the costs of the constraints on 
network design are as significant as expected. 
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Chapter 5 
 
QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS FROM STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN 
RAILWAY TRANSPORT MARKETS IN APEC ECONOMIES 
 
 
Pedro Cantos,1 José M Pastor2
 
 and Lorenzo Serrano2 
 
• Productivity has increased in a sample of rail systems among APEC economies: the 
average rate of productivity change for APEC rail systems rose by 3.5% per year 
• However productivity growth in non-APEC economies productivity rose by 4.8% per 
year, indicating the scope for further gain in the APEC group. 
• Nearly all the productivity growth in rail in APEC economies is associated with 
technical change and not with changes in efficiency. 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
During the past 50 years the most common market structure in many economies’ rail sectors 
was a single, publicly-owned firm entrusted with the unified management of both 
infrastructure and services. Despite some differences in their degree of commercial 
autonomy, the traditional methods of regulation and control of this sort of company have 
been relatively homogeneous. In general, it was assumed that the monopoly power of the 
national company required price and service regulation to protect the general interest. In 
addition, there was an obligation, often referred to as ‘common carrier’ status, on the part of 
the companies to meet any demand at those prices. The closure of existing lines or the 
opening of new services required government approval. Thus, competition was rare and often 
discouraged, and the preservation of the national character of the industry was considered the 
key factor governing the overall regulatory system. 
 
Under this protective environment, most national rail companies incurred growing financial 
deficits during the 1970s and 1980s. Furthermore, social obligations to their staff made it 
nearly impossible to reach any agreement on redundancies or even wage adjustments. In 
some economies the companies were forced to finance their deficits by borrowing, so their 
accounts lost all resemblance to reality. The main problems associated with the traditional 
policies for railways were increasing losses, which were usually financed by public subsidies, 
a high degree of managerial inefficiency and business activities oriented exclusively toward 
production targets rather than commercial and market targets. 
 
These distortions did not come from any artificial reduction in the range of services provided or 
from excessively high fares but, more commonly, from an unjustified increase in the supply of 
services (and where costs exceeded revenues). Such behaviour implied larger public subsidies. 
In many cases, the lack of commercially oriented tariffs and investment policies explained 
many of the difficulties faced by the companies. Together with the burden imposed by the 
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technical characteristics of the sector, this placed most railways in a very weak position to 
compete against alternative transport modes. However, fierce intermodal competition alone 
was not able to improve the competitiveness of the railway system, it was necessary to adopt 
measures affecting the internal behaviour and structure of the sector itself. Therefore, the 
sector’s overall decline sparked a widespread, restructuring movement around the world. 
 
The worldwide restructuring process of the rail industry began with timid reforms. Many 
economies began by replacing their railways with autonomous commercial bodies possessing 
independent, realistic balance sheets, in which only public service obligations could be 
explicitly subsidised by the government. Other economies opted to substitute their old 
geographically based management with a multi-divisional structure, defined by the 
companies’ different lines of business or services.  
 
Some economies have carried out relatively long-term restructuring whereas others have 
preferred a quicker implementation. For example, privatisation in New Zealand and Japan 
was phased in over several years, while in Argentina and the United Kingdom it took less 
than 2 years. Yet a common characteristic is that all restructuring processes were undertaken 
to make the companies attractive to private investors, although full privatisation has been less 
preferred than concessioning. 
 
The changes have involved the revision of laws and other regulations affecting railways: 
reducing staff, dealing with pension issues and deciding how much property should be sold 
and how much should be retained by the government. In addition, several arrangements for 
paying for unprofitable (but socially needed) train services were put into place, together with 
a precise definition of the concession contracts and their main terms. 
 
With regard to results, in general most of the restructuring experiences detailed below seem 
to have been positive. The objectives of stopping the industry’s drain on public sector 
resources, along with the stabilisation of market share for both passengers and freight, were 
achieved in most economies. Likewise, the companies succeeded in raising their levels of 
productivity. 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the main restructuring measures in 
the world rail sector, with special emphasis in the assessment of the national rail networks of 
the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) economies. The study is based on a sample 
of European and APEC economies with data for the period from 2001 to 2008, and uses non-
parametric techniques (DEA and the Malmquist productivity index) to calculate indexes of 
productivity growth, while also disaggregating their various components. This latter aspect is 
important, as we aim to determine the impact of changes in the sector, not only in efficiency 
but also in the overall evolution of productivity and its components (technical change and 
changes in efficiency).  
 
The results of the work show that, on average, productivity, efficiency and technical changes 
are slightly lower for APEC members’ rail systems than for other national rail systems. In 
particular, the average rate of productivity change for APEC rail systems rose by 3.5% per 
year, while for non-APEC economies it rose by 4.8%. We also find that the productivity 
improvements are mainly explained by the technical change, while changes in efficiency are 
less relevant. In particular, for APEC member economies our results show that no rail system, 
except Viet Nam, improved its efficiency. Finally, APEC member economies improved, on 
average, their rate of technical change by 3.2% while non-APEC economies improved by 
3.7%. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 5.2 briefly describes the restructuring measures 
for the world rail industry; Section 5.3 provides a short review of the literature; Section 5.4 
presents the methodology, the data used in the study and estimations of productivity growth 
and its components; and Section 5.5 presents the main conclusions. 
 
5.2 RESTRUCTURING MEASURES FOR THE RAIL INDUSTRY 
 
Despite all these changes, the most salient characteristic of the restructuring process of the 
rail industry in the last decades has been the consolidation of different and alternative 
organisational structures for the industry as a whole. These structures differ in three main 
features to be analysed in detail: how access and infrastructure and multimodal competition 
are considered; what extent of vertical separation is introduced after the change; and what 
degree of competition (and private participation) is allowed in the industry after the reform. 
 
The next subsections are devoted to describing the main restructuring measures undertaken in 
the vertical and horizontal dimensions. 
 
5.2.1 The degree of vertical separation 
 
The management of rail infrastructure not only includes simple pricing principles, it also 
encompasses access rights and long-term development provisions. Each economy addresses 
these matters differently: while most have opted to retain infrastructure in public hands, 
creating government management agencies to regulate private train operators, others have 
established nominally independent (actual control from political independence varies) but 
government-owned enterprises to manage stations and tracks. 
 
One of the most clearly defined patterns emerging from deregulation and restructuring is that 
they carry out two critical dimensions: the degree of vertical separation between 
infrastructure and services and the promotion of competition within the sector. With respect 
to the first dimension, there are three main options for the vertical organisation of the railway 
industry: vertical integration, competitive access and vertical separation.  
 
The first option of vertical integration corresponds to the traditional, historical model of 
railway organisation described above, where a single (usually public) entity controls all the 
infrastructure facilities as well as the operating and administrative functions. Less frequent 
competitive access is characterised by the existence of an integrated operator, who is required 
to make rail facilities (tracks, stations etc.) available to other operators on a fair and equal 
basis through the trading of, for example, circulation rights. This has the advantage of 
integration (economies of scope, coordinated planning and reduction of transaction costs) but 
its overall effectiveness may be jeopardised if the integrated company has incentives to leave 
out other operators. 
 
Alternatively, in the complete vertical separation scenario, the management (and possibly the 
ownership) of facilities is fully separated from other rail functions. This is very attractive 
because, although infrastructure may remain a natural monopoly, it is separated from rail 
services, where potential competition among different operators is possible. In general, the 
main advantage of this vertical unbundling is that rail transport is placed in a similar situation 
to road transport, especially regarding the tariff system and infrastructure planning. 
Investment proposals could be studied on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis, while pricing 
policies could be based on social cost. In addition, separating infrastructure from services 
greatly facilitates the entry of more than one operator in a single route. For profitable services 
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this would permit notable improvements in efficiency by allowing direct competition among 
operators. For non-profitable services, infrastructure separation can be accompanied by 
tendering to stimulate increased efficiency through competition for the market, the 
introduction of innovations and marketing improvements. 
 
However, the vertical unbundling of the rail industry also implies several disadvantages. The 
main problem is the potential loss of economies of scope derived from the joint operation of 
tracks and services. It is often noted that the relationship between the services supplied and 
the rolling stock used, as well as the quality, quantity and technical characteristics of the 
infrastructure, is so close that both aspects need to be planned together. Thus, assigning 
different services to several operators may decrease the utilisation of the sector’s staff and 
physical assets. Also, the new system may become less attractive to the user than an 
integrated system because of the lack of interchangeable ticketing, the absence of an 
integrated national network and the high risk. Vertical separation may also require such a 
complex institutional arrangement that the resulting transaction costs may be prohibitive for 
many economies. A final consideration with vertical separation is the reduction of investment 
incentives. For example, an infrastructure owner considering an investment in a facility with 
only one potential buyer will anticipate bargaining away some of the benefit from the new 
service once it comes on line. This problem becomes less relevant with more competition in 
the market, since competition weakens the bargaining position of individual operators by 
reducing the specificity of the assets. 
 
5.2.2 Promotion of competition (horizontal dimension) 
 
Reforms to the horizontal dimension have been very different all over the world. Horizontal 
level reforms in Europe have been very moderate and have consisted mainly of new operators 
entering the freight sector and of a franchising system in passenger services. In contrast, there 
are many instances across the world where some of these measures have been undertaken. 
 
Although it is accepted that infrastructure (characterised by its high levels of sunk costs) may 
be managed under monopoly conditions, competition can be introduced into operations in 
two different ways. The first option consists of directly facilitating the free entry of new 
companies into the railway network. This can be done in either passenger transport or freight 
transport sectors, but, it has been much more usual in the latter. 
 
The alternative is to foster competition for the market by means of a franchising or 
concessions system in which the franchised companies compete for the right to use the 
infrastructure during a certain period of time, which is in all cases notably shorter than the 
infrastructure concession period. This second option has proved to be very attractive in the 
European context, in which many railway services are heavily subsidised.  
 
However, this new structure can also have serious drawbacks. As Nash and Rivera-Trujillo 
(2004) point out, the entry of various companies using the same infrastructure leads to 
obvious problems in a schedule design that must efficiently assign slots among companies 
and operations and at the same time satisfy all of them. These problems significantly affect 
service quality, since coordination is lost as a result of the separate management of 
infrastructure and operations. 
 
Table 5.1 summarises the features of the APEC rail networks. We observe that China; 
Malaysia; the Philippines; Chinese Taipei; and Viet Nam maintain a vertically integrated 
structure without introducing horizontal reforms. Canada; Japan; and the USA maintain a 
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vertically integrated industry but allow the entry of new rail operators, and the rest of the rail 
systems have fully separated the infrastructure and the rail operations. Finally, some 
economies like Chile; Mexico; Peru; and Russia have introduced franchising systems and 
free open systems in their rail networks, while Canada; Japan; and the USA have only 
reformed the sector at horizontal level by allowing the free entry of new operators. 
 
Table 5.1: The main features of APEC members’ rail networks. 
 Vertical dimension Horizontal dimension 
APEC member Integrated monopoly 
Competitive 
access 
Vertical 
unbundling 
Franchising 
system 
Entry new 
operators 
Canada      
Chile      
China      
Indonesia      
Japan      
Korea      
Malaysia      
Mexico      
Peru      
Philippines      
Russia   1 2 1 
Chinese Taipei       
Thailand       
USA      
Viet Nam      
Note: 1 Implemented in 2003; 2 Implemented in 2006 
 
5.3 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
There are many studies in the literature analysing productivity and efficiency in the railway 
sector. However, most of the vertical, and particularly horizontal, separation processes have 
taken place in recent years, and as a result there is very little conclusive empirical evidence 
on the effects of these processes on productivity and efficiency. Furthermore, most of the 
studies are focused on analysis in the European rail network; there are few studies devoted to 
other, and different, experiences.  
 
In general terms, the first studies in this field (see Gathon & Perelman 1992; Oum & Yu 
1994; Gathon & Pestieau 1995) indicated that the economies with the most liberalised 
railway sectors were the most efficient. An excellent survey can be found in Oum et al. 
(1999) covering many of the results obtained in the previous literature. 
 
Likewise, more recent studies have obtained similar results. Cantos et al. (1999; 2010) also 
conclude that rail operators with a higher degree of autonomy and independence are the most 
efficient, are more technologically advanced and achieve higher gains in productivity. 
Similarly, Cantos and Maudos (2001) estimate efficiency in costs and revenue, and show that 
companies need to move towards more commercial policies that also encourage their 
competitiveness. 
 
Friebel et al. (2005) carried out an initial analysis of some of the restructuring measures in the 
sector for the 1995–2000 period, focusing on measures designed to separate the industry 
vertically. Their results suggest that, in general, the reforms have furthered more efficient 
behaviour; however, these reforms must be carried out sequentially if they are to be effective. 
In addition, Driessen et al. (2006) study the efficiency of a sample of European companies for 
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the period 1990–2001. These authors do not come to a decisive conclusion on the impact of 
vertical separation of infrastructure and operations. They find that vertical separation does not 
seem to be necessary to achieve an increase in productive efficiency, although tendering 
processes do appear to favour an increase in efficiency. In all events, these authors recognise 
certain data definition problems and particularly acknowledge that many of the predicted 
effects may still not have been in evidence, since the sample period ended in 2001. 
 
Positions supporting disparate opinions on the efficiency of separating infrastructure and 
operations are therefore not difficult to find. Evans (2003) states that the process leads to 
gains in efficiency, transparency and greater competition. Other authors such as Pfund (2003) 
believe, however, that the disadvantages clearly outweigh the benefits of separation. In the 
same vein, as noted above, the initial empirical studies to approach the subject (Friebel et al. 
2005; Driesden et al. 2006) provide no conclusive results. 
 
Very little analysis has been conducted on the changes stemming from the horizontal 
restructuring of the industry. In particular, Driessen et al. (2006) find that processes of 
competition for the market (through concessions) encourage efficiency more than processes 
that foster competition in the market (through free entry), and that greater managerial 
independence does not encourage greater efficiency. These results contradict those from the 
previous literature (Gathon & Pestieau 1995; Cantos et al. 1999; Friebel et al. 2005). 
 
Recent works have evaluated some of these reforms, particularly in those economies that 
have advanced more in these types of measures. Mulder et al. (2005) used an analysis on the 
basis of cost-benefit techniques in order to evaluate the efficiency of the reforms in the 
railway industry in the Netherlands. Their results indicate that separating the industry 
vertically is beneficial when competition is increased in an efficient way in the sector. 
Furthermore, the authors show that the introduction of competition in the freight sector has 
increased both efficiency and performance. Passenger transport, however, has had difficulties 
in realising historical performance levels. Similarly, in the case of the franchising process in 
passenger services in Sweden, Alexandersson and Hultén (2005) note some significant 
problems associated with very low bids in tenders, and the very low number of firms that 
compete in each tender. Some of these problems have also been observed in the Australian 
experience (Kain 2006). 
 
To sum up, results from the majority of studies indicate that most of the reforms have made 
railway systems more efficient and productive (Cantos et al. 2010). However, a greater effort 
is still required in order to delineate the relevance and significance of each measure. 
 
5.4 RESULTS 
 
Before presenting the results, we must stress that the railway systems included in the sample 
vary significantly in terms of technology and quality of service. The comparison of their 
efficiency levels can therefore lead to misleading or confusing conclusions. For this reason, 
we will focus our results on the changes in productivity, efficiency and technical change and 
compare these changes mainly between the APEC economies and other economies. Our 
methodology is described in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 5.1 shows the accumulated productivity index since 2001. Table 5.2 shows the 
productivity change for pairs of consecutive years as well as the average for the whole 
period. Results show that between 2001 and 2005, productivity growth was similar between 
APEC member economies and other economies. In 2006 the productivity for the non-APEC 
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railway systems increased at a clearly higher rate than the rate for the APEC economies 
(12.1% against 0.3%). In the following 2 years productivity increased more for the APEC 
economies. On average, productivity for APEC economies rose by 3.5% per year, while for 
non-APEC economies productivity rose by 4.8%. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Productivity change (2001=1). 
 
We then decompose the productivity change between efficiency changes and technical 
change in order to analyse the causes of the productivity changes. As we see in Figure 5.2, 
until 2005 the evolution of efficiency is similar, but in 2005 the efficiency notably improved 
for non-APEC economies, which partially explains the increase in productivity for these 
economies. But the efficiency of non-APEC economies decreased in 2007: the rates are again 
similar between the two groups of economies for the last year of the sample. At aggregate 
level, there were no significant efficiency improvements for APEC economies, while 
efficiency improved by 1.4% per year for non-APEC economies. 
 
Regarding technical change, Figure 5.3 shows that the differences are not significant between 
the two groups of economies. However, from 2005 the technical change improved at a higher 
rate for non-APEC economies. At aggregate level, technical changes for APEC economies 
increased by 3.2% per year, while for non-APEC economies productivity increased by 3.7%. 
 
Table 5.2 analyses the annual results per economy for pairs of consecutive years in terms of 
productivity. The last column expresses the average outcome over the whole sample period 
per economy. 
 
Regarding productivity change, we can observe that the Russian Federation; Viet Nam; and 
China have the highest rates, while Chinese Taipei and Korea have the lowest. At aggregate 
level, APEC economies obtained an average increase of 3.5%, while non-APEC economies 
obtained an average increase of 4.8%. 
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Table 5.2: Productivity change. 
Economy 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Average 2001–08 
Austria 1,056 1,055 1,042 0,950 1,088 1,006 1,064 1,037 
Belgium 1,067 1,006 1,085 1,042 1,116 0,977 0,999 1,042 
Bulgaria 0,919 1,095 1,058 1,025 1,000 1,015 0,910 1,003 
Czech Republic 0,990 1,016 1,002 0,991 1,138 1,048 0,948 1,019 
Denmark 0,808 0,914      0,861 
Estonia  1,127 1,031 1,064 1,131 1,066 0,791 0,804 1,002 
Finland 1,043 1,071 1,320 0,856 2,417 0,465 1,060 1,176 
France 1,070 1,030 0,994 0,666 1,640 1,029 1,087 1,074 
Germany 0,992 0,854 1,281 0,923 1,019 1,007 1,004 1,012 
Greece 1,099 0,889 1,114 1,162 1,040 1,159 1,086 1,078 
Hungary 1,009 1,098 1,118 1,006 1,139 0,966 0,964 1,043 
Ireland 1,018 1,007 0,989 1,190 1,057 1,143 1,458 1,123 
Italy 1,006 0,961 1,029 0,985 1,014 1,010 0,985 0,999 
Latvia 1,122 1,203 0,975 1,132 0,877 0,968 1,059 1,048 
Lithuania 1,266 1,194 1,019 1,101 1,041 1,016 0,992 1,090 
Luxembourg 0,876 0,981 1,026 0,852 1,117 0,848 0,994 0,956 
Netherlands 1,152 1,083      1,118 
Norway 0,999 1,225      1,112 
Poland 1,010 1,085 1,008 0,958 0,970 1,022 0,958 1,002 
Portugal 1,137 1,012 1,074 1,043 1,122 1,049 1,049 1,070 
Romania 0,915 1,091 1,052 1,102 0,915 1,046 0,821 0,992 
Slovak Republic 0,963 0,971 1,009 0,965 1,065 0,979 1,005 0,994 
Slovenia 1,084 1,180 1,056 1,007 0,987 1,047 1,013 1,053 
Spain 1,056 1,021 1,010 2,076 1,035 1,010 1,098 1,187 
Sweden 1,458 0,291 2,722 0,424 0,896 1,042 1,019 1,122 
Switzerland 1,049 0,911 0,948 1,158 1,031 1,131 1,042 1,039 
Canada 0,999 1,047 1,088 1,011 1,016 0,979 1,018 1,023 
China  1,050 1,022 1,108 1,042 0,931 1,071 1,160 1,055 
Japan 1,013 1,055 0,992 1,020 1,023 1,014 1,037 1,022 
Korea  0,981 1,019 0,995 0,998 1,006 1,010 1,014 1,003 
Russia 1,210 1,099 1,000 1,079 1,037   1,085 
Chinese Taipei 0,963 0,903 1,068 1,023 0,984 0,957 0,978 0,982 
USA 1,028 1,035 1,050 1,106 1,028 0,994 1,011 1,036 
Viet Nam  1,143 0,891 1,179 1,045 1,000 1,102 1,183 1,078 
Total 1,049 1,010 1,112 1,034 1,091 0,997 1,027 1,045 
APEC members 1,048 1,009 1,060 1,040 1,003 1,018 1,057 1,035 
Non-APEC  1,050 1,011 1,130 1,032 1,121 0,990 1,018 1,048 
Note: Blank cells correspond to missing data in the sample. 
 
Table 5.3 presents the results for the efficiency change. The results show that China; Japan; 
Russia; and the USA were efficient during the whole period and thus cannot obtain efficiency 
changes. In any case, we observe again that, on average, APEC members’ rail systems 
improved their efficiency level only by 0.2%, while non-APEC economies improved the 
efficiency scores by 1.4%. 
 
Rates of technical change are expressed in Table 5.4. At aggregate level, we can conclude 
that APEC economies improved their rate of technical change an average of 3.2%, while non-
APEC economies improved 3.7%. Distinguishing between economies, Russia obtains the 
highest score (8.5%), followed by China (5.5%) and the USA (3.6%). The reasons for this 
increase may be related in a higher investment in the technology of the railway infrastructure 
and rolling stock systems. 
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Figure 5.2: Efficiency change (2001=1). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Technical change (2001=1). 
 
From these results we conclude that productivity improvements are mainly explained by 
technical change, while changes in efficiency are less relevant. In particular, for APEC 
economies our results show that no rail system other than Viet Nam improved its efficiency 
significantly. Figures 5.4 to 5.6 summarise the results for each APEC member economy. 
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Table 5.3: Efficiency change. 
Economy 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Average 2001–08 
Austria 1,024 1,027 0,987 0,896 1,068 0,974 1,014 0,999 
Belgium 1,033 0,948 1,026 1,001 1,197 0,940 0,942 1,012 
Bulgaria 0,892 1,043 1,002 0,969 0,967 0,991 0,858 0,960 
Czech Republic 0,958 0,969 0,927 0,928 1,189 1,023 0,913 0,987 
Denmark 0,753 0,845      0,799 
Estonia  1,087 0,984 0,990 1,037 1,054 0,785 0,793 0,961 
Finland 1,016 1,006 1,241 0,802 2,345 0,457 1,031 1,128 
France 1,032 0,998 0,971 0,628 1,608 1,023 1,058 1,045 
Germany 0,981 0,803 1,242 0,874 1,044 0,983 0,966 0,985 
Greece 1,081 0,829 1,049 1,135 0,998 1,144 1,050 1,041 
Hungary 0,990 1,032 1,083 0,945 1,108 0,964 0,932 1,008 
Ireland 1,001 0,939 0,930 1,163 1,026 1,127 1,418 1,086 
Italy 0,994 0,895 1,022 0,952 1,000 0,996 0,965 0,975 
Latvia 1,098 1,158 0,951 1,044 0,866 0,928 0,991 1,005 
Lithuania 1,224 1,129 0,966 1,011 1,023 0,992 0,961 1,044 
Luxembourg 0,843 0,934 0,943 0,807 1,223 0,813 0,929 0,928 
Netherlands 1,123 1,060      1,092 
Norway 0,956 1,317      1,136 
Poland 0,980 1,034 0,938 0,894 1,017 0,996 0,921 0,968 
Portugal 1,117 0,945 1,011 1,015 1,078 1,036 1,016 1,031 
Romania 0,889 1,034 0,999 1,037 0,918 1,034 0,792 0,957 
Slovak Republic 0,920 0,932 0,929 0,917 1,155 0,937 0,940 0,961 
Slovenia 1,049 1,128 1,010 0,948 0,973 1,029 0,972 1,016 
Spain 1,037 0,954 0,950 2,023 0,994 0,997 1,062 1,145 
Sweden 1,024 0,372 2,637 0,394 0,868 1,042 0,984 1,046 
Switzerland 1,025 0,854 0,915 1,113 1,075 1,099 0,997 1,011 
Canada 1,001 1,025 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,004 
China  1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Japan 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Korea  0,962 0,949 1,010 0,980 0,997 0,990 0,988 0,982 
Russia 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000   1,000 
Chinese Taipei 0,961 0,828 1,153 1,007 0,972 0,943 0,964 0,975 
USA 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 1,000 
Viet Nam  1,105 0,853 1,168 1,000 0,978 1,098 1,147 1,050 
Total 1,005 0,965 1,066 0,985 1,088 0,978 0,987 1,011 
APEC members 1,004 0,957 1,041 0,998 0,993 1,004 1,014 1,002 
Non-APEC  1,005 0,968 1,075 0,980 1,121 0,970 0,978 1,014 
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Table 5.4: Technical change. 
Economy 2001–02 2002–03 2003–04 2004–05 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 Average 2001–08 
Austria 1,031 1,027 1,056 1,060 1,019 1,033 1,050 1,039 
Belgium 1,033 1,060 1,058 1,042 0,932 1,040 1,061 1,032 
Bulgaria 1,030 1,050 1,056 1,059 1,034 1,024 1,061 1,045 
Czech Republic 1,034 1,049 1,081 1,067 0,957 1,024 1,038 1,036 
Denmark 1,073 1,082      1,077 
Estonia  1,037 1,049 1,075 1,090 1,012 1,007 1,014 1,041 
Finland 1,027 1,065 1,064 1,068 1,031 1,018 1,028 1,043 
France 1,036 1,032 1,024 1,060 1,020 1,006 1,028 1,029 
Germany 1,011 1,064 1,031 1,057 0,976 1,024 1,040 1,029 
Greece 1,017 1,072 1,063 1,024 1,042 1,013 1,034 1,038 
Hungary 1,019 1,064 1,033 1,064 1,029 1,001 1,034 1,035 
Ireland 1,017 1,072 1,063 1,023 1,031 1,014 1,028 1,035 
Italy 1,011 1,074 1,007 1,035 1,014 1,015 1,020 1,025 
Latvia 1,022 1,038 1,025 1,085 1,012 1,040 1,069 1,042 
Lithuania 1,034 1,058 1,055 1,089 1,018 1,025 1,032 1,044 
Luxembourg 1,039 1,050 1,088 1,056 0,913 1,044 1,069 1,037 
Netherlands 1,026 1,022      1,024 
Norway 1,045 0,930      0,988 
Poland 1,031 1,050 1,074 1,072 0,954 1,027 1,041 1,035 
Portugal 1,019 1,071 1,063 1,027 1,041 1,013 1,033 1,038 
Romania 1,029 1,056 1,053 1,063 0,997 1,011 1,037 1,035 
Slovak Republic 1,046 1,041 1,086 1,053 0,923 1,045 1,069 1,037 
Slovenia 1,033 1,046 1,045 1,062 1,015 1,018 1,042 1,037 
Spain 1,019 1,071 1,063 1,026 1,041 1,013 1,034 1,038 
Sweden 1,425 0,783 1,032 1,078 1,032 1,000 1,036 1,055 
Switzerland 1,024 1,066 1,036 1,040 0,959 1,029 1,046 1,029 
Canada 0,998 1,022 1,088 1,011 1,016 0,979 1,018 1,019 
China  1,050 1,022 1,108 1,042 0,931 1,071 1,160 1,055 
Japan 1,013 1,055 0,992 1,020 1,023 1,014 1,037 1,022 
Korea  1,020 1,074 0,985 1,018 1,009 1,020 1,027 1,022 
Russia 1,210 1,099 1,000 1,079 1,037   1,085 
Chinese Taipei 1,002 1,090 0,926 1,016 1,013 1,014 1,014 1,011 
USA 1,028 1,035 1,050 1,106 1,028 0,994 1,011 1,036 
Viet Nam  1,034 1,045 1,009 1,046 1,022 1,004 1,031 1,027 
Total 1,045 1,044 1,045 1,053 1,003 1,019 1,041 1,036 
APEC members 1,044 1,055 1,020 1,042 1,010 1,014 1,042 1,032 
Non-APEC  1,045 1,040 1,053 1,056 1,000 1,021 1,041 1,037 
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Figure 5.4: Productivity change for APEC economies (2001=1). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Efficiency change for APEC economies (2001=1). 
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Figure 5.6: Technical change for APEC economies (2001=1). 
 
5.5 CONCLUSION 
 
We have estimated productivity change indicators for a sample of 34 railway systems during 
the period from 2001 to 2008. These indexes have been decomposed in efficiency changes 
and technical change. The methodology used to estimate these indexes has been the DEA 
approach. We must point out that, as the railway systems are very heterogeneous, it is very 
difficult to compare them individually. 
 
We carried out a first analysis where APEC rail systems may be compared with non-APEC 
rail systems. The results show that, on average, the productivity, efficiency and technical 
changes are slightly lower for the APEC rail systems. In particular, the average rate of 
productivity change for APEC rail systems rose by 3.5% per year, while for non-APEC 
economies productivity rose by 4.8%. The Russian Federation; Viet Nam; and China showed 
the highest rates, while Chinese Taipei and Korea had the lowest. 
 
However, China; Japan; and the USA were efficient during the whole period. In any case, we 
observe again that, on average and excepting Viet Nam, APEC rail systems did not improve 
their efficiency scores, while non-APEC economies did improve their efficiency scores by 
1.4% per year.  
 
Finally, APEC member economies improved, on average, their rate of technical change by 
3.2%, while non-APEC economies improved by 3.7%. 
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APPENDIX: METHODOLOGY 
 
The Malmquist productivity index (Malmquist 1953) allows changes in productivity of 
railway companies to be broken down into changes in efficiency and technical change. 
Furthermore, it allows a different rate of technical change for each railway company. Also, if 
it is estimated using a non-parametric frontier model (data envelopment analysis; DEA), 
which is the most commonly used approach, it is not necessary to impose any functional form 
on the data or make distributional assumptions for the inefficiency term, unlike the Stochastic 
Frontier Approach (SFA). The main disadvantage of this approach is that the estimation of 
inefficiency may show an upward bias, capturing as inefficiency the influence of other 
factors, such as errors in data measurement, bad luck etc. 
 
The Malmquist productivity index uses the notion of distance function, so its calculation 
requires prior estimation of the corresponding frontier. In this study we use the determinist 
DEA. 
 
To illustrate the calculation of the Malmquist productivity index, let us assume that the 
transformation function that describes the technology in each period t is:  
( ), 0; 1,...,t t tF y x t T= =          [1] 
where yt=(y1t,…,yNt)∈RN+ is the output vector and xt=(x1t,…,xMt)∈RM+ the input vector 
corresponding to period t. 
 
Following Caves et al. (1982), technology can be represented alternatively by means of the 
input distance function:  
( ) ( )[ ]0/,:, ,, == tttttttttt mxyFmMaxxyD        [2] 
This function is defined as the maximum reduction to which it is necessary to subject the 
vector of inputs of period t ( )tx , given the level of outputs ( )ty , so that the new observation 
( ),, /t t t ty x m  is at the frontier of period t. 
 
This function characterises completely the technology in such a way that ( ) 1, ≥ttt xyD  if and 
only if ( ) ttt Fxy ∈, . Furthermore, ( ), 1t t tD y x =  if and only if the observation stands at the 
limits of the frontier, which occurs when the observation is efficient in the sense used by 
Farrell (1957).  
 
Figure A5.1 illustrates the above concepts for a situation with a single output and a single 
input. The observation ( ),t ty x  stands below the technological frontier of period t, which 
means that it is not technologically efficient. The distance function would be calculated as the 
maximum reduction in inputs, given the output, in such a way that the deflected input reaches 
the technological frontier. In the graph, this reduction in inputs would be represented by 
, ,/t t t t tx x m= . Farrell’s output-oriented measurement of technical efficiency measures how 
much input could decrease, given the output. 
 
In Figure A5.1 it can be observed that Farrell’s measurement of technical efficiency for the 
observation ( ),t ty x  is , ,/ /t t t t tOD OB x x m= = . 
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Figure A5.1: The input-based Malmquist productivity index. 
 
Note that so far the distance function has been defined for a single period. Specifically, we 
have composed observations of one period with the technology of the same period. To define 
the Malmquist productivity index it is necessary to define distance functions with respect to 
technologies of different periods. 
 
( ) ( )[ ]0/,:, 1,11,11 == +++++ tttttttttt mxyFmMaxxyD       [3] 
In the above expression, the distance function ( )1 1,t t tD y x+ +  measures the maximum 
proportional reduction in inputs, given the outputs, to make the observation of period t+1, 
( )1 1,t ty x+ + , feasible in period t. In the situation represented in Figure A5.1 the observation
( )1 1,t ty x+ +  is outside the feasible set represented by the technology in t, so the value of the 
distance function will be lower than one ( )1 , 1/ / 1t t tOE OF x x+ += < . 
 
In a similar way, it is possible to define the distance function of an observation in t, ( ),t ty x , 
to make it feasible in relation to a technology current in t + 1, ( )1 ,t t tD y x+ . 
 
Note that when comparing observations of one period with technologies of different periods, 
the distance function may be less than unity. In particular ( )1 1,t t tD y x+ +  and ( )1 ,t t tD y x+  
may be less than unity if there has been technical progress and technical regress, respectively. 
And note further that in the situation represented in Figure A5.1 ( )1 1, 1t t tD y x+ + < , indicates 
that there has been technical progress. 
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On the basis of the above concepts, the input based Malmquist productivity index used to 
analyse productivity change between periods t and t + 1, taking the technology of period t as 
reference, is defined as (see Caves et al. [1982]): 
( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1
,
, , ,
,
t t t
t t t t t
t t t
D y x
M y x y x
D y x
+ +
+ +=        [4] 
Mt > 1 indicates that the productivity of period t + 1 is higher than that of period t, since the 
reduction of the input vector of period t + 1 to reach the frontier of period t is higher than that 
applicable to the inputs of period t. But Mt < 1 indicates that productivity has decreased 
between period t and t + 1. 
 
Alternatively, it is possible to define the Malmquist productivity index by taking the 
technology of period t + 1: 
( ) ( )( )
1
1 1 1
1 1 1
,
, , ,
,
t t t
t t t t t
t t t
D y x
M y x y x
D y x
+
+ + +
+ + +=        [5] 
In this case the interpretation is similar. Mt > 1 indicates that the productivity of period t + 1 
is higher than that of period t, since the reduction necessary in the inputs of the period t + 1 
for the observation to be feasible in t + 1 is lower than that applicable to the inputs of period 
t. 
 
In all the above definitions only two periods (t and t + 1) have been considered, and the 
definitions have been made taking as reference the technology of period t or t + 1. However, 
when we wish to analyse the productivity change for a longer time series, the use of a fixed 
technology may cause problems the further away we are from the base year. Also Moorsten 
(1961) shows that the choice of base year is not neutral in the results. To attempt to solve 
these problems two methodologies are offered. The first consists of calculating two indices 
based on pairs of consecutive years which take as base the technology of the two periods t 
and t + 1 and calculating the geometric mean of the two, thus allowing the technology of 
reference to change, minimising the problems caused by the change (Färe et al. 1994). 
 
Another procedure, used by Berg et al. (1992) to solve the above-mentioned problems is to 
consider two frontiers of reference corresponding to the initial and final years and to take the 
geometric mean of the two Malmquist indices. 
 
In this study we will use the first of the alternatives:  
1
21
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
( , ) ( , )( , , , )
( , ) ( , )
t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t
D y x D y xM y x y x
D y x D y x
+
+ +
+ + + + +
   
=    
   
     [6] 
Rewriting the above expression, it is possible to break down the Malmquist productivity 
index into the catching-up effect and technical change or movement of the frontier: 
1
21 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1 1
( , ) ( , ) ( , )( , , , )
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
Productivity change
t t t t t t t t t
t t t t
t t t t t t t t t
Catching up effect Technical change
D y x D y x D y xM y x y x
D y x D y x D y x
+ + + +
+ +
+ + + + +
−
   
=    
   
 
   [7] 
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The catching-up effect or change in relative efficiency between periods t and t + 1 is 
represented by the first ratio, which will be higher than unity if there has been an increase in 
efficiency. Similarly, the geometric mean of the two ratios between brackets measures the 
change or movement of technology between periods t and t + 1. 
 
Recent developments in the Malmquist productivity index have included an additional 
component to measure the contribution of the output bias on Total Factor Productivity (Färe 
et al. 1997). 
 
The above breakdown can again be illustrated using Figure A5.1. 
 
1
2
1 1 / / /( , , , )
/ / /
/ ·
/
Productivity change
t t t t
Catching up effect Technical change
Catching up effect
OD OB OE OC OD OAM y x y x
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If the observation has not varied its efficiency between t and t + 1, the first term will be equal 
to 1 and the productive change experienced between the two periods (M) will be explained 
only by the movement of the frontier.  
 
However, if the second term is 1 (the frontier has not moved), the changes in productivity 
estimated by M will be explained only by the changes in efficiency of firms in the two 
periods (catching-up). In other cases, the productive changes reflected in M will be a mixture 
of changes in efficiency and movements of the frontier. 
 
The Malmquist productivity index can be calculated in several ways (Caves et al. 1982). In 
this study, as noted, we calculate the Malmquist productivity index using DEA, a non-
parametric technique of linear programming. 
 
Suppose that in each period t there exist k = 1,...,K firms which use n = 1,...,N inputs ( tnkx ) to 
produce m = 1,...,M outputs ( tnky ). The calculation of the Malmquist productivity index for a 
firm j requires calculation of four types of distance function: ( , )t t tD x y , 1 1 1( , )t t tD x y+ + + , 
1 1( , )t t tD x y+ +  and 1( , )t t tD x y+ . 
Making use of the property whereby the input distance function is equal to the reciprocal of 
the Farrell input-oriented efficiency measure (Färe & Lovell 1978), we have that for 
( , )t t tD x y , 
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Note that we assume constant returns to scale (Caves et al. 1982; Cantos et al. 1999, Färe et 
al. 2008). Also note that this efficiency measure is radial and therefore can leave slacks, 
which constitute a non-radial form of inefficiency. This fact led some authors such as Grifell-
Tatjé et al. (1998) to develop a non-radial efficiency measure which incorporates the slacks. 
Replacing the conventional radial efficiency measure with this new measure generates what 
the author calls the ‘quasi-Malmquist productivity index’. 
 
The calculation of 1 1 1( , )t t tD x y+ + + is obtained in a similar way but substituting t for t + 1. 
Finally, the calculation of the first of the distances referred to two different moments in time 
1 1( , )t t tD x y+ +  is done in the following way: 
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Note that the observation 1 1( , )t tx y+ +  is compared with the technology in t, formed by the set 
of observations existing in t, and so it may occur that the observation is not feasible, given the 
technology current in t (Ft) and the solution is greater than unity. 
 
The second, 1( , )t t tD x y+ , is done in the same way but substituting t for t + 1, and t + 1 for t. 
 
The data correspond to a sample of 34 world railway systems from 2001 to 2008. The 
information was taken from reports published by the Union Internationale des Chemins de 
Fer and completed with data published in the organisation’s statistical memoranda. 
Specifically, the different railway systems established in each economy are evaluated. Thus, 
in the first years of the sample, the systems were run by one single company with vertically 
integrated infrastructure and operations and horizontally integrated operating services. Over 
the years, as many of the railway systems began to be separated both vertically and 
horizontally, different companies took over their management. In this case, the data 
corresponding to all the companies making up a railway system are aggregated for each 
variable. 
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Two outputs and three inputs are considered. The variables selected as outputs are the 
number of passengers/km transported for passenger transport and tonnes/km transported for 
freight transport. In the case of input variables, the following are considered (Table A5.1): 
Number of employees in all of the railways making up the railway system; 
Two measures of the rolling stock: 
A variable indicating the number of locomotives, including light rail motor tractors; and 
A variable calculated as the annual fleet wagons and the number of coaches, railcars and 
railcar trailers; and 
Number of kilometres of railway infrastructure in each economy. 
 
Table A5.1: Average values for the variables (2001–08). 
Economy PKT 
(millions) 
TKT 
(millions) 
LLT 
(km) 
LOCOM WAG EMP 
(,000) 
Austria 8,761 18,176 5,786 1,232 20,457 46 
Belgium 9,041 8,309 3,502 776 15,883 39 
Bulgaria 2,538 5,041 4,215 602 14,700 35 
Czech Republic 6,749 16,313 9,492 2,180 39,814 69 
Denmark 5,478 1,941 2,122 57 5,294 12 
Estonia 224 8,838 924 128 3,904 4 
Finland 8,017 13,287 5,827 784 14,535 21 
France 72,307 45,918 29,456 4,355 57,971 164 
Germany 68,707 75,502 34,901 4,976 123,848 201 
Greece 1,806 581 2,476 162 4,046 8 
Hungary 7,000 8,127 7,951 1,034 18,894 48 
Ireland 1,745 305 1,919 94 1,772 6 
Italy 47,158 21,589 16,538 3,286 58,449 101 
Latvia 855 16,414 2,303 217 5,962 14 
Lithuania 446 11,885 1,763 249 9,857 12 
Luxembourg 297 461 275 100 3,334 3 
Netherlands 14,176 3,848 2,809 275 5,190 26 
Norway 2,406 2,723 4,111 156 2,765 9 
Poland 17,818 45,115 19,738 3,711 88,993 134 
Portugal 3,591 2,474 2,840 182 4,456 9 
Romania 7,895 13,656 11,007 1,966 61,314 69 
Slovak Republic 2,352 9,809 3,647 1,041 18,581 38 
Slovenia 778 3,239 1,229 165 4,821 8 
Spain 19,888 11,820 12,853 732 19,348 23 
Sweden 6,042 12,945 10,004 398 8,149 12 
Switzerland 14,716 12,216 3,357 1,654 15,854 29 
Canada 1,484 334,820 55,893 2,913 94,015 36 
China  579,817 1,890,285 61,266 16,157 560,396 1.679 
Japan 246,085 22,547 19,884 1,218 34,356 140 
Korea  30,165 10,766 3,260 580 12,225 30 
Russia 155,149 1,639,928 86,703 11,945 596,127 1.219 
Chinese Taipei 9,285 889 1,096 323 4,692 14 
USA 8,985 2,526,146 194,228 22,476 476,044 183 
Viet Nam 4,142 2,898 2,804 356 5,588 42 
Total  41,202 200,267 18,787 2,610 70,724 130 
Source: Union Internationale des Chemins de Fer. 
PKT = number of passengers/km transported for passenger transport; TKT = tonnes/km transported for freight 
transport; EMP = number of employees in all of the railways making up the railway system; LOCOM = number 
of locomotives, including light rail motor tractors; WAG = annual fleet wagons (coaches, railcars and railcar 
trailers); and LLT = number of kilometres of railway infrastructure in each economy. 
 
 
Chapter 6 
 
QUANTIFYING THE BENEFITS FROM STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN 
ELECTRICITY AND GAS MARKETS IN APEC ECONOMIES 
 
 
Philippa Dee1
 
 
 
• Structural reforms in electricity sectors in APEC economies since 2004 have generally 
been incremental; and those in gas have been less extensive than in electricity. 
• Partial reforms have had significant effects on productivity. 
• Reform to introduce competition, in particular, is expected to lead to further efficiency 
gains and lower prices. 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The production and distribution of electricity and gas involves networks – networks of 
electricity transmission and distribution lines, and networks of gas transmission and 
distribution pipelines. At least some components of these networks have the characteristics of 
a ‘natural monopoly’, meaning that it is less costly for their operation to be carried out by a 
single producer using a single set of facilities, rather than having two or more operators with 
duplicate facilities. In addition, there are strict technical requirements for operating electricity 
and gas networks, so as to preserve the physical integrity of the distribution systems. For 
these reasons, electricity and gas have traditionally been supplied by single, vertically 
integrated monopolies often in government ownership. 
 
The absence of competition meant that there were few (if any) incentives for electricity and 
gas providers to keep costs to a minimum and to operate efficiently. Unless prices were 
regulated, there was also scope for operators to abuse their monopoly power and price above 
cost.2
 
 
Structural reforms in electricity and gas have aimed to overcome these two key problems. 
The reforms have typically aimed to introduce competition to allow competitive suppliers 
having access to those parts of the network that are natural monopolies. Successful reform 
also requires that the restructuring be done in such a way that the benefits of competition in 
the competitive sectors outweigh the loss of any economies of scope that may have prevailed 
when the monopoly and competitive activities were operated together under single 
ownership. 
 
Beyond these common features, there are some differences in the physical characteristics of 
electricity and gas markets, which have led to differences in the extent of reforms carried out. 
                                                            
1 Crawford School of Economics and Government, Australian National University, Canberra, Australian Capital 
Territory (philippa.dee@anu.edu.au). 
2 Notwithstanding higher prices, government owners often received returns on equity and capital that were 
below average. 
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6.2 KEY FEATURES OF ELECTRICITY AND GAS MARKETS 
 
6.2.1 Electricity markets 
 
The production of electricity involves: generation, transport over high-voltage lines 
(transmission), transport over low-voltage lines (distribution), marketing to consumers 
(supply) and buying and selling on wholesale markets (trading). What follows is drawn from 
European Commission (2007). 
 
Transport operations are considered to be natural monopolies, and typically remain regulated 
even after structural reform. But generation is seen as a competitive activity, and is generally 
the first activity to be opened to competition, followed by wholesale trading and retail supply. 
However, retail prices may remain regulated in some economies, even after structural reform.  
 
Unlike gas, electricity cannot be stored economically once it is produced, so supply has to be 
matched to demand on a second-by-second basis, even though demand may vary significantly 
over different times of the day and over different seasons. The introduction of new 
competitive generators needs to be managed in a way that does not jeopardise this supply–
demand matching or bring down the grid network.3
 
 After structural reform, this balancing is 
typically achieved by having balancing markets run by an independent system operator.  
Electricity can be generated using a variety of technologies, each of which has different cost 
characteristics. Nuclear plants tend to have low operating (variable) costs, so are typically 
used for base-load supply (i.e., operated all the time). Hydro plants also have low operating 
costs and are used for base-load supply when water availability allows. However, nuclear 
plants (and some hydro plants) also have very high capital costs, so the prices to consumers 
from this source may have to be high if operators are to receive an adequate return on capital. 
The operating (variable) costs of thermal plants depend largely on the prices of their input 
fuels. At current prices, coal-fired plants tend to have the next lowest operating costs after 
hydro and nuclear, and thus are next on the ‘merit order’. Combined cycle and gas turbine 
plants tend to have the highest operating costs, and tend to be used as ‘peaking plant’ (i.e., 
used to meet peak demand). However, combined cycle and gas plants have low capital costs, 
so consumer prices from this source can be relatively low. In general terms, therefore, 
electricity prices to consumers depend not just on the extent of structural reform but also on 
the mix of production technologies available. 
 
Finally, like most network industries, electricity transmission and distribution are subject to 
economies of density – costs are lower, the shorter the distances over which electricity has to 
be transported. Thus geography also has an impact on electricity prices to users. 
 
England and Wales took the lead in structural reform of electricity markets in 1990, but many 
OECD economies (and some non-OECD ones) have gone at least some of the way down 
similar paths. In the European Union (EU) structural reform has received an additional 
impetus with the Second Electricity Directive of 2003 (discussed below). Doove et al. (2001) 
describe the broad outlines of the structural reform agenda as follows: 
• structurally separating (‘unbundling’) the competitive activities (particularly 
generation, but sometimes also retailing) from the natural monopoly elements 
(particularly transmission but sometimes also distribution) – this is called ‘vertical 
separation’; 
                                                            
3 This applies particularly to wind and solar sources which may be generating at a time supply is not required. 
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• dividing existing generation capacity among a number of different generation 
companies, who then compete with each other – this is called ‘horizontal separation’; 
• allowing new generators to enter the market – these are sometimes called independent 
power producers (IPPs); 
• guaranteeing open and non-discriminatory access for all generators to the 
transmission grid (subject to available capacity), so that they can sell directly to 
downstream suppliers or users, rather than selling to the incumbent – this is called 
‘third party access (TPA)’; 
• establishing a wholesale price pool or spot wholesale market for electricity (either 
mandatory or optional, and broader than, but interconnected with, the balancing 
market), so that new entrants are not obliged to enter both the generation and retailing 
sector at the same time, thus lowering entry costs;  
• regulating the natural monopoly activities to prevent any abuse of market power; 
• introducing an economic regulator independent of industry players and day-to-day 
influence, and typically separate from the (technical) system operator; 
• enabling large customers (retailers and sometimes large industrial users) to buy 
electricity directly from the generator of their choice; 
• introducing competition into metering and billing activities and contract terms, thus 
allowing retail customers freedom to choose among different electricity suppliers; 
• providing a full range of tradable financial instruments (e.g., futures contracts and 
options); 
• undertaking partial or complete privatisation or corporatisation of publicly-owned 
assets; 
• introducing cross-ownership restrictions, especially between competitive and natural 
monopoly activities; 
• liberalising restrictions on foreign investment and ownership; 
• mandating service quality standards; and  
• allowing retailers to introduce innovative services (e.g., the ability to switch retailers 
over the internet or providing electricity jointly with other services such as telephony 
and gas). 
The possible benefits of these reforms are discussed below. 
 
6.2.2 Gas markets 
 
Natural gas is found in underground reserves, often in combination with oil and condensate 
products. Exploration and production is generally done by oil companies, and there are few 
synergies between these and other activities in gas markets. In economies without indigenous 
production, however, the primary supply activity is undertaken by importers, who may also 
be involved in downstream activities. What follows is also drawn from European 
Commission (2007). 
 
Natural gas is mostly transported from production to market by high-volume, high-pressure 
transmission pipelines. Natural gas can also be cooled and condensed, and then shipped 
overseas in liquid form (liquefied natural gas [LNG]). Both forms of transport are expensive 
relative to the value of the gas transported, but pipeline is cheaper for shorter distances while 
shipment is more viable for longer distances. Both transmission pipelines and LNG terminal 
facilities involve substantial sunk costs, giving both activities natural monopoly 
characteristics. 
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Once natural gas reaches the market, it is distributed to customers over low-volume, low-
pressure distribution pipelines. These distribution networks also have the characteristics of a 
natural monopoly.  
 
Unlike electricity, there is essentially only one technology for producing natural gas. Also 
unlike electricity, natural gas can be stored, so there is no necessity to instantaneously match 
supply to demand. Nevertheless, flexibility is somewhat limited because the physical 
characteristics of storage facilities may limit the speed with which gas can be injected or 
withdrawn. Flexibility is also limited because gas extraction rates from underground reserves 
may depend on geology rather than demand, and the ability to alter pipeline pressures is also 
somewhat limited.  
 
In many economies, gas importation, transmission and storage was traditionally undertaken 
by a single monopolist (or several companies with regional monopolies). Sometimes the 
monopoly importer also sold to consumers, or else these sales were handled by downstream 
monopolies.  
 
Like electricity, structural reform of gas markets involves allowing new entrants into the 
potentially competitive segments of the market, without requiring them to be vertically 
integrated. Possible new business models include the following: 
• new companies that produce gas or import it from external sources, in competition 
with the incumbent(s); 
• new shipper/suppliers who buy gas on wholesale markets, arrange for its 
transportation with the network company and sign retail contracts with consumers; 
• pure traders who buy and sell on wholesale markets to take advantage of arbitrage 
opportunities.  
These new business models rely on the development of functioning wholesale markets and on 
third party access to transmission and distribution networks. To reduce the possibility of 
incumbents using their control over pipeline or terminal facilities to thwart competition, both 
transmission and distribution should be unbundled into separate transmission system 
operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators (DSOs). If such operators are sufficiently 
independent from incumbents, they should have an incentive to maximise, rather than restrict, 
the amount of gas sold through their networks, thus facilitating competition. 
 
Thus the broad features of structural reform in gas markets are similar to those in electricity 
markets, though the scope for competition in primary production/importing is somewhat 
more limited than in electricity generation. 
 
6.3 THE STATE OF PLAY IN APEC ECONOMIES 
 
The state of play in APEC electricity and gas markets is summarised in Table 6.1, for those 
APEC economies for which adequate information has been collected via desk research (the 
exceptions are Brunei and Papua New Guinea). More details are in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (Annex 
6), which also note the extent of reforms since 2004. There are variations in regimes between 
regional jurisdictions in many economies. These are acknowledged in Tables 6.2 and 6.3. The 
status reported by Dee (2010; Tables 2.4 and 2.5) is based on reform in at least some 
significant regional jurisdictions or, in the case of the United States of America, on the 
situation in California, an area most relevant to the APEC region. 
 
According to Table 6.1, very few APEC economies have achieved substantial reform of both 
electricity and gas markets, and those that have are essentially developed economies –  
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Table 6.1: Summary of current regulation in APEC electricity and gas markets, 2009 
APEC member Electricity  Gas 
Unbundling 
generation 
Third party 
access 
Wholesale 
pool 
Unbundling 
transmission 
Third party 
access 
Retail 
competition 
Australia Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Canada  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Chile Yes Yes Yes  Yes   
China Yes  Yes    Yes 
Hong Kong, China        
Indonesia     Yes Yes  
Japan  Yes Yes   Yes Yes 
Republic of Korea Yes Yes Yes     
Malaysia        
Mexico      Yes Yes 
New Zealand Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Peru Yes Yes   Yes Yes  
Philippines Yes       
Russia Yes Yes Yes     
Singapore Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Chinese Taipei        
Thailand     Yes Yes  
United States Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Viet Nam        
Sources: See Tables 6.2 and 6.3 in Annex 6. 
 
Australia; Canada; New Zealand; Singapore; and the United States of America. Japan and 
Peru have achieved some reform in both markets, though in Japan’s case this has been 
without vertically unbundling its incumbent operators. China has also started to reform both 
markets, though its electricity reform is only on an experimental basis in a few geographic 
areas. A few APEC economies have achieved substantial reform in electricity but not in gas – 
Chile; the Republic of Korea; and Russia – though Table 6.2 indicates only partial electricity 
reform in the Republic of Korea. A few more APEC economies have achieved substantial 
reform in gas but not electricity – Indonesia; Mexico; and Thailand. 
 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (Annex 6) indicate that, to the extent that structural reforms have taken 
place in electricity and gas markets since 2004, they have tended to be incremental – there 
have been few ‘big bang’ initiatives. 
 
6.3.1 APEC electricity markets 
 
Reform in electricity is incremental partly because introducing competition into generation 
and retail is a highly complex regulatory process. The regulatory requirements for 
competitive new producers and/or wholesalers to get access to existing transmission and 
distribution networks need to be compatible with the technical requirements for the safety 
and physical integrity of the system. The Californian electricity crisis of 2000 and 2001 had a 
chilling effect on reforms in Malaysia. Reforms have also been stymied by domestic legal or 
political considerations. For example, in 2004 Indonesia’s electricity reform legislation was 
annulled by the Constitutional Court; only in late 2009 was amended legislation passed. 
Similarly, in the Philippines reform has been handicapped by a legislative requirement that 
liberalisation can proceed only after key players have been privatised. In Mexico, under 
Article 27 of the Constitution, the state has exclusive responsibility for generating, 
transporting, transforming, distributing and supplying electricity as a public service. In 
Chinese Taipei, the incumbent had a legislated monopoly until 2008, though it now only 
produces 75% of the island’s electricity. In Thailand, after a change of government in 2001, 
reform plans were converted into a plan to create a ‘National Champion’. 
 
However, by 2004 some economies in the APEC region had already achieved major 
structural reforms in electricity generation. These included Australia; Chile; New Zealand; 
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Peru; and parts of the USA. In Hong Kong, China the electricity market is a duopoly, but this 
appears to be ‘natural’ as neither party has exclusivity. 
 
Thus the post-2004 reform experience in the region has been concentrated in a few 
economies – Canada and Japan have undergone minor reforms, while the Republic of Korea; 
Russia; and Singapore have undergone more significant ones. In several Canadian provinces 
and Japan, wholesale price pools have been introduced. The Republic of Korea has gone 
through a more extensive process of separating transmission from generating capacity and 
introducing one-way bidding in a wholesale pool but it has yet to introduce competition in the 
retail sector, and the six separate generating companies are still wholly owned subsidiaries of 
the majority state-owned incumbent. Singapore had already separated generation from 
transmission prior to 2004, and has been gradually introducing both wholesale and retail 
competition since then. Russia has undertaken the most comprehensive reform since 2004, by 
separating generation capacity into separate companies (though still under partial ownership 
of the incumbent) and, from 2008, introducing both wholesale and retail competition.  
 
6.3.2 APEC gas markets 
 
Reforms in natural gas since 2004 have been less extensive than in electricity. In part this is 
because the scope for competition in natural gas production depends on the range of sources 
of supply. Indeed, many of those economies with extensive indigenous reserves had already 
undertaken significant reform prior to 2004. These included Australia; Canada; Mexico; New 
Zealand; Peru; and the USA. At the other extreme, the Philippines has little domestic 
production and no imports, meaning the market is essentially still nascent. In Chile the scope 
for competition is limited, given that there is deemed little scope for sources of gas other than 
Argentina. Import-dependent economies such as the Republic of Korea and Chinese Taipei 
have extended their sources of supply by building terminals to handle LNG, but so far their 
natural gas industries are still dominated by incumbents.  
 
There have been four main instances of reform since 2004. China reformed its retail price 
controls so that they can more closely match production costs. New Zealand introduced a 
regulated third party access regime for one of its pipelines. Following earlier reforms in 2002, 
Singapore introduced a Gas Code in 2005 that details the terms and conditions for gas 
transportation on an equitable and non-discriminatory basis. Similarly, Thailand introduced 
third party access to pipelines to facilitate wholesale competition among its four major 
producers.  
 
6.4 THE GAINS FROM REFORM – EVIDENCE TO DATE 
 
The evidence of gains from the reforms to date has been qualitative and quantitative. Most of 
it has been based on the ongoing reform experiences in the developed economies, particularly 
in Europe and the USA. Reviews of the reform experience have also had to evaluate instances 
of possible reform failure – the first being the Californian electricity crisis of 2000–01 and 
the second the United Kingdom’s retreat from a wholesale price pool back to bilateral 
contracts in 2001. Empirical evidence on these two issues is presented later. 
 
6.4.1 Qualitative evidence 
 
In several recent papers Pollitt (2007, 2008) summarises the gains from reform in electricity 
markets (and by extension, he claims, in gas markets), based primarily on the UK experience, 
which in many respects is a best-case scenario. While the UK is not a member of APEC, the 
research provides some guidance to impacts from reform. 
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Competition reduces costs (and prices) significantly, relative to what they might have been 
without reform, even if it does not reduce them in absolute terms over time. It does this by 
encouraging efficient operation and least-cost and timely investment. It also exposes pre-
existing market power. 
 
Retail competition has been revealed to be an important complement to competition in 
generation. Retail competition involves more than the choice of buying wholesale power 
from a non-incumbent generator. It also involves competition in billing, contract terms and 
the bundling of other services (i.e., competition at the supplier level). 
 
Consumers do respond to price signals, both by switching suppliers and by demand 
reduction. This contradicts the previous conventional wisdom that demand was very 
unresponsive to price. Further, Pollitt (2008) claims that household consumers do not need 
institutionalised protection from fluctuations in wholesale prices – where they prefer fixed 
tariffs, suppliers have generally offered these voluntarily, providing a form of insurance as 
part of their bundled package of services. Pollitt (2007) also claims that with sufficient 
competition in generation, regulation of the level of retail prices should also become 
unnecessary (though incentive regulation of transmission prices, through CPI-X price caps, 
remains a critical part of the regulatory landscape). 
 
Vertical separation is costly, but the vertical economies of joint operation between networks 
and competitive segments of the industry are not sufficient to outweigh the increased 
competitive pressure that comes from clear separation of the monopoly networks from the 
rest of the supply chain. Pollitt (2008) claims that this has been proved for electricity 
transmission, gas transmission and may be in the process of being proved for gas distribution 
in the UK. For APEC members this finding suggests that vertical separation should not be 
pursued for its own sake, but only where it can facilitate greater competition. 
 
However, Pollitt (2007) notes that vertical economies between generation and transmission are 
not sufficient to offset the benefits of competition in wholesale power markets but they do 
appear to be significant between generation and retail. This is because the integration of 
generation and retail offers advantages in terms of matching supply and demand, and it means 
that retail-only companies are likely to struggle, as they have in the UK, the Netherlands and 
New Zealand. One side effect of generation and retail integration, however, is that it makes 
wholesale markets much thinner, which can have its own effect on the ease of new entry. 
 
Finally, markets have been good at choosing between technologies on the basis of price, as 
demonstrated by the move to combined cycle gas turbines in the 1990s and by the resurgence 
of interest in nuclear power more recently. It is sometimes claimed that regulated markets are 
good at ensuring the efficient use of existing capacity but are not as good at ensuring 
appropriate investments in new capacity. However, Pollitt (2008) notes that as network 
capacity limits are reached the X factor in CPI-X price caps should become less driven by 
squeezing monopoly profits and more driven by the need to finance new investments. 
Nevertheless, new regulatory mechanisms may be necessary to ensure that the new 
investments are least cost, rather than simply undertaken to the incumbents’ specifications. 
 
Despite these potential gains from structural reforms, they have been implemented the 
farthest only in jurisdictions where supranational bodies (the European Commission), central 
governments (the USA) or inspired individuals (in Russia) have pushed hard and 
consistently. But even parts of the USA do not yet have full retail competition. In many other 
jurisdictions, reforms have stalled at some early or intermediate stage. 
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Clearly, local physical, institutional and other factors have a role to play in the ability of 
reforms to deliver real gains. According to Pollitt (2007), key institutional factors that seem 
to have been important are significant initial public ownership and prices that more than 
cover efficient economic cost (as in Australia; Chile; New Zealand; and the UK). Initial 
private ownership (e.g., in Japan and the USA) and prices below economic cost (e.g., in 
India) have made reform much more difficult. This is a significant qualification, since 
subsidisation of energy prices is relatively widespread in the APEC region. Also critical has 
been the capacity and flexibility of regulators to tailor reforms to local conditions and to 
adapt as network conditions change. 
 
Beyond local conditions, Correlje and De Vries (2008) identify four key lessons from reforms 
that have taken place in: 
• ownership separation (not just accounting or legal separation) of electricity 
transmission from the rest of the network has been critical to improving access for 
competitive generation and removing incentives to under-invest in transmission; 
• getting the market structure right in electricity generation is crucial for the success of 
reforms, and allowing new entry alone may not be sufficient – horizontal separation 
may also be required; 
• incentive regulation based on CPI-X price control of monopoly transmission networks 
can deliver significant incentives to reduce costs and facilitate efficient operation, 
while proving a stable cash flow for new investment, and economies with tougher 
incentive regulation of networks have significantly lower network costs as a result; 
• regulation can address market failures such as those associated with the quality of 
supply, but it requires a degree of regulatory sophistication to balance efficiency and 
quality objectives.  
 
Reviewing the experience of electricity reform in developing economies, Jamasb (2006) 
notes that the cost savings from wholesale markets or independent power producers will not 
be passed on to consumers if there is not enough competition in generation. While retail 
competition may be feasible only in the long term, competition among independent 
generators is possible even in a single-buyer market, and economies with small markets can 
also introduce competition for the market. 
 
Reform in developing economies can take place even without privatisation. Reform requires 
a well-functioning transmission system, which should probably remain in public ownership in 
the early stages of reform. Incentive regulation can also drive efficiency improvements in 
distribution activities and ensure that they are passed on to consumers, even when distribution 
companies remain in public or local ownership. 
 
Jamasb (2006) also confirms that cost-reflective tariffs and proper subsidy schemes (i.e., 
funded transparently and not relying on cross-subsidies) are crucial for the sustainability of 
reforms. He notes that stable macroeconomic conditions are crucial for attracting the 
necessary investments from domestic and foreign sources. Finally, he notes that progress in 
developing economies is likely to be evolutionary, particularly since regulatory capabilities 
and experience and the necessary institutional structures take time to develop.  
 
6.4.2 Empirical evidence 
 
The empirical evidence on the gains from reform is mixed. To some extent, the mixed results 
are themselves a sign that reforms may not have been taken far enough in some economies or 
are still in progress. Either reforms have not been taken far enough to have any real effect or 
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there are not enough reforms in the chosen samples for econometric techniques to discern any 
significant effects. 
 
The mixed results may also reflect the difficulty of the empirical task. Establishing the effects 
of reform requires a data sample in which there has been a variety of reform experiences. 
This typically requires a data sample involving a number of different economies, and it can 
be difficult to correct for all the other economy-specific factors (other than reform) that may 
also account for the performance of the electricity sector. Even if it is possible to establish the 
effects of reform (correcting for other factors), it is typically very difficult to get robust 
evidence on which dimensions of the reform experience are responsible for those effects. As 
noted earlier, reform involves a number of inter-related steps, many of which are often taken 
together. This makes it very difficult to isolate which particular steps are responsible for the 
effects. 
 
One of the first empirical assessments of the effects of electricity reform was Steiner’s (2000) 
study of OECD members over the 1986–96 period. She found that unbundling of generation, 
third party access and the introduction of wholesale electricity markets were all associated 
with lower electricity prices. However, she also confirmed that private ownership was not 
necessarily associated with increased competition. Nevertheless, both private ownership and 
unbundling of generation and transmission were found to be associated with a higher rate of 
utilisation of existing generation capacity, and with reserve plant margins that were closer to 
optimal. 
 
Hattori and Tsutsui (2004) undertook a similar study of OECD members over a slightly later 
period of 1987–99. Their findings were less definitive than Steiner’s, though this could in 
part be because of differences in their measurement of variables (including prices). They 
found that giving customers access to alternative suppliers (which they argue is highly 
correlated with third party access) was associated with lower prices. However, unlike Steiner, 
they did not find a significant effect of unbundling or the introduction of a wholesale spot 
market on prices.  
 
Nagayama (2007) undertook a broadly similar study of 83 economies over the 1985–2002 
period. He found that neither unbundling nor the introduction of a wholesale pool market on 
their own would necessarily reduce electricity prices. In fact, contrary to expectations, there 
was a tendency for the price to rise. However, coexistent with an independent regulatory 
authority, unbundling could work to reduce prices. He also found that privatisation, the 
introduction of foreign independent producers and retail competition could lower electricity 
prices in some regions, but not all.  
 
There have also been in-depth before-and-after studies of reform experiences in individual 
economies. Two areas of interest are the Californian electricity crisis and the UK’s apparent 
reversal of reforms in the early 2000s. Both of these demonstrate the dangers of incomplete 
or inconsistent reforms.  
 
Joskow’s (2001) detailed analysis of the Californian crisis shows that when demand spikes, 
individual generators may have considerable market power to increase prices and withhold 
generating capacity, even when there is not collusion among them. This was found to be a 
factor contributing to a ten-fold rise in wholesale electricity prices in California in 2000. But 
regulatory problems also contributed significantly. One problem was wholesale market-
design rules that prevented a smoothing of wholesale prices. Another problem was the 
maintenance of retail price caps that prevented signals about market conditions being passed 
Quantifying the benefits from structural reforms in electricity and gas markets in APEC economies 133 
on to consumers. The caps led to the bankruptcy of major suppliers when wholesale prices 
rose above the capped retail prices. 
 
Evans and Green (2003) examined why electricity prices fell in the UK after the 
abandonment of the wholesale price pool and the return to bilateral contracts. One problem 
with the pool had been collusion or manipulation by dominant players (arguably because of 
insufficient horizontal separation). Evans and Green attempt to distinguish the impact of a 
subsequent decline in market concentration from the introduction of the new electricity 
trading arrangements in 2001. They found that it was declining concentration that explained 
the fall in wholesale prices. This shows that effective regulatory action to reduce incumbent 
market shares can be more important than market design per se.  
 
There are fewer studies of the effects of reform in gas markets. Jamasb, Pollitt and Triebs 
(2008) studied the effects of US regulatory reform on productivity, and found that 
encouraging competition has been rather successful in raising productivity. Hawdon (2003) 
found evidence that the types of reforms introduced in the UK are associated with higher 
levels of efficiency, good utilisation of labour and levels of underutilisation of capital 
sufficient to support the development of competitive markets. Nevertheless, Brakman, van 
Marrewijk and van Witteloostuijn (2009) warn that lack of competition and capacity 
constraints in gas production/import can prevent these gains being passed on to consumers.  
 
6.5 NEW EVIDENCE ON THE GAINS FROM REFORM IN ELECTRICITY AND 
GAS MARKETS 
 
One of the limitations of empirical studies of the effects of regulatory reform is that the studies 
are somewhat ‘captive’ to the nature and extent of reforms that are present in the sample. As 
the recent APEC experience shows, regulatory reform in the developing world has tended to be 
slow and incremental, so that samples taken from developing economies will not necessarily 
encompass a wide variety of reform experiences. Samples drawn from the developed world 
may not match the local conditions of developing economies, so that any extrapolation needs to 
be done with care. But samples from developed economies may capture a wider set of reforms 
and, therefore, give a clearer picture of the potential benefits of reform.  
 
A recent round of new EU directives has provided a fresh impetus to regulatory reform of 
electricity and gas markets in these economies. This provides a rich new source of reform 
experience with which to test the empirical findings of earlier studies.  
 
The First Electricity Directive (Directive 96/92/EC) of 1996 removed legal monopolies by 
requiring EU member states to allow large electricity users to choose their suppliers.4
 
 It also 
obliged vertically integrated companies to grant third party access to transmission and 
distribution networks and a minimum level of unbundling of vertically integrated companies. 
Gradually, this regime was seen to have various limitations. It allowed the terms of third 
party access to be negotiated rather than regulated. The unbundling obligations were limited, 
allowing accounting separation as well as legal or ownership separation. And the directive 
did not require the establishment of a national energy regulator. As a result, there were 
significant differences across member states in the extent of market opening. 
To overcome these limitations, the Second Electricity Directive (2003/54/EC) was introduced 
in 2003, seven years after the original Directive. This obliged EU members to introduce a 
                                                            
4 This is competitive because it involves large and informed consumers dealing with large informed producers. 
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regulated third party access regime, and removed the possibility of negotiated third party 
access. It also mandated the appointment of a national regulator that is independent of the 
industry. It required legal separation, rather than just accounting or management separation, 
between network activities (transmission and distribution) and all other activities. Finally, it 
required non-household customers to have choice of supplier by mid 2004, and household 
customers to have choice by mid 2007. These regulations tightened up a range of market 
opening requirements, and led to significant additional regulatory changes in lagging member 
states during the 2000s. In particular, the new regulations also stimulated the development of 
wholesale electricity markets in those members, so they could meet their obligations 
regarding consumer choice. 
 
A similar slow evolution of regulation occurred in EU gas markets. The legislative process 
began in the 1990s with a series of directives aimed at abolishing import monopolies, 
gradually opening markets, mandating accounting separation for vertically integrated network 
companies and the adoption of regulated third party access. The Second Gas Directive 
(2003/55/EC) of 2003 required full market opening, national sector regulators, regulated third 
party network access, regulated or negotiated access to storage facilities and further 
unbundling of integrated companies. Supporting regulation set obligatory minimum 
requirements for access to transmission systems, including network tariffs, third party access 
services, capacity allocation, transparency, balancing and trading of capacity rights. 
 
In analysing the impact of these regulatory frameworks, European Commission (2007) 
stresses how incomplete unbundling can seriously undermine attempts to introduce 
competition into electricity and gas markets. If network operators are not sufficiently 
independent from incumbent service suppliers, they will find a myriad of ways to thwart the 
activities of new entrants, despite third party access legislation. 
 
The remainder of this section describes econometric analysis of the effects of electricity and 
gas reforms on prices and non-price measures of efficiency, using data for OECD members 
(including a significant number of EU members) over the 1990–2008 period. Thus the sample 
captures regulatory changes induced by both the first and second waves of EU reforms. The 
choice of OECD members is dictated largely by the availability of price information. A key 
source of relatively consistent information on energy prices across economies is the ‘Energy 
Prices and Taxes’ publication of the International Energy Agency, the data from which is 
available for sale online. However, the price information is only available for OECD 
members. Ideally, the exercise would have included the effects of reform on quality measures 
such as the reliability of supply. Unfortunately, there is no comprehensive international data 
on these measures. 
 
6.5.1 Analysis of electricity markets 
 
The analysis closely follows the approach of Steiner (2000). Electricity prices are modelled 
as being determined by measures of regulatory policy, as well as a number of non-regulatory 
controls. The regulatory measures are the presence of a regulated or negotiated third party 
access regime, the existence of a liberalised wholesale market for electricity, the existence of 
vertical unbundling between transmission and generation, and the prevalence of private 
ownership. The non-regulatory controls are the level of GDP, the shares of electricity 
generation accounted for by nuclear sources and hydro sources, and the urban share of the 
population, as a measure of the density of the network. These explanatory variables are the 
same as in Steiner, except for the addition of the degree of urbanisation, a higher value of 
which could be associated with lower prices if there were significant economies of density. 
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Missing from the current analysis are Steiner’s measures of the time to privatisation and the 
time to liberalisation, since these performed perversely in her regressions, suggesting that 
they were correlated with each other and with other variables, so their own effects would not 
be established with precision.  
 
Ideally, the model of electricity prices should include the prices of thermal fuel inputs (i.e., 
oil, coal and gas) as controls. However, the coverage of input prices from International 
Energy Agency sources is very patchy, and restricting the estimation to those economies and 
time periods for which it was available would severely restrict the range and extent of 
electricity reform in the sample. To some extent, controlling for hydro and nuclear shares 
helps to control for variations in generating input costs. The estimation also corrects for 
unobservable differences across economies, as will be explained shortly.  
 
The current analysis also examines the effects of regulatory policy on capacity utilisation, and 
on the extent of deviation of reserve plant margins from optimal. Efficient generators 
typically plan to meet demands with a capacity buffer that is prudent but not excessive. This 
analysis follows Steiner in using a 15% margin as a rough indicator of the optimal reserve 
plant margin. Both measures of efficiency are modelled as being determined in part by the 
extent of third party access, the extent of unbundling, and the degree of private ownership. 
The existence of a wholesale price pool is not expected to influence efficiency, though it is 
expected to influence prices. These measures of efficiency are also affected by non-
regulatory controls, including the degree of urbanisation. Instead of Steiner’s measures of 
state preferences in favour of coal technology or against nuclear technology (both of which 
would be expected to reduce measured efficiency), the current formulation uses the actual 
shares of hydro, nuclear and coal technologies on total generating capacity. 
 
The data sources are similar to those used by Steiner though including more APEC members. 
Electricity prices are taken from ‘Energy Prices and Taxes’ (third quarter 2009 edition) 
published online by the International Energy Agency. The necessary data on electricity 
capacity and generation to compute the efficiency and control measures were taken from 
‘Electricity Information’ (2009 edition), also by the International Energy Agency. GDP and 
the rate of urbanisation are both taken from the World Bank’s ‘World Development 
Indicators’. Both electricity prices and GDP are expressed in US dollars converted using 
purchasing power parities. Electricity prices are the net-of-tax prices to industrial users, since 
the share of generation costs in consumer prices is likely to be highest for industrial users, 
and reforms are expected to impact most on generation costs. A summary of the data on 
electricity prices, efficiency measures, and non-regulatory controls is shown in Table 6.4 
(Annex 6).  
 
The policy variables used in the analysis are defined as follows:  
etpa  Existence of regime for regulated or negotiated third party access to electricity transmission 
grid 
 0 = no third party access, 1= third party access 
ewpp  Existence of liberalised wholesale market for electricity (wholesale price pool) 
 0 = no wholesale price pool, 1= wholesale price pool 
eunb  Existence of vertical separation between the transmission and generation segments of the 
electricity market (whether accounting separation or separate companies) 
 0 = no vertical separation, 1= vertical separation 
eown  Ownership structure of the largest companies in the generation, transmission, distribution and 
supply segments of the electricity market  
 0 = public, 1 = mostly public, 2 = mixed, 3 = mostly private, 4 = private 
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Measures of these policy variables for all of the OECD economies in the sample except for 
the Republic of Korea and Mexico are available up until 2003 from OECD (2005). Measures 
for the remaining economies and time periods were constructed from information obtained 
online from the International Energy Regulation Network, the ‘EIA Country Analysis Briefs’ 
of the US Energy Information Administration, and the ‘Trade Policy Reviews’ of the WTO. 
Web addresses for these sources are shown at the bottom of Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (see Annex 6). 
A full listing of the values of these policy variables for all OECD economies and time periods 
in the sample is given in Table 6.6 (Annex 6). 
 
As noted earlier, one difficulty in exercises like this is distinguishing the separate 
contributions of different steps in the reform process when the different steps are often taken 
together. This creates a technical problem of multicollinearity, which manifests itself in 
econometric estimation on panel data sets as instability or ‘flip-flop’ in the signs of the 
coefficients on the policy variables, while the magnitudes of the coefficients are often 
implausibly large, but apparently highly significant. As an initial reality check, it is therefore 
useful to look at the simple correlations between the policy variables and the resulting 
measures of performance, prior to correcting for the influence of other variables. 
 
These simple correlations are shown in Table 6.7 (Annex 6; unfortunately, graphical 
presentation does not show the correlations clearly, because of the zero-one nature of the 
policy variables). The table shows the same pattern of policy changes on price as in Steiner – 
third party access, a wholesale market and unbundling all tend to reduce electricity prices, 
while private ownership can increase them. Third party access, unbundling and private 
ownership also tend to increase capacity utilisation, while a wholesale market can apparently 
reduce it, though the effect is small, as expected. Third party access, a wholesale market, 
unbundling and private ownership are all associated with reserve plant margins being closer 
to optimal (the distance from the optimal margin is reduced), though the effect of the 
wholesale market is again small, as expected. 
 
The simple correlations do not show whether the strength of these effects is significantly 
different from zero. They also do not correct for the influence of other, non-regulatory 
factors. The results of econometric estimation shown in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 (Annex 6) 
overcome these limitations.  
 
The econometric estimation also attempts to control for unobservable influences on 
electricity prices and efficiency that might vary over time or across economies. Unobservable 
differences over time are controlled using a deterministic time trend. In principle, 
unobservable differences across economies could also have been controlled using 
deterministic dummy variables. However, such dummies are relatively highly correlated with 
both the policy variables and with the degree of urbanisation (which does not vary much over 
time in many economies). Including such deterministic dummies, therefore, causes the ‘flip-
flop’ problem noted earlier. Consequently, unobservable economy effects are controlled by 
assuming them to be random and using random effects estimation, even when Hausman tests 
show that these estimates differ significantly from fixed effects estimates (the fixed effects 
estimates are not regarded as robust, for the reasons just described).  
 
The effects of the policy variables on electricity prices are qualitatively the same as indicated 
by simple correlations. Furthermore, the effects are shown to be significantly different from 
zero. So Steiner’s results are again confirmed – third party access, a wholesale market and 
unbundling all tend to reduce electricity prices, while private ownership can increase them. 
The apparent insignificance of some of these factors found by other researchers, particularly 
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the presence of a wholesale market, has been overcome by using a dataset in which there is 
more reform ‘action’. 
 
The non-regulatory influences on electricity prices are generally also as expected. Prices tend 
to be higher when GDP is higher, while a higher hydro share in generation tends to reduce 
prices. A high nuclear share also appears to reduce prices, against expectations, but this effect 
is not significant. A higher rate of urbanisation tends to reduce prices, confirming that there 
are economies of density in the production and sale of electricity.  
 
The policy variables have less significant effects on efficiency than on prices. The only result 
that comes close to being significant is that unbundling tends to increase capacity utilisation. 
Note that European Commission (2007) also identifies adequate unbundling as the key 
linchpin to promoting effective competition. Utilisation also increases significantly when 
there is a high nuclear share in generating capacity. No policy variable has a significant effect 
on the deviation of reserve plant margin from optimal. However, this estimation performs 
poorly on all fronts. 
 
These results should not be taken to mean that structural reform of electricity markets has 
minimal effect on efficiency. It just means that it has little discernable effect on the particular 
efficiency measures chosen in this exercise. Reform could still have a large beneficial effect 
on other measures, such as labour productivity. Indeed, the reforms that are shown to reduce 
electricity prices could do so in one of two ways – perhaps by squeezing the excess profits of 
incumbent operators, or more likely by encouraging them to reduce inflated production costs. 
Anecdotal evidence from the reform experience in economies such as Australia suggests that 
reforms can dramatically boost labour productivity and, therefore, reduce production costs.  
 
6.5.2 Analysis of gas markets 
 
While there are many models of gas efficiency (e.g., Lee, Park & Kim 1999, Granderson 
2000, Hawdon 2003, Jamasb, Pollitt & Triebs 2008, Farsi & Filippini 2009) there are fewer 
models of gas prices. Furthermore, many of the price models explain the extent of 
convergence of gas prices across different geographic markets (e.g., Walls 1994, Cuddington 
& Wang 2006) rather than the level of gas prices per se. 
 
This may in part reflect the limitations imposed by the way that gas prices are set, especially 
in Europe. As explained in European Commission (2007), a large majority of gas consumed 
in the EU is bought by the incumbent wholesale players under long-term contracts from 
producers outside and inside the EU. The prices in European long-term gas contracts are 
mainly linked to the prices of oil and oil derivatives. Thus the contract prices paid by 
different producers to different suppliers move in an almost identical manner through time, 
and do not react smoothly (or at all) to changes in the supply and demand of gas markets. The 
UK gas market is a little different, with long-term gas prices from UK fields being 
determined partly by hub gas prices (i.e., the prices on more or less organised wholesale 
exchanges) and partly by general inflation indexes. But hub trading has been slow to develop. 
At the retail end a majority of EU members regulate prices to households and small 
businesses, while at least six members set a regulated price that is available to all customers 
(though the proportion of consumers that have stayed with the regulated tariff varies between 
member states). 
 
Thus if EU structural reform is to be reflected in gas prices at all, it is likely to be reflected in 
the wholesale–retail margins on gas sold to industrial users. The approach here is, therefore, 
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to look for any discernable effect of regulatory reform on the net-of-tax price to industrial 
users. These prices are modelled as being determined by measures of regulatory policy, as 
well as a number of non-regulatory controls. The regulatory measures are the presence of a 
regulated or negotiated third party access regime, the percentage of the retail market for gas 
that is open to competition, the absence of national, state or provincial regulations that restrict 
the number of competitors, the existence of vertical unbundling between production/import 
and other segments, the existence of vertical unbundling between gas supply and other 
segments and the prevalence of private ownership. The non-regulatory controls are the level 
of GDP, the total gas pipeline length (to account for economies of scale) and the urban share 
of the population (to account for economies of density).  
 
Ideally, the model of gas prices to industrial users should include the wholesale price of gas 
as a control. However, as was the case for electricity, the coverage of input prices from 
International Energy Agency sources is very patchy, and restricting the estimation to those 
economies and time periods for which it was available would severely restrict the range and 
extent of gas reform in the sample. But given the relative unresponsiveness of wholesale gas 
prices to supply and demand conditions, it was judged adequate to proxy wholesale gas prices 
by a non-linear time trend.  
 
The current analysis also examines the effect of regulatory policy on gas capacity utilisation, 
as measured by annual gas consumption relative to total pipeline length. This is modelled as 
being determined in part by the same regulatory variables as for gas prices. It is also affected 
by non-regulatory controls, including the share of gas in electricity generation (which would 
be expected to increase the utilisation rate) and the degree of urbanisation. Urbanisation could 
have an ambiguous effect on the utilisation rate. Greater urbanisation could increase the 
utilisation rate by allowing economies of density. However, if there were industrial or other 
users with heavy and reliable gas demands (such as mining operators or electricity 
generators) located outside urban areas, this too could increase utilisation despite the degree 
of urbanisation. 
 
The coverage of economies and time periods is the same as for the electricity analysis. Net-
of-tax gas prices to industrial users are taken from ‘Energy Prices and Taxes’ (third quarter 
2009 edition) published online by the International Energy Agency. The necessary data on 
gas consumption and the gas share of electricity capacity is taken from ‘Electricity 
Information’ (2009 edition) and ‘Natural Gas Information’ (2009 edition) by the International 
Energy Agency. Pipeline lengths are taken from various editions of the ‘CIA World 
Factbook’, available online. GDP and the rate of urbanisation are both taken from the World 
Bank’s ‘World Development Indicators’. Both gas prices and GDP are expressed in US 
dollars converted using purchasing power parities. A summary of the data on gas prices, the 
efficiency measure and non-regulatory controls is shown in Table 6.5 (Annex 6).  
 
The policy variables used in the analysis are defined as follows:  
gtpa Existence of regime for regulated or negotiated third party access to gas transmission grid 
 0 = no third party access, 1= third party access 
gretc Percentage of the retail market for gas that is open to competition 
 0 = less than 10%, 1= 10% or more 
gent Existence of national, state or provincial laws or other regulations that restrict the number of 
competitors allowed to operate a business in at least some markets in gas production/import 
 0 = restrictions in all markets, 1= free entry in all markets 
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gunb_p Existence of vertical separation between gas production/import and other segments of the gas 
market (whether accounting, legal or ownership separation) 
 0 = no vertical separation, 1= vertical separation 
gunb_t Existence of vertical separation between gas supply and other segments of the gas market 
(whether accounting, legal or ownership separation) 
 0 = no vertical separation, 1= vertical separation 
gown Percentage of shares in the largest firm in the gas production/import sector owned by 
government  
 0 = 100%, 1 = more than 50%, 2 = 50%, 3 = less than 50%, 4 = 0% 
Measures of these policy variables for all of the OECD economies in the sample are available 
up until 2003 from OECD (2005). Measures for the remaining time periods were constructed 
from information obtained online from the International Energy Regulation Network, the 
‘EIA Country Analysis Briefs’ of the US Energy Information Administration and the ‘Trade 
Policy Reviews’ of the WTO. Web addresses for these sources are shown at the bottom of 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (see Annex 6). A full listing of the values of these policy variables for all 
OECD economies and time periods in the sample is given in Table 6.6 (Annex 6). 
 
As an initial reality check, it is useful to look at the simple correlations between the policy 
variables and the resulting measures of performance, prior to correcting for the influence of 
other variables. These simple correlations are shown in Table 6.8 (Annex 6; once again, 
graphical presentation does not show the correlations clearly, because of the zero-one nature 
of the policy variables). The table shows that removing regulatory restrictions on entry can 
have an apparently large downward effect on gas prices. Unbundling production/import and 
private ownership are also associated with lower gas prices. Third party access, retail 
competition and unbundling of gas supply appear to be associated with higher gas prices. But 
note that there is limited scope for customer prices to reflect the conditions of supply, demand 
and competition, especially in Europe.  
 
In simple correlations the policy variables also appear to have mixed effects on the utilisation 
of gas pipelines. Retail competition and private ownership appear to be associated with 
higher utilisation rates. Third party access, removal of entry restrictions and any type of 
unbundling appear to be associated with lower utilisation rates. Note, however, that European 
Commission (2007) was particularly critical of the adequacy of unbundling and the 
effectiveness in practice of third party access regimes in European gas markets, even after the 
reforms, in part because of the prevalence of long-term contracts and the continued close 
vertical ownership links between incumbent operators. In addition, the methods by which the 
incumbents have been able to reserve storage capacity, whether or not they use it, have had 
serious deleterious effects on the ability of new entrants to provide adequate services.  
 
The results of econometric estimations shown in Tables 6.11 and 6.12 (Annex 6) correct for 
the influence of other, non-regulatory factors and also show whether the strength of the 
policy effects are significantly different from zero. 
 
As for electricity, the econometric estimation also attempts to control for unobservable 
influences on gas prices and efficiency that might vary over time or across economies. 
Unobservable differences over time are controlled using a deterministic, quadratic time trend. 
In particular, this trend is intended to capture the significant and accelerating upward trend in 
wholesale gas prices over the sample period. Unobservable differences across economies are 
controlled using random effects estimation, even when Hausman tests show that these 
estimates differ significantly from (perhaps flawed) fixed effects estimates. 
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When non-regulatory factors are controlled for, few of the policy variables have a significant 
effect on gas prices. The only variable that appears to be significantly associated with lower 
gas prices is the unbundling of production/import from other market segments. This result 
accords with the observations of European Commission (2007) that close ownership links 
(and long-term contracts) lock new entrants out of being able to secure their own primary gas 
supplies, creating a serious impediment to competition.  
 
The non-regulatory factors have the expected impact on gas prices. Prices are higher when 
GDP is higher. Prices are lower when gas pipelines are longer, suggesting economies of scale 
in gas production. Higher rates of urbanisation tend to reduce gas prices, though this effect is 
not significant. 
 
Few of the policy variables have a significant effect on the utilisation of gas pipelines. Third 
party access appears to reduce pipeline utilisation, but third party access in Europe has been 
effectively thwarted by a variety of other means. Retail competition increases pipeline 
utilisation. The presence of retail competition is the ‘acid test’ of whether unbundling and 
third party access regimes create effective competition, and the effect on pipeline utilisation 
is significant. Private ownership also has a significant positive effect on pipeline utilisation. 
Higher rates of urbanisation tend to reduce pipeline utilisation, though the effect is not quite 
significant at conventional testing levels and, in any event, the effect is ambiguous a priori. 
 
6.6 IMPLICATIONS FOR APEC ECONOMIES 
 
The econometric results of the previous section can be used to project the effects that further 
structural reforms in APEC electricity and gas markets may have on prices and efficiency. 
 
As noted earlier, such out-of-sample projections need to be interpreted cautiously. The 
econometric results are conditioned by local factors and details of policy design and 
implementation that are peculiar to OECD members in general and European economies in 
particular. To the extent that these local factors are adequately captured by the policy and 
control variables used in the regressions, they can also be taken into account in out-of-sample 
projections. But many of them will not be adequately captured by these variables. For 
example, the above policy variables do not distinguish between regulated and negotiated third 
party access, and this distinction was seen as crucial to the effectiveness of European reform 
efforts. Nevertheless, while caution is needed in interpreting numerical out-of-sample 
projections, the general lessons from Section 6.3 also provide some guidance about the 
prerequisites for successful reform.  
 
Tables 6.2 and 6.3 (Annex 6) provide a great deal of detail about the current state of play in 
APEC electricity and gas markets, and can be used as the basis for deriving values for the 
policy variables currently appropriate to each APEC economy. Combined with the coefficient 
estimates from Tables 6.9–6.12 (Annex 6), this information can then be used to project by 
how much prices or efficiency measures would change if further reforms were undertaken 
(and, hence, the values of each of the policy variables were to change). To simplify the 
process, however, projections can be made for each type of reform, assuming a starting point 
for prices or efficiency that was the same as the OECD average (as shown in Tables 6.4 and 
6.5 [Annex 6]). Thus a rough guide to the effects of individual reforms can be obtained as 
follows. 
 
In electricity markets, the introduction of a third party access regime would be associated 
with about 4.7% lower electricity prices than otherwise, on an indicative basis and holding all 
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other factors constant (where 0.0032/0.067587 = 4.7%). The introduction of a wholesale 
electricity market would be associated with about 7.2% lower electricity prices, while the 
unbundling of generation from transmission would be associated with 11.1% lower electricity 
prices. In reality, the allocation of separate effects to separate reform initiatives is unlikely to 
be as precise as the combined effect of all initiatives, since the separate initiatives tend to go 
together. The combined effect of all three initiatives would be electricity prices estimated to 
be 23% lower than otherwise. This is a similar order of magnitude to the effects implicit in 
Steiner’s projections.  
 
Note that the econometric results also suggest that wholly private ownership of electricity 
operators would be associated with prices that were 23.1% higher than if ownership were 
wholly public (where 4*0.0039/0.067587 = 23.1%). Pollitt (2007) also notes that private 
ownership can make it difficult to get reforms under way. However, this is an effect of initial 
conditions that is unlikely to persist over time. Doove et al. (2007) also note that ownership is 
unlikely to be independent of market structure, as the econometrics implies. Any positive 
relationship between price and private ownership is likely to be strongest when there is a 
monopoly provider – private sector monopolists might be more likely to pursue higher profits 
than government monopolists and, hence, to raise electricity prices by exploiting their market 
power. This effect is also unlikely to persist over time as reform efforts continue. 
 
The econometric results also suggest that unbundling of generation from transmission would 
be associated with 2.1% higher utilisation of generating capacity on an indicative basis 
(where 0.0944/4.428908 = 2.1%). No other reform initiatives were shown to have a 
significant effect on efficiency.  
 
In gas markets the introduction of retail competition would be associated with gas prices 
being about 15.0% lower than otherwise, on an indicative basis and holding all other factors 
constant (where 30.446/203.2362 = 15.0%). The unbundling of gas production/import from 
other segments of the market would be associated with about 23.4% lower gas prices. Both 
these percentages would be lower if initial gas prices were higher than the average in the 
OECD sample, as they are currently. 
 
The econometric results also suggest that the introduction of retail competition would be 
associated with 24.3% higher utilisation of pipeline capacity than otherwise on an indicative 
basis (where 1.4587/6.013908 = 24.3%). Third party access was projected to reduce capacity 
utilisation, but this reflects the difficulty of instituting an effective third party access regime 
in European gas markets. Private ownership is projected to about double capacity utilisation, 
probably reflecting that private gas operations tend to serve dedicated industrial users.  
 
As noted, these results are indicative only and are not fine tuned to the individual 
circumstances of each APEC economy. However, they do suggest that the slow, incremental 
approach to reform of APEC energy markets is worth reviving or continuing, despite the 
considerable burdens imposed on regulatory capacity. APEC economies learn from the 
general lessons of reform in other economies, and they can learn from close interaction and 
cooperation among industry regulators. APEC processes are well tuned to providing the sort 
of experience sharing and capacity building that can make the regulatory burden easier. They 
can also learn from doing. The results of this paper suggest that the gains to industrial users 
and, by inference, to households would be considerable. 
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Table 6.2: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Australia Partially privatised Ownership of 
generation remains 
concentrated, with 
significant state 
regulation 
Partially privatised Interconnected 
national grid 
operated by 8 TSOs 
13 DSOs operate 
distribution 
networks under state 
TPA regimes. 
Australian Energy 
Regulator to take 
over regulation by 
2010  
National Electricity 
Market is a 
compulsory 
wholesale pool 
operated by 
National Electricity 
Market 
Management 
Company. 
Wholesale prices 
are market-based. 
Partially privatised Retail competition 
has been introduced 
since 2003 
IERN 
Canada Most generation 
companies are 
Crown corporations, 
but generation in 
Alberta is mostly 
private. 
18 generators, but 
85–90% of the 
market is served by 
the provincial 
majors (BC Hydro, 
Hydro Quebec etc.) 
Partially privatised, 
vertically integrated 
Some vertically 
integrated (BC 
Hydro). Some 
functionally 
unbundled (Quebec, 
Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, Nova 
Scotia, Ontario). 
IERN also describes 
the situation as 
'mostly' vertically 
integrated. 
Several provinces 
have adopted the 
Open Access 
Transmission Tariff 
which allows IPPs 
to bid on new 
generation 
development and 
use the transmission 
system to gain 
access to wholesale 
markets (see also 
retail access 
details). 
BC, Saskatchewan, 
Quebec, Manitoba, 
New Brunswick and 
Alberta have a 
competitive 
wholesale pool. It is 
mandatory in 
Alberta. 
Partially privatised Ontario: retail 
access since 2002. 
Alberta: Retail 
access since 2001. 
BC, NB: Industrial 
open access.  
IERN 
Chile Fully privatised 31 power generation 
companies, very 
often vertically 
integrated along the 
supply chain 
Fully privatised Yes - most 
transmission 
facilities were 
owned by 
TRANSELEC, 
majority owned by 
Hydro Quebec. 
Free access to 
transmission 
services for 
generators; 
regulated third party 
access regime. 
Wholesale prices 
are market based for 
sales to eligible 
customers and to 
Centros de Despcho 
Economico de 
Carga. Sales to 
distributors (which 
mainly supply non 
eligible customers) 
are regulated. 
Fully privatised 34 distribution 
companies. 
Eligibility levels set 
at 2000KW (and 
500-2000KW under 
certain 
circumstances). 
IERN 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
China Dominated by state-
owned enterprises. 
Even the new 
generation and grid 
companies created 
in accordance with 
2002 reform plans 
are under the direct 
ownership and 
control of State-
owned Asser 
Supervision and 
Administration 
Commission 
90% of electricity 
produced by state-
owned or state-
controlled 
enterprises, despite 
a number of small 
power plants. The 
government 
determines the 
output that each 
generator is to 
produce, and 
approves selling 
prices.  
Dominated by state-
owned enterprises. 
Six state-owned 
regional networks in 
charge of 
transmission and 
distribution.  
The separation of 
transmission and 
distribution has not 
yet taken place. 
However, in the 
reform experiments 
in the North East 
and East, there are 
separate grid 
operating 
companies.  
The North East 
China and East 
China regional 
electricity markets 
are described as 
being power 
exchange markets 
with a single buyer 
– hence no third 
party access because 
there is no retail 
choice.  
Trading activity 
low, mostly between 
generators and 
provincial 
electricity 
companies, which 
act as single buyers. 
Two pilot projects 
to develop regional 
trading markets 
(one in North East, 
one in East) were 
launched in 2007 
Dominated by state-
owned enterprises 
Under each of the 
regional grid 
companies, there are 
provincial grid 
companies that have 
monopolies over 
distribution and 
sales within a 
specified area in 
accordance with the 
Electricity Law 
1995. 
TPR, Ni 
(2005). 
Hong 
Kong, 
China 
Two vertically 
integrated private 
companies with 
regional 
monopolies, 
operating under 
agreements that 
expire in 2018. 
Duopoly appears 
natural, as neither 
has exclusivity. 
None Two vertically 
integrated private 
companies with 
regional 
monopolies, 
operating under 
agreements that 
expire in 2018. Each 
owns its exclusive 
transmission grid 
None None None Two vertically 
integrated private 
companies with 
regional 
monopolies, 
operating under 
agreements that 
expire in 2018. 
An earlier 
government 
consultation 
document on post-
2008 arrangements 
proposed continued 
regulation with 
more flexibility 
(shorter duration of 
agreement, lower 
permitted rate of 
return). This has 
now been accepted. 
No competition, but 
rates of return 
regulated, and high 
by global standards 
for regulated private 
companies  
TPR 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Indonesia State-owned 
electricity utility PT 
PLN (Persero) owns 
two-thirds of 
generating capacity. 
IPPs provide the rest 
under Power 
Purchase 
Agreements. Under 
new government 
regulation 3/2005 
IPPs must be in 
joint venture 
(maximum 95% 
foreign ownership). 
Retail prices were 
controlled, often at 
less than cost of 
production, so 
incumbent operated 
at a loss. This 
deterred investment 
in IPPs. There have 
also been disputes 
over payments by 
PT PLN to IPPs. 
There were take-or-
pay contracts at high 
prices, to favour IPP 
owners who had 
political 
connections. Under 
new regulation 
3/2005, there will 
generally be 
competitive bidding 
for new capacity 
State-owned 
electricity utility PT 
PLN (Persero) 
dominates, and 
presumably owns 
the transmission 
capacity. 
None None No - IPPs sell to PT 
PLN on long-term 
contract. 
PT PLN has 
monopoly on retail 
sales. 
Electricity Law of 
2002 anticipated 
retail competition by 
2008, but the law 
was annulled by the 
Constitutional 
Court. A new 
government 
regulation has been 
drafted (3/2005) but 
PT PLN retains the 
sole right to 
distribute and sell 
electricity. 
However, regulated 
retail price has been 
raised - now about 
production cost. 
New law was finally 
passed in September 
2009 - will allow 
private investors and 
local authorities to 
generate, transmit, 
distribute and sell 
electricity without 
working through 
PLN. Authorities to 
retain some control 
over prices. 
TPR, 
Nikombori
rak and 
Manachotp
hong 
(2007). 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Japan Privatised 10 regional private 
utilities responsible 
for generation, 
transmission, 
distribution and 
supply in their 
respective service 
areas. Only a small 
percentage provided 
by IPPs.  
Private None The regional 
utilities own and 
operate transmission 
and distribution 
grids under a TPA 
regime.  
The Japan 
Electricity Power 
Exchange is a 
voluntary market 
where both spot and 
forward trading 
takes place. It was 
established in 
November 2003 and 
started operation in 
April 2005 
Private Eligibility levels set 
at 50 KW since 
2005. Full market 
opening (including 
residential 
customers) to be 
introduced in 2007 
IERN 
Korea Majority state-
owned KEPCO 
generates 94% of all 
power. A few IPPs 
supply to KEPCO 
under long-term 
contract. KEPCO 
generating capacity 
split into 6 separate 
Gencos, but these 
are still subsidiaries 
of KEPCO - 
privatisation not 
attempted since 
liberalisation was 
suspended in 2004. 
KEPCO generates 
94% of all power 
and handles 
distribution and 
transmission. A few 
IPPs supply to 
KEPCO under long-
term contract. 
KEPCO's monopoly 
on non-nuclear 
power generation 
abolished in 1999, 
and its generation 
capacity was split in 
2001. These gencos 
compete with each 
other in a 
generation pool. 
KEPCO manages 
transmission and 
distribution, its 
wholly owned 
subsidiaries manage 
generation. 
KEPCO generating 
capacity split into 6 
separate Gencos, 
but these are still 
subsidiaries of 
KEPCO - 
privatisation not 
attempted since 
liberalisation was 
suspended in 2004, 
based on the two-
thirds 
recommendation of 
a joint study team, 
who thought the 
benefits of an 
integrated regulated 
monopoly 
outweighed the 
benefits of 
competition. 
A regulated third 
party access system 
for transmission 
was introduced to 
facilitate trade 
between generators 
and large 
customers, using 
rate of return on 
assets to determine 
the transmission fee.  
Gencos compete in 
a wholesale power 
pool (one-way 
bidding). 
KEPCO manages 
transmission and 
distribution, and is 
majority state-
owned. 
None. Eligible 
customers can buy 
electricity directly 
from Gencos, but 
distribution services 
(billing etc) are still 
a KEPCO 
monopoly.  
TPR, Cho, 
Gulen and 
Foss 
(2007). 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Malaysia Tenaga is majority 
state-owned, and 
owns about 60% of 
generating assets. 
The IPP sector owns 
40%. The first 5 IPP 
licences (in early 
1990s) went to the 
politically well-
connected, and 
Tenaga became 
minority 
shareholder in all 
but one of the first 
IPPs. 
The IPPs signed 
long-term contracts 
with Tenaga, which 
were overseen by 
the government. 
These included take 
or pay provisions or 
fixed capacity 
charges, very 
beneficial to the 
IPPs. Since the 
Asian financial 
crisis IPPs have 
signed contracts on 
less beneficial 
terms. 
Tenaga holds a 
monopoly over 
transmission and 
distribution in all of 
Peninsula Malaysia. 
Two smaller 
companies provide 
power in Sabah and 
Sarawak.  
None Described as being 
very limited. 
None. Plans for a 
power pooling 
system were put on 
hold in the wake of 
the Californian 
power crisis, but 
there were moves to 
inject more 
competition into the 
process of bidding 
for power plant 
construction. 
Tenaga holds a 
monopoly over 
transmission and 
distribution in all of 
Peninsula Malaysia. 
Two smaller 
companies provide 
power in Sabah and 
Sarawak.  
None.  Rector 
(2005) 
Mexico Under Article 27 of 
the Constitution, the 
State has exclusive 
responsibility for 
generating, 
transporting, 
transforming, 
distributing and 
supplying electricity 
as a public service. 
The public 
electricity system is 
dominated by CFE, 
a decentralised 
state-owned entity 
that operates most 
of the electricity 
plants, and all of the 
transmission and 
distribution network 
jointly with LFC.  
In 2006 CFE bought 
26% of its energy 
from IPPs. IPP 
(small scale 
production), 
cogeneration, self-
supply, import and 
export are not 
deemed a public 
service.  
Under Article 27 of 
the Constitution, the 
State has exclusive 
responsibility for 
generating, 
transporting, 
transforming, 
distributing and 
supplying electricity 
as a public service. 
The public 
electricity system is 
dominated by CFE, 
a decentralised 
state-owned entity 
that operates most 
of the electricity 
plants, and all of the 
transmission and 
distribution network 
jointly with LFC.  
None. The system 
operator, the State-
owned National 
Energy Control 
Centre, is part of 
CFE.  
None. IPPs can sell 
only to CFE. In 
2002 there was a 
proposal by the 
Executive to, among 
other things, convert 
the National Energy 
Control Centre into 
a decentralised 
entity responsible 
for dispatch and 
capable of 
guaranteeing non-
discriminatory 
access to 
distribution 
networks. This was 
not adopted by 
Congress.  
Apparently none. Under Article 27 of 
the Constitution, the 
State has exclusive 
responsibility for 
generating, 
transporting, 
transforming, 
distributing and 
supplying electricity 
as a public service. 
The public 
electricity system is 
dominated by CFE, 
a decentralised 
state-owned entity 
that operates most 
of the electricity 
plants, and all of the 
transmission and 
distribution network 
jointly with LFC.  
Private generators 
are not allowed to 
sell to end users. 
End-user prices are 
subsidised. 
IERN, TPR 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
New 
Zealand 
Partially privatised 5 companies 
produce 95% of the 
electricity 
generation 
Transmission is 
publicly owned, 
while distribution is 
partially privatised. 
Transmission is 
owned and operated 
by Transpower.  
Yes (see also retail 
competition) 
Yes. Transmission is 
publicly owned, 
while distribution is 
partially privatised. 
There are 28 
distribution 
companies that sell 
mainly to retailers. 
Retailers include the 
big 5 generation 
companies, plus at 
least 4 others. All 
end users can 
choose between 
retailers. 
IERN 
Peru Partially privatised State-owned 
Electroperu SA is 
the dominant player. 
Other IPPs are 
Edegel SAA and 
Egenor Duke 
Energy 
Internacional SAC. 
The private sector 
produces four-fifths 
of the energy and 
competes for non-
regulated customers.  
Partially privatised Yes. The majority 
of the transmission 
system is controlled 
by ISA Group. 
Yes - generators 
compete for 
customers.  
No. The wholesale 
market relies on 
bilateral medium or 
long-term contracts 
for non-regulated 
customers.  
Partially privatised, 
mainly private. 
Two big private 
companies, plus the 
rest operated by the 
State. Eligibility is 
set at 1 MW. 
IERN 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Philip-
pines 
Partially privatised State-owned 
PSALM took over 
operation of 
generation assets of 
the vertically 
integrated National 
Power Corporation 
when it was broken 
up in 2001. These 
assets are to be 
privatised. The 
Electric Power 
Industry Reform 
Act of 2001 
(EPIRA) states that 
70% must be sold 
before open access 
and retail 
competition. As of 
May 2008, 
privatisation was 
still not complete. 
There are also IPPs. 
Transmission is 
publicly owned, 
while distribution is 
partially privatised. 
Yes. State-owned 
National 
Transmission 
Company operates 
the national grid. 
No. See also retail 
competition. 
No. Wholesale 
prices regulated by 
the Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission. IPPs 
had long-term 
contracts with NPC 
prior to EPIRA. 
Immediately after 
EPIRA, lack of 
contracts may have 
thwarted 
privatisation. 
EPIRA now allows 
short-term transition 
contracts until one 
year after open 
access. But still a 
'chicken and egg' 
problem.  
Partially privatised. 
Distribution: 17 
privately owned 
companies and 119 
cooperatives. 
Accounting 
separation between 
regulated and non-
regulated assets for 
DSOs was 
promulgated in 
2003 and is due for 
amendment in 2006.  
The implementation 
of retail competition 
and open access was 
tentatively set up on 
1 July 2006, but it is 
totally dependent on 
the realisation of 
NPC's generation 
asset privatisation 
plan. 
IERN, 
Mira and 
Singson 
(2007), 
Philippine 
Daily 
Inquirer 
Russia System was 
dominated by 
vertically integrated 
Unified Energy 
System of Russia 
(RAO UESR), 52% 
government owned 
with 10% Gazprom 
stake. Foreign 
investors have taken 
stakes in the 
wholesale 
generation 
companies and 
territorial 
generation 
companies that were 
split off since 2006.  
RAO UESR has 
70% installed 
capacity. A RAO 
UESR subsidiary 
owns the wholesale 
market. Mandatory 
bilateral contracts 
were at government 
fixed prices in 
transition to Target 
Market Model.  
RAO UESR is sole 
owner of Federal 
Grid Company. It 
owns about 96% of 
transmission and 
77% of distribution 
systems.  
Not really initially. 
Vertically 
integrated RAO 
UESR was sole 
owner of Federal 
Grid Company. But 
since 2006 six 
wholesale 
generation 
companies and 14 
territorial 
generation 
companies have 
been split off, 
though RAO UESR 
retains 
shareholdings in 
these.  
Not initially 
(customers were 
serviced by regional 
monopolies). But by 
2008, competitive 
supply companies 
and retail 
competition were in 
place.  
Not initially. But 
now a competitive 
wholesale market 
accounts for about 
20% of generation.  
Customers were 
served by regional 
monopolies. But by 
2008, competitive 
supply companies 
and retail 
competition were in 
place. Supply 
companies privately 
owned.  
As at 2008, 
simplified 
provisions in place 
for transition of 
consumers from one 
seller to another. 
Extent of real retail 
competition not 
clear. Aiming for 
full competition (ie 
phasing out of 
regulated prices) at 
both wholesale and 
retail level by 2011.  
IERN 
(from 
March 
2006), 
RAO 
UESR 
present-
ations. 
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Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Singa-
pore 
Generation 
dominated by 3 
government-linked 
companies. 
Temasek announced 
in 2007 that they 
will be divested by 
2008–09.  
To curtail market 
power, the Energy 
Market Authority 
imposed vesting 
contracts in 2004, 
which oblige 
generators to 
produce a specified 
quantity of 
electricity and limit 
prices. Contracts to 
be rolled back from 
2005.  
One transmission 
company, SP 
PowerAssets Ltd, is 
a subsidiary of 
Singapore Power, a 
Temasek company.  
Yes Yes (see also retail 
competition) 
Yes. Wholesale 
market run by 
Energy Market 
Company Pty Ltd. 
Singapore 
electricity pool 
introduced in 1998. 
SP Services, another 
subsidiary of 
Singapore Power, 
administers billing, 
meter reading and 
customer databases.  
Retail competition 
being introduced in 
stages. By mid-
2004, the 10 000 
biggest customers 
(75% of total 
demand) could buy 
from the wholesale 
pool or from 
retailers. The 
Energy Market 
Authority is 
studying how to 
retail to households 
efficiently.  
TPR 
Chinese 
Taipei 
TPC is a vertically 
integrated state-
owned monopoly, 
with monopoly 
rights until 2008. 
IPPs provided 
around 16% of 
power in 2004, and 
sell through power 
purchase 
agreements to TPC. 
TPC privatisation is 
on hold indefinitely.  
IPPs provided 
around 16% of 
power in 2004, and 
sell through power 
purchase 
agreements to TPC.  
TPC is a vertically 
integrated state-
owned monopoly, 
with monopoly 
rights until 2008. 
TPC privatisation is 
on hold indefinitely.  
None None None TPC is a vertically 
integrated state-
owned monopoly, 
with monopoly 
rights until 2008. 
TPC privatisation is 
on hold indefinitely.  
TPC is a vertically 
integrated state-
owned monopoly, 
with monopoly 
rights until 2008. 
TPC privatisation is 
on hold indefinitely.  
TPR, 
Wang 
(2006) 
Quantifying the benefits from structural reforms in electricity and gas markets in APEC economies 153 
Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Thailand As at 2007, State-
owned generator 
and distributor 
(EGAT) had 56.8% 
of production. Rest 
was from private 
suppliers and 
imports (from 
Myanmar, Lao PDR 
and China). 
Domestic 
generation was 
96.4% of domestic 
consumption. 
EGAT was 
corporatised in June 
2005, but a planned 
IPO was called off.  
As at 2007, State-
owned generator 
and distributor 
(EGAT) had 56.8% 
of production. Rest 
was from private 
suppliers and 
imports. 
EGAT has a 
monopoly in 
transmission. 
No – EGAT is 
vertically integrated, 
but there is 
accounting 
separation. 
No. In December 
2003 the 
government 
approved the 
Enhanced Single 
Buyer model, which 
establishes EGAT 
as the sole 
electricity buyer, 
transmitter and 
wholesaler.  
In 2000 there were 
plans to unbundle 
transmission and 
distribution, to 
create an 
independent 
regulator and create 
a wholesale power 
pool. Plans were 
thwarted by EGAT 
objections and by 
election of Thaksin, 
which converted 
reform plans into 
plan to create a 
'national champion'. 
Enhanced single 
buyer model looks 
like it uses 
(retains?) PPAs, but 
'new capacity 
allocation' based on 
competitive bidding. 
However, no 
independent 
regulator (cf 
Republic of Korea) 
so claimed to favour 
incumbent.  
EGAT sells to the 
Metropolitan 
Electricity 
Authority (MEA) 
and the Provincial 
Electricity 
Authority (PEA). 
None. In 2005 
regulated retail 
tariffs were only 
about 0.6% higher 
than marginal cost. 
Different categories 
of customers receive 
different degrees of 
cross-subsidy. 
TPR, 
Greacen 
and 
Greacen 
(2004), 
Sira-
soontorn 
(2008). 
154 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
Table 6.2 continued: Electricity regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling Third party access Wholesale pool Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
United 
States 
Mixed, mostly 
private. 
IPPs have 
flourished. 
Mixed, mostly 
private.  
Transmission 
segment is now 
undergoing 
unbundling. 
Distribution 
segment is changing 
more slowly. 
Companies are 
operated on a 
vertically integrated, 
cost-plus business 
model.  
Starting from 2000, 
retail customers in 
some states have 
been given the 
choice of electricity 
suppliers. This 
suggests third party 
access.  
In 2001 the 
California Power 
Exchange went out 
of business. 
Internet-based B2B 
markets have 
emerged, using a 
pay-as-bid model 
(essentially bilateral 
contracts). 
Mixed, mostly 
private.  
Starting from 2000, 
retail customers in 
some states have 
been given the 
choice of electricity 
suppliers.  
IERN, 
Finance-
Tech. 
Viet Nam State-owned EVN 
dominates 
generation, 
transmission, 
distribution and 
sales of electricity 
in Viet Nam. 
Foreign and private 
participation has 
been permitted since 
2002, but lack of a 
regulatory regime 
has inhibited 
investment.  
IPPs provide 19% 
of generating 
capacity 
State-owned EVN 
dominates 
generation, 
transmission, 
distribution and 
sales of electricity 
in Viet Nam. 
Foreign and private 
participation has 
been permitted since 
2002, but lack of a 
regulatory regime 
has inhibited 
investment.  
No No No State-owned EVN 
dominates 
generation, 
transmission, 
distribution and 
sales of electricity 
in Viet Nam. 
Foreign and private 
participation has 
been permitted since 
2002, but lack of a 
regulatory regime 
has inhibited 
investment.  
No EIA 
Country 
Analysis 
Brief 
* IERN is the International Energy Regulation Network website (http://www.iern.net/portal/page/portal/IERN_HOME/IERN_ARCHIV/Country_Factsheets). APEC IAP is 
the APEC Individual Action Plan website (http://www.apec-iap.org/). EIA Country Analysis Briefs come from the US Energy Information Administration website 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html). TPR is the Trade Policy Reviews of the WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm). 
Sources: See last column. 
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Table 6.3: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Australia Private Many private 
companies involved 
in exploration and 
production. 
Private Many major gas 
pipeline companies 
National Gas Code 
regulates the gas 
distribution and 
transmission access 
regime.  
Some companies 
vertically integrated 
in this way, but 
some separate 
retailers.  
Private Most States and 
Territories 
committed to 
implement full retail 
competition. Actual 
eligibility varies. 
Key reform dates 
are 1999 for NSW 
(partial) and SA, 
2002 for NSW, 
ACT and Vic. 
IERN 
Canada Private At least 4 big 
companies 
Partially privatised Yes. Privately 
owned TransCanada 
Pipelines is the 
largest operator 
Regulated third 
party access 
(according to 
OECD). 
Yes (according to 
OECD). Natural gas 
distribution 
companies have 
been given franchise 
areas to serve 
customers 
(generally by local 
municipalities).  
Private Yes - fully 
liberalised since 
1987. 
IERN, 
OECD 
regulatory 
scorecard. 
Chile Partially privatised State-owned ENAP 
is the main licensee 
for exploration and 
production. LNG 
terminal is owned 
by GASCO. Chile 
heavily dependent 
on imports from 
Argentina. Only one 
of four disjoint 
markets (the 
Magellan market) is 
supplied in part by 
ENAP.  
Transmission 
partially privatised 
and distribution 
fully privatised. 
Mostly. GASCO 
(LNG owner) has 
part ownership in 
one of 2 
transmission 
pipelines to central 
area. ENAP owns 
the pipeline from its 
production fields to 
the Magellan basin. 
Other pipelines 
owned by third 
parties or end user 
(Methanex, a 
methanol producer 
in the Magellan 
region). 
Unclear.  Apparently not.  Distributors are two 
GASCO 
subsidiaries plus 
two other private 
companies 
More than one 
distribution 
company, but 
unclear whether 
there is competition 
or whether these are 
regional 
monopolies. OECD 
describes the natural 
gas market as a 
monopoly. Little 
prospect for sources 
other than 
Argentina, and it 
has cut supplies at 
various times.  
IERN, 
Galetovic 
and de 
Mello 
(2005). 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
China Dominated by the 3 
large state-owned 
oil and gas holding 
companies - CNPC, 
Sinopec and 
CNOOC. All 3 have 
numerous local 
subsidiaries, which 
are listed on stock 
exchanges. CNPC 
and Sinopec are 
vertically integrated 
but their mandates 
are geographically 
separated. 
CNPC dominates in 
gas production and 
sales, with 75.6% 
market share in 
2006. LNG imports 
began in 2006. 
CNPC also involved 
in LNG imports. 
CNOOC provides 
offshore gas by 
pipeline to Hong 
Kong, China and 
Shanghai, and is the 
leading player in 
LNG. Some small 
size producers 
becoming active, 
mainly private or 
owned by local 
governments, to 
supply local 
markets.  
One West to East 
pipeline became 
operational in 2004, 
and another has 
been approved. 
CNPC now owns 
about 80% of 
pipeline network. 
One West to East 
pipeline became 
operational in 2004, 
and another has 
been approved. 
CNPC now owns 
about 80% of 
pipeline network. 
Probably not. There 
is no specific law to 
regulate the natural 
gas industry. The 
existing legislation 
on pipelines 
concerns safety. 
Nevertheless, with 
growing 
interconnectedness, 
sharing of pipeline 
capacity apparently 
occurs.  
Apparently. In 
2002, the city gas 
business was 
opened to private 
and foreign 
companies, and 
more than 60 
companies are now 
distributing in 
several cities.  
Most distribution 
companies owned 
and managed by 
local governments. 
Natural gas 
delivered to some 
major industrial 
users directly by 
producers. In 2002, 
the city gas business 
was opened to 
private and foreign 
companies, and 
more than 60 
companies are now 
distributing in 
several cities. LNG 
receiving terminals 
owned by joint 
ventures of local 
governments, has 
users and importing 
companies such as 
CNOOC and 
CNPC. 
Up until 2005, the 
price was tightly 
controlled, and not 
linked to production 
costs. This distorted 
use. In August 2007, 
the government 
issued a directive on 
which activities can 
use natural gas. 
Household fuel and 
combined cycle 
seems preferred, 
while its use to 
produce methanol is 
forbidden. Since 
2005, controlled 
prices are adjusted 
annually in 
accordance with the 
price of other fuels, 
and producers can 
increase prices up 
to a limit, usually of 
8%.  
TPR, 
Higashi 
(2009) 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Hong 
Kong, 
China 
Town gas is 
distributed by 
HKCG. LPG is 
supplied by six oil 
companies. Natural 
gas is supplied by 
pipe from the South 
China Sea and used 
solely by CLP for 
power generation. 
CLP plans for an 
LNG terminal 
recently scrapped 
after HK and 
Chinese 
governments signed 
MOU renewing 20 
year supply 
agreements for 
natural gas and 
electricity. 
Excluding natural 
gas, HKCG had 
about 80% of the 
market in the mid 
2000s. 
HKCG owns the 
pipes that service 
most households. 
No. No. Common 
carrier provisions 
investigated in late 
1990s but there 
were deemed to be 
too few gas sources 
to make this 
worthwhile.  
No. Town gas is 
distributed by 
HKCG. LPG is 
supplied by six oil 
companies. Natural 
gas is supplied by 
pipe from the South 
China Sea and used 
solely by CLP for 
power generation.  
Excluding natural 
gas, HKCG had 
about 80% of the 
market in the mid 
2000s. 
APEC IAP 
and other 
documents, 
CLP 
documents 
available 
from web. 
Indonesia Prior to 2001, 
Pertamina was both 
the oil and gas 
company and 
regulator. Under the 
2001 deregulation 
and reform, 
upstream regulation 
is now under BP 
Migas. PT 
Pertamina is now 
limited liability and 
100% government 
owned.  
PT Pertamina and 
six major 
international 
companies dominate 
the natural gas 
industry. According 
to EIA, the six 
majors had about 
80% market share in 
the mid 2000s. Just 
over 50% of gas 
was exported in the 
mid 2000s, but this 
is shrinking.  
PT PGN has 87% 
share of 
transmission 
business and 93% 
share of 
distribution. It is 
55% government 
owned. Listed on 
the Stock Exchange.  
Apparently. Yes. Gas 
transmission 
contracts are long-
term, with minimum 
ship-or-pay 
volumes, with 
tariffs in USD. 
Access regulated by 
BPH Migas 
(downstream 
regulatory agency). 
Apparently not.  PT PGN has 87% 
share of 
transmission 
business and 93% 
share of 
distribution. It is 
55% government 
owned. 
PT PGN has 87% 
share of 
transmission 
business and 93% 
share of 
distribution. It is 
55% government 
owned. 98.7% of its 
customers are 
industrial. 
EIA 
Country 
Analysis 
Briefs, PT 
PGN 
documents.  
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Japan Partly privatised. Domestic 
production 
negligible – 97% of 
demand met by 
LNG imports. Most 
import contracts in 
1980–90s were 
long-term, tied to 
price of crude oil 
and not flexible. 
From 2001 the three 
major vertically 
integrated private 
companies (Tokyo 
Gas, Osaka Gas and 
Toho Gas) started to 
sign or renew on 
more flexible terms. 
Partly privatised. No. The three 
largest gas 
companies own and 
operate their 
transmission and 
distribution 
networks under a 
regulated third party 
access for large 
volume supply since 
1999.  
Yes. Regulated third 
party access for 
large volume supply 
since 1999.  
No. Partly privatised. Most imports go to 
power generation or 
petrochemical 
feedstock - only 
about 1/3 to 
domestic 
consumption. 
Private companies 
have 97% of the 
market. Eligibility 
levels were at 0.5 
Mcm by 2004, 
lowered to 0.1 Mcm 
by 2007. The price 
for non-eligible 
customers is 
regulated. 
IERN 
Korea KOGAS is the main 
importer and 
distributor of natural 
gas and the largest 
purchaser of LNG 
in the world. 
KOGAS is 27% 
owned by 
government, 25% 
owned by (majority 
govt owned) 
KEPCO, and the 
rest split among 
local govt and 
institutional 
investors. State-
owned KNOC is 
involved in 
domestic 
production, but this 
is a small fraction of 
consumption.  
Not much. In 2005 
POSCO and 
Mitsubishi started a 
fourth LNG import 
terminal, with about 
7% of total import 
capacity. 
KOGAS operates 3 
LNG import 
terminals as well as 
the pipeline system. 
In 2005, POSCO 
and Mitsubishi 
started a fourth 
LNG import 
terminal, with about 
7% of total import 
capacity. 
No KOGAS has a 
monopoly over 
wholesale trade, 
transmission and 
wholesale 
distribution. 
KOGAS is the sole 
distributor to private 
city gas companies 
that have territorial 
monopolies and 
supply retail users 
through their 
distribution 
pipelines. 
Partly privatised. KOGAS is the sole 
distributor to private 
city gas companies 
that have territorial 
monopolies and 
supply retail users 
through their 
distribution 
pipelines. 
Wholesale gas 
tariffs must be 
approved by 
MOCIE, and retail 
gas prices by local 
governments. 
Essentially rate of 
return regulation. 
TPR, EIA 
Country 
Analysis 
Briefs. 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics) 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Malaysia Wholly state-owned 
Petronas has a 
monopoly on all 
upstream natural gas 
developments. It 
also plays a leading 
role in downstream 
activities and LNG 
trade. Most natural 
gas production 
occurs from 
production sharing 
contracts operated 
by foreign 
companies in 
conjunction with 
Petronas.  
No.  Through its listed 
subsidiary, Petronas 
Gas Bhd, Petronas 
has since 1984 been 
implementing the 
three-phase 
Peninsular Gas 
Utilisation (PGU) 
project. The entire 
PGU system now 
spans over 1,700km, 
comprising main 
gas transmission 
pipelines, supply 
pipelines and 
laterals. Also 
planning a Sabah-
Sarawak pipeline. 
No No Yes. Gas Malaysia is sole 
provider of gas to 
non-power sector. It 
is 55% owned by 
MMC, 25% Tokyo 
Gas - Mitsui 
Holdings, and 20% 
Petronas Gas.  
No  EIA 
Country 
Analysis 
Briefs, 
MMC 
website. 
Mexico Partially privatised. 
Government-owned 
PEMEX is licensed 
for production and 
first hand sale of gas 
on the wholesale 
market, while 
import, export and 
commercialisation 
have been 
liberalised and no 
authorisation is 
required. 
No. However, as at 
mid 2007, the 
Regulatory 
Commission for 
Energy had granted 
private consortia, 
with domestic and 
foreign 
participation, 22 
permits for 
distribution, 5 
storage permits and 
21 transport permits 
for serving the 
public.  
Partly privatised. 
The Mexican 
natural gas transport 
system is composed 
of different 
unconnected 
pipelines operated 
by different TSOs 
under a third party 
access regime. The 
main pipeline is run 
by PEMEX. Several 
local DSOs operate 
the distribution 
pipelines under a 
regulated 
TPA/negotiated 
TPA. 
No. However, 
transmission, 
storage and 
distribution rates 
and quality of 
services are 
regulated by the 
ERC. 
Yes. No. But ERC 
controls prices when 
DSOs act as 
supplier in their 
licensed area. Also, 
vertical separation 
(corporate 
unbundling) is 
required one step 
back – between 
distribution and 
transmission 
activities when the 
two systems are 
integrated.  
Partly privatised. Yes. The market is 
fully opened since 
1995. End-user 
prices are market-
based. ERC controls 
PEMEX's first hand 
sales prices as well 
as when DSOs act 
as supplier in their 
licensed area. 
IERN, 
TPR. 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
New 
Zealand 
Privatised. 81% of natural gas 
production comes 
from 2 fields - Maui 
(Shell, OMV NZ 
Ltd and Todd 
Petroleum) and 
Kapuni (Shell, Todd 
Petroleum). The rest 
comes from a 
number of fields. 
Mainly private. 
NGC has one main 
network in the 
North Island - NGC 
has been acquired 
by Vector, which is 
majority private 
owned. The Maui 
pipeline is owned 
by a subsidiary of 
the Maui field 
owners. Other 
pipelines are 
privately owned.  
Mostly.  Yes. A regulated 
TPA regime has 
been in place for the 
Maui pipeline since 
2005. The 
NGC/Vector 
pipeline had open 
access arrangements 
before this.  
Partly. 4 
distributors, with 
NGC/Vector the 
main player. 9 gas 
retailers, including 
NGC/Vector, but 
also other players 
not involved in 
distribution. 
Partly privatised. 9 gas retailers. 
Domestic prices are 
regulated by the 
Ministry of 
Economic 
Development.  
IERN 
Peru Four main areas 
being exploited by 
domestic and 
foreign private 
companies. Also an 
LNG gas export 
terminal operated by 
a consortium led by 
Hunt Oil.  
Yes. One transmission 
pipeline operated 
under a regulated 
TPA regime by a 
consortium led by 
Techint based in 
Argentina.  
Yes.  Yes. No. A company majority 
owned by Suez 
Group is the 
licensee distributor 
supplying Lima. 
Other major cities 
yet to be connected.  
No IERN 
Philip-
pines 
Small but rapidly 
growing sector. 3 
main areas of gas 
associated with oil. 
Main one is 
offshore. Domestic 
production used for 
power generation. 
No. Imports under 
consideration. 
 No. No. NA NA NA IERN 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Russia Gazprom is the 38% 
government-owned 
natural gas 
monopolist that 
dominates the 
sector. It accounts 
for 90% of 
production (2006). 
Three other private 
companies expected 
to be major 
contributors in the 
future. 
Not much.  Gazprom controls 
the pipeline 
network.  
No. No. Gazprom has the 
duty to supply gas 
to the domestic 
market at 
government-
regulated prices. 
Gazprom. No IERN 
Singa-
pore 
Partially privatised. 
After 2002 reforms, 
two companies 
import gas: 
SembGas and Gas 
Supply, the latter 
being a wholly 
owned subsidiary of 
government-owned 
Temasek Holdings. 
Senoko Power 
(owned by 
Temasek) also 
imports, but solely 
for its own power 
generation. 
Duopoly. Government-owned 
Power Gas is 
involved only in the 
transport of gas. It 
remains the only 
licensed gas 
transporter and gas 
system operator. 
Yes.  Yes. The Gas Code 
of 2005 details the 
terms and 
conditions for gas 
transportation on an 
equitable and non-
discriminatory 
basis.  
No. SembGas, Gas 
Supply and City 
Gas (also a wholly 
owned subsidiary of 
Temasek) are 
involved in gas 
retailing. City Gas 
also manufactures 
gas.  
Three players. TPR 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
Chinese 
Taipei 
Natural gas is 
supplied mainly by 
the state-owned 
CPC. It is the sole 
provider of gas, 
wholesale and 
transportation 
services to local 
distribution 
companies, power 
generators and 
industrial firms. 
There are private 
LNG terminals. 
No. But wholesale 
prices are set by a 
Natural Gas Pricing 
Formula based on 
full cost recovery 
principle.  
Natural gas is 
supplied mainly by 
the state-owned 
CPC. It is the sole 
provider of gas, 
wholesale and 
transportation 
services to local 
distribution 
companies, power 
generators and 
industrial firms. 
There are private 
LNG terminals. 
No. No. No. Local distribution 
companies. 
No. But retail gas 
prices are also 
regulated by the 
ministry and local 
government, also 
based on the full 
cost recovery 
principle.  
TPR 
Thailand Chevron Texaco is 
the largest natural 
gas producer, with 
about 2/3 of 
production. Three 
other companies 
also produce. 
PTTEP has about 
28% of market. It is 
a subsidiary of PTT, 
the partly privatised 
oil giant. 
Yes. PTT Pipeline Co, 
100% owned by 
PTT, which is just 
over 50% 
government owned. 
Yes. Yes. Unclear when 
this came into force, 
but may have been 
after 2004. 
No. Only one 
distribution licence 
had been issued to 
PTT by the newly 
formed Energy 
Regulatory 
Commission in 
2009. 
No TPR, ERC 
website, 
Dept of 
Mineral 
Resources 
website, 
Skeer 
(2004). 
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Table 6.3 continued: Gas regulation in APEC economies, 2009 (reforms since 2004 in italics). 
 Upstream 
ownership 
Upstream 
competition 
Transmission 
ownership 
Unbundling of 
transmission and 
production 
Third party access Unbundling of 
distribution and 
supply 
Downstream 
ownership 
Downstream 
competition 
Source* 
United 
States 
More than 500 
natural gas 
processing plants. 
Following reform in 
1990s, the 
companies owning 
these shifted from 
primarily oil/gas 
producers to 
'midstream' 
companies, which 
now dominate. 
Yes. Competition 
encouraged by 
FERC letting 
pipelines unbundle 
their gathering, 
transportation and 
storage services - 
can price these 
separately. FERC 
also revised 
transportation rate 
structures.  
Yes. Regulated TPA. Yes Since the late 1980s 
public utility 
commissions have 
encouraged local 
gas distribution 
companies to 
unbundle their 
services and allow 
customers to choose 
their gas supplier.  
Only about 50% of 
states have actively 
pursued 
deregulation of gas 
distribution. One 
problem is special 
obligations (e.g., 
USOs). 
IERN 
Viet Nam State-owned 
Petrovietnam 
dominates the 
natural gas sector. It 
has foreign partners 
such as BP, 
Chevron, Petronas 
etc in production 
and development. 
Most gas is sent 
directly to industrial 
and power sector 
end users, such as 
the Phu My power 
complex. 
No Presumably 
Petrovietnam 
No No No Presumably 
Petrovietnam 
No EIA 
Country 
Analysis 
Brief. 
* IERN is the International Energy Regulation Network website (http://www.iern.net/portal/page/portal/IERN_HOME/IERN_ARCHIV/Country_Factsheets). APEC IAP is 
the APEC Individual Action Plan website (http://www.apec-iap.org/). EIA Country Analysis Briefs come from the US Energy Information Administration website 
(http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/contents.html). TPR is the Trade Policy Reviews of the WTO (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tpr_e.htm). 
Sources: See last column. 
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Table 6.4: Economic and technological data for electricity, OECD economies, 1990–2008. 
Variable Variable name Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Electricity end-user price to industry, net of taxes, USD PPP/kWh  entpr 349 0.067587 0.028455 0.016 0.187 
GDP, PPP (current international $, trillions) gdp_ppp_s 399 1.190218 2.09913 0.046 14.204 
Nuclear share in gross production (ratio) nucshr 399 0.189979 0.2158379 0 0.783681 
Hydro share in gross production (ratio) hydroshr 399 0.2009344 0.2536616 0.0003546 0.9962215 
Urban share of population (%) urban 399 75.3015 10.94613 47.9 97.4 
       
Utilisation rate = gross production (GWh)/net capacity (MWe)  eutil 374 4.428908 0.562455 2.715238 5.852232 
Deviation of reserve margin from optimal = abs[(capacity – peak)/peak – 0.15] eres 332 0.304555 0.1984277 0.0004457 0.9926048 
Nuclear share in capacity (ratio) nuccapshr 374 0.1209503 0.1447605 0 0.5509456 
Hydro share in capacity (ratio) hydcapshr 374 0.2659052 0.2393256 0.0006915 0.9907865 
Coal share in capacity (ratio) coalcapshr 332 0.1543606 0.1766962 0 0.6428536 
Sources: See text. 
 
 
Table 6.5: Economic and technological data for gas, OECD economies, 1990–2008. 
 Variable name Number of 
observations 
Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Gas end-user price to industry, net of taxes, USD PPP/10e+7kcal gntpr 260 203.2362 118.1389 74.21 644.418 
GDP, PPP (current international $, billions) gdp_ppp 399 1190.218 2099.13 46 14204 
Pipeline length (,000km) gpipe_s 399 29.32738 87.17871 0 548.665 
Urban share of population (%) urban 399 75.3015 10.94613 47.9 97.4 
       
Utilisation rate = gas consumption (million m3)/pipeline length (kms)  gutil 391 6.013908 8.047427 0.023514 47.62 
Gas share in electricity generation capacity (ratio) gascapshr 327 0.1019645 0.1029867 0 0.5691414 
Sources: See text. 
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Table 6.6: Policy data for electricity and gas, OECD economies, 1990–2008. 
Economy  Year ETPA EWPP EUNB EOWN GTPA GRETC GENT GUNB_P GUNB_T GOWN 
Australia 1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1992 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1993 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1994 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1995 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1996 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1997 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1998 1 0 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
 1999 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2000 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2001 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2002 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2003 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2004 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2005 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2006 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2007 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2008 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
            
Belgium 1990 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1996 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1997 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1998 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1999 0 0 0 3 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 2000 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 0 4 
 2001 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2002 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2003 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2004 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2005 1 0 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2006 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2007 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2008 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 0 1 4 
            
Canada 1990 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1991 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1992 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1993 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1994 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
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 1995 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1996 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1997 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1998 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1999 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2000 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2001 1 0 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2002 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2003 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2004 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2005 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2006 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2007 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2008 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 1 4 
            
Denmark 1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 1996 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 1997 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 1998 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 1999 1 1 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 0 
 2000 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 0 0 
 2001 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 2002 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 2003 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 2004 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 2005 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 2006 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 0 
 2007 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 2008 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 
            
Finland 1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1992 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1993 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1994 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1995 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1996 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1997 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1998 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 1999 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2000 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2001 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2002 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
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 2003 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2004 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2005 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2006 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2007 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
 2008 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 3 
            
France 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2000 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2001 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2002 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2003 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
 2004 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 
 2005 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 2006 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 2007 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 2008 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
            
Germany 1990 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1991 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1992 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1993 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1994 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1995 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1996 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1997 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 1 0 4 
 1998 1 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 4 
 1999 1 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2000 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2001 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2002 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2003 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2004 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2005 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2006 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2007 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
 2008 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 4 
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Greece 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1999 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2000 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2001 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 2002 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 2003 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 2004 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
 2005 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 
 2006 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 2007 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
 2008 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
            
Ireland 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 1996 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 1997 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 1998 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 1999  0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 2000  0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 2001 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 2002 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 
 2003 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 2004 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 2005 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 2006 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 2007 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
 2008 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 
            
Italy 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
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 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 1999 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2000 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2001 1 0 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 3 
 2002 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 3 
 2003 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 2004 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 2005 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 2006 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 2007 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 
 2008 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 3 
            
Japan 1990 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1991 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1992 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1993 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1994 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1995 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 1996 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 1997 0 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 1998 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 1999 1 0 0 4 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 2000 1 0 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2001 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2002 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2003 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2004 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2005 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2006 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2007 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
 2008 1 1 0 4 1 1 0 0 0 4 
            
Korea 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1999 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2001 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2002 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2003 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2004 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2005 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
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 2006 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2007 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
 2008 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
            
Mexico 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
 1996 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 1997 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 1998 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 1999 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2000 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2001 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2002 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2003 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2004 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2005 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2006 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2007 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
 2008 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 
            
Netherlands 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1994 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1995 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1996 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1997 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1998 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1999 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 4 
 2000 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2001 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2002 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2003 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2004 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2005 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2006 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2007 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2008 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 0 1 4 
            
New Zealand 1990 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1991 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1992 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1993 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
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 1994 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1995 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1996 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1997 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1998 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1999 1 1 1 2 1 0 1  0 4 
 2000 1 1 1 2 1 0 1  0 4 
 2001 1 1 1 2 1 0 1  0 4 
 2002 1 1 1 2 1 0 1  0 4 
 2003 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
 2004 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
 2005 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
 2006 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
 2007 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
 2008 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 1 0 4 
            
Norway 1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1991 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1992 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1993 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1994 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1995 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1996 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1997 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1998 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 1999 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2000 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2001 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2002 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 2003 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 2004 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 2005 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 2006 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 2007 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
 2008 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 
            
Portugal 1990 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1991 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1992 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1993 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1994 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1995 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1996 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1997 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1998 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 1999 0 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 2000 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2001 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
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 2002 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 1 
 2003 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 2004 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 2005 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 2006 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 1 1 1 
 2007 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 
 2008 1 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 1 1 
            
Spain 1990 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1991 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1992 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1993 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1994 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1995 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1996 1 0 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 4 
 1997 1 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 0 4 
 1998 1 0 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 4 
 1999 1 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 4 
 2000 1 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 4 
 2001 1 1 1 3 0 1 0 0 1 4 
 2002 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
 2003 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
 2004 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
 2005 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
 2006 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
 2007 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
 2008 1 1 1 3 1 1 0 0 1 4 
            
Sweden 1990 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1991 1 0 0 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1992 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1993 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1994 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1995 1 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1996 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1997 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1998 1 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 
 1999 1 1 1 2 1 0 1 0 0 4 
 2000 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2001 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2002 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2003 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2004 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2005 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2006 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2007 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
 2008 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 0 1 4 
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United 
Kingdom 
 
1990 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 4 
 1991 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 4 
 1992 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 4 
 1993 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 4 
 1994 1 1 1 3 1 0 1 0 0 4 
 1995 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 0 1 4 
 1996 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 0 1 4 
 1997 1 1 1 4 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1998 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1999 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2000 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2001 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2002 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2003 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2004 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2005 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2006 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2007 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2008 1 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 
            
United States 1990 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1991 0 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1992 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1993 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1994 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1995 1 0 0 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1996 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1997 1 0 1 3 1 0 1 1 1 4 
 1998 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 1999 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2000 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2001 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2002 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2003 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2004 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2005 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2006 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2007 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
 2008 1 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 1 4 
Sources: See text. 
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Table 6.7: Simple correlations between policy and performance in electricity. 
 
Policy variables 
Performance measures 
entpr eutil eres 
etpa -0.09 0.05 -0.16 
ewpp -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 
eunb -0.04 0.06 -0.17 
eown 0.05 0.02 -0.14 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.8: Simple correlations between policy and performance in gas. 
 
Policy variables 
Performance measures 
gntpr gutil 
gtpa 0.20 -0.05 
gretc 0.20 0.20 
gent -0.40 -0.28 
gunb_p -0.06 -0.29 
gunb_t 0.16 -0.18 
gown -0.26 0.22 
Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 6.9: Results of random effects panel regression for electricity prices.* 
Dependent variable Industry price 
Constant 0.1571 
 [0.000] 
Third party access (etpa) -0.0032 
 [0.270] 
Wholesale price pool (ewpp) -0.0049 
 [0.072] 
Unbundling (eunb) -0.0075 
 [0.008] 
Private ownership (eown) 0.0039 
 [0.011] 
Hydro share in generation (hydroshr) -0.0276 
 [0.047] 
Nuclear share in generation (nucshr) -0.0033 
 [0.847] 
Urbanisation (urban) -0.0013 
 [0.000] 
GDP in PPP (gdp_ppp_s) 0.0010 
 [0.352] 
Time trend 0.0018 
 [0.000] 
  
Number of observations 347 
Number of time periods 19 
Number of OECD economies 21 
  
Wald test that coefficients not significantly different from zero 100.06 
 [0.000] 
Breusch-Pagan chi-squared test that random effects equal zero 838.65 
 [0.000] 
Hausman test of no difference between random and fixed effects estimates 4.34 
 [0.888] 
* Numbers in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are Prob>lzl. 
Numbers in parentheses after the Wald, Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are Prob>chi2.  
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Table 6.10: Results of random effects panel regression for electricity efficiency.* 
Dependent variable Utilisation rate Reserve margin deviation 
Constant 3.9804 0.5256 
 [0.000] [0.034] 
Third party access (etpa) -0.0638 -0.0023 
 [0.289] [0.919] 
Unbundling (eunb) 0.0944 -0.0317 
 [0.111] [0.152] 
Private ownership (eown) 0.0077 -0.0019 
 [0.780] [0.871] 
Hydro share in capacity (hydcapshr) 0.6381 -0.0126 
 [0.152] [0.939] 
Nuclear share in capacity (nuccapshr) 2.3007 -0.2038 
 [0.003] [0.481] 
Coal share in capacity (coalcapshr) 0.4208 -0.0126 
 [0.284] [0.939] 
Urbanisation (urban) -0.0028 -0.0031 
 [0.760] [0.355] 
Time trend 0.0133 0.0036 
 [0.014] [0.078] 
   
Number of observations 330 302 
Number of time periods 19 19 
Number of OECD economies 21 21 
   
Wald test that coefficients not significantly different from zero 24.30 6.46 
 [0.002] [0.596] 
Breusch-Pagan chi-squared test that random effects equal zero 811.45 869.64 
 [0.000] [0.000] 
Hausman test of no difference between random and fixed effects 
estimates 
17.49 6.90 
 [0.025] [0.547] 
* Numbers in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are Prob>lzl. Numbers in parentheses after the Wald, 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are Prob>chi2.  
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Table 6.11: Results of random effects panel regression for gas prices.* 
Dependent variable Industry price 
Constant 320.5354 
 [0.000] 
Third party access (gtpa) -4.75449 
 [0.682] 
Retail competition (gretc) -30.4460 
 [0.026] 
Absence of entry restrictions (gent) 13.3761 
 [0.474] 
Unbundling of gas production/import (gunb_p) -47.5065 
 [0.002] 
Unbundling of gas supply (gunb_t) 3.8747 
 [0.780] 
Private ownership (gown) -2.9226 
 [0.595] 
Pipeline length (gpipe_s) -0.3071 
 [0.078] 
Urbanisation (urban) -1.7877 
 [0.124] 
GDP in PPP (gdp_ppp) 0.0183 
 [0.018] 
Time  -11.9693 
 [0.000] 
Time squared 1.4067 
 [0.000] 
  
Number of observations 256 
Number of time periods 19 
Number of OECD economies 21 
  
Wald test that coefficients not significantly different from zero 531.42 
 [0.000] 
Breusch-Pagan chi-squared test that random effects equal zero 63.95 
 [0.000] 
Hausman test of no difference between random and fixed effects estimates 40.10 
 [0.000] 
* Numbers in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are Prob>lzl. Numbers in parentheses after the Wald, 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are Prob>chi2.  
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Table 6.12: Results of random effects panel regression for gas efficiency.* 
Dependent variable Pipeline utilisation rate 
Constant 15.8143 
 [0.080] 
Third party access (gtpa) -1.1931 
 [0.046] 
Retail competition (gretc) 1.4587 
 [0.015] 
Absence of entry restrictions (gent) 0.6199 
 [0.427] 
Unbundling of gas production/import (gunb_p) -0.7744 
 [0.319] 
Unbundling of gas supply (gunb_t) -0.7000 
 [0.271] 
Private ownership (gown) 1.4720 
 [0.000] 
Gas share in electricity capacity (gascapshr) 2.2703 
 [0.444] 
Urbanisation (urban) -0.1827 
 [0.132] 
Time  0.0089 
 [0.872] 
  
Number of observations 315 
Number of time periods 19 
Number of OECD economies 21 
  
Wald test that coefficients not significantly different from zero 49.31 
 [0.000] 
Breusch-Pagan chi-squared test that random effects equal zero 1320.69 
 [0.000] 
Hausman test of no difference between random and fixed effects estimates 43.26 
 [0.000] 
* Numbers in parentheses after the coefficient estimates are Prob>lzl. Numbers in parentheses after the Wald, 
Breusch-Pagan and Hausman tests are Prob>chi2.  
 
 
  
Chapter 7 
 
QUANTIFYING THE IMPACTS OF STRUCTURAL REFORMS IN 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS MARKETS IN APEC ECONOMIES 
 
 
Roy Chun Lee1
 
, John Ure and Hsin Chin Lee 
 
• All APEC member economies have implemented a market liberalisation policy in the 
telecommunications sector for over a decade: reforms are important, principally 
because of the network effects. 
• Competition has produced benefits in terms of lower prices, innovation in networks 
and services (economic growth) and in the efficiency of the use of spectrum. 
• For some APEC members, the availability of telecommunications network 
infrastructure to all citizens remains an issue, and a universal service regime is a 
valuable part of a reform program. 
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The telecommunications sector stands out from all other networked industries for two 
reasons. Firstly, it is a mode of communications and therefore enters into every activity: 
cultural, which is a sensitive area that inevitably raises issues of morality, privacy, security 
etc.; economic, which involves wealth-generating activities; social, which has direct welfare 
implications; scientific and technological, which involves innovations that disrupt the 
existing status quo; and political, because better communications open the door to 
information and empowerment. No other networked industry can claim such ubiquitous 
influence over people’s lives and livelihoods.  
 
Secondly, no other networked industries, for example banks or airlines, have been subject to 
such transformative technological developments as telecommunications. When analogue 
networks gave way to digital networks in the 1980s, the beginnings of convergence between 
telecommunications and information technology (IT; computers) began. When Internet 
Protocol (IP) came along in the 1990s, convergence between telecommunications and web-
based media services (TV, video, web downloads, etc.) began. When mobile cellular phones 
spread, especially pre-paid in low income societies, telecommunications became globally 
ubiquitous for the first time. When broadband came along in the 2000s convergence was 
raised to a higher level as networks grew in bandwidth capacity (higher speeds) and the 
phenomenon of social networking began. When smart phones, and especially Apple’s iPhone, 
came along, convergence over mobile devices began, offering low-income societies their first 
real chance of widespread broadband access to the Internet. And the Internet itself offers a 
means to bypass many of the traditional revenue gateways of carriers and service providers, 
causing a major transformation of the business models that drive and sustain the industry. 
 
                                       
1 Associate Research Fellow, Taiwan WTO Center, CIER (roy.lee@cier.edu.tw). 
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At the same time the sector has been highly regulated, because of the risks of significant 
barriers to entry and the consequences for competition of network externalities. Those 
regulatory systems are being reformed, and the primary objectives of this chapter are to 
quantify the benefits of telecommunications structural reform and to review the impact of 
telecommunications reforms on performance in APEC member economies. This requires an 
assessment of the current state of policy. 
 
In a liberalised telecommunications market where entry restrictions are removed, new 
entrants often face a situation where a vertically integrated incumbent controls a ubiquitous 
network infrastructure. In addition, the incumbent often enjoys a significantly larger 
subscription base. Both network coverage and subscription lead to market dominance. 
 
In generic competition policy, dominance itself is not of policy concern, as long as the 
potential threat of competition is able to discipline the dominant operator. Nevertheless, for 
the telecommunications sector, though entry restrictions are removed in light of market 
liberalisation, economies of scale and high sunk costs in the telecommunications networks, in 
particular in the local access network (in other words, the ‘last mile’), create high entry 
barriers. 
 
While sunk costs make potential entrants more sensitive to the level of post-entry profitability 
than the incumbent, economies of scale inherent in pre-established switching facilities enable 
the incumbent to take advantage of the low marginal cost to further degrade the prospect for 
post-entry profitability through strategies such as posing a high likelihood of price wars post-
entry (Armstrong et al. 1995). 
 
But potential entrants wishing to self-supply network infrastructure also face a more stringent 
environment. The pre-existing monopoly status enables the incumbent to establish an 
ubiquitous network infrastructure with ease. For most economies, the universal network 
coverage has often been funded through cross-subsidisation or direct public budget 
expenditure. Also, incumbents in most APEC economies were once part of the government 
and thus had little difficulty in obtaining right-of-way for infrastructure deployment. In a 
competitive context, not only does the technical issue of right-of-way become increasingly 
difficult for new private entrants to acquire but the removal of cross-subsidies and lack of 
market share often increases their hurdles in network construction. 
 
For these reasons, even if facility based entry is allowed at the policy level – and in practice 
new entrants are willing to do so – entry is unlikely to reach a scale necessary to produce 
effective competition (Hausman & Sidak 1999). Regulation cannot change the commercial 
costs of network deployment but it can facilitate entry by enhancing the certainty of post-
entry business viability and by providing a safeguard against the potential anti-competitive 
conduct of the incumbent.  
 
Network externalities represent another impediment to entry. One of the major effects of 
network externalities is that networks with a larger subscriber size are more attractive to 
potential subscribers than smaller ones. This peculiar feature creates a constant competitive 
advantage for existing networks with an established subscriber base when different networks 
are not interconnected. Further, in a competitive environment both the incumbent and the 
new entrant have the incentive to interconnect. As failing to provide any-to-any connectivity 
might deter potential subscribers, the incumbent operator is still in a position to undermine a 
new entrant by setting high interconnection charges. Commercially agreed interconnection 
charges between networks of equal size are also likely to be above cost, due to the 
termination monopoly issue. 
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Section 7.2 reviews the state of play of the telecommunications sector in the APEC region, 
including some indicators of performance. The next step is to identify the key features of the 
regulatory regime. These regulatory features are then related to performance, both at the 
sectoral level and at the economy level. 
 
7.2 STATE OF PLAY IN THE APEC TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR 
 
7.2.1 Overview 
 
Raw data used throughout this report is supplied mainly by the ITU Telecom Database. 
Although every effort has been made to ensure that the data is up-to-date, the researchers 
understand that information for some member economies has not been updated. Given the 
speed of information and communications technology (ICT) development, some assessments 
made in this report might underestimate actual situations in some economies, especially in the 
broadband, Internet and mobile sectors. This nonetheless does not affect the report’s ability to 
reflect the overall and general trend of development and performance in the region. 
 
The accessibility of telecommunications infrastructure in APEC economies has improved 
significantly in recent years. The most remarkable development is the enormous expansion in 
mobile and Internet accessibility, particularly in economies with low penetration rates in the 
past. Table 7.1 reports a series of indicators. 
 
In 2008 the average penetration for fixed-line PSTN network per 100 inhabitants in the 
APEC region exceeded 30%, which is well above the world average of 19%. Mobile 
penetration exceeded 90%, which is again significantly higher than the world average of 60%. 
 
Table 7.1: Key telecommunications indicators of APEC member economies. 
APEC member Population (millions) 
GDP capita 
(million; 2008) 
Main telephone 
lines/100 
inhabitants 
Mobile phone 
subscribers/100 
inhabitants 
Fixed 
broadband 
subscribers/100 
inhabitants 
Australia 21.07 46,824.1 44.46 105.00 24.4 
Brunei Darussalam 0.39 37,053 19.53 95.85 3.56 
Canada 33.26 45,085.3 54.87 66.42 29.6 
Chile 16.80 10,117 20.99 88.05 8.49 
China 1337.41 3,259.46 25.48 47.95 6.23 
Hong Kong, China 6.98 30,725.9 58.72 165.9 28.1 
Indonesia 227.35 2,238.93 13.36 61.83 0.18 
Japan 127.29 4,910.69 38.04 86.73 23.7 
Korea  48.15 38,457.2 44.29 94.71 32.1 
Malaysia 27.01 8,118.21 15.89 102.6 4.93 
Mexico 108.56 10,199.6 19.04 69.37 7.00 
New Zealand 4.23 30,030.1 41.37 109.2 21.6 
Papua New Guinea 6.58 1,306.01 0.912 9.123 0.00 
Peru 28.84 4,447.81 9.981 72.66 2.52 
Philippines 90.35 1,845.17 4.512 75.39 1.16 
Russia 141.39 11,806.9 31.75 141.1 6.56 
Singapore 4.62 38,972.1 40.24 138.1 21.7 
Chinese Taipei 23.04 1,6987.9 61.96 110.3 21.8 
Thailand 67.39 4,116.32 10.42 92.01 1.41 
United States 311.67 47,439.9 49.62 86.79 23.5 
Viet Nam 87.10 1,042.39 33.98 80.37 2.35 
APEC average – 18,808.8 30.45 90.45 12.9 
Source: ITU, 2009b; IMF, 2009. 
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Broadband is another area of growth: the fixed broadband subscription rate is also 
significantly higher than the rest of world. 
 
Figure 7.1 presents the more specific relationship between total teledensity and the broadband 
penetration with GDP per capita of APEC economies as at 2008. Total teledensity is 
calculated by adding fixed telephone lines penetration rate and mobile penetration rate. 
Penetration rate used throughout this chapter, unless specified otherwise, refers to subscribers 
per 100 inhabitants as defined in ITU.2
 
 
 
Note: The size of the bubbles represents broadband penetration.  
Figure 7.1: Teledensity, broadband penetration and GDP per capita as at 2008. (Source: ITU 2009b) 
 
As a rule of thumb, APEC economies with higher income levels and teledensity tend to have 
a better broadband penetration rate, reliability underpinned by market demand and the 
availability of telecommunications infrastructure. Nonetheless, economies with relatively 
limited telecommunications resources are also catching up rapidly in terms of next generation 
broadband infrastructure development. Hong Kong, China; Korea; and Chinese Taipei are not 
only regional but also world leaders in broadband performance, and China; Chile; Malaysia; 
and Mexico are also performing well. Several factors might contribute to this outcome. 
Firstly, developed economies usually have a higher market demand for communications 
services. Secondly, lack of financial as well as technical support might result in delaying 
infrastructure developments in developing economies. Finally, the lacking of a predictable 
policy/regulatory environment affects investments in the telecommunications sector. The 
third factor underpins the importance of structural reform efforts. 
 
7.2.2 Performance of the fixed-line telecommunications network 
 
Although communications traffic has been shifting from voice to data and the fibre-optical 
network is phasing in as the broadband Next Generation Networks (NGN), traditional fixed-
line Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) networks remain one of the most essential 
telecommunications infrastructures for the majority of APEC economies for the foreseeable 
                                       
2 For detailed discussions on the definition of telecommunications statistics, see ITU 2009, Technical Notes on 
World Telecom/ICT Indicators, available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ICTEYE/Indicators/WTI_Technotes. 
pdf (23 October 2009). 
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future. The performance of fixed-line telecommunications network development, measured in 
penetration rate (accessibility) and price (affordability), affects not only the provision of 
traditional voice services such as local and long distance telephony but also other value-
added services it supports. 
 
With the advancement of broadband technologies such as Digital Subscribers Line (DSL) that 
have evolved based on PSTN configurations, the fixed-line telecommunications network 
plays a central role in the building of broadband infrastructure. This is equally relevant in the 
deployment of NGN. Despite the fact that the fibre-optical based and Internet-Protocol (IP) 
switched NGN is technologically different from the traditional PSTN,  the diffusion of the 
latter requires the sharing of many critical network as well as ICT elements, including 
conduits, power supply units and users’ information, with the existing telecommunications 
network.  
 
Significant variations in access to fixed-line infrastructure still exist across the APEC region 
on a per capita basis. Performance in fixed-line telecommunications network accessibility 
among APEC economies is in general a function of the level of economic development 
(Figure 7.2). Accessibility conditions in some economies, in particular China; the Russian 
Federation; and Viet Nam, have been significantly improved over the last decade, and the gap 
in accessibility between developing and developed economies is rapidly reducing.  
 
  
Figure 7.2 APEC economies’ fixed-line penetration rate in 2008. (Source: ITU 2009b) 
 
Figure 7.3 demonstrates the change of fixed-line accessibility in the APEC region between 
2002 and 2008. Fixed-line networks in most developed APEC economies have reached 
saturation point. Competition from alternative networks – notably mobile 
telecommunications services and NGN – means the fixed-line penetration rate in many 
economies is actually declining rapidly. The penetration rate in Japan, for example, has 
reduced 28.6% between 2002 and 2008 and a 17.8% reduction is also recorded for the USA. 
A remarkable performance in Viet Nam is recorded where network penetration grew from a 
modest 5% to 34% over the review period, reaching close to the level of Japan. 
 
The fixed-line penetration performance is most likely the result of technological advancement, 
competition and structural reform. For economies with declining fixed-line penetration, the 
likely explanations include the liberalisation of the mobile sector, the cost and technological 
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Figure 7.3: Comparison of fixed-line penetration rates between 2002 and 2008. (Source: ITU 2009b) 
 
advantages of mobile network deployment, and in particular the development of fixed-mobile 
convergence (FMC). These developments underpin the shifting of consumers from traditional 
fixed-line subscription to mobile services. This development will be further analysed in the 
next section. The effect of cross-network competition is most evident in economies already 
enjoying a high level of fixed-line penetration.  
 
Structural reform, at the same time, underpins the remarkable growth rate in developing 
economies. As already mentioned, penetration in Viet Nam grew rapidly over the last 6 years. 
This is also the period when Viet Nam was negotiating with trading partners for its WTO 
membership and had hence introduced substantial structural reform initiatives in light of its 
WTO accession process in both market access liberalisation and regulatory reform as set out 
in the case study focusing on telecommunications in Viet Nam. Viet Nam officially joined 
the WTO in 2008.  
 
The most critical policy issue with fixed-line accessibility is perhaps the uneven distribution 
of infrastructure resources between urban and rural areas. In most circumstances, 
development is centred on metropolitan areas with a significantly higher than average 
penetration rate (World Bank 2003). PECC (2005) reports that Indonesia’s fixed-line 
penetration rate was only 3 per 100 inhabitants at the end of 2001; but the penetration rate in 
the capital (also largest) city Jakarta is around 8.7 times higher than the national average, 
reaching 26 phone lines per 100 inhabitants. Several policy considerations are required to 
tackle the issue, the centrepiece of which is a well defined and effectively implemented 
universal service regime to bring forth a more balanced distribution of telecommunications 
infrastructure resources.  
 
7.2.3 Performance in the mobile sector 
 
The APEC region leads the world in mobile sector performance. Contributing factors include 
relatively low network deployment costs, less policy constraints, high market demand and an 
increasing variety of services (ITU 2006). With the launch of the 3G mobile service that 
promises an access speed of up to 3 Mbps, mobile services are fast shifting from voice to 
Internet access and multimedia applications. 
 
Unlike fixed-line networks, the relationship between economic development and network 
accessibility performance in mobile network is less apparent. As shown in Figure 7.4, a large 
number of developing APEC economies enjoy an equal if not higher level of mobile 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HKC INA JPN ROK MEX MAS NZ RP PNG PE RUS SIN CT THA US VN
Fi
xe
d 
lin
e 
pe
ne
tra
tio
n 
ra
te
2002 2008
Quantifying the impacts of structural reforms in telecommunications markets in APEC economies 185 
 
Figure 7.4: Mobile penetration rate and GDP per capita (2008). (Source: ITU 2009b) 
 
penetration performance vis-à-vis their developed peers. As a matter of fact, the majority of 
APEC economies enjoy a mobile penetration rate of between 60% and 120% regardless of 
their respective levels of economic development.  
 
The high growth rate in the mobile sector is occurring in both developed and developing 
APEC economies. This is particularly evident on a cross-year comparison approach. Figure 
7.5 shows the change of mobile network accessibility in the APEC region between 2002 and 
2008. It is evident that the mobile sector is expanding rapidly for all APEC economies 
without exception. Even Hong Kong, China, where the penetration rate was already reaching 
100% in 2002, has a 50% increase in penetration over the 6-year period. The Russian 
Federation took off in 2002 from a penetration of less than 10% to reach 110% in 2008. This 
reflects the speed at which the mobile network is emerging as the most widely available 
telecommunications infrastructure in the region. 
 
Table 7.2 shows that growth of penetration is 27% between 2003 and 2008, which is 
significantly higher than that of the fixed-line network (3%). All economies except Chinese 
Taipei enjoy a positive growth rate. Papua New Guinea (PNG) stands out with an average 
growth rate of 102.8%, and Indonesia reports 50%. 
 
Unsurprisingly, extensive network and subscription roll-outs in the mobile sector have led to 
the mobile network becoming the most popular telecommunications infrastructure in the 
 
  
Figure 7.5: Comparison of change in APEC economies’ mobile penetration rate. (Source: ITU 2009b) 
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Table 7.2: Growth rate for APEC economies’ mobile sector. 
APEC member Mobile penetration rate, 2008 
Compound Annual Rate 
Growth(%; 2003-2008) 
Percentage of total 
telecommunications 
subscribers 
Australia 105 9.0 70.2 
Brunei Darussalam 96 16.2 83.1 
Canada 66 10.7 54.8 
Chile 88 15.3 80.8 
China 48 18.6 65.0 
Hong Kong, China 166 9.5 73.9 
Indonesia 62 50.0 82.2 
Japan 87 5.0 69.5 
Korea  95 4.92 68.4 
Malaysia 103 20.1 86.6 
Mexico 69 20.1 78.5 
New Zealand 109 12.2 72.5 
Papua New Guinea 9 102.8 90.9 
Peru 73 48.2 87.9 
Philippines 75 24.8 94.4 
Russia 141 40.7 81.6 
Singapore 138 12.3 77.4 
Chinese Taipei 110 -0.3 64.0 
Thailand 92 23.2 89.8 
United States 87 11.0 63.6 
Viet Nam 80 91.2 70.3 
APEC Average 90.43 27 76.9 
Source: ITU 2009b. 
 
APEC region. As illustrated in Table 7.2, at 2008 the number of mobile subscribers in the 
majority of APEC economies has overtaken that of fixed-line subscribers to become the most 
commonly used infrastructure. An average of 76.9% of telecommunications subscribers 
subscribed to mobile services. In PNG and the Philippines, the very high share of mobile 
subscribers in total subscribers has led to the observation that the mobile network appears to 
be the only telecommunications infrastructure available to the public. 
 
7.3 DEVELOPMENT IN BROADBAND ACCESSIBILITY 
 
Technically speaking, the Internet is an inter-networking system connecting more than 
50 000 sub-networks worldwide. By virtue of this character, and with the rapid expansion of 
Internet-based applications and cloud computing architecture, the Internet has emerged 
undoubtedly as one of the core telecommunications infrastructures.  
 
A growing number of Internet-based applications require a flexible bandwidth which cannot 
be provided through the traditional dial-up access service with its maximum speed of 
56 Kbps. Not surprisingly, demand for broadband Internet access has been extremely robust 
in recent years and it is rapidly becoming the mainstream Internet access method: 
assessments and surveys on Internet accessibility are not complete without the inclusion of 
broadband accessibility. Specific attention will be given to the analysis of broadband 
performance in the following sections. (There are various definitions on the minimum speed 
of the qualification for broadband services. Commonly quoted are ITU’s 128 Kbps, FCC’s 
definition of 200 Kbps, OECD’s 256 Kbps downstream. Due to the fact that the ITU database 
is used in this document and the fact that 128 Kbps will be able to support the minimum 
bandwidth requirement for many applications, broadband is thus defined in this report as any 
access speed above 128 Kbps.) 
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Internet accessibility performance will be measured in two dimensions. The first is Internet 
user penetration rate (i.e., Internet user per 100 inhabitants) and the second is Internet 
subscription penetration rate. The Internet is accessible through various channels, many of 
which require no prior subscription arrangements. In addition to Internet access provided in 
work places and public institutions such as public libraries and schools, free Internet hot spots 
are also widely available in many economies. Internet kiosks that are popular in many APEC 
economies also require no subscription between user and access provider. Yet the user 
penetration rate reflects the on-the-ground accessibility of Internet services that are also part 
of the outcome of structural reforms in the telecommunications sector. 
 
7.3.1 User penetration performance  
 
Figure 7.6 shows the total penetration of Internet users at 2008 across APEC economies. 
Economies with higher economic development tend to have a higher penetration rate. Korea; 
New Zealand; Malaysia; and Chile performed well above the average of their GDP level. 
This outcome is linked with the accessibility of other telecommunications infrastructures 
discussed previously. Policy, however, also plays an important role in promoting Internet 
accessibility. Thus economies with a similar level of economic development varied 
substantially in terms of Internet accessibility. For example, Internet user penetration in 
Malaysia significantly outperformed its peers with similar levels of economic development. 
Viet Nam is another good example of above average performance within its counterparts.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.6: Internet user penetration rate and GDP per capita (2008). (Source: ITU 2009b) 
 
7.3.2 Subscriber penetration performance 
 
The subscriber penetration rate is not directly connected to the level of economic 
development. As illustrated in Figure 7.6, a large group of APEC economies shares a close 
level of Internet subscriber penetration with varying levels of GDP per capita. Malaysia and 
the Russian Federation are two good examples: they share a similar level of subscriber 
penetration rate to the USA and Singapore. Korea; Hong Kong, China; and New Zealand are 
also out-performing some of the more advanced economies. 
 
With respect to the diffusion of broadband access, dial-up has been phased out and broadband 
has became the only Internet access technology in Korea and Japan in 2008 (Figure 7.7). 
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Note: data not available for Thailand 
Figure 7.7: Broadband subscribers as a percentage of total Internet subscribers (2008). (Source: ITU 
2009b) 
 
Other economies with mass conversion include Canada; Chile; Hong Kong, China; Mexico; 
Singapore; Chinese Taipei; and the USA. Dial-up remains the primary access service for 
Indonesia; Malaysia; the Philippines; the Russian Federation; and Viet Nam. 
 
As broadband access is a recent development, we use the year 2004 as the basis to observe 
the change of broadband penetration rate. As shown in Figure 7.8, it is evident that access 
among APEC economies is one of the areas where significant development has taken place. 
Australia; Canada; and New Zealand, for example, are catching up rapidly over the period 
with leading broadband APEC economies. To a lesser degree, broadband expansion in other 
economies such as Chile; China; Malaysia; and Mexico, is also a major development. 
 
 
Note:  Broadband is not available in PNG as at 2008. 
Figure 7.8: Comparison of change in APEC economies’ broadband penetration (Source: ITU 2009b) 
 
Nonetheless, it is equally notable that the gap between economies with advanced broadband 
access and those with the limited access is increasing. Status in access for Indonesia; the 
Philippines; and PNG was virtually at a standstill over the period. While less market demand 
might be partly responsible for this, it is also likely that there exist structural impediments 
that prevent broadband access development. 
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7.4 MARKET STRUCTURE AND ACCESS CONDITIONS 
 
7.4.1 The fixed-line telecommunications sector 
 
Entry restrictions have been removed by the majority of APEC member economies as the 
preferred structural reform tool to attract infrastructure investment and to achieve better 
performance in fixed line services. The main measures taken are the opening of market entry 
and the privatisation of the state-owned incumbents. Yet it is a common practice among 
APEC economies to liberalise the fixed-line sector in a much-delayed sequence compared to 
mobile and Internet services. 
 
With the introduction of liberalisation policies since the late 1980s, the market structure (i.e., 
the number of operators) has been moving from monopoly to competition in the APEC region. 
Considerable improvements are observed, especially since the WTO–GATS agreement on 
basic telecommunications service came into effect in 1998. Since 2000 a large number of 
economies started to adopt a market opening policy (Figure 7.9). Compared to market access 
conditions in 2003, when China; Indonesia; Russia; and Thailand were restricting entry under 
a duopoly structure, a competitive structure was dominant in 2009, with only Brunei and 
PNG maintaining a monopoly market structure and Indonesia a duopoly structure. 
 
 
Figure 7.9: Fixed network market structures in the APEC region, 2003–09. 
 
In many circumstances market structure does not always reflect actual market access 
conditions. The number of operators is affected by many non-policy considerations, including 
market size, services maturity and state of competition. Thus, there might be, as in the case of 
Singapore, a duopoly structure yet market access restrictions are completely liberalised. In 
contrast, multiple existing players do not indicate that future entry is possible, as in the case 
of Thailand. In Viet Nam only state-owned enterprises are allowed to apply for new licences. 
 
Different forms of market access restrictions are applied across the APEC region. Aside from 
the licensing regime, some economies such as Thailand and Russia adopted BOT-style 
concession arrangements that often require new entrants to establish revenue sharing schemes 
with the incumbent. As of 2009, all APEC economies except Brunei and PNG have adopted 
full market entry liberalisation, with no predetermined numeric restrictions. Actual market 
entry conditions among APEC economies are summarised in Table 7.3. 
 
Due to the nature of telecommunications infrastructure, establishing a commercial presence is 
the most common and feasible mode of supply. Foreign suppliers can set up a commercial 
outlet, with or without domestic partners, only through foreign investment. Hence, 
restrictions on foreign investment are also a major market access barrier. There are two major 
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categories of restriction on foreign investment. The first is the limitations on the percentage 
of foreign ownership and the second is the requirement to adopt particular legal forms. 
 
As of 2009, there are eight APEC economies that allow 100% foreign ownership for fixed-
line operators: Australia; Chile; Hong Kong, China; Japan; New Zealand; Peru; Singapore; 
and the USA. These economies impose no restrictions on legal forms. Australia; Japan; and 
New Zealand, together with Korea and Chinese Taipei, have retained foreign investment 
restrictions on existing operators. The Philippines offers higher ownership allowances for 
fellow ASEAN member economies. Brunei; PNG; the Russian Federation; and Viet Nam do 
not allow foreign investment in the fixed-line networks at all. Most APEC economies limit 
foreign investment from gaining dominant positions in fixed-line operations. Restrictions on 
foreign investment among APEC economies are summarised in Table 7.4. 
 
Table 7.3: Market access conditions of fixed-line networks in APEC economies (2009). 
Economies Market structure 
No. of new 
entrants Access conditions 
Australia C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Brunei Darussalam M 0 Entry prohibited. Review policy 10 years after privatisation of incumbent JBT. Timetable for privatisation unclear 
Canada C 3^ Full liberalisation; new entrants do not need to be licensed 
Chile C 3^ Full liberalization; entry based on merits of application 
China C 3^ Short-term policy: two major and two minor operators Long-term policy: unclear  
Hong Kong, China C 3^ Full-liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Indonesia C 3 
Early 2008 the government awarded the third International 
Operators which is expected to offer services before end of 
the year. 
Current government has announced tender for the third 
operator for domestic long distance services, as well as 
additional local and long distance services. 
Japan C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Korea  C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Malaysia C 3^ Market-oriented approach; entry based on necessity test and merits of application 
Mexico C 3^ Market-oriented approach; entry based on necessity test and merits of application 
New Zealand C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
PNG M 0 Entry prohibited. Future policy: unclear 
Peru C 3^ Market-oriented approach; entry based on necessity test and merits of application 
Philippines C 3^ 
Based on granting of legislative franchise from Congress 
and Certificate of Public Convenience and Necessity from 
regulator 
Russia C 2 Concession with incumbent. Short-term policy: duopoly. Long-term policy: unclear 
Singapore C 2 Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Chinese Taipei C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Thailand C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
United States C 3^ Full liberalisation; entry based on merits of application 
Viet Nam C 3^ Limited: based on necessity test. Only state-owned enterprises allowed. 
Notes: C = competition; D= duopoly; M= monopoly. 3^ denotes more than 3 operators. 
Sources: APEC Telecom Regulatory Updates and other sources. 
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Table 7.4: Restrictions on fixed-line network foreign investment in APEC economies (2009). 
APEC member Direct investment ceiling Legal form required 
Australia 
100% except:  
 35% of Telstra’s shares 
 Majority Australian ownership of Vodafone 
None 
Brunei Darussalam Not allowed Not allowed 
Canada Facilities based telecommunications service suppliers: 46% None 
Chile 100% None 
China 49% Joint venture only 
Hong Kong, China 100% None 
Indonesia 30% (40% for ASEAN member) Joint venture only 
Japan None except no more than 33% is allowed for NTT  
Korea General: 49%; Incumbent (KT): 33% None 
Malaysia 49% Only through acquisition of shares of existing operators 
Mexico 49% None 
New Zealand 100% except 49.9% for Telecom NZ None 
Papua New Guinea Not allowed Not allowed 
Peru 100% None 
Philippines 40% None 
Russia Not allowed Not allowed 
Singapore 100% None 
Chinese Taipei General: 60%; existing operator: 49% None 
Thailand 49% Joint venture 
United States None after passing public interest test None 
Viet Nam Not allowed Not allowed 
 
 
7.4.2 The mobile telecommunications sector 
 
As of 2009, all APEC economies have liberalised, albeit to different degrees, their mobile 
sector. Multiple new entrants are allowed to compete with incumbent operators in APEC 
economies, except in Brunei with its duopoly structure. All new licences are granted based on 
market-oriented approaches unless limited by the availability of spectrum. Brunei; PNG; and 
China are the exceptions: there the number of operators is regulated in line with their 
telecommunications development master plans underpinned by phased-in liberalisation 
policies. This reflects a significant refinement in market access policy across the APEC 
region. In 2003 mobile sectors in Brunei and PNG where still monopolised by state-owned 
incumbents, and China was maintaining a duopoly structure. Market entry conditions among 
APEC economies are summarised in Table 7.5. 
 
Restrictions on foreign investment in the mobile sector in the APEC region are in general 
governed by the same regime that applies to the fixed-line sector. The exceptions are Mexico 
and the USA (Table 7.6), but Mexico allows 100% foreign ownership for mobile operators 
while the USA applies a 20% foreign ownership ceiling for mobile operators (PSC licensees) 
unless the FCC approves otherwise, based on case-by-case evaluations. 
 
A major issue remaining in mobile market accessibility is the assignment of radio spectrum. 
In accordance with the WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications, which all 
APEC members have undertaken as their respective GATS commitments, the allocation 
process should be carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner. The spectrum allocation among APEC members can be assessed when more data 
becomes available. But some general comments drawn from a background paper prepared for 
this project (Ure 2010) are worthwhile.  
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Table 7.5: Market access conditions of mobile networks in APEC economies (2009). 
APEC member Market structure 
No. of 
operators Access conditions 
Australia C 3^ Market-oriented approach; evaluate applications based on merits and availability of spectrum 
Brunei Darussalam D 2 Second mobile operator (Bmobile) began in 2006  
Canada C 3^ Market-oriented approach; evaluate applications based on 
merits and availability of spectrum Chile C 3^ 
China C 3^ Three licences were issued for 3G operations 
Hong Kong, China C 3^ 
Market-oriented approach; evaluate applications based on 
merits and availability of spectrum 
Indonesia C 3^ 
Japan C 3^ 
Korea  C 3^ 
Malaysia C 3^ 
Mexico C 3^ 
New Zealand C 3^ 
Papua New Guinea C 3 Two mobile carrier licences were issued on 27 March 2007. The licences have a validity of 10 years.  
Peru C 3^ 
Market-oriented approach; evaluate applications based on 
merits and availability of spectrum 
Philippines C 3^ 
Russia C 2 
Singapore C 2 
Chinese Taipei C 3^ 
Thailand 
C 2 
Market-oriented approach; evaluate applications based on 
merits and availability of spectrum. 
Concessions with incumbent operator 
United States C 3^ Market-oriented approach; evaluate applications based on merits and availability of spectrum 
Viet Nam C 3^ Limited based on necessity test and availability of spectrum. Only state-owned enterprises allowed  
Notes: C = competition; D= duopoly; M= monopoly. 3^ denotes more than 3 operators. 
 
Table 7.6: Restrictions on mobile network foreign ownership in Mexico and the USA. 
Economy Investment ceiling Legal form Fixed-line ceiling 
Mexico 100% None 49 
United States 20% unless otherwise approved None 100 
 
The allocation of radio spectrum by national regulatory authorities for different categories of 
use such as broadcasting, mobile phones, satellite etc. usually follows the recommendations 
of the ITU-organised World Radio Conference. This ensures the harmonisation of 
frequencies across regions of the world, permitting services such as mobile roaming, and 
preventing cross-border radio interference. Once allocated, the frequency bands are 
subdivided into frequency bandwidths for assignment to individual users, either by 
administrative means (‘command and control’) or by a market mechanism, such as auctions. 
In cases where spectrum is in plentiful supply and demand for it is unlikely to cause 
interference between users, it is usually available unlicensed. For example, no-one needs a 
licence for a microwave oven. But where demand is competitive, spectrum is a valuable 
scarce resource. 
 
Reforms therefore straddle both licensed and unlicensed spectrum: the former to improve the 
efficient use of a scarce resource by placing a price on frequencies; and the latter to increase 
welfare by facilitating the use of the resource, for example, making it easier for populations 
in remote areas to access wireless networks and the Internet. Reforms in spectrum 
management can be seen as falling into three categories: 
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• Transparency – including conforming with the WTO’s Basic Agreement on Telecom 
regulatory guidelines, by making spectrum management a more open process, by 
providing national spectrum plans for investors to estimate the risks and opportunities, 
by providing databases for the public to check spectrum usage and licences, by 
engaging the industry and the public in the consultation process behind proposed 
changes to spectrum policies, by speeding up response times and reducing 
administrative processes and by maintaining easy-to-navigate websites. 
• Licensing – including making clear distinctions between property rights, with 
appropriate constraints such as limits on the power of emissions, on spectrum sharing, 
on the right to transfer ownership, on the right to trade spectrum and on the rights to 
change spectrum usage (‘refarm’ etc.) and spectrum availability for common usage – 
which may or may not require a licence or the registration of usage – and spectrum 
reserved for use by government; by speeding up the licensing process (see 
‘Transparency’ above) and by the introduction of market mechanisms or shadow price 
mechanisms (where prices are based on opportunity cost) to assist in a more efficient 
use of the scarce resource. Market mechanisms and shadow mechanisms can include, 
inter alia, spectrum usage fees (SUFs) where demand is competitive, auction prices 
and administrative incentive pricing schemes where assignments are non-competitive 
(e.g., to government agencies etc.). 
• Convergence – including an adaptation of existing policies, rules and regulations to 
take account of convergence between telecommunications, IT (e.g., the Internet) and 
new media (e.g., web-server based services), measures to enable and encourage 
investment and innovation in converged services, and increasingly a trend to merge 
the regulatory agencies responsible for telecommunications and broadcasting, thereby 
providing the industry and the public with a single point of contact. 
 
7.4.3 Summary 
 
This section reports the latest progress of APEC member economies in refining market access 
conditions. As far as market entry policy is concerned, most APEC members which had not 
adopted a liberalisation policy in 2003–04 have now aligned with more liberal policy 
considerations. While advances in liberalisation policy for the mobile sector is more 
encouraging than that for the fixed-line sector, structure reform through market opening has 
became the primary policy setting in the APEC region. 
 
Despite the emergence of new technologies and communications convergence, the 
telecommunications sector is expected to remain highly regulated. Thus, the results surveyed 
in this section indicate that in order to deepen the benefits of market liberalisation and, 
consequently, structure reform efforts, regulatory reform that adheres to world best practices 
is necessary. Given the complexity and dynamic advancement of the telecommunications 
sector, regulatory reform will be a challenge that requires regional cooperation and capacity-
building initiatives. 
 
7.5 REGULATORY REFORM UNDERPINNING STRUCTURAL REFORM 
 
Regulation is a double-edged sword. Market access and the treatment of foreign operators 
were discussed in Section 7.4. Regulation in this section refers to regulatory measures other 
than market entry and foreign investment restrictions. Often regulation is required to preserve 
the outcome of liberalisation. Firstly, due to both historical and technical reasons, to prevent 
an incumbent operator from misusing its market dominance. Secondly, to ensure that public 
interest objectives (e.g., sector development, any-to-any connectivity, service quality, pricing 
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and universal service) are accomplished. But without proper design it can also be the major 
source of restrictions, especially in a sector where the dynamics of improving technologies 
and innovation produce rapid change. 
 
The greatest challenge of designing and implementing a pro-competitive regulatory framework 
is that it must be flexible enough to allow national consideration and at the same time be not so 
abstract that it fails to provide meaningful guidelines for pro-competitive regulatory approaches. 
Based on this understanding, 18 APEC economies reached a consensus in the APEC Leader’s 
Los Cabos Statement to Implement APEC Policies on Trade and the Digital Economy (2002) 
to adopt the regulatory principles inscribed in the WTO Reference Paper as the underlying 
guideline for implementing a pro-competitive regulatory regime in the APEC region (Box 
7.1).  
 
That said, the state of APEC economies’ implementation of the aforementioned core 
regulatory principles is summarised in Table 7.7. 
 
7.6 QUANTIFYING THE IMPACT OF REFORM  
 
The impact of reform is assessed at two levels: in the sector itself, where the performance 
indicators are penetration rates, and on the economy as a whole. 
 
7.6.1 Impact at the sectoral level 
 
Following the work of Warren (2000), performance in penetration for fixed, mobile and 
broadband services are modelled as being affected by a set of structural reform initiatives, 
with additional non-policy variables such as housing or population density and income level 
(GDP per capita).  
 
Policy initiatives concerning telecommunications structural reform can be divided into two 
primary categories: 
• Market access policies 
Market access policies represent restrictions on market entry by either domestic or 
foreign new entrants. 
• Pro-competition regulatory regimes 
Telecommunications services are particularly sensitive to the regulatory environment. 
The WTO Telecom Reference Paper, which all APEC WTO members undertook as 
part of their Los Cabos commitment, provides a set of multilaterally agreed regulatory 
principles to guard against the potential manipulation of a dominant operator and to 
ensure that de facto competition can take place. These include, inter alia, safeguards 
to prevent major operator(s) from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices, cost-based pricing rules for access to essential infrastructure, an 
independent regulator and a number portability regime. 
 
Based on this understanding, a composite set index that captures both market entry and 
regulatory undertakings has been developed. The index has been split into two categories: 
‘market entry and non-discrimination’ and ‘pro-competition regulations’. The market entry 
category reflects market entry and investment conditions, with the assumption that 
competition through competitive entry by both foreign and domestic new entrants impact on 
performance. The pro-competition regulations category captures measures that are the 
prerequisite elements for a competitive market. Policy measures included in the calculation of 
the index have been split into five components, according to their primary impact. 
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Box 7.1 Regulatory principles included in the WTO Reference Paper. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
• Non-discrimination 
Non-discrimination is to ensure that domestic regulation does not discriminate between 
foreign services (most-favoured nation treatment) and between foreign and national services 
and service suppliers (national treatment). 
• Good governance 
The aim of good regulatory governance is to ensure that domestic regulation is administered 
in a transparent and fair manner for all parties involved. This concerns the notification and 
publication of regulatory rules and procedures, as well as the independence of the regulator. 
• Competitive safeguards 
Appropriate measures are to be maintained for the purpose of preventing suppliers, who, 
alone or together are a major supplier, from engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices. Besides state rules and regulations, anti-competitive practices carried out by 
suppliers, in particular the incumbent who has market power, pose a major barrier to 
competition. For example, the practice of cross-subsidisation, by offering services below 
cost in competitive markets and making up for the loss from another service where 
competition is absent, can foreclose competition. The problem is particularly acute in the 
telecommunications sector, where there are bottleneck facilities, giving rise to monopolies. 
In this regard, the economy should have a competition regime in place to ensure that 
competition in the telecommunications market is ‘fair’ for all suppliers. 
• The establishment of an interconnection regime 
While a mandatory non-discriminatory interconnection regime is established in many 
economies, it is not necessarily cost based, and a dispute settlement mechanism is often 
absent. A sound interconnection regime ensures that interconnection and access to 
bottleneck facilities are provided in a fair and transparent fashion.  
• Access to essential facilities 
As provided in the WTO Reference Paper, access to essential facilities controlled by a major 
supplier will be ensured at any technically feasible point in the network. It should also be 
provided under non-discriminatory terms and conditions, in a timely fashion and subject to 
charges that are cost based. To ensure transparency of the access regime, the procedures for 
interconnection to a major supplier should be made publicly available, and major suppliers 
should make publicly available either their access agreements or a reference access offer. 
Service suppliers requesting access with a major supplier should have recourse to an 
independent body to resolve disputes. 
• Universal service obligations 
Each member economy should have the right to define the kind of universal service 
obligations it wishes to maintain. These obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive 
per se, provided they are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and 
competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of 
universal service defined by the particular economy. Universal service requirements can 
have anti-competitive effects. Many economies in the past allow the incumbent to use a 
cross-subsidy to finance universal service. For example, profits from long distance are used 
to compensate for losses in local fixed line services. In such a situation, competition in the 
long distance would have to be restricted in order to sustain the high profits for the 
incumbent. In many economies the state operator alone undertakes the obligation to provide 
universal services. But the actual cost of providing the service is rarely available, and as a 
result, the state operator may be over or under compensated for shouldering the 
responsibility. Over compensation would provide the state operator with unfair financial 
advantage. Under compensation, however, may undermine the universal service goals, since 
the state operator would be unwilling to carry out loss-making activities.  
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Table 7.7: Summary of APEC economies’ implementation of the WTO regulatory principles. 
Regulatory Elements APEC Performance 
1. Competitive safeguards 
1.1 Preventing major supplier from engaging in anti-competitive 
cross-subsidisation; 
1.2 Preventing major supplier from using information obtained from 
competitors with anti-competitive results; 
1.3 Preventing major supplier from not making available to other 
service suppliers on a timely basis technical information about 
essential facilities and commercially relevant information which 
are necessary for them to provide services. 
Interconnection regime 
 Implemented: 14 economies 
 Not yet implemented: 4 economies 
 Regulatory proposals under 
consideration: 3 economies  
Access to essential facilities 
 Implemented: 13 economies 
 Not yet implemented: 7 economies 
2. Interconnection  
2.1 Interconnection with a major supplier is under non-discriminatory 
terms and conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and rates and of a quality no less favourable than 
that provided for its own like services or for like services of non-
affiliated service suppliers or for its subsidiaries or other affiliates;  
2.2 Interconnection with a major supplier is provided in a timely 
fashion, on terms, conditions (including technical standards and 
specifications) and cost-oriented rates that are transparent, 
reasonable, having regard to economic feasibility, and sufficiently 
unbundled so that the supplier need not pay for network 
components or facilities that it does not require for the service to 
be provided;  
2.3 Interconnection with a major supplier is provided on request, at 
points in addition to the network termination points offered to the 
majority of users, subject to charges that reflect the cost of 
construction of necessary additional facilities; 
2.4 The procedures applicable for interconnection to a major supplier 
are made publicly available; 
2.5 It is ensured that a major supplier will make publicly available 
either its interconnection agreements or a reference 
interconnection offer; 
2.6 Dispute settlement. 
 Implemented: 12 economies 
 Not yet implemented: 4 economy 
 Regulatory proposals under 
consideration: 3 economies 
 Partial implementation (e.g. non 
cost-based rules and/or no dispute 
settlement): 2 
3. Public availability of licensing criteria  
Where a licence is required, the following is made publicly available:  
3.1 All the licensing criteria and the period of time normally required 
to reach a decision concerning the application;  
3.2 The terms and conditions of individual licences. 
The reasons for the denial of a licence will be made known to the 
applicant upon request.  
 Implemented: 13 economies  
 Partial implementation: 8 
economies (failure to provide 
timeline for licensing and reasons 
for denial) 
4. Independent regulators  
4.1 The regulatory body is separate from, and not accountable to, any 
supplier of basic telecommunications services; 
4.2 The decisions of and the procedures used by regulators shall be 
impartial with respect to all market participants.  
 Implemented: all APEC economies 
5. Allocation and use of scarce resources  
5.1 The procedures for the allocation and use of frequencies are 
carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-
discriminatory manner; 
5.2 The procedures for the allocation and use of numbers are carried 
out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-discriminatory 
manner; 
5.3 The procedures for the allocation and use of rights of way are 
carried out in an objective, timely, transparent and non-
discriminatory manner; 
5.4 The current state of allocated frequency bands is made publicly 
available. 
 Implemented: 20 economies 
 Not implemented: 1 economy 
Source: ITU, World Telecommunication Regulatory Database; APEC Tel, Regulatory Updates, 2007 and 2008. 
USTR, 2009 Section 1377 Review of Telecommunications Trade Agreements.  
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7.6.1.1 Market entry and non-discrimination category 
 
The market entry and non-discrimination category captures measures affecting the ability of a 
telecommunications operator to establish a physical operation. Four index variables are 
included in this category: 
• licensing of new fixed-line local service licences; 
• licensing of new mobile operation licences; 
• direct foreign investment regime; 
• foreign investment, which includes the following sub-items: 
o general: the maximum direct foreign equity participation in any licence; and  
o incumbents: the maximum direct foreign equity participation allowable for 
incumbent operators. 
 
‘New licensee’ means a licensed operator other than the incumbent. Given the fact that most 
APEC economies allow fixed-line service operators to provide a basket of integrated fixed-
line services (i.e., the bundling of provision of local, domestic and international long distance 
and broadband access services), we therefore do not further distinguish separate licensing 
regimes that might be available for individual services. 
 
7.6.1.2 Pro-competition regulation category 
 
The pro-competition regulation category measures policies that are deemed essential for the 
establishment of a pro-competition regulatory regime after market opening. Index 
components included under this category are: 
• Competitive safeguard 
After market opening it is also essential to ensure that all anti-competitive activities 
undertaken by the major operator in the telecommunications sector are regulated and 
prevented. 
• Interconnection rules 
For networked industries such as the telecommunications sector, the security of 
interconnection with other networks, in particular, interconnection with the major 
operator’s network, is a prerequisite for service provision. 
• Independent regulator 
In many economies the legacy of state-owned monopolist PTOs has led to a structure 
where the incumbent PTO is also the sector regulator. This referee–player structure 
affects the creation of a level playing field in a competitive market place. 
• Access to essential facilities 
Based on WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications, essential facilities are 
defined as ‘facilities of a public telecommunications transport network or service that 
(a) are exclusively or predominantly provided by a single or limited number of 
suppliers; and (b) cannot feasibly be economically or technically substituted in order 
to provide a service’. This element captures rules that enable new entrants access to 
essential facilities managed by the major operators. 
• Number portability 
Number portability (NP) is an additional policy indicator. When subscribers decide to 
change their existing telecommunications operators to another, they face switching 
costs. High switching costs often prevent subscribers from changing operators and 
therefore deter competition. NP is identified as an effective measure to address non-
pecuniary switching costs. In general, an NP regime allows subscribers to retain the 
same telephone numbers when they switch between operators. 
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A weighting and scoring methodology is developed to give scores to each of the policy 
variables to produce an aggregated index, with a zero given to an economy that maintains no 
restrictions on entry and investment and has implemented the full set of regulatory measures 
included in the index. Partial liberalisation and/or implementation of regulations will be 
scored accordingly, with a score of one for restrictive regimes. Weighting of each variable is 
based on the judgment of the importance of each policy variable to maximise the correlation 
between the individual components and their weighted averages (Sidorenko 2001). The index 
system and the results of the index measurement are provided in the Annex of this chapter. 
Only current policy information is included in this index and the models are estimated for 
only one point of time (2009). 
 
Information on market access and regulatory measures are collected mainly from the ITU 
World Telecom Regulatory Database, with additional inputs from the individual economy’s 
Regulatory Updates reported to the APEC Telecommunications and Information Working 
Group (TEL) meetings.  
 
In the following part we examine the impact of the policies included in the index on the 
performance of network development (fixed and broadband penetration) and mobile 
penetration. Drawing from Warren (2000), the estimated equations also include non-policy 
explanatory variables, such as GDP, housing density (population density in the case of 
mobile penetration) and the two policy index categories. It could be expected that an 
economy with limitations on the introduction of the policy regimes defined (resulting in 
higher index scores) will show a lower penetration rate, allowing for the influence of the 
other non-policy variables. 
 
Tables 7.8 and 7.9 show the results of the analysis for fixed-line and mobile penetration in 
APEC economies. Contrary to the findings of Warren (2000), none of the models found a 
significant relationship between the two policy index categories and penetration rates, 
controlling for GDP and density. There are several possible explanations behind this. Firstly, 
fixed-line and mobile liberalisation policies have been implemented for an extended period of 
time. For the fixed-line market, that process started around 1997 when the WTO 
telecommunications commitments came into effect for most APEC economies, and mobile 
sector liberalisation in most economies was even earlier than that. In addition, despite varying 
levels of implementation, all APEC economies have agreed to adopt the WTO regulatory 
principles. 
 
As such, the establishment of a pro-competition regulatory regime plays a much less critical 
role in refining market performance by 2009. Instead, technology advancements, innovative 
services and growing market demand for communications services perhaps are the main 
reasons underpinning the considerable performance that is observed. The reduction in costs for 
both service provision and consumer devices, and the advancement in wireless technologies, 
might be more important factors affecting development in the telecommunications sector. This 
is not to say that the traditional regulatory policy is without influence; rather it suggests a shift 
in policy directions and priorities. Policy initiatives that facilitate technology development, 
innovation and the development of intellectual property protection (and harmonisation) will 
play an increasingly important role. Regulations ensuring the quality of services are also 
important in light of the diversified and innovative modes of services provisions. 
 
For the relatively new development of broadband, the impact of policy is more direct and 
obvious. Table 7.10 shows the result of the regression analysis on fixed-line broadband 
penetration for APEC economies. With strong explanatory power, all regression models 
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Table 7.8: Results of fixed-line penetration models. 
Variable Mode1-1 (Policy1) Mode1-2 (Policy2) Mode1-3 (average) 
Policy1 -10.62762 (12.02183) – – 
Policy2 – -18.75779 (10.92538) – 
Policy average – – -16.10337 (11.9413) 
Y 0.0015399 (0.000917) 
0.0014696 
(0.0008631) 
0.0015143 
(0.0008896) 
Y2 -0.0000000196 (0.000000019) 
-0.0000000202 
(0.0000000179) 
-0.0000000201 
(0.0000000184) 
HD 0.0037694 (0.0064281) 
0.003167 
(0.0059265) 
0.0031934 
(0.0061874) 
Constant 16.29225** (7.454765) 
19.98039** 
(7.216838) 
18.57443** 
(7.444616) 
R-squared 0.5596 0.6100 0.5852 
Notes: Reported figures are coefficient estimates; figures in parentheses represent standard errors;*= coefficient 
estimates are significant at the 90% level; **= coefficient estimates are significant at the 95% level. 
 
Table 7.9: Results of mobile penetration models. 
Variable Mode2-1 (Policy1) Mode2-2 (Policy2) Mode2-3 (average) 
Policy1 -9.81373 (22.09086) – – 
Policy2 – -0.0350171 (21.94072) – 
Policy average – – -5.224837 (22.86316) 
Y 0.0064254** (0.0018034) 
0.0064998** 
(0.0018107) 
0.006467** 
(0.0018099) 
Y2 -0.000000123** (0.0000000376) 
-0.000000123** 
(0.0000000378) 
-0.000000123** 
(0.0000000377) 
Population 0.0615315 (0.081313) 
0.0632053 
(0.0822061) 
0.0637684 
(0.0816567) 
Constant 47.84828** (17.81047) 
44.06617** 
(17.58578) 
45.99976** 
(17.86413) 
R-squared 0.5166 0.5103 0.5120 
Notes: Reported figures are coefficient estimates; figures in parentheses represent standard errors;*= coefficient 
estimates are significant at the 90% level; **= coefficient estimates are significant at the 95% level.  
 
Table 7.10: Results of broadband penetration models. 
Variable Mode3-1 (Policy 1) Mode3-2 (Policy 2) Mode3-3 (aggregate) 
Policy1 -13.4699(5.9441)** -- -- 
Policy2 -- -18.00711** (4.822528) -- 
Policy aggregate -- -- -17.17051** (5.519789) 
Y 0.0008281** (0.0004534) 
0.0007531* 
(0.000381) 
0.0007959* 
(0.0004112) 
Y2 -0.00000000864 (0.0000000094) 
-0.00000000877 
(0.00000000789) 
-0.00000000889 
(0.00000000852) 
Household Density 0.0010802 (0.0031783) 
0.0010242 
(0.002616) 
0.0008078 
(0.0028601) 
Constant 6.470009* (3.68595) 
8.860321** 
(3.185556) 
8.150823** 
(3.441227) 
R-squared 0.7219 0.8037 0.7711 
Notes: Reported figures are coefficient estimates; figures in parentheses represent standard errors;*= coefficient 
estimates are significant at the 90% level; **= coefficient estimates are significant at the 95% level. 
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establish a significant and negative relationship between the policy index categories and the 
broadband penetration rate, controlling for GDP and household density. This outcome 
supports our expectation that limitations on market entry, investment and shortcomings in 
pro-competition policy regimes hinder broadband development. 
 
There are still uncertainties in the market demand for fixed-line broadband, and competition 
from wireless broadband technologies (e.g., 3.5G, LTE and Wimax) worsens the investment 
risk. Given the fact that fixed-line broadband requires significantly higher investment that is 
sunk, these investment uncertainties make it particularly sensitive to policy environment. 
Among the models, the relatively high coefficient for the aggregate index model (Model 3-3) 
highlights the significance of developing a holistic approach for structural reform. 
 
7.6.2 Economy-wide effects 
 
The research literature on the impact that investment in telecommunications has upon 
economic growth is extensive, pioneered by studies such as Hardy (1980) and reviewed by 
Negash and Patala (2006). These have been followed by numerous studies on the importance 
of market reforms in opening the sector to greater investment – see Sridhar and Sridhar 
(2004) for an analysis and overview; for case studies see Petrazzini (1995) and for an 
overview of reforms across the Asia–Pacific see Ure (1995, 2008). Some general comments 
are drawn from a background paper prepared for this project (Ure 2010). 
 
The economic gains from the spread of access to telecommunications networks are generated 
mostly through the network effects (‘externalities’) of linking hundreds of thousands of 
businesses and residential subscribers, and through reduced transactions costs, including 
reduced costs of market information, reduced travelling times, faster responses to changing 
markets etc. The growth of the telecommunications sector itself adds to GDP but the initial 
impact of liberalisation or competitive market entry is often a contraction of the workforce – 
see review by Ure and Vivorakij (1997). This is partly a response to competitive pressures by 
the incumbents becoming more efficient; and more important over time, it is a response by 
the incumbents to accelerate the adoption of new digital technologies which are far less 
labour intensive. New technologies are associated with innovation in services through more 
effective delivery channels, such as digital subscriber line (DSL) and IP-based mobile 
cellular etc., and through new services such as converged services like IPTV and mobile TV. 
As new entrants make their mark and users become more aware of the benefits and 
availability of telecommunications, the elasticity of demand tends to rise (i.e. demand 
becomes less responsive to price changes). For this reason, it was common in the 1990s in 
many low income economies immediately following liberalisation for waiting lists to grow 
rather than shrink, as potential subscribers realised there was, for the first time, a realistic 
opportunity to register for a telephone line. And as new services create new markets, so 
employment in the sector grows again. 
 
The evidence from econometric studies on the impact of investment in fixed line telephony 
growth has varied according to the methods employed. Hardy (1980) found that investment in 
telecommunications had a higher impact on developing rather than developed economies, 
while the ITU studies referred to above tended to imply quasi-linear relationships between 
teledensity and per capita GDP. In 1996 an influential study by Roller and Waverman 
challenged these results by finding that across the OECD economies the impact of investment 
in telecommunications on GDP growth was higher at higher levels of per capita GDP.3
                                       
3 For other studies see, for example, http://www.nipfp.org.in/working_paper/wp04_nipfp_014.pdf. 
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The approach of Roller and Waverman is to be preferred because it tackles several estimation 
problems not handled by earlier studies.4 When these are accounted for, most of the growth 
attributed to investment in telecommunications in previous studies disappears. Having 
revised the earlier view, they then test for network effects or network externalities by a 
regression of economic growth not simply on each economy’s teledensity but also its 
teledensity squared to reflect network effects. 5
 
 Their findings show clearly that as 
teledensities, and therefore the network effects, rise, so the impact of investment in 
telecommunications rises. This finding is also intuitively appealing. Table 7.11 summarises 
the results. 
Table 7.11: Teledensity and the impact of telecommunications investment – developed economies. 
OECD economies Teledensity Impact of 10% investment 
OECD average 30% 2.8% increase in GDP 
USA 40% 7.8% increase in GDP 
 
Independent estimates for GDP elasticity with respect to investment in telecommunications 
were made for Hong Kong, China by Ure (1997) in a study for PECC which found a much 
lower impact of investment on GDP. This might be expected of a small open economy such 
as Hong Kong, China, where many of the benefits of the multiplier effects of investment will 
be leaked overseas through the import of equipment. 
 
The findings of Roller and Waverman (1996) have implications for developing economies 
because they suggest that the economic return on investment in telecommunications in lower 
income economies will be less than in their more developed counterparts, although for 
individual telecommunications companies the financial returns may, of course, be high. 
However, the findings also suggest that in developing economies there should be increasing 
returns to telecommunications investment as the network effects become progressively more 
widespread, and therefore policies and regulations should be tailored to promote the spread of 
network effects in developing economies. This objective would be consistent with APEC’s 
concept of inclusive growth. While these results only relate to fixed-line telephones, the 
network effects of mobile are increasingly strong, and by 2010 the substitution of mobile for 
fixed lines is well established in almost all economies, as already noted. 
 
Research into the impact of investment in the mobile cellular sector on economic growth has 
given important insights into the way in which the lives and livelihoods of people in 
developing economies have improved due to access to wireless networks. The research cited 
here is academic in nature and some of it is sponsored by a vendor, Vodafone. Table 7.12 
summarises the findings of three studies, each of which uses econometrics to derive results: 
Waverman et al. (2005) appeared separately as a Vodafone research paper, and there is a 
similar study to that of Sridhar and Sridhar (2004) on the impact of mobile phones in India 
(Kathuria, Uppal & Mamta 2009). 
 
Table 7.12: Teledensity and the impact of telecommunications investment in mobile. 
Developing economies Teledensity Impact of 10% investment 
Torero et al. (2002) 5–15% 0.3% increase in GDP 
Waverman et al. (2005) 10% 5.9% increase in GDP 
Sridhar & Sridhar(2004) <20% 7% increase in GDP 
                                       
4 The first is the problem of simultaneity, i.e., a growth in telecommunications can cause economic growth and 
economic growth can cause a growth in telecommunications. Secondly, economic growth can be caused by 
the accumulation of fixed assets, such as R&D, to which telecommunications investment is closely correlated. 
5 The number of possible connections in a network is n(n-1) or n2-n. 
202 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
Two notable features emerge from these studies. Firstly, the elasticity of GDP growth is 
mostly higher when teledensities are higher, replicating the findings of Roller and Waverman 
(1996). Secondly, the impact mobile network investment has on economic growth of 
developing economies is higher at lower levels of teledensity than for comparable levels of 
investment in fixed lines in developed economies. There is intuitive appeal in this result. The 
mobile function offers ‘anytime, anywhere’ networking opportunities, and the opportunity 
cost measured in terms of the cost and duration of travelling times and the loss of business 
and social opportunities arising from difficulties in accessing information make the mobile 
phone an ideal communications and networking tool. The implication is that policies and 
regulations should be designed to encourage further investment in, and wider usage of, 
mobile networks (e.g., by encouraging the spread of services such as mobile banking, mobile 
payments, mobile search, location-based services etc.). 
 
The latest wave of technology to engulf the telecommunications sector is broadband. Because 
it is rather new, research into the impact of broadband remains nascent. Work includes 
studies by Atkinson, Castro and Ezell (2009) and Crandall, Lehr and Litian (2007) which find 
significant effects on employment and productivity. Although these studies are for the USA, 
the impact of broadband is likely to be very high in other developed economies and 
strategically important in the main metropolitan centres of developing economies to attract 
foreign investment. The competitive advantage of ‘world cities’ will be influenced by their 
level of broadband access, but equally important is the growing phenomenon of social 
networking in developing economies. For example, Indonesia is the world’s fourth largest 
market for Facebook. For most people in developing economies their first use of broadband 
will most likely be through wireless access. 
 
There are, therefore, three aspects to policy making and regulation with respect to broadband: 
enabling the demand side, promoting the supply side and providing sufficient radio spectrum. 
On all three issues it is worth noting the conclusions of Crandall, Lehr and Litian (2007): 
• Demand side 
‘[G]iven that the demand for broadband is price elastic, the most effective policies are 
likely to be those that contribute to lower prices. The surest route to lower prices is 
provided by increasing competition in the delivery of broadband services’. 
• Supply side 
‘[G]overnments should actively seek to remove barriers to new infrastructure 
investment by incumbents and new entrants. The growth of Internet traffic, especially 
video traffic associated with such services as YouTube and file sharing traffic 
associated with a variety of P2P sharing applications, is straining current 
infrastructure. Providers will need to continue to invest substantially to meet this 
growing demand without quality-reducing congestion occurring … more investment 
in facilities risks being derailed if the firms investing in such infrastructure cannot 
reasonably expect to recover their economic costs, including earning a fair, risk-
adjusted return on investment. Regulatory rules which unduly restrain provider 
pricing and service offerings threaten carriers’ ability to recover their costs and hence 
the viability of on-going investment in infrastructure’. 
• Spectrum management 
‘Finally, there is one important way in which federal policy makers can and should 
expand both demand and supply of broadband services. That is to continue the 
process of increasing the amount of radio spectrum available for commercial uses and 
subject to flexible market allocation’. 
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Spectrum trading refers to the right to trade ownership of part or all of spectrum assigned to a 
user, or to lease part or all of spectrum. For example, in the USA utility companies often sit 
on under-utilised radio spectrum assigned to them in past years, and they can lease part of it 
to other users, which generates revenue for them and provides a scarce resource to others who 
can use it productively. Liberalisation is a more radical measure. It means giving the owners 
of spectrum the right to change its usage, in effect using a market mechanism to change 
spectrum allocation. This can threaten regional harmonisation of usage, so its application is 
usually reserved for cases not requiring strong harmonisation measures. An intermediate step 
is refarming of spectrum, where frequencies assigned to support a service such as a 2G 
mobile network are re-assigned to support a 3G or a 4G network 
 
There have been various studies on the likely economic benefits or impact of spectrum 
liberalisation and trading (see Ure 2010). One example is from the UK regulator Ofcom, who 
commissioned a study by Europe Economics (2006). The survey did not report on consumer 
price responsiveness for 2006 but based its assumptions upon a survey carried out in 2002, 
using four different methods of extrapolation. However, it found that most of the benefits of 
trading spectrum will arise in the provision of public mobile services (51% in 2006 in the UK 
report) and broadcasting (29% in 2006). Eighty-seven per cent of the benefits from public 
mobile services accrued as consumer surplus rather than producer surplus, and 82% of the 
benefits from broadcasting services. These findings are not surprising given the value users 
place on public mobile phone and broadcasting services, and these results are very much in line 
with similar studies from other regions such as Analysys et al. (2004) for the European Union. 
 
Trading, however, is still limited. The following economies, together with dates of 
introduction, have categories of licences that may be traded: New Zealand (1989), Australia 
(1992), El Salvador (1996), Guatemala (1996), the USA (1997), Norway (2003) and the UK 
(2003, 2006). The evidence from El Salvador and Guatemala is not overwhelming but a study 
by Hazlett, Ibarguen and Leighton (2006) does show that trading is consistent with higher 
than average radio spectrum deployment per capita GDP across 16 South American 
economies, and for minutes of usage per GDP per capita. In other words, whether due to 
spectrum trading or not, both economies compared well with their neighbours.  
 
Successful trading requires transparency and low transactions costs. Where auctions have 
already assigned frequencies efficiently, trading tends to be low in volume. The most 
commonly traded frequencies in Australia, the UK and the USA are those supporting 
personal communications services (PCS) and broadband fixed wireless access services 
(BFEA). In other economies publicly available information is insufficient to make an 
analysis, which is a future issue for data availability and research yet to come. 
At regional level, however, one potential drawback that might undermine the development of 
mobile services (and possibly the 2000 Brunei Goal and regional economic integration) is the 
issue of international roaming charges. It became apparent that international roaming charges 
for both voice and data services are in many if not all cases unreasonably high globally. The 
European Commission has found, for example, that international mobile roaming prices were 
on average 4 times higher than national mobile calls in the EU region (ITU 2008). OECD 
(2009) also reported that in some extreme cases in the OECD region, it can be 20 times more 
expensive to make a call back to the home economy whilst roaming in the host economy than 
for users in the host economy to make an international call to the roamer’s home economy.  
 
Recent studies undertaken by ITU (2008) and OECD (2009 and 2010) recommended that, as 
the high roaming charges could not be explained by the underlying costs, there exists 
significant market failure in this area. Regulatory interventions are therefore required as a 
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primary measure to resolve the issue. As international roaming involve at least one foreign 
partner, this implies that regulatory cooperation and coordination at regional (or even 
international) level is required because price regulation by national regulator can only 
manage half of the roaming loop; the rest is beyond the jurisdiction of a single economy. 
APEC initiatives therefore are needed to examine this issue from a regional perspective and 
to explore the possible regional framework for regulatory cooperation.6
 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION 
 
The considerable development of the telecommunications sector in the APEC region in recent 
years reflects the structural reform efforts by APEC economies. While some of the APEC 
economies are taking a world leadership role in telecommunications development, more 
recent starters are also catching up rapidly and reducing the gap.  
 
This chapter reviewed the quantitative impact of telecommunications structural reform in the 
APEC region. It found that, as all APEC economies have already implemented a market 
liberalisation policy for over a decade, structural reform and pro-competition regulations 
played a less critical role in refining market performance in 2009. The results of the 
quantitative analysis on broadband penetration, however, also suggest that structure and 
regulatory reform still have a direct impact on new investment. For new investment such as 
broadband access, while each of the policy components has its own unique value and 
purpose, the implementation of a full set of rules appears to be the most desired policy. 
 
In addition, the results also suggest that, as far as the telecommunications sector is concerned, 
policy initiatives to promote technology development and innovation will play an 
increasingly critical role in the future. Still, for some APEC economies, the availability of 
telecommunications network infrastructure to all citizens remains a critical issue. To achieve 
this goal, a good universal service regime is a prerequisite as market failure restricts the size 
of network. Yet the effective implementation of the universal service regime also requires 
political commitment to encourage investment and a sound regulatory environment that 
removes policy uncertainties. 
 
This chapter also reviewed some of the evidence of recent research on the impact of reforms 
in terms of more open policies and regulations that spur greater competition, access and 
innovation in telecommunications service markets. Chronologically, reforms have taken 
place in the fixed line, cellular mobile wireless and broadband markets, and concomitantly in 
spectrum management. In all cases the evidence indicates what intuitively sounds right, 
namely, that competition produces benefits in terms of lower prices, innovation in networks 
and services (economic growth) and in the efficiency of the use of spectrum. Reforms are 
important in telecommunications, principally because of the network effects. The benefits are 
spread throughout the economy because telecommunications is a major productive input into 
just about every sector of industry and commerce. Potential shortcomings, such as the 
international roaming pricing issue, warrant that further regional regulatory cooperation is 
required. 
 
                                       
6 APEC Telecommunications Working Group (APEC TEL) recently held the first workshop on international 
roaming charges during APEC TEL 41 (2010) meeting. Member economies shared their experiences in 
consumer information provisions as a measure to address the issue. 
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ANNEX 7 POLICY INDEX 
 
 
Table A7.1: Policy index. 
Category 
weight Score Categories 
Market entry and non-discrimination (total score=1 for least performing economy ) 
0.30  Licensing of new fixed network operation licences 
 1.00 Issues no new licences 
 0.75 Issues 1 new licence 
 0.50 Issues up to 3 new licences 
 0.25 Issues more than 3 new licences 
 0.00 No limitation on the number of new licences 
0.30  Licensing of new mobile network operation licences 
 1.00 Issues no new licences 
 0.75 Issues 1 new licence 
 0.50 Issues up to 3 new licences 
 0.25 Issues more than 3 new licences 
 0.00 No limitation on the number of new licences except for technical reasons 
0.40  Direct investments 
0.20  General  
  
The score is inversely proportional to the maximum direct equity participation 
permitted in an existing domestic telecommunications operator. Issues no new 
licences. For example, equity participation to a maximum of 75% would be given a 
score of 0.25. 
0.20  Incumbents 
  The score is inversely proportional to the maximum direct equity participation permitted in a specific domestic telecommunications operator. 
Pro-competition regulations (total score=1 for least performing economy) 
0.20  Anti-competition rules against major operators c 
 1.00 No anti-competition rules  
 0.50 Proposals for anti-competition rules are developed and/or under consideration  
 0.00 Existence of anti-competition rules 
0.20  Interconnection rules 
 1.00 No interconnection rules  
 0.50 Partial application and/or proposals for interconnection rules are developed and/or under consideration  
 0.25 Existence of interconnection rules that are not consistence with WTO 
 0.00 Existence of WTO-consistent interconnection rules 
0.20  Independent regulator 
 1.00 Regulators is not separated from services provisions 
 0.00 Regulator is separate from services provisions 
0.20  Access to incumbent’s facilities 
 1.00 No regulatory regime available  
 0.50 Partial application and/or proposals for access rules are developed and/or under consideration 
 0.00 Regulatory regime available for competitors to seek access 
0.20  NP 
 1.00 No NP regime 
 0.50 Partial application and/or proposals for interconnection rules are developed and/or under consideration 
 0.00 NP regime implemented 
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Table A7.2 Policy index values. 
Category 1: Establishment and non-discrimination 
Policy component AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HKC INA JPN ROK MAS MEX NZ PNG PE RP RUS SIN CT THA US VN 
Licensing of new fixed-line licences 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 0.5 0 0.25 
Licensing of new mobile licences 0 0.75 0 0 0.5 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.25 0 0.25 
Inv-General 0 1 0.54 0 0.51 0 0.7 0 0.51 0.51 0.51 0 1 0 0.6 1 0 0.4 0.51 0 0.51 
Inv-Incumbents 0 1 0.54 0 0.51 0 0.7 0.67 0.67 0.51 0.51 0.501 1 0 0.6 1 0 0.51 0.51 0 0.51 
Total-policy 1 0 0.925 0.216 0 0.504 0 0.505 0.134 0 0.204 0.204 0.1002 0.775 0 0.24 0.55 0 0.182 0.429 0 0.354 
Category 2: Pro-competition regulation 
Policy component AUS BD CDA CHL PRC HKC INA JPN ROK MAS MEX NZ PNG PE RP RUS SIN CT THA US VN 
Anti-competition rules 0 1 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0 0 0.5 0 1 0.5 0.5 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 
Interconnection rules 0 1 0 1 0.5 0 0.5 0 0 0 1 0 1 0.5 0.25 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.25 
Independent regulator 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Access to incumbent's facilities 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0.5 0 1 0 0.5 1 0 0 1 0 1 
NP 0 1 0 0.5 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0.5 0 0.5 
Total--policy 2 0 0.8 0 0.5 0.5 0 0.6 0 0 0 0.4 0 0.8 0.2 0.25 0.8 0 0 0.5 0 0.45 
Aggregate (P1+P2) 0 1.725 0.216 0.5 1.004 0 1.105 0.134 0 0.204 0.604 0.1002 1.575 0.2 0.49 1.35 0 0.182 0.929 0 0.804 
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• Foreign direct investment inflows at the aggregate level are influenced by the general 
regulatory environment in an economy rather than by regulation which is specific to 
infrastructure. 
• There is some evidence of the positive influence of infrastructure regulatory quality 
when examining flows at the sectoral level, at least for telecommunications. 
• Quality of regulation includes aspects other than just the independence of the 
regulator. 
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Policy debate on the impact of structural reform often makes use of a series of indicators of 
institutional quality and of the characteristics of an economy’s regulatory system. Such 
indicators are often produced by agencies such as the World Bank. APEC also uses similar 
indicators in its work programs on structural reform. In this chapter, indicators of this type 
are tested for their influence on indicators of economic performance. The focus is the link 
between regulatory quality and performance in relation to the infrastructure sector from two 
perspectives. The first explores how the quality of regulations, including infrastructure 
regulation, may affect foreign direct investment (FDI) in infrastructure industries. The second 
assesses how the regulatory environment may affect total FDI inflows. 
 
The review finds that FDI inflows aggregated across infrastructure industries are influenced 
by the general regulatory environment in an economy, such as the legal framework and the 
cost of compliance with administrative requirements. This effect is more important than that 
of the quality of regulation. However, there is some evidence of a positive link between 
regulatory quality in a specific infrastructure sector and investments in that particular sector, 
such as in telecommunications.  
 
For economy-wide total FDI inflows, more important are the opportunities for foreign 
investors to acquire a controlling share in domestic companies and the degree of openness to 
trade. Ease of access to finance also appears to be connected to the total FDI inflows.  
 
APEC membership since 2004, when the structural reform agenda was launched, does not 
seem to be significantly associated with a higher rate of FDI inflows, after accounting for the 
regulatory environment, as well as other economy characteristics. 
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These results focus only on one performance indicator but they suggest the value of further 
work using a longer time frame and testing a wider range of indicators of regulatory quality 
as they apply to infrastructure sectors. At the same time, they stress the importance of the 
general regulatory environment, at least for FDI. 
 
8.2 MODELLING AND DATA 
 
The paper estimates two models using panel data. The first relates regulation with FDI in 
infrastructure and is adapted from the specification in Kirkpatrick et al. (2006): 
InfraFDIit = β0 + β1REGit + β2Xit + β3apectit + νi + ut + εit     [1] 
where i denotes economy, t denotes year. The dependent variable, InfraFDI, is private foreign 
investment in infrastructure projects and measured in logarithm. REG refers to general 
regulatory and infrastructure policy variables and X represents the control variables, which 
will be elaborated below. apect is an interaction term to assess whether an economy that is an 
APEC member would receive higher private investments in infrastructure industries after 
2004, as APEC members implement structural economic reforms that would fit within the 
APEC Leader’s Agenda to Implement Structural Reform (LAISR). νi absorbs the time-
invariant economy-specific effects, while ut is a set of year dummies to control for 
macroeconomic shocks; ε is the idiosyncratic error term. 
 
The second model estimates the relationship between the regulatory environment and quality 
of infrastructure on aggregate FDI inflows to an economy: 
FDIit = β0 + β1REGit + β2Xit + β3apectit + νi + ut + εit     [2] 
FDI is measured as foreign direct investment inflow as a percentage of GDP. The right hand 
variables are the same as defined for Equation (1). 
 
The data on FDI in infrastructure projects is obtained from the Private Participation in 
Infrastructure (PPI) Project Database compiled by the World Bank. The PPI data records 
infrastructure projects with private participation in the energy, telecommunications, transport, 
and water and sewerage sectors in low- and middle-income economies. Thus, the equation is 
estimated for a set of developing economies only, of which 11 are APEC member economies. 
 
Detailed project information is examined to calculate private investors’ share of investment 
commitments in infrastructure projects with private participation. State-owned enterprises or 
their subsidiaries are considered private investors in projects located offshore. Kirkpatrick et 
al. (2006) notes that about 80% of private contribution in infrastructure projects comes from 
foreign investors. Thus, the values of private investment can be regarded as comprising 
mainly values of private foreign investment and will reflect the influences of FDI 
determinants.  
 
Regulatory quality variables are the focus of research interest in this chapter. Alternative sets 
of regulatory indicators are used, which comprise a mix of indicators of various aspects of the 
general regulatory environment as well as measures of infrastructure policy. General 
regulatory indicators are obtained from the alternative sources of the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) database produced by Kaufmann et al. (2009), 
IMD Business School’s World Competitiveness Yearbook (WCY), and the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). These regulatory indicators are based on 
survey responses and thus are subjective measures. They are also open to the criticism that 
they only give an idea of relative regulatory quality across economies in broad aspects but do 
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not provide information on the policy measures that might have contributed to an economy’s 
ranking or changes in its relative position. Nevertheless, information from these sources has 
the advantage of containing annually updated data for a large number of economies and thus 
is suited for use in multiple-year, cross-economy regressions. 
 
Where possible, a set of indicators is chosen to proxy for the five priority areas of the LAISR, 
namely: regulatory reform, strengthening economic legal infrastructure, competition policy, 
corporate governance and public sector management. However, it is noted that some of these 
indicators may be highly correlated as they reflect the common underlying governance and 
policy environment of an economy. Thus, the final set of regulatory indicators included in 
any estimation is selected after checking their degree of correlation and also using the best 
fitting specification based on a model selection criterion (this is called the Akaike 
Information Criterion). 
 
The effective regulation of privatised infrastructure sectors requires a policy environment that 
sustains market incentives and investor confidence, and a key condition towards this end is 
independence of the regulators from political interference. Following Kirkpatrick et al. 
(2006), this study constructs a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if an economy has 
independent regulators in both the telecommunications and electric power industries in any 
year, to proxy for the quality of its infrastructure regulation. ‘Independence’ here refers to 
organisational independence of the regulatory bodies – where the regulator is not integrated 
as a section of a government ministry – rather than their actual autonomy from government 
interference. This information is obtained from the International Energy Regulation Network 
and the International Telecommunications Union. A second measure used in the estimations 
that proxies for infrastructure policy is the survey response to the question of whether 
‘maintenance and development of infrastructure are adequately planned and financed’ from 
WCY. 
 
The scope of the set of variables measuring economy characteristics (called control variables) 
is based on the specification in Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) and data obtained from the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators database. These variables are: 
• real GDP per capita as a measure of the level of income and demand in an economy; 
• inflation, domestic credit, exchange rate and taxation variables to capture 
macroeconomic stability; 
• trade openness; and  
• domestic financial development and skills level of the labour force as indicators of 
structural characteristics of the host economy. 
Not all the control variables in Kirkpatrick are used in the final estimations, as the inclusion 
of all the variables significantly reduces the sample size and the excluded variables are found 
in preliminary estimations to be statistically insignificant. The final set of control variables 
included are lagged variables of income per capita, inflation and openness to allow for 
statistical problems (including potential endogeneity bias and adjustment lags).  
 
The apec-time (apect) interaction term is constructed as ait x trt, where ait is a dummy that is 1 
if an economy is an APEC member in year t and 0 otherwise, and trt is a trend term with 0 
values before 2004. 
 
The main regression technique applied in the estimations is fixed effects panel regression, 
which controls for time-invariant, economy-specific effects. However, since the dataset is a 
relatively short panel that covers 2000 to 2008 (or shorter depending on the set of regulatory 
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indicators used), the equation is also estimated using pooled OLS with cluster-robust standard 
errors, on the assumption that the errors are correlated over time for each economy but not 
across economies. 
 
8.3 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
 
Table 8.1 presents the results for the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions with FDI in 
infrastructure projects as the dependent variable. The results apply to a set of developing 
economies for which data are available and include the APEC economies of Chile; China; 
Indonesia; Malaysia; Mexico; Peru; the Philippines; the Russian Federation; Thailand; and 
Viet Nam. 
 
Of the regulatory and infrastructure policy variables there is evidence of a statistically 
significant and positive relationship between the quality of a general regulatory environment 
and foreign private investment in infrastructure across the different sets of regulatory 
indicators used. 2
 
 Coefficient estimates that are significant include those on the WGI-
government effectiveness index, the WCY indicator on whether a ‘legal and regulatory 
framework encourages the competitiveness of enterprises’ and the GCR indicator on whether 
‘complying with administrative requirements is burdensome’. 
The correlation between infrastructure policy and quality and FDI in infrastructure is 
generally insignificant. In particular, the dummy of regulatory independence is not significant 
across all specifications. The apec-time interaction term intended to capture the differential 
effects of regulatory changes since 2004 in APEC economies is only sometimes significant.  
 
Table 8.2 reports the results of pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions with economy-level 
FDI inflows as the dependent variable. The sample used for the aggregate FDI equations 
includes a much larger number of economies than the sample for the FDI in infrastructure 
equations. These economies are spread across different income levels and comprise all APEC 
economies except Brunei; Papua New Guinea; and Chinese Taipei where not all the data 
included in the regressions are available. The regulatory and infrastructure policy variables 
are largely insignificant regardless of the sets of regulatory indicators and econometric 
methods used. The only exception is the WCY variable on whether ‘foreign investors can 
acquire control in domestic companies’, which is significant and positive. The variable that is 
consistent in being strongly and positively correlated with FDI across regressions is trade as a 
percentage of GDP. The last two findings indicate that FDI is encouraged by economies that 
are more open to trade and that foreign investors respond to lower restrictions on FDI. There 
is also evidence that an increase in credit extended to the private sector, which proxies for 
ease of access to finance, is associated with higher FDI. The apec-time interaction term is 
significant only in pooled OLS regressions and is negatively signed across specifications. 
 
The dummy variable that measures regulatory independence in infrastructure (precisely, in 
both telecommunications and electricity industries) is found to be insignificant across the 
board, regardless of whether the dependent variable is infrastructure investments or aggregate 
FDI inflows. This is unlike the findings in Kirkpatrick et al. (2006), where the variable is 
weakly significant (at the 10% level) and positively correlated with infrastructure investment 
in selected specifications. As mentioned in Kirkpatrick et al. (2006), when both general 
regulatory indicators and an infrastructure regulatory independence dummy are included in 
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Table 8.1: Results for the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions with FDI 
in infrastructure projects as the dependent variable. 
Dependent variable: 
Ln FDI in Infrastructure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Economy fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regulatory environment       
WGI       
Government effectiveness 
index 
0.064 
(0.885) 
1.850 
(0.462)*** 
    
WCY       
Control by foreign investors   -0.236 
(0.128)* 
0.102 
(0.085) 
  
Legal and regulatory 
framework 
  0.301 
(0.134)** 
0.388 
(0.100)*** 
  
Shareholders' rights   -0.120 
(0.238) 
-0.089 
(0.127) 
  
GCR       
Business impact of rules on 
FDI 
    -0.374 
(0.323) 
0.329 
(0.202) 
Burden of government 
regulation 
    -0.070 
(0.271) 
0.370 
(0.187)** 
Effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policy 
    1.237 
(0.420)*** 
0.027 
(0.244) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests 
    -0.202 
(0.358) 
-0.338 
(0.213) 
Infrastructure policy       
Independence of regulators in 
electric power and 
telecommunications sectors 
(dummy variable) 
-0.405 
(0.260) 
-0.017 
(0.222) 
0.197 
(0.376) 
-0.112 
(0.290) 
0.129 
(0.440) 
-0.159 
(0.311) 
Maintenance and 
Development of infrastructure 
(WCY) 
  -0.089 
(0.139) 
-0.270 
(0.124)** 
  
Control variables       
Ln GDP per capita (lagged) 0.604 
(0.235)** 
-1.174 
(1.046) 
0.129 
(0.228) 
1.977 
(1.126)* 
0.175 
(0.250) 
-1.304 
(1.618) 
Annual change of inflation 
(lagged) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
-0.014 
(0.005)*** 
-0.028 
(0.015)* 
-0.018 
(0.010)* 
0.015 
(0.020) 
-0.014 
(0.014) 
Export and import/GDP 
(lagged) 
-0.021 
(0.005)*** 
-0.001 
(0.007) 
-0.013 
(0.005)** 
-0.020 
(0.009)** 
-0.018 
(0.006)*** 
0.007 
(0.010) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP 
0.017 
(0.006)*** 
0.016 
(0.006)** 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.015 
(0.005)*** 
0.005 
(0.007) 
0.014 
(0.007)* 
apec-time interaction term 0.305 
(0.108)*** 
-0.181 
(0.064)*** 
0.112 
(0.094) 
-0.155 
(0.089)* 
0.405 
(0.113)*** 
-0.038 
(0.089) 
Joint significance of year 
dummies (p-value) 
0.002 0.000 0.008 0.121 0.260 0.006 
Adjusted R2 0.365 0.813 0.253 0.776 0.376 0.844 
No. of observations 440 440 150 150 243 243 
No. of economies 62 62 23 23 54 54 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * - indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
 
the same regression, results of significant coefficients on the former and insignificant 
coefficient on the latter could indicate that investors, whether in infrastructure or more 
generally, are more strongly influenced by the overall governance environment, and 
infrastructure regulation does not exert an independent influence from the quality of overall 
governance. 
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Table 8.2: Results for the pooled OLS and fixed effects regressions with 
economy-level FDI inflows as the dependent variable. 
Dependent variable: 
FDI 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Economy fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regulatory environment       
WGI       
Government effectiveness 
index 
0.674 
(0.491) 
1.398 
(1.321) 
    
WCY       
Control by foreign 
investors 
  1.015 
(0.270)*** 
0.743 
(0.443)* 
  
Legal and regulatory 
framework 
  0.369 
(0.306) 
-0.134 
(0.411) 
  
Shareholders' rights   -0.498 
(0.376) 
-0.429 
(0.561) 
  
GCR       
Business impact of rules on 
FDI 
    0.499 
(0.845) 
0.052 
(0.915) 
Burden of government 
regulation 
    0.321 
(0.711) 
0.222 
(0.682) 
Effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policy 
    0.168 
(0.637) 
-0.110 
(0.918) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests 
    -0.872 
(0.707) 
-0.894 
(0.917) 
Infrastructure policy and 
quality 
      
Independence of regulators 
in electric power and 
telecommunications sectors 
(dummy variable) 
-0.253 
(0.495) 
0.269 
(0.700) 
-0.330 
(0.551) 
-0.356 
(1.265) 
-0.518 
(0.865) 
-0.699 
(1.374) 
Maintenance and 
Development of 
infrastructure (WCY) 
  -0.058 
(0.273) 
0.540 
(0.532) 
  
Control variables       
Ln GDP per capita (lagged) -0.247 
(0.307) 
2.814 
(3.316) 
-0.503 
(0.388) 
-2.323 
(5.325) 
-0.091 
(0.263) 
-6.497 
(7.031) 
Annual change of inflation 
(lagged) 
0.031 
(0.019)* 
0.048 
(0.018)*** 
-0.031 
(0.028) 
-0.022 
(0.061) 
0.025 
(0.040) 
0.031 
(0.064) 
Export and import/GDP 
(lagged) 
0.044 
(0.006)*** 
0.088 
(0.017)*** 
0.037 
(0.006)*** 
0.107 
(0.022)*** 
0.045 
(0.008)*** 
0.062 
(0.032)* 
Domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.027 
(0.014)* 
-0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.021 
(0.023) 
0.004 
(0.011) 
0.085 
(0.026)*** 
apec-time interaction term -0.525 
(0.254)** 
-0.187 
(0.242) 
-0.354 
(0.268) 
-0.179 
(0.326) 
-0.634 
(0.281)** 
-0.339 
(0.408) 
Joint significance of year 
dummies (p-value) 
0.0006 0.7321 0.0015 0.3097 0.0026 0.0865 
Adjusted R2 0.318 0.472 0.419 0.541 0.317 0.632 
No. of observations 660 660 323 323 331 331 
No. of economies 99 99 51 51 89 89 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * - indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
 
Some studies (e.g., Cubbin & Stern 2006; Zhang et al. 2008) have found a significant and 
positive link between the quality of regulation of the electricity industry, which included 
regulatory independence, and a positive outcome as measured by generation capacity. So it 
may be the case that independence of the regulator in an infrastructure sector might be more 
specifically linked to outcomes in that sector. To test this premise, two additional regressions 
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are conducted in this paper. The first relates private investment in telecommunications 
infrastructure projects (which accounts for over half the amount of infrastructure investments) 
to independence of telecom regulators only. The other relates private investment in energy 
infrastructure projects (which accounts for 28% of total investments) to independence of 
electricity regulators only. The other variables remain as specified in Equation (1). 
 
The results are reported in Tables 8.3 and 8.4. It is observed that the regulatory dummy 
variable is now significant in a number of regressions although not always with the expected 
signage. Independence of telecom regulators is strongly and positively related to FDI in 
telecoms infrastructure projects in developing economies when fixed effects regression is run 
on the sample that includes GCR indicators. However, the variable is weakly significant and 
negative in the sample using WCY indicators. Coefficient estimates on the electricity 
regulatory independence variable are significant in the sample with the WGI variable but they 
are negative. 
 
8.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The paper finds that FDI flows, whether aggregated across infrastructure industries or at the 
economy-wide level, are influenced by the general regulatory environment in an economy 
rather than regulation which is specific to infrastructure. There is no conclusive evidence that 
APEC membership since 2004 is significantly associated with a higher rate of FDI inflows. 
There is some evidence of the positive influence of infrastructure regulatory quality when 
examining flows at the sectoral level, at least for telecommunications. Further investigations 
could be carried out by constructing a regulatory indicator that takes into account more 
dimensions of infrastructure regulatory quality than the independence of regulators and using 
a longer time series. Overall the results, although mixed, serve to highlight that the quality of 
infrastructure regulations should be taken into consideration in any statistical analysis of 
infrastructure sector performance. 
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Table 8.3: Relating private investment in telecommunications infrastructure projects 
to independence of telecom regulators. 
Dependent variable: 
Ln FDI in Telecom 
Infrastructure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Economy fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regulatory environment       
WGI       
Government effectiveness 
index 
-0.142 
(0.361) 
0.353 
(0.370) 
    
WCY       
Control by foreign investors   -0.176 
(0.168) 
0.122 
(0.082) 
  
Legal and regulatory 
framework 
  0.215 
(0.125)* 
0.344 
(0.095)*** 
  
Shareholders' rights   -0.147 
(0.280) 
-0.116 
(0.132) 
  
GCR       
Business impact of rules on 
FDI 
    -0.291 
(0.283) 
-0.001 
(0.186) 
Burden of government 
regulation 
    -0.376 
(0.249) 
0.116 
(0.162) 
Effectiveness of anti-
monopoly policy 
    1.328 
(0.342)*** 
0.198 
(0.214) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests 
    -0.276 
(0.343) 
0.170 
(0.196) 
Infrastructure policy       
Independence of regulators in 
telecommunications sector 
(dummy variable) 
0.426 
(0.404) 
-0.005 
(0.291) 
0.123 
(0.492) 
-0.576 
(0.343)* 
0.148 
(0.553) 
1.822 
(0.667)*** 
Maintenance and 
Development of 
infrastructure (WCY) 
  -0.218 
(0.154) 
-0.293 
(0.128)** 
  
Control variables       
Ln GDP per capita (lagged) 0.683 
(0.171)*** 
-0.584 
(0.790) 
0.144 
(0.241) 
2.638 
(1.264)** 
0.166 
(0.188) 
-1.449 
(1.538)** 
Annual change of inflation 
(lagged) 
0.010 
(0.005)** 
-0.013 
(0.004)*** 
-0.031 
(0.014)* 
-0.032 
(0.010)*** 
0.031 
(0.021) 
-0.008 
(0.013) 
Export and import/GDP 
(lagged) 
-0.021 
(0.004)*** 
0.004 
(0.005) 
-0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.010 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.006)*** 
0.003 
(0.009) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP 
0.016 
(0.006)*** 
0.002 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.005) 
0.004 
(0.005)** 
0.006 
(0.007) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
apec-time interaction term 0.418 
(0.109)*** 
-0.164 
(0.067)** 
0.136 
(0.091) 
-0.020 
(0.063)* 
0.375 
(0.102)*** 
-0.036 
(0.089) 
Joint significance of year 
dummies (p-value) 
0.000 0.000 0.4885 0.3666 0.1143 0.025 
R2 0.376 0.8260 0.237 0.811 0.394 0.846 
No. of observations 559 559 145 145 272 272 
No. of economies 92 92 23 23 64 64 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * - indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels 
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Table 8.4: Relating private investment in energy infrastructure projects 
to independence of electricity regulators. 
Dependent variable: 
Ln FDI in Energy Infrastructure 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Economy fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Regulatory environment       
WGI       
Government effectiveness index 0.090 
(0.614) 
0.651 
(1.019) 
    
WCY       
Control by foreign investors   -0.407 
(0.184)** 
-0.405 
(0.299) 
  
Legal and regulatory framework   0.227 
(0.321) 
0.359 
(0.283) 
  
Shareholders' rights   0.061 
(0.404) 
0.262 
(0.393) 
  
GCR       
Business impact of rules on FDI     -0.603 
(0.459) 
-0.684 
(0.549) 
Burden of government regulation     0.081 
(0.436) 
0.258 
(0.486) 
Effectiveness of anti-monopoly 
policy 
    0.950 
(0.550)* 
0.957 
(0.637) 
Protection of minority 
shareholders’ interests 
    0.115 
(0.526) 
-0.655 
(0.674)) 
Infrastructure policy       
Independence of regulators in 
electric power sector (dummy 
variable) 
-0.828 
(0.376)** 
-1.219 
(0.532)** 
0.120 
(0.556) 
-1.344 
(0.860) 
0.347 
(0.552) 
1.034 
(1.077) 
Maintenance and Development 
of infrastructure (WCY) 
  -0.042 
(0.340) 
-0.079 
(0.377) 
  
Control variables       
Ln GDP per capita (lagged) 0.234 
(0.340) 
3.271 
(2.096) 
-0.033 
(0.365) 
6.305 
(3.274)* 
-0.054 
(0.290) 
4.779 
(4.606) 
Annual change of inflation 
(lagged) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.017) 
-0.005 
(0.029) 
0.027 
(0.029) 
0.005 
(0.020) 
-0.028 
(0.057) 
Export and import/GDP (lagged) -0.007 
(0.007) 
-0.024 
(0.017) 
-0.003 
(0.008) 
-0.011 
(0.027) 
-0.001 
(0.008) 
-0.053 
(0.033) 
Domestic credit to private 
sector/GDP 
0.007 
(0.010) 
0.009 
(0.015) 
-0.008 
(0.017) 
0.020 
(0.021) 
-0.009 
(0.015) 
0.044 
(0.026)* 
apec-time interaction term 0.187 
(0.138) 
-0.024 
(0.124) 
0.100 
(0.145) 
0.158 
(0.180) 
0.291 
(0.123)** 
0.248 
(0.213) 
Joint significance of year 
dummies (p-value) 
0.0066 0.0875 0.2315 0.1583 0.0036 0.4298 
Adjusted R2 0.115 0.454 0.050 0.448 0.134 0.498 
No. of observations 237 237 119 119 137 137 
No. of economies 58 58 22 22 43 43 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
***, **, * - indicates significance at the 1, 5 and 10% levels. 
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Chapter 9 
 
AIR TRANSPORT IN KOREA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 
 
 
Yeon Myung Kim and Sean Seungho Lee1
 
 
 
• Competition on domestic routes in Korea by low cost carriers has led to much lower 
fares. 
• The negotiation of an Open Skies agreement led to lower fares and more flights and, 
therefore, greater convenience and higher traffic levels on routes to Shandong 
province in China: this experience could be extended to other international routes. 
• There are some lessons in the experiences of the European Union and the USA on 
how this might be done; and the expected competitive pressure that spills over from 
the agreement between the EU and the USA is another driver for change in North-
East Asia. 
 
 
9.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Korean civil aviation has shown remarkable development in recent years. Korea has recorded 
one of the highest air traffic growth rates in Asia, averaging over 10% annual growth for 
international passengers and 7% for cargo from 2005 to 2007. Incheon International Airport 
has grown into one of Northeast Asia’s largest hub airports since its inauguration in March 
2001. It now ranks as the world’s second airport in international cargo transported and the 
tenth airport in passenger volume in 2009. Meanwhile, domestic traffic has slumped from a 
peak of 23.5 million trips in 1996 to less than 17 million in 2007. There was a large drop in 
2004 which coincided with the opening of Korea’s Bullet Train. This led to a response in 
airline strategy, which is discussed in this case study. 
 
In international markets, a new program of ‘Open Skies’ negotiations has begun. These 
developments and their consequences are reviewed in this case study. The main interest is 
developments on international routes but also included is a brief review of the experience of 
the entry of low cost carriers (LCCs) to the domestic market in Korea. 
 
9.2 DOMESTIC MARKETS 
 
A series of regulatory reforms in 2009 changed the entry conditions into the Korean air 
transport market, including reductions in the value of the capital required for new entrants 
and in the number of aircraft in the fleet. However, even prior to the regulatory and policy 
reform, private entities had already been operating airline services as new start-up carriers. 
The LCCs began to enter domestic routes in 2006. Kim and Lee (2010) review the LCC 
sector in Korea and Zhang et al. (2008) review the experience in Thailand and China. They 
link the growth of the sector to the growth of domestic tourism in 2005. Another pressure on 
the full service carriers (FSCs) that previously dominated the market was the competition 
                                       
1 The Korea Transport Institute (ymkim@koti.re.kr). 
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from high-speed trains which began in 2004. The use of the LCC model was a competitive 
response. Another driver was the interest of regional governments willing to invest and to 
develop their local airports. 
 
Table 9.1 shows the status of Korea’s start-up operations. Six have set up and four remain in 
operation. There are reports that Hansung Airlines may resume this year (Korea Herald 
2010). Most charge fares of about 70% (one charges 80%) of the fares of the FSCs or the fare 
prior to their entry. Two of the airlines are not subsidiaries of the established carriers. The 
LCC share is now 25% (Jin Air 8% Jeju Air 7%, Air Busan 7%, Eastar Jet 3%) of the 
domestic market, with Korean Air having 48% and Asiana Airlines 27%. The LCC share is 
close to 30% on some routes (e.g., Gimpo-Jeju). 
 
Clearly, the established FSCs see the LCCs as a threat. Recently, the Korean competition 
authority, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC), ruled as anti-competitive some 
practices of the FSCs, including offering loyalty rebates to travel agents. The KFCT also 
warned against FSCs asking agents to restrain sales of tickets on LCCs by threatening access 
to fewer seats on FSCs at peak times or on certain routes. 
 
Table 9.1: Status of Korean low cost carriers. 
Carrier/ 
Operations 
Seju Air Hansung 
Airlines 
Yeongnam Air Jinair Air Busan Eastar Jet 
Licence 
issued 
August 2005 March 2005 July 2008 April 2008 June 2008 August 2008 
Inauguration June 2006 August 2005–
April 2009 
July 2008–
December 2008 
July 2008 October 2008 June 2009 
Airport base Jeju 
International 
Airport 
Cheongju 
International 
Airport 
Kimhae 
International 
Airport 
Gimpo 
International 
Airport 
Kimhae 
International 
Airport 
Gimpo 
International 
Airport 
Licence type Scheduled Non-
scheduled 
Non-scheduled Scheduled Scheduled Non-scheduled 
Route Jeju–Gimpo 
Jeju–Kimhae 
Gimpo–Kimhae 
Cheongju–
Jeju 
Gimpo–Jeju 
Kimbae–Jeju, 
Gimpo, Daegu 
Gimpo–Jeju Kimhae–Gimpo 
Kimbae–Jeju 
Kimbae–
Gunsan 
Gimpo–Jeju 
Gunsan–Jeju 
Cheongju–Jeju 
Air fare 70% of current 
fare 
70% of 
current fare 
70% of current 
fare 
80% of 
current fare 
70% of current 
fare 
70% of current 
fare 
Capital 
investment 
Aekyung Group 
KRW15 billion; 
Jeju Province 
KRW5 billion 
Private fund 
KRW5 billion 
na Korean Air 
subsidiary 
Asiana Airlines 
subsidiary 
na 
Operational Yes  Ceased Ceased Yes Yes Yes 
Note: na = not applicable 
 
9.3 INTEGRATED INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT MARKETS 
 
The international policy of the three Northeast Asian (NEA) economies is reviewed in this 
section. All are working towards more liberal arrangements. Before turning to the detail it is 
important to note that events in transport across the North Atlantic Ocean are a driver of this 
change. In May 2008 routes to any destination within the European Union (EU) and the 
United States of America (USA) were opened to carriers of either continent. Two giant 
markets have been consolidated with the aim of expanding market share in the global air 
transport industry, and the increased competitiveness of these carriers may be expected to 
spill over to other markets. The North Atlantic market is well known for its profitability and 
the EU–Far East market remains one of the biggest premium travel markets (accounting for 
15.2% of total premium revenues worldwide; Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation 2008). The EU 
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and USA carriers may target other routes in NEA and carriers in that region now also seek to 
remove the impediments to their own international competitiveness. 
 
9.3.1 Policy in Korea 
 
The Korean government’s aim is to have Korean airlines operating in a hub and spoke 
structure in the international market, thereby adding to traffic growth to and within Korea. 
With more open agreements, air carriers will operate more effectively and efficiently and 
passengers will benefit as a result. To establish a more liberal hub and spoke air transport 
market, the Korean government has negotiated bilateral and multilateral agreements 
according to the principles of Open Skies. Table 9.2 summarises the state of these 
negotiations and Table 9.3 refers to features of all Korea’s air services agreements (ASAs). 
 
Table 9.2: Status of Open Skies in Korea, January 2010. 
Deregulation of passenger and cargo traffic 
rights Deregulation of cargo traffic rights Open Skies 
Maldives; China; Thailand; Chile; Myanmar; 
Peru; Cambodia; Japan; Viet Nam; Ukraine; Sri 
Lanka; Kenya; Azerbaijan; Mexico; Malaysia; 
Tunisia; Belarus 
Australia; India; Austria; Sweden; 
Norway; Denmark; Macau; Germany; 
South Africa; Finland; Greece; Uzbekistan 
USA; 
Canada 
Source: KOTI. 
 
Table 9.3: Status of Korean Air Services Agreements (ASAs). 
Type of bilateral ASAs Non-operational bilateral ASAs Operational bilateral ASAs 
Predetermined (TP)1   
Bermuda (B)2 Macau (pax); Brunei; Khuzestan; 
Gabon; Nigeria; Libya; Morocco; 
Algeria; Djibouti; Columbia; 
Rumania; Malta; Bulgaria; 
Iceland; Palau; Yugoslavia; 
Portugal; Bahrain; Saudi Arabia; 
Oman; Jordan; Iraq; Kuwait 
France; Hong Kong, China; 
Chinese Taipei; Singapore; 
Indonesia; Netherlands; Belgium; 
Switzerland; Spain; Italy; 
Czechoslovakia; Poland; Finland; 
Hungary; UAE; Iran; Turkey; 
Egypt; Qatar; Israel; Fiji; Australia 
(pax); New Zealand 
‘Point to Point’ Open Skies 
(POS)3 
Maldives; Peru; Norway; 
Denmark; Sweden; Portugal; 
Qatar; Palau; Nigeria; Kenya; 
Mexico; Chile 
Viet Nam; China; Japan; 
Malaysia; Myanmar; Cambodia; 
Thailand; Sri Lanka; Azerbaijan; 
Ukraine; UK (cargo); Australia 
(cargo); Germany; Austria 
‘Multiple Point’ Open Skies 
(MOS)4 
Canada USA 
1 TP – Each economy designates a single company to operate on the route; limited number of points/routes 
operated by designated airlines; capacity and frequency to be agreed ex ante; few 5th freedoms are granted. 
2 B – Each economy designates one or several airlines on each route; limited number of points/routes operated 
by designated airlines; there is no ex ante capacity control on each route, capacity offered is often negotiated 
via commercial agreements between airlines; several 5th freedoms may be granted; total capacity must be 
proportional to the needs of the main bilateral route. 
3 POS – Multiple designation of airlines; free access to designated routes, between specific points, either 
departure or arrival points may be left open and unrestricted; no frequency or capacity control; extensive 5th 
freedom rights are granted. 
4 MOS – Multiple designation of airlines; airlines can fly on any route between two states; no frequency or 
capacity control; unrestricted 5th freedom rights. 
 
This more open approach was reinforced in March 2008 when a new government sought to 
open the international air transport markets to and from Korea. The administration’s intention 
was to promote and deregulate Korea’s air transport industry, and to offer a broader range of 
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choices to the air passengers by allowing open market competition to air transport operators. 
However, the procedure was that airlines had to ‘provide the basic requirements for domestic 
air transport operation before entering the international air transport market’. All ‘start-up’ 
carriers in Korea were required to serve 2 years of probation in order to stabilise their safety 
management systems, and also to complete 20 000 Aircraft Transport Movements (ATMs) in 
the domestic sector before they could launch their international operations. This meant, for 
example, that LCCs had to become established on domestic routes before being able to fly 
internationally, whereas some may have preferred otherwise. 
 
In one case, an international LCC, Tiger Airways, attempted to enter the Korean market. The 
majority owner of Incheon Tiger was the Incheon municipal government (51%) and the 
balance was owned by Tiger. However, it was argued to the Ministry of Transport that the 
new airline was effectively controlled by Singapore Airlines, which has an ownership share 
in Tiger. This would have contradicted Korea’s policy on the entry of foreign controlled 
carriers, and the application for a licence was withdrawn. 
 
9.3.2 Policies in China and Japan 
 
Instead of an immediate move to Open Skies, China has preferred a process of ‘stepwise’ 
market integration, with a focus on NEA. China’s preference is to follow the example of the 
EU’s ‘Open Aviation Area’ (OAA), which was set up in three packages from 1988 to 1997. 
Chinese researchers have proposed four stages of reform. As the first step, the target is to turn 
the separate ASAs of China; Korea; and Japan into a plurilateral ASA. At this stage, the 
difficulty is how to coordinate the differences among the ASAs. The other three steps would 
be followed in a package program similar to the OAA (Table 9.4). However, change of this 
sort would be significant. The partial open sky policy between Korea and China established 
in 2006 is discussed in detail below. In May 2007 they also initiated the Seoul Gimpo–
Shanghai Hongqiao shuttle service. 
 
In 2006, under the former Abe Administration, Japan began a reform called the Asian 
Gateway Initiative (AGI) that was to revitalise the Japanese economy and share prosperity 
with its neighbouring economies, China and Korea. In May 2007 the government of Japan 
proposed a comprehensive policy package for air transport which accelerated the promotion 
of an Open Skies policy in Japan. This brought about drastic changes in the Japanese air 
transport industry. In July 2007 Korea became the first partner of Japan to abolish the 
restrictions on entry points into both economies and, with the exception of flights to and from 
airports in metropolitan areas of Japan that have capacity constraints, to abolish limits on 
frequencies. The Japan Civil Aviation Bureau (JCAB) has now reached agreement with 
Thailand; Macau; Hong Kong, China; Viet Nam; Malaysia; and Singapore, with negotiations 
in progress with China and India. 
 
A Japanese air transport specialist has suggested that Japan; China; and Korea should 
cooperate to approach an integrated air transport market. In the first stage of bilateral 
liberalisation, two economies could, as much as possible, reciprocally seek to liberalise both 
the routes and frequencies between any points within them and direct flights between them. 
The two economies may also reciprocally expand up to the rights of airlines to pick up traffic 
bound for destinations other than the airline’s home base. In the second stage the expansion 
of traffic rights up to the full Open Skies could be initiated on a reciprocal basis. However, 
according to this analyst, prior to the formation of the integrated air transport market in NEA, 
the following issues would have to be resolved: 
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• proper capacity of infrastructure for the air transport industry; 
• development of common safety, security and social rules and regulations; 
• geographical scope of liberalisation; and 
• security policy. 
 
Table 9.4: The EU action package for the integration of the air transport market. 
 1st (January 1988–) 2nd (November 1990–) 3rd (January 1993–) 
Fare* 
Percentage of full fare Percentage of full fare  
Establish regulations 
for committee or 
government to 
implement 
Inordinate discount 
fare 
Continuous lowering 
of the fare 
Fare type Ref. fare Approval Fare type 
Ref. 
fare Approval 
Discount or 
radically low 
fare 
45–
90 Permitted 
Fully flexible 106 
Not to be denied 
by either 
government 
Economy 95–105 Permitted 
Discount or 
radically low 
fare 
30–
94 Permitted 
Approval of 
dual service 
Annually, > 250 000 passengers at 
each departure point (1988) 
Annually, >200 000 passengers or 
>1200 aircraft frequencies at each 
departure point (1989) 
Annually, >180 000 passengers or 
1000 aircraft frequencies at each 
departure point (1990) 
Annually, >140 000 passengers or 
>800 aircraft frequencies at each 
departure point (1991) 
Annually, >100 000 passengers or 
>600 aircraft frequencies at each 
departure point (1992) 
Not applicable 
Seat 
distribution 
per economy 
45/55% (Jan. 1988–) 
40/60% (Oct. 1989–) 
Up to 60% capacity to be distribution 
Up to 75% of yearly expansion  Unlimited 
Route 
entrance 
3rd, 4th freedom for permitted hub 
routes 
5th freedom up to 30% of capacity 
5th freedom to Ireland and Portugal 
3rd, 4th freedom in all airports 
5th freedom up to 50% of the capacity 
All entrants on 
international and 
domestic routes 
Cabotage since April 
1997 
Permitted cabotage 
in >50% of capacity† 
prior to April 1997 
Exempt from 
fair 
competition 
Fare discussion 
Slot allocation 
CRS 
Ground service for aircraft, freight, 
passenger and in-flight meals etc. 
Fare discussion 
Slot allocation 
CRS 
Ground service for passenger, freight 
and in-flight meals etc. 
Fare discussion 
Slot allocation 
CRS 
Cooperate in low 
demand routes 
Operator 
licence Not applicable in 1
st and 2nd package.  
Source: Kim 2004. 
Note: *To the above exception, the bilateral agreement can be applied (up to 2nd package) 
†Domestic flight operation by third economy flag carrier 
 
9.4 IMPACT OF OPEN SKIES 
 
A regional version of Open Skies was established between Korea and Shandong Province in 
China in 2006. The result was rapid growth in passenger numbers and aircraft movements 
(much faster than other routes to China), higher frequencies (and therefore greater 
convenience), a new network structure and lower fares by more than 8% on average. Tables 
9.5 and 9.6 report the data for routes between Korea (ICN) and Shandong Province compared 
with other Chinese destinations. Both series show growth to record heights but with much 
higher growth on routes to Shandong. 
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Another way to assess the impact of Open Skies is to review the experience of the following 
destinations in Shandong from 2005 to 2007 and their links to Korea: 
• Incheon–Weihai, Yantai, Qingdao, Jinan routes 
• Busan–Weihai, Qingdao routes 
• Daegu–Qingdao routes 
 
Table 9.5: Aircraft movement after the Open Skies policy between Korea and China. 
Classification Aircraft movement A B C 
ICN–Shandong 
Korean Carriers 3,756 5,330 (+41.9%) 
5,645 
(+50.3%) 
Chinese Carriers 4,208 8,361 (+98.7%) 
8,732 
(+107.5%) 
ICN–Other Cities 
Korean Carriers 19,897 26,667 (+34.0%) 
25,361 
(+27.5%) 
Chinese Carriers 18,229 27,976 (+53.5%) 
24,493 
(+34.4%) 
   Note: A = 12 months to 16 June 2006; B = 12 months from 16 June 2006; C = 12 months to June 2008. 
 
Table 9.6: Passenger performance after the Open Skies policy between Korea and China. 
Classification Passengers L/F A B C A B C 
ICN–
Shandong 
Korean 
Carriers 495,259 
549,836 
(+11.0%) 
563,109 
(+13.7%) 62.3% 56.6% 57.9 % 
Chinese 
Carriers 376,234 
653,388 
(+73.7%) 
774,869 
(+106.0%) 60.1% 52.4% 59.6 % 
ICN–Other 
Cities 
Korean 
Carriers 3,303,690 
3,893,73
8 
(+17.9%) 
3,236,856 
(-2.0%) 71.0% 65.5% 61.2 % 
Chinese 
Carriers 2,671,634 
3,473,055 
(+30.0%) 
2,876,549 
(+7.7%) 66.5% 62.2% 65.4 % 
Note: A = 12 months to 16 June 2006; B = 12 months from 16 June 2006; C = 12 months to June 2008. 
 
The number of passengers using the Korea–Shandong route in 2006 was 1.02 million, 
showing an increase of 16.1% compared to the previous year (Table 9.7). In 2007 the number 
of passengers was 1.4 million, a much higher growth rate of 37.2%. 
 
The number of passengers carried on all Korea–China routes in 2006 and 2007 were 
6.57 million and 7.32 million respectively, each showing growth of 24.3% and 11.4% 
compared to the previous years (Table 9.8). In 2006 the increase on the Korea–Shandong 
route was 8.2%, which was lower than that on all routes, whereas it was higher by 25.8% 
after the initiation of Open Skies. The performance of Korea–Shandong Province passenger 
traffic has surpassed the rate of growth in the overall Korea–China market. 
 
The aircraft movements on the Korea–Shandong route also grew rapidly (Table 9.9). This 
was the case even before the agreement but after 2006 the growth rate was even higher. More 
aircraft movements also meant higher frequencies and therefore a higher quality of service. 
 
Airfares on the Korea–Shandong routes decreased by 8.4% on average. 
 
The response to Open Skies differed among the airlines (Table 9.10). New airlines entered 
the Incheon–Weihai and Yantai, Busan–Weihai and Qingdao routes with Open Skies and 
they offered lower fares. 
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Table 9.7: Number of passengers on the Korea–Shandong route, 2005–07. 
2005 2006 2007 
880,390  1,021,806 (16.1%) 1,401,523 (37.2%) 
    Note: Unit = persons; (%) = growth rate compared to the previous year. 
 
Table 9.8: Number of passengers on the Korea–China route, 2005–07. 
2005 2006 2007 
5,288,252  6,573,175 (24.3%) 7,321,391 (11.4%) 
    Note: Unit = persons; (%) = growth rate compared to the previous year. 
 
Table 9.9: Aircraft movements on the Korea–Shandong route, 2005–07. 
2005 2006 2007 
9,907 13,954 (40.8%) 23,256 (66.7%) 
    Note: Unit = times; (%) = growth rate compared to the previous year. 
 
Table 9.10: Airfare changes on the Korea–Shandong route. 
Routes Carriers Airfare (June 2006) Airfare (July 2007) YoY (%) 
Incheon 
Jinan 
KE 450 460 2.2 
SC 360 300 -16.7 
Average 405 380 -6.2 
Qingdao 
KE 400 400 0.0 
OZ 370 400 8.1 
CA 450 300 -33.3 
MU 280 200 -28.6 
Average 375 325 -13.3 
Weihai 
KE 350 390 11.4 
OZ 340 390 14.7 
CA 400 300 -25.0 
MU – 150 – 
Average 363 308 -15.4 
Yantai 
KE – 390 – 
OZ 370 390 5.4 
MU 340 180 -47.1 
CA – 300 – 
Average 355 315 -11.3 
Busan 
Weihai 
OZ – 390 – 
Average – 390 – 
Qingdao 
KE 410 410 0.0 
SC 340 – – 
CA – 340 – 
Average 375 375 0.0 
Daegu Qingdao 
KE 370 – – 
SC 340 – – 
CA – 340 – 
Average 355 340 -4.2 
Overall -8.4 
Source: AirTimes, Economy Class 
Note: Regular airfare, excludes fuel and airport taxes. Currency exchange hypothesised as USD1 = KRW1000. 
KE = Korean Air; OZ = Asiana Airlines; SC = Shandong Airlines; CA = Air China; MU = China Eastern Airlines 
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Korean Air and Asiana Airlines, Korea’s flag carriers, did not lower fares but Chinese 
airlines such as Shandong Airlines, Air China and China Eastern Airlines did. The network 
structure also changed. A new route Busan, Korea–Weihai, China was launched in 2007. 
 
9.5 STEPS TOWARDS NEA MARKET INTEGRATION 
 
The next question is how the experience between Korea and China might be made more 
general across NEA. There are several constraints: 
 
Different interests 
The Korea Transport Institute (KOTI) has pointed out that the most serious obstacles are the 
asymmetries between economies with diverse market sizes, different geographical locations 
and disparate economic interests based on the varying strengths of their airlines. 
 
Bilateral agreements 
Another constraint is the set of terms of existing bilateral agreements. KOTI found that the 
bilateral ASAs between Japan, Korea and China are in certain respects even more restrictive 
than the Bermuda I agreement between EU economies, which was established at the point 
when a common European air transport policy began to emerge.  
 
Legal issues 
Zhang (2008) identified a legal issue as each economy’s legal system is not in line with up-
to-date transport and logistics practices. An updated Civil Aviation Act, Decree and 
Ordinance should be implemented or reinforced through regulation. Korean aviation 
authorities have begun to reconstruct the legal system that governs the air transport industry, 
bringing the issue to the National Assembly with the intention of presenting a better method 
of regulation. 
 
People movement 
With regard to eliminating administrative barriers, particularly in the movement of people, 
Korea and Japan agreed to implement a visa exemption program, which was initiated to 
comply with the opening of the 2004 Aichi Expo in Japan and the inauguration of the Central 
Japan International Airport in Nagoya.  
 
More specific suggestions for the development of the air transport regulatory system in the 
region are the following: 
 
Give first priority to air cargo liberalisation 
The air cargo sector may be a good place to start in implementing liberalisation in NEA, 
rather than passenger operations. Korea has a special interest in this strategy because 
throughout the region air cargo traffic is growing rapidly. Table 9.11 shows the fastest 
growing airports in Asia. In terms of freight volume, airports in NEA mark the top five, and 
there are five Chinese and three Japanese airports within the top 30. Each of the three 
economies plans to construct more social infrastructure at airports to provide improved 
business and to support air cargo operations. Narita International Airport (Japan) Beijing-
Tianjin International (China) and Incheon International Airport (Korea) are either already 
equipped with the necessary infrastructure or plan further expansion. These plans would be 
supported by a commitment to more liberal arrangements for cargo operations. 
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Table 9.11: Fast-growing cargo airports in Asia, 2007. 
Rank Airport Cargo carried (ton) 
YoY 
(%) 
World 
rank 
1 Beijing, China 1,220,001 15.8 20 
2 Shanghai Pudong, China 2,494,808 15.5 5 
3 Jakarta, Indonesia 384,050 11.5 46 
4 Chengdu, China 328,429 11.1 56 
5 Xiamen, China 193,625 10.6 89 
5 Shenzhen, China 616,058 10.1 33 
7 Incheon, Korea 2,555,582 9.4 4 
8 Shanghai Hongqiao, China 388,815 6.9 47 
9 Guangzhou, China 694,923 6.4 30 
10 Kunming, China 232,647 6.1 78 
Source: KOTI and Airport Council International. 
 
Complementary measures 
It will be important to deal with complementary issues in order to capture the benefits from a 
regional agreement. For example, issues to consider include traffic control, people movement 
and safety and security. 
 
While NEA may not follow the EU model exactly, there are lessons to be learnt from that 
experience. In particular, the EU started EUROCONTROL for safe airspace control and the 
centralisation of the air traffic control system before proceeding into discussions on the 
integration and liberalisation of the air transport market. Similarly, EU’s air transport 
passengers or citizens of EU members are not required to carry their passport within the EU 
boundaries. However, NEA economies demand authorisation stamps from economies to 
which one desires to travel, as well as travel documentation, which must be unnecessary in a 
truly integrated and liberated air transport market. 
 
A regional agreement would also put emphasis on safety and security. Representatives from 
the three economies must discuss and cooperatively stipulate such measures. ICAO has set 
forth a complete series of common safety and security standards, by which the contracting 
states must abide. Aviation authorities in China and Japan established a cooperative 
mechanism at the ministerial level in May 2005, which covers the entire field of aviation 
issues except for air traffic rights. Furthermore, China and Korea could establish an identical 
cooperative mechanism. If the three economies shared identical safety and security 
obligations and adhered to the common standards, it would be easier to develop bilateral 
safety and security mechanisms into tripartite ones. 
 
To capture these and other wider dimensions and non-aeronautical issues directly linked to 
the air transportation market, KOTI has proposed to use the term ‘free sky policy’ for the 
scope of regional strategy. 
 
9.6 CONCLUSION 
 
There are significant examples of reform to date within NEA. Within Korea (and other 
economies) the growth of the LCCs has been important. Fares are lower and traffic has 
grown. The negotiation of an Open Skies arrangement between Korea and China based on 
Shandong Province led to lower fares, more frequent flights, greater convenience and higher 
traffic levels. This has increased the interest in extending this experience to international 
routes. There are some lessons in the experiences of the EU and the USA on how this might 
be done but for a variety of reasons its applicability is limited. At the same time, the expected 
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competitive pressure that spills over from the agreement between the USA and the EU is a 
driver for change in NEA.  
 
There are some specific issues to be addressed, including security and safety, air traffic 
control and the movement of people. However, the members of the region have common 
interests in pursuing this development. A place to start may be to seek more rapid 
liberalisation in the cargo sector, where traffic is growing rapidly. There are challenges to 
resolve and this case study concludes with some comments on the role of research, both in 
the experience to date and in formulating the next steps. 
 
Further research will contribute to progress. For the integration of NEA’s air transport 
market, a number of academic and government institutes have already conducted important 
studies on the regional air transport market (Oum, Zhang & Fu 2009). There have been many 
studies and proposals; aviation academic specialists have presented the requirements for the 
market integration process and suggested additional research ideas for the identification of 
winners and losers at the bilateral/trilateral air transportation liberalisation meetings. 
Whatever projects are designed, the goal must be to develop a new strategy. To carry such 
studies further, forming a joint research group among NEA’s representatives might be the 
first step of the action plan. A methodology that supports the reform program but recognises 
issues in the distribution of its effects, as well as an analysis of safeguard measures, could be 
developed. 
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Chapter 10 
 
RAIL TRANSPORT IN NEW ZEALAND 
 
 
Dave Heatley1 and Margot Schwass2
 
 
 
• Privatisation of track and operations in New Zealand’s rail system had significant 
effects, including lower prices and higher volumes, improved productivity and better 
financial performance. 
• Despite reforms, profits did not cover the cost of capital and debt was increasing, 
while track maintenance was falling: these were consequences of the underlying 
economics of rail and of the constraints imposed by the government. Eventually the 
track was returned to the government. 
• Successful structural reforms require a solid understanding of the economics of rail, 
and the specific circumstances and history of an economy’s transport system. 
 
 
10.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
‘The railways in New Zealand have never been regarded, or run, as a profit-making concern’, 
wrote New Zealand’s Minister of Railways, Gordon Coates, in 1923. Even the most 
unprofitable branch lines and services had an intangible value, he said: ‘They have opened up 
the economy, increased production and consequently the wealth of the Dominion’ (Atkinson 
2007 p. 60). For much of the 20th century, rail was regarded not only as core government 
business but also as an iconic part of New Zealand’s journey to prosperity. Notions that the 
railways should cover costs or provide a return on the capital invested were anathema to 
policy makers and the public alike. To Minister Coates, running a railway solely on 
commercial grounds ‘would not be utilising the service in the true interests of [New 
Zealand]’. 
 
Those traditional assumptions were swept aside in the 1980s. Corporatisation was followed 
by deregulation, privatisation and then the separation of infrastructure from rail operations. 
But in 2008 rail became a government activity once more, with both the tracks and rail 
services owned and managed by the New Zealand Rail Corporation through its business 
arms, ONTRACK and KiwiRail. After more than 25 years of policy shifts and U-turns, rail in 
New Zealand today is still far from ‘a profit-making concern’ and the need for significant 
government subsidies remains. There are conflicting views on rail’s potential to contribute to 
New Zealand’s economic development and environmental goals. Debate continues over how 
best to fund and run a railway ‘in the true interests’ of New Zealand. 
 
This case study describes the arrangements under which rail has operated in New Zealand, 
and explores the policies and political imperatives that drove them. Figure 10.1 summarises 
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the changes in policy. How has rail performed under the various models? And, given its 
ongoing economic performance problems, where might the future of rail in New Zealand lie? 
 
The next section includes some detail of the history of the development of the rail network up 
to the creation of corporate structure for the government-owned system in 1982. Those more 
interested in regulatory changes since then should turn to section 10.3. 
 
10.2 A SHORT HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND RAIL TO THE 1990s 
 
10.2.1 Building the railway, building the nation: 1860 to the 1920s 
 
Rail has been described as New Zealand’s ‘engine of colonisation’ (Atkinson 2007 p. 22). 
Railways helped open up the economy’s interior, linking new European settlements to ports, 
from the 1860s. The first railways were short lines built by provincial governments at 
considerable and usually very high cost. By 1880, with the economy’s population still only 
500 000, New Zealand had more than 1900km of track. Trains carried nearly 3 million 
passengers and 830 000 tons of freight a year (ONTRACK 2010). 
 
The government’s enthusiasm for railways continued well into the 20th century. While some 
had dreamed of a national trunk line, it was also considered vital to establish branch lines 
connecting rural areas – with their farms, dairy factories, meat works, mills and mines – to 
export ports. Passenger services between major urban centres expanded too, and some 
extraordinary feats of engineering saw the North Island main trunk line finished in 1908 (its 
South Island counterpart was completed in 1945). Between 1870 and 1929 tens of millions of 
pounds were spent on rail construction, representing 48% of the economy’s Public Works 
Fund (Atkinson 2007 p. 57). By 1920 New Zealand Rail was carrying 28 million passengers 
and more than 6 million tons of freight. 
 
10.2.2 The end of the golden age: 1930 to the 1990s 
 
The rail network continued to expand, reaching its peak in 1952 at 5695km. However, it was 
not until 1962 – when rail ferries began sailing between the North and South Islands – that 
New Zealand had a fully integrated national rail network.  
 
For much of the first part of the 20th century, rail remained a protected icon of national 
progress. Money was poured into enhancements – the transition from steam to diesel, the 
electrification of suburban lines, the introduction of railcars, the promotion of rail tourism – 
without any expectation that the costs would be recouped. Rail was effectively a public 
service, with the Railways Department New Zealand’s largest employer. Yet even as the 
network was expanding, rail was losing its pre-eminence and by the 1920s increasing 
competition from road transport saw the start of the steady deterioration in rail’s financial 
performance that has continued ever since (see Figure 10.2). 
 
New Zealanders embraced the automobile early and enthusiastically, with ownership of cars 
more than doubling from 71 403 to 150 571 in the second half of the 1920s, by which time 
there was one car for every nine New Zealanders – one of the highest rates of automobile 
ownership in the world at that time (Atkinson 2007 p. 100). Passenger rail travel began to fall 
almost immediately (Figure 10.3). 
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Figure 10.1: Milestones in the development of railways in New Zealand, 1982–2008. 
  
The government Railways Department becomes the New Zealand Rail 
Corporation (NZRC), which operates the rail network (freight and passenger 
services) and the rail ferry service connecting the North and South Islands. 
NZRC becomes a publicly-owned enterprise as the government pursues a far-
reaching program of economic liberalisation, including the privatisation of many 
state activities. 
In preparation for privatisation, NZRC’s core rail and ferry operations are 
transferred to a new entity, NZ Rail. NZRC retains ownership of the land under 
the tracks, and various non-core businesses (e.g., buses, property etc.). 
NZ Rail sold to a private consortium for NZD400 million by the National 
Government, which continues many of the previous government’s economic 
policies. 
The government buys the rail and ferry businesses from Toll NZ for 
NZD690 million and rebrands them as KiwiRail. Toll retains other non-core 
businesses. On the recommendation of the Rail Development Group, the 
government adopts a vertically integrated structure for rail operations. NZRC is 
the single entity responsible for both rail and ferry services, and for rail 
infrastructure. KiwiRail and ONTRACK are separate operating units reporting to 
the NZRC Board. 
NZ Rail renamed Tranz Rail. 
Tranz Rail shares publicly floated. 
Tranz Rail sells the Auckland commuter rail network to the government, and the 
operation of commuter trains becomes the responsibility of a subsidiary of the 
Auckland Regional Council. Ownership of the track network is transferred to the 
publicly-owned enterprise, NZRC (which in 2004 adopts the trading name 
ONTRACK). 
Operation of the Auckland commuter train services is sub-contracted to the private 
company Connex Group Australia (later Veolia Transport Auckland). 
The government buys the remaining track network beyond Auckland from Toll NZ 
and establishes ONTRACK to manage the tracks (structural separation). 
Logistics and transport company Toll Group buys an 84% shareholding in Tranz 
Rail, which is renamed Toll NZ. 
1982 
1986 
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1995 
1996 
1993 
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2008 
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Figure 10.2: Rail operating profit/loss as a percentage of revenue, 1875–1982. (Source: Heatley 2009 
p. 11) 
 
For freight, the competition from trucks – whose greater flexibility and connectivity made 
them ideally suited to New Zealand’s low freight volumes and sparse settlement patterns – 
represented a major threat. The government stepped in, offering generous freight concessions 
to ensure local producers used rail. Then, in 1936, legislation was introduced preventing 
trucks from carrying loads more than 30 miles (48km) and restricting new trucking operators 
to those that could prove a need for their services. The Railways Department expanded its 
Road Services Branch, which soon become one of the economy’s largest bus operators 
(Atkinson 2007 p. 102). 
 
Despite these interventions, rail’s already poor financial performance continued to decline. 
After an upsurge due to fuel rationing during and after World War II (Dravitzki & Lester 
2006 Fig. 3), passenger travel dropped dramatically, apart from some resurgence in urban 
commuter services for the new suburbs established post-war (see Figure 10.3). The option of 
travelling from Auckland to Wellington within an hour by air, rather than 10 hours by train, 
increasingly enticed long-distance travellers. Freight services continued to lose market share 
to road. 
 
The Railways Department continued to struggle financially and its declining fortunes 
eventually prompted drastic measures. Closures of the least profitable branch lines and 
services, which had begun in the 1950s, accelerated. In 1982 the Railways Department was 
corporatised, becoming the New Zealand Railways Corporation. With a new focus on profit 
making, there were massive job losses – between 1982 and 1989 the workforce was cut by 
54%. For a while rail’s financial decline steadied. But like new technologies and regulatory 
protection previously, line closures and staff cuts were not enough to arrest the downward 
trend.  
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Figure 10.3: The decline in passenger rail travel. (Source: Atkinson 2007 pp. 101, 215) 
 
In the 1980s the transport sector felt the full force of the Fourth Labour Government’s 
deregulation program. The restriction on road freight movements (which had steadily 
increased from 48 to 150km) was phased out, and by 1986 road transport operators were no 
longer subject to the Ministry of Transport’s qualitative licensing system. At the same time, 
the permitted size and weight of trucks were growing steadily. The combined impact was 
immediate and dramatic: rail lost one-third of its freight market share between 1980 and 1988 
(ISCR 1999a p. 13), and greater competition saw freight haulage prices fall by 25% 
(McKinnon 1998 p. 213). If rail was to remain competitive, services and infrastructure (for 
both freight and passengers) needed modernising urgently. 
 
All these factors, in conjunction with the reforming ideology of the times, drove the 
government’s decision to sell rail to the private sector. 
 
10.3 PRIVATISATION 
 
Deregulation, privatisation, asset sales and subsidy removal were central planks of the radical 
economic program of the government which was elected in 1984. In its electoral term, a 
heavily-indebted, tightly-regulated economy that the new Prime Minister described as 
operating ‘like a Polish shipyard’ was transformed into a deregulated free market economy at 
a speed that astonished onlookers. 
 
The privatisation mantra was continued by the new government that came to power in 1990. 
This new government saw selling government assets as a way to raise money while avoiding 
ongoing investment in them. In the case of rail, significant investment was urgently needed in 
both the track and rolling stock after years of cost cutting: who better to take on the task than 
the private sector? The same approach was applied to other areas previously seen as core 
government business. Telecommunications, electricity, the postal service and the national 
airline were all either privatised or became publicly-owned enterprises during this period. In 
New Zealand, a publicly-owned enterprise is a corporation whose shares are wholly owned 
by the government, and whose principal objective is to operate as a successful business. Each 
enterprise has an independent board and management, and their responsibilities (together 
with those of the shareholding Minister) are clearly delineated under the State Owned 
Enterprises Act 1986. 
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Preparations for selling New Zealand Rail began in 1990. In 1993 it was bought by a private 
consortium comprising Fay Richwhite and Company (local investment bankers), the 
Wisconsin Central Transportation Corporation and Berkshire Partners LLC. They paid 
NZD400 million, and renamed the business Tranz Rail. 
 
A ‘Core Lease’ between the Crown and Tranz Rail gave the company an exclusive 40-year 
right (with a right of renewal for a further 40 years) to use the land under the current network 
for the purposes of running a railway. There was no access regime for potential competitors 
(excepting provisions for heritage operators). Presumably, by granting exclusive rights the 
government received a higher sale price at privatisation. 
 
Following the decision to prepare rail for privatisation in 1989, a focused marketing effort led 
by non-rail staff brought in for that purpose segmented the freight market. This effort led to 
better understanding of customer needs and a customer-centric approach that recognised that 
Tranz Rail’s freight business was dominated by a small number of customers transporting a 
very small number of commodities (ISCR 1999a pp. 32–4). Tranz Rail benefited from this 
market segmentation, improved understanding of customers and focus on marketing to their 
largest customers. Volumes for the bulk-goods segment increased by 5.5% per year over 
1994–97 in response to price falls of 7% per year. The export-goods segment was more 
elastic, with volumes growing at 12% per year in response to price falls of 4.4% per year. The 
distribution (logistics) segment had small price and volume growth in response to an 
improved quality of service (ISCR 1999a p. 42). 
 
It was not until 1996 that Tranz Rail sought to directly measure operational indicators that 
had been identified as important to service quality. The limited data available showed 
somewhat variable results through to 1997 (ISCR 1999a pp. 39–40). Significant 
improvements were reflected in customer satisfaction surveys conducted in 2000 and 2003, 
with positive responses to the question ‘Would you recommend Tranz Rail to another 
potential customer?’ increasing from just over 30% to nearly 80% (Tranz Rail Holdings 
Limited 2003). 
 
Under private ownership Tranz Rail further improved productivity and returned the first 
operating profits for rail in many years. Costs were reduced, including by cutting uneconomic 
services. Freight volumes grew, peaking in 2000 (Figure 10.4), while rail’s share of the land 
freight market peaked at 29% in 1998 (Richard Paling Consulting 2008 p. 4). 
 
 
Figure 10.4: Rail freight in New Zealand from 1880. (Source: Rockpoint 2009 p. 103) 
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But Tranz Rail’s debt levels were rising at the same time. Its profits were insufficient to cover 
the opportunity costs of capital (shown in Figure 10.5) and both the track and the rolling 
structure continued to suffer from insufficient investment in maintenance, renewal and 
upgrades (ONTRACK 2010; Heatley 2009 p. 35). 
 
 
Figure 10.5: Tranz Rail’s profit could not sustain its operations. (Source: Heatley 2009 p. 28) 
 
Nor did Tranz Rail perform well for its shareholders. From a high point of NZD9/share in 
1997, the value of Tranz Rail shares fell steeply to NZD0.39 in 2003. Those who had bought 
shares in the public float in 1996 and retained them through to 2003 got back only 28% of 
their original investment (although the original investors did very well indeed, realising a 
total of NZD470 million on their initial equity of NZD105 million when they sold their 
shares in 1997 – a transaction that subsequently became the focus of an insider-trading 
inquiry) (Gaynor 2008; Heatley 2009 p. 31). 
 
At the time of privatisation, the government retained ownership of the land under the rail 
tracks, leasing it to Tranz Rail through the ‘Core Lease’. Assuming that the initial objective 
of privatisation was greater economic efficiency, the Core Lease arrangement worked to 
undermine it. If a line was not economic, the rail operator was unable to make the 
economically rational decision to sell the land for a more productive use. This suggests that, 
although the government had at one level embraced the new era of privatisation, it was 
reluctant to abandon rail to market forces entirely. This became even clearer in 2002, when 
Tranz Rail indicated it wanted to close 41% of the lines, deeming them uneconomic (RDG 
2008a; Heatley 2009 p. 46). Faced with this politically unpalatable prospect, and with real 
concerns about the impact of under-investment in the network, the government (Labour-led 
once more) sought a way to maintain a national railway that met its political, economic and 
social goals. 
 
What went wrong with privatisation? One problem was the assumption that – despite rail’s 
history – simply changing the ownership model would ‘fix’ the underlying economics of rail 
in New Zealand (Box 10.1). Secondly, the government’s willingness to intervene when the 
owners sought to rationalise services and close unprofitable lines demonstrated that it still 
wanted substantial control over rail. Not only did this create difficulties at the time, but it is 
also likely to have long-term ramifications: any future government wishing to pursue 
privatisation may find it cannot credibly commit to non-interference (Heatley 2009 p. 46). 
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Box 10.1: Constrained by geography and population. 
New Zealand – population 4.3 million3
 
 – is an economy comprising two narrow, mountainous main 
islands, whose nearest neighbour is 1500km away. These facts place certain inescapable limits on 
rail operations and have dictated some significant decisions. For example, the economy’s 
challenging topography was instrumental in the early choice of narrow-gauge tracks, which were 
cheaper to build in mountainous terrain (Japan, Indonesia and Australia’s Tasmania chose the same 
option for similar reasons). Unfortunately, this decision placed technological and commercial 
constraints on rail’s development which took decades to overcome (Leitch & Stott p. 5). 
More insurmountable have been the problems caused by New Zealand’s low population density (16 
people/km2). This has made it impossible to achieve the ‘economies of density’ essential for 
successful rail services – in other words, there is insufficient population to justify running more 
trains on existing tracks (The Treasury 2009 p. 25). Frequent, high-speed passenger trains may be 
viable in similarly-sized island nations such as the United Kingdom and Japan, but those 
economies’ population density is far greater, at 338 and 251 people/km2 respectively. 4
 
 New 
Zealand’s low urban population density and a trend to dispersed employment have also contributed 
to the demise of commuter rail services in all but two cities, Auckland and Wellington. Thus, in 
New Zealand today, freight, and not passengers, is the lifeblood of rail. 
The viability of freight services, too, is constrained by physical factors. The fact that the railways 
still follow routes mapped out more than 100 years ago, often through difficult terrain, means 
freight may have to travel more slowly and over longer distances to reach the same destinations 
served by roads. Rail’s competitiveness is also constrained by the low volume of bulk freight and 
the short distances it is carried, relative to international standards. For the past 30 years, the average 
freight journey has been just under 300km, well below the distance at which rail is found to be 
competitive internationally for all but point-to-point transport of bulk commodities (Heatley 2009 
p. 25). New Zealand’s lack of borders, and the obvious inability to connect with other economies’ 
rail networks, is an important factor here. In combination with the low population and other factors, 
it means New Zealand’s rail freight density – calculated as the average number of tonnes of freight 
transported per kilometre of track – is very low by international standards (Figure 10.6). 
 
Despite all these constraints and their impact on rail’s economic performance, the size of New 
Zealand’s rail network in 2010 (4000km) remains unchanged from 1991. 
                                                 
3 As at 30 September 2009. (Source: Statistics New Zealand, http://www.stats.govt.nz.top-statistics.aspx). 
4 Population density statistics are based on 2007 data. (Source: United Nations Statistics Division, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/products/dyb/dyb2007.htm). 
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Figure 10.6: A comparison of rail freight density internationally. (Source: Heatley 2009 p. 21) 
 
10.4 THE GOVERNMENT RETURNS TO RAIL 
 
The government’s return to the rail business began with its purchase of the Auckland 
suburban rail network from Tranz Rail in 2002. The Auckland Regional Council’s transport 
agency, the Auckland Regional Transport Authority, became responsible for services (which 
were later contracted out to Veolia Transport: see Section 10.5.2). In 2003 the government 
began discussing the possibility of buying a stake in Tranz Rail, but this stalled when 
Australian transport and logistics company Toll Group moved to take over Tranz Rail. 
 
Toll Group saw Tranz Rail as complementing its New Zealand activities, and considered that 
it could operate the business profitably (ONTRACK 2010; Toll Holdings Ltd 2004; Toll 
Group 2003). In 2003 it bought an 84% stake in Tranz Rail at NZD1.05/share (valuing Tranz 
Rail at NZD232 million) and renamed the business ‘Toll NZ’. A year later the government 
struck a deal with Toll, buying the whole track network for NZD1. It was to be managed by 
ONTRACK, a business unit formed as part of the New Zealand Railways Corporation 
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(NZRC). It could be argued that Toll had thus secured itself an attractive deal: it had bought 
into rail relatively cheaply and retained the only part of the business that was ever likely to be 
profitable, while the intrinsically loss-making part (the track network) was now the 
government’s responsibility. 
 
This observation may seem counter-intuitive: a track network with its high fixed and sunk 
costs seems a promising candidate for a natural monopoly, and the opportunity to earn 
monopoly rents. However, the allocation of rents is only pertinent if there are rents to be 
allocated. As argued in this chapter, New Zealand rail (as a whole) is uneconomic relative to 
its competition; therefore there is no natural monopoly. 
 
Under its agreement with Toll NZ, the government committed to spending NZD200 million 
on network upgrades and renewal. For its part, Toll NZ would spend NZD100 million on new 
rolling stock, and pay the government an annual track charge for exclusive access to the rail 
network. These access rights were subject to a ‘use-it-or-lose-it’ provision: if Toll NZ’s 
traffic fell below 70% of average freight levels for 2002–04 on any line segment, it would no 
longer have exclusive rights to that segment (The Treasury 2004 p. 12). It must be considered 
very unlikely that this provision would have led to the appearance of a serious above-rail 
competitor to Toll, as the competitor’s operations would have been restricted to those isolated 
line segments where there was declining demand for rail freight (Heatley 2009, p. 47). In any 
case there was no competitive entry between 2004 and 2008, when the agreement was 
effectively cancelled. 
 
The access charge became a serious sticking point over the next few years. When the 
government sought to raise the charge to help fund upgrades, Toll NZ argued that this would 
lead to substantial losses unless freight prices were increased – and this would inevitably 
mean losing customers to road transport. Nonetheless, Toll NZ said in October 2007 that it 
remained ‘absolutely committed to rail in New Zealand and freight was increasing on a 
number of its services’ (Sydney Morning Herald 2007). 
 
In the access charge negotiations between Toll and the government, both parties were in the 
position to ‘hold up’ the other and extract a ‘profit’ at the expense of a larger loss incurred by 
the other party.5
 
 Both the track (an exclusive sunk investment) and operations (with exclusive 
access conferred by contract) could be considered as ‘bottleneck facilities’, relative to each 
other. (But this does not make them bottleneck facilities in the economy as a whole – for that 
to be the case there would need to be a lack of close substitutes for the services offered by 
those facilities.) 
The question was: ‘Who had the greater bargaining power in the negotiations?’. 
 
Toll had a credible threat: to withdraw selected services from rail and shift their operations to 
road and/or sea transport. This threat was credible because they had an existing road and sea 
transport business, and their shareholders would demand that Toll exit any business in which 
there was no reasonable prospect of earning an economic profit. Withdrawal of services 
would create a political cost for the government, which had made explicit policy 
commitments to invest in rail infrastructure and to move an increasing share of freight from 
road to rail. 
                                                 
5 The ‘hold up problem’ in economics is that a party that has a relationship-specific investment is vulnerable to a 
threat by other parties to terminate that relationship. The threat enables these parties to obtain better terms 
than initially agreed (Milgrom & Roberts 1992). 
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But the government lacked any credible threats against Toll. They were contractually 
committed to maintain or improve the rail infrastructure (The Treasury 2004 p. 20). If Toll 
withdrew services, the contract allowed for a new rail operator to take over those services. 
While a lack of scale would mean that the new operator would likely face a higher cost 
structure than Toll, the contract meant that the terms for new entrants (including access 
charges) could be no more favourable than those faced by Toll (The Treasury 2004 p. 14). 
The putative entrant, with higher costs, would have little chance of earning a profit on a 
service that Toll decided to exit because it was uneconomic. Hence, there was no credible 
threat of entry. 
 
Thus, the 2004 agreement had left Toll with substantially greater bargaining power. The 
government’s frustration at Toll’s exercising this power (combined with some unrealistic 
ideas about the potential of rail) led it to buy out the rail operator on terms very favourable to 
Toll. However, the costs of resolving this bargaining problem (to date over NZD1 billion) 
have exceeded the costs of living with it (perhaps an access charge subsidy of NZD70 million 
per year6
 
). 
In this instance, the contractual allocation of rights determined the locus of the bargaining 
power. With hindsight, other strategies may have been more successful in 2003–04, for 
example: 
• encouraging the rail operator to withdraw from uneconomic services (in order to 
ensure the operator’s ongoing viability); 
• making an equity injection into the integrated rail operator (so that the government 
and private shareholders faced the same incentives); 
• purchasing the distressed integrated rail operator at a bargain market price before (or 
in competition with) the takeover offer from Toll; and 
• letting the rail operator fail, cancelling the exclusive access rights and introducing a 
new ownership and access model (e.g., one with sections of track owned by major 
users or port operators and cross-licensing arrangements for access). 
 
In May 2008 the government moved to purchase the rail (and inter-island ferry) business 
from a reluctant Toll NZ, citing the impasse over the access charge. The change of ownership 
came into effect in July 2008, with the government rebranding the rail business ‘KiwiRail’. 
Like ONTRACK, KiwiRail was a business arm of the New Zealand Railways Corporation 
and reported to the NZRC Board. In principle, there were still no barriers to competition 
within rail. Under the Railways Act 2005, any operator who met safety-related licence 
conditions could start running a rail service – providing they could negotiate access to the 
ONTRACK rail network. Toll NZ retained its road transport and logistics arm, Toll 
TranzLink, which became New Zealand’s largest road freight operator. 
 
Despite the public battles over the track access charge, the government’s buy-back of rail was 
primarily driven by ideology. This expressed the government’s belief that a strong rail 
network was essential to New Zealand’s future economic and environmental performance. 
With freight volumes forecast to rise by 75% over the next 25 years, rail had a significant 
economic role to play. It was essential for regional development, and for New Zealand’s vital 
export industries that benefited from rail’s ability to carry large volumes of bulk commodities 
(such as coal and dairy products) comparatively cheaply (Cullen 2008a). The government 
also argued that the purchase was integral to the development of a more environmentally 
                                                 
6 http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/informationreleases/rail/purchase/pdfs/rp-tsy-em-4dec06.pdf. 
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sustainable and integrated transport system. But even more fundamentally, the purchase 
confirmed the government’s view that, if it was going to have to subsidise the rail network – 
which rail’s performance under successive ownership structures had shown to be inevitable – 
it was preferable to subsidise a government-owned enterprise, rather than a foreign-owned 
private company. The Deputy Prime Minister of the time said that his government would not 
allow ‘New Zealand taxpayers [to] indefinitely subsidise a private, foreign operation and then 
not make sure that the investment would deliver social and economic returns for New 
Zealand’ (Cullen 2008b). 
 
There was considerable criticism of the price that taxpayers paid for the railways. At 
NZD690 million, even the government admitted it had paid ‘a premium price’ (Young 2008). 
However, the government said that the price reflected the need to buy Toll out of its long-term 
monopoly rights (Bridgman 2008). It was also argued that the buy-out was preferable to the 
alternatives: ‘continuing to subsidise a foreign-owned company failing to invest sufficiently in 
basic infrastructure, increased expenditure required on roading, increased accidents on the road, 
and increased greenhouse gas emissions at a direct cost to the taxpayer’ (Young 2008). 
 
The government made an immediate commitment to investment. In July 2008 it appointed a 
Rail Development Group (RDG) to make recommendations about rail’s future. The RDG 
confirmed that deferred capital expenditure was a pressing issue, but said that remedying this 
would go only some way towards making rail commercially viable without government 
subsidy (RDG 2008b p. 6). It called for more than NZD1 billion to be spent over 5 years on 
replacing locomotives, rehabilitating key sections of the network, upgrading information 
technology and creating freight hubs. As a first step, in October 2008 the government 
announced an injection of NZD121 million for rail industry improvements in the current 
fiscal year, in addition to previously forecast spending (Cullen 2008c). 
 
The next month, there was a change of government. The new government had already 
pledged not to sell any government assets in its first term, so government ownership of rail 
for the next 3 years at least was guaranteed. The government stressed there was now a strong 
expectation that the rail network should deliver ‘a commercial rate of return. Any taxpayer 
subsidies to the freight side of the business should be provided transparently and should not 
be at the expense of other transport modes’ (Joyce 2009a). 
 
After its first year back in government ownership, rail’s economic performance problems 
remain. KiwiRail made a loss of NZD187 million in 2008/09, largely due to depreciation 
expenses on network assets (KiwiRail 2009 p. 76). The total government funding of 
NZD425 million almost exceeded operating revenue of NZD518 million. 
 
10.5 REGULATION, COMPETITION AND STRUCTURAL REFORM 
 
10.5.1 Minimal regulation 
 
The 1980s New Zealand model of structural reform has been labelled ‘light-handed 
regulation’ (Evans et al. 1996 p. 1885). It sought to minimise government and regulatory 
intervention and to place reliance on actual and potential competition for the regulation of 
prices and monopoly behaviour. 
 
When the New Zealand Railways Corporation became a government-owned corporation in 
the 1980s and was subsequently privatised, a raft of regulations was discarded, including, 
most importantly, the regulatory restrictions on road transport first introduced in 1936 to 
242 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
allow rail to remain competitive. As already noted, deregulation had a major impact on the 
business, with rail losing one-third of its share of the freight market between 1980 and 1988. 
Today there is only minimal regulation of the sector and it focuses almost entirely on safety. 
The sector regulator is the Rail Regulation Section of the New Zealand Transport Agency, 
the government agency responsible for planning and funding land transport. Its rail-related 
responsibilities are confined to administering the Railways Act 2005, monitoring accidents, 
and licensing organisations that control and use rail networks. Licences are granted to rail 
providers and operators that meet specified safety standards. 
 
Rail is also affected by the provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991, the principal 
legislation dealing with the use of the natural environment and its resources. Under the Act, 
rail operators wanting to build or expand infrastructure need to embark on planning and 
resource consent processes that can be both costly and time consuming. 
 
The largely ‘hands-off’ approach to rail regulation reflects the present government’s thinking 
about infrastructure regulation in general. A recent Treasury paper described the objective of 
regulation as ‘to ensure sufficient certainty and consistency for business to operate 
competitively and with confidence, and with minimum transaction costs’. It also expressed 
concern that the costs of compliance may be contributing to New Zealand’s relatively low 
productivity performance: it ranks 22nd of 30 OECD economies (The Treasury 2009 p. 95). 
 
10.5.2 No barriers to entry 
 
As described above, under the Railways Act 2005 any operator who meets safety-related 
licence conditions can start a rail service when they negotiate access to the ONTRACK rail 
network. The real competition lies with those other transport modes that manage to respond 
to changes and challenges more rapidly than rail – with its high fixed costs and ‘sunk’ assets 
– has been able to. Most rail costs (e.g., the cost of providing tracks or signalling equipment) 
are fixed: they do not change depending on the volume of freight or passengers. In addition, 
rail infrastructure is a very long-lived asset that gets more expensive to maintain and renew as 
it ages. Most of New Zealand’s fixed rail assets are sunk: the value of tunnels, bridges etc. 
cannot be recovered if they are no longer used for railways (Heatley 2009 p. 20). 
 
In practice, KiwiRail has no competitors in either the rail freight or long-distance passenger rail 
markets. Nor is there much likelihood of competitors emerging, given rail’s perennial lack of 
profitability and KiwiRail’s ability to access government financial support. The only scenario a 
potential new entrant might consider would be to service a profitable subset of routes or 
customers. KiwiRail could be expected to oppose such competitive entry vigorously, as the 
company relies on its profitable routes to cross-subsidise its less profitable ones, and its 
integration with ONTRACK gives it substantial power to exclude rail competitors. 
 
Recent overseas trends towards supply-chain integration have seen port operators taking 
control over their supply chains by purchasing the rail networks servicing their hinterlands 
(e.g., in Europe: Notteboom 2008). Similarly, some large exporters (such as Australian 
mining companies) own the railways that connect their operations to ports. Such 
arrangements are unlikely to arise in New Zealand, as both major political parties appear 
committed to a national rail network with a single owner. 
 
Urban commuter rail is in a slightly different situation. In 2004 services in Auckland were 
contracted out via competitive tender. The successful tenderer was the French-owned 
multinational Veolia Environment (Box 10.2). 
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Box 10.2: Competition for Auckland Commuter Rail Services. 
When the Auckland Regional Council (ARC) called for tenders for the operation of Auckland’s 
commuter rail system in 2002, Tranz Rail chose not to tender. Instead, it sold the Auckland 
metropolitan rail network to the Crown for NZD81 million. In November 2003 the successful 
tenderer was announced: Connex Group Australia (now know as Veolia Transport Auckland, part 
of the French multinational Veolia Environment). Connex was one of three tenderers; the British 
firms Serco and Stagecoach were unsuccessful.7
 
 Connex took over operation of the trains from July 
2004.  
In parallel with these changes the ARC moved to consolidate passenger transport planning, asset 
management and service delivery in one organisation. ARC formed the Auckland Regional 
Transport Authority (ARTA) in 2004 to own stations and passenger trains and take responsibility 
for service planning. Under the contract terms, Veolia receives payment for its costs plus a 
management fee. All fare revenue goes directly to ARTA. 
 
Ownership of the track network and responsibility for signals and corridor infrastructure was 
transferred to the publicly-owned enterprise NZRC, which adopted the trading name ONTRACK. 
 
As a result of the new public–private partnership structure, substantial investment in new 
infrastructure and fare subsidies, train patronage in Auckland doubled between 2005 and 2010 
(Figure 10.7).8
More trains, more often. With the double tracking of the Western Line almost complete, trains 
run every 15 minutes at peak times, and five to six trains an hour run at peak times on the Southern 
and Eastern lines. Services increased from 635 per week in 2005 to 1475 in 2009 with 49 carriages 
added to the network. 
 ARTA attributes the increase in patronage to the following changes: 
More punctual. In March 2005 only 76.6% of trains arrived on time. This figure steadied at over 
85% for most of 2009. 
Better stations, better trains. 21 of the 41 stations on the network have been upgraded over 5 
years. Six train carriages have been fitted this year with new seating, carpet and upgraded air 
conditioning (Auckland Regional Transport Authority 2009 p. 1). 
 
The doubling in passenger numbers, however, came from a very low base. While rail now services 
12.5% of public transport trips in Auckland, passenger transport is still dominated by the use of 
private vehicles. 
 
The fare subsidies required to reach this level of patronage are significant: rail requires a NZD7–8 
operating subsidy/passenger trip (Auckland Regional Transport Authority 2006 p. 26). These 
subsidies do not include a contribution to capital costs. Fares have recently been raised after a 
significant period in which they were held constant in order to attract patronage.  
 
The structural split between ONTRACK and ARTA has created integration issues (Mein 2008) and 
continuing disputes between central and local government about who pays for rail. Transport 
Minister Stephen Joyce recently summed up the situation neatly: ‘everybody loves [rail], but 
nobody wants to pay’.9
 
 
Central government has committed to an NZD1.6 billion upgrade of Auckland’s commuter rail 
system, including electrification of the network at a cost of NZD1 billion. ARTA expects these 
upgrades to enable it to provide fast, reliable journeys at 10-minute frequencies and attract 
15.7 million passengers to rail by 2016. ARTA’s modelling suggests that at this level of patronage 
the operating subsidy per passenger can be reduced to NZD4 per passenger trip (Auckland 
Regional Transport Authority 2006). 
                                                 
7 http://tvnz.co.nz/content/238981. 
8 http://www.arta.co.nz/newsroom/media-releases.html?releaseid=dfdd9285-5056-a41f-9226-f3c70938762c. 
9 http://www.guide2.co.nz/politics/news/councils-need-to-pay-for-regional-rail-use-minister/11/15796. 
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Figure 10.7: Growth in Auckland passenger rail. (Source: Ministry of Transport10
 
) 
Commuter services in Wellington, currently owned and operated by KiwiRail under contract 
to the Wellington Regional Council, are expected to be similarly tendered out in 2016.11
 
 
Assuming the successful tenderer is a new entrant to the market, the total number of 
significant rail operators will climb to four. The three current operators are KiwiRail, Veolia 
Transport and Taieri Gorge Railway Ltd. Taieri Gorge Railway is the largest of the 
economy’s 60 heritage rail operators (the others are mainly small, non-profit organisations). 
10.5.3 Structural integration favoured 
 
For much of its history New Zealand rail has been structurally integrated, with a single 
organisation responsible for both infrastructure and rail services. There was, however, a 
period of structural separation from 2004 to 2008 when ONTRACK was responsible for 
below-rail infrastructure and Tranz Rail provided above-rail services. ‘Below-rail’ in this 
context means the non-moving parts of the rail network, including the rails themselves. 
 
Elsewhere in the world, structural separation has often been introduced to enhance 
competition. However, results have been mixed, with some economies (such as the United 
States) reporting a reduction in efficiency (Heatley 2009 p. 46). But in New Zealand the case 
for structural separation was made for somewhat different reasons. It arose at a time when the 
private rail operator, Toll NZ, was seeking government subsidies in order to maintain the 
national network. Rather than continuing to make direct subsidies, the government elected 
instead to create ONTRACK as a separate entity with which Toll would negotiate a track 
access agreement. As Nick Wills-Johnson (2007 p. 2) has argued in relation to Australia, ‘by 
investing in the below-rail infrastructure only, government can [ensure] that its investment is 
not affected by future inefficiencies elsewhere in the railway, or even by the railway 
operation becoming insolvent’. For the New Zealand government, then, structural separation 
was a less risky (and perhaps more politically acceptable) way of investing in rail. 
                                                 
10 http://www.transport.govt.nz/ourwork/TMIF/Pages/TV020.aspx accessed 3 May 2010. 
11 http://www.transport.govt.nz/ourwork/rail/Documents/Metro%20rail%20Oct%2009.pdf. 
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In the event, information-sharing difficulties soon arose between ONTRACK and Toll. For 
example, the former needed accurate forecasts of future freight volumes in order to plan its 
capital works program. But was supplying such information in Toll’s interests when 
ONTRACK might have used it to justify a higher track access charge? Impasses such as this 
contributed to the return to vertical integration in 2008. 
 
10.6 THE GAP TO BEST PRACTICE IN STRUCTURAL REFORM 
 
The current government favours minimal regulatory intervention, and has a review program 
in place to identify and remove ‘unnecessary and superfluous regulation’. 12
All things being equal, the Government will favour the distributed decision-making 
power of a competitive market for the provision of infrastructure. This is because the 
commercial disciplines that come from investors risking their own money are difficult to 
replicate in the public sector. However, the Government does have a role providing 
goods and services where: 
 Government 
ownership of transport infrastructure should be the exception rather than the norm, as 
evidenced by the following policy: 
• the goods and services have the characteristics of being ‘public goods’ in the 
technical sense; 
• the service is a monopoly and there are advantages in regulating through direct 
ownership rather than through the Commerce Act or other regulatory vehicle; or 
• distributional and equity objectives are better achieved through in-kind provision 
than through income support. (The Treasury 2010 p. 25) 
 
It would be hard to argue that railway freight and long-distance passenger services meet these 
criteria. Urban passenger rail may meet the criteria insofar as it can deliver public goods such 
as reductions in urban road congestion. There is little doubt that the current government 
would prefer rail to be privately owned, but they are constrained by their own pre-election 
policy commitments and a general public distrust of privatisation. There is a substantial gap 
between the current situation and one that harnesses the ‘distributed decision-making power 
of a competitive market’. The cost of this gap is difficult to establish. The direct costs of 
current policy to the taxpayer are measurable: they are the ongoing operational and capital 
subsidies to rail. Indirect costs include the opportunity costs of the land and other assets 
currently allocated to rail but potentially not being used for their most productive purpose in 
the economy. For example, the government is earning a zero financial return on the 
approximately NZD6 billion of land under the rail network. 
 
As rail is generally a price taker in a competitive freight market, it is unlikely that the current 
policy has a significant impact on freight prices. However, ongoing public ownership and 
subsidy of rail is restraining private investment in other transport modes, particularly in 
coastal shipping (Rockpoint 2009 p. 219). Distorted investment signals can be expected to 
lead to the creation or maintenance of an economically inefficient freight transport network 
with higher average prices over time. 
 
As noted, under present circumstances, competition within the rail sector is unlikely to emerge. 
Close substitutes exist for almost all of the freight products offered by New Zealand railways 
(Mackie, Baas & Manz 2006 p. 2). Rail faces substantial competition from both road and 
coastal shipping, and entry barriers in these sectors have been low in New Zealand since the 
1980s (ISCR 1999a pp. 15, 28). Competition in rail’s product markets (and threats of further 
entry there) should be sufficient to ameliorate monopoly power and drive efficiency gains.  
                                                 
12.http://www.treasury.govt.nz/economy/regulation/statement/govt-stmt-reg.pdf. 
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While the current arrangements are technically an open-access regime, entry is unlikely: the rail 
operator is in government ownership, rail freight is unprofitable, the operator is subsidised and 
the government is unable to credibly commit to future non-interference in the sector. These 
problems would need to be overcome before access regime changes had any material effect in 
the sector. Moreover, reforms designed to foster competition within the rail sector (e.g., 
structural separation and improved access regimes) would lack credibility given the 
government-owned and funded incumbent, and likely involve significant costs for little benefit. 
 
10.7 WHERE TO NOW FOR RAIL IN NEW ZEALAND? 
 
10.7.1 Drivers for reform 
 
From the government’s perspective, the key drivers for change appear to be: 
• a wish not to be seen as supporting rail over other transport modes, and hence 
unwillingness to continue subsidising unprofitable services; 
• the need for significant investment in rail infrastructure; 
• an expectation that further investment in KiwiRail will enable it to generate enough 
additional income to eventually meet its own renewal and capital development costs; 
• a wish to be seen to be actively addressing road congestion in Auckland; 
• a tight fiscal situation following the global financial crisis and recession in New Zealand; 
and 
• competitive and political pressure from the road transport and coastal shipping 
sectors, requiring rail to be more narrowly focused on providing services only where 
it has a competitive advantage. 
 
10.7.2 Barriers to reform 
 
Major barriers to change include: 
• a pre-election commitment to retaining KiwiRail in public ownership (at least for the 
current parliamentary term); 
• a public perception that New Zealand went too far with structural reform in the 1980s 
and 1990s; 
• ongoing operational and capital subsidies which reduce the incentives for efficiency 
improvements and structural change; and 
• the risk of policy capture by the incumbent publicly-owned firm, which faces the 
weak market discipline inherent in a corporatised structure. 
 
There is a strongly held public perception that the rail network was run down by its private 
owners and that this situation has been ‘fixed’ by re-nationalisation, regardless of the 
existence of evidence to the contrary. In fact, neither private nor public owners maintained 
rail infrastructure at anywhere near replacement levels from 1991 to 2008 (Heatley 2009 
pp. 34–5). Advocates of structural reform will need to overcome this public perception. 
 
A possible impediment to change is emphasis on over-detailed centralised transport network 
planning, under various labels including ‘logistics’ and ‘integrated planning’. While the goals 
of such activities are laudable, the vast majority of transport supply and demand factors are 
outside the control of the planners. Treasury (2010 p. 88) recognises this when they state ‘the 
parts of the [rail freight] network that thrive, and those that decline, will be determined to a 
large extent by the decisions of our major exporters and by the configuration of our ports’. 
There is a risk that integrated planning is used as a delaying tactic that supports the status 
quo, rather than as a true search for efficiency. Supply and demand uncertainties need to be 
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acknowledged as such, and not unduly delay decision making. Technical coordination – the 
efficient interchange of passengers and freight where transport modes interconnect – needs 
little central coordination; it will happen where demand is present and transport suppliers can 
profit from it. 
 
10.7.3 Small steps to support reform 
 
One useful reform would be to structurally separate the urban commuter services from the 
freight operator, with distinct branding and reporting. Advocates of the status quo frequently 
rely on confused arguments that ascribe commuter rail benefits to the freight network and 
vice versa. Functional and structural separation could allow for a more rational debate of 
these logically separate businesses. 
 
The advocates of policy reform are at a substantial information disadvantage to the 
incumbent firm. The level of financial detail (in particular breakdowns by business unit) and 
frequency of reporting have declined under public ownership compared with the situation 
under private ownership. A small but useful step in enabling the effective advocacy of 
structural reform would be to improve the financial reporting to the public, permitting 
effective evaluation of the rail sector by competitors and independent commentators. 
 
10.7.4 More questions than answers 
 
In 2010 rail faces an uncertain future, and for policy makers there are more questions than 
answers. How best to address rail’s long legacy of under investment and deferred maintenance 
(e.g., locomotives with an average age of 31 years, more than 550 bridges over 80 years old 
and dilapidated passenger services)? Much work is already in progress: major urban rail 
upgrades are underway in Wellington and Auckland, new locomotives and carriages are being 
purchased and some heavily used parts of the network are being upgraded. But the total cost of 
overcoming this legacy may be as much as NZD2 billion over the next 5 years (The Treasury 
2009 p. 85). And quite apart from ‘catch up’ funding, there is also a need to invest in new 
technology and infrastructure that would allow KiwiRail to take advantage of emerging 
business opportunities. It cannot be assumed that competing transport modes will stay stagnant 
– KiwiRail’s new infrastructure will be competing for customers against more efficient coastal 
shipping and larger trucks with improved fuel efficiency running on better roads. 
 
The 2009 government-appointed RDG concluded that while KiwiRail’s commercial revenue 
might be sufficient to fund its operating costs, it would be well short of the level required to 
provide a return on capital, or to fund asset renewals and new investment. Nor would it be 
sufficient to ‘maintain ongoing operating capability at a level to achieve the government’s 
desired policy outcomes’ (RDG 2008b p. 6). 
 
The clear need for ongoing government support was recognised when the government allocated 
NZD90 million in operating grants to KiwiRail for 2009/10. But is it prepared to keep on 
subsidising rail to this extent, and for how long? How can the government both deliver 
subsidies and incentivise good commercial decision making aimed at maximising financial 
returns? And should government subsidies be used to keep on supporting parts of the network 
that have long been non-commercial? An RDG report (2008c p. 2) noted that some routes had a 
good commercial rate of return (15–20%) while others were operating on negative returns. 
 
The government expects ‘that all investments in the national rail network provide a 
commercial rate of return. Taxpayer subsidies should be provided only as a last resort and 
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where there is clear evidence that it will improve service and provide a decent return on 
taxpayers’ money’ (Joyce 2009b). Although the government had not yet announced its rail 
policy at the time of writing, it appeared to be preparing to withdraw its NZD90 million 
operating subsidy to KiwiRail for 2011/12, while continuing to provide capital grants for 
infrastructure renewal and development without expecting any return on that investment. 
 
Government support for commuter rail would remain and KiwiRail would continue to 
provide some passenger services, possibly in conjunction with private operators. But in terms 
of KiwiRail’s core freight business, a clear message seemed to be emerging: the government 
expected the company to generate enough revenue to meet its own cash requirements – not 
necessarily to the point of providing the government (as owner) with a return on its 
investment, but sufficient to meet its own renewal and capital development costs. Exactly 
how KiwiRail was to achieve this turnaround in performance remained unclear, but it was 
likely to involve improvements in yield and productivity. The possibility of cutting 
unprofitable activities (such as long-distance passenger services) was still on the table. 
 
The government does not wish to be seen as supporting rail over competing modes of 
transport, and this position moves it marginally closer to that goal. It is interesting to note that 
when the first National Infrastructure Plan was released in March 2010, rail was not among 
the government’s eight key or emerging infrastructure priorities (The Treasury 2010 p. 15). 
 
Other policy questions surround the extent to which rail can deliver other economic and 
environmental benefits – the ‘positive externalities’ which the previous government used to 
justify its buy back of the railway. Research by the New Zealand Institute for the Study of 
Competition and Regulation in both 1999 and 2009 suggested that the magnitude of these 
externalities had been overstated. In some cases the benefits sought – such as reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions or congestion – could best be achieved by other means, such as a 
carbon tax, emissions trading scheme, commuter rail subsidies or road user charging. The 
research found that while rail did have some positive effects on economic development and 
the quality of the environment, they were not enough to outweigh rail’s negative contribution 
to New Zealand’s overall economic performance (ISCR 1999b p. 85; Heatley 2009 p. 58). 
 
Similar observations have been made by the Treasury. Its paper ‘Infrastructure: Facts and 
Issues’– a discussion document intended to guide the preparation of the first National 
Infrastructure Plan – noted that economic benefits are likely to be realised only on heavily 
used parts of the network. Treasury offered the following analysis: 
The argument for ongoing public subsidisation of the network tends to rest on the 
premise that rail offers positive externalities (e.g., reduced congestion, emissions and 
accidents) and that road transport does not pay for its full social costs, reducing the 
ability of rail to compete. There is little current evidence to support this. 
Much of the New Zealand rail network is uneconomic, even when taking into account the 
environmental value of rail’s greater fuel efficiency. While there may be a case for 
subsidising rail up to a certain point, based on its social and environmental contribution, 
it is an unresolved question about whether this would be sufficient to cover the full 
capital costs of the entire rail network. (The Treasury 2009 p. 29) 
 
Environmental benefits respond to the same economies of density that drive railway 
economics. The fixed (economic) costs of rail incur environmental costs in parallel. The main 
inputs into railway construction and maintenance are earthmoving (diesel), transport (diesel), 
steel and concrete. All have significant environmental costs, including being substantial 
sources of greenhouse gas emissions. On the operational side, heavily used lines are more 
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likely to carry full trainloads, and these offer significantly better fuel efficiencies than partial 
trainloads. It follows that the most environmentally beneficial parts of the network are likely 
to be those in least need of government subsidy. 
 
At the time of writing, the Ministry of Transport was undertaking more work to quantify the 
economic and environmental benefits of rail. In regard to the latter, there was a particular 
focus on determining the ‘environmental footprint’ costs to New Zealand if rail were not part 
of the overall transport mix. 
 
In deciding how best to proceed, the government will negotiate a course between doing what 
is economically rational and what is politically feasible. It has been suggested that the most 
economically rational course would be to largely abandon rail (Malpass 2009). This view 
acknowledges that rail has placed an enormous burden on New Zealand taxpayers for 
decades, and the situation is unlikely to change. Without the loss-making railways, hundreds 
of millions of dollars could be diverted to more socially and economically beneficial uses. 
 
A less extreme course would be to reduce the size of the network to only its most economic 
components (widely considered to comprise around 1500–2000km: see RDG 2008b p. 3; 
Heatley 2009 p. 69) and focus on rail’s competitive advantages: the point-to-point transport of 
large volumes of bulk freight and carefully planned commuter rail. Under this scenario, line 
closures and land sales would fund the upgrade of the network to modern standards (Heatley 
2009 pp. 70–2). However, the present government seems disinclined to move in this direction, 
seeing the retention of the national network as no more costly than having a disjointed smaller 
network (which could necessitate some duplication of rolling stock across its disparate parts). 
 
The course that the previous government was advised to take by the RDG avoided any such 
potentially controversial steps as dismantling the national network. While the RDG recognised 
that, on a purely financial basis, ‘rail is not commercially sustainable without a significant 
reduction in the size of the existing network’ (RDG 2008c p. 2), its ultimate recommendation 
was to retain the network at its present size through ongoing government support. 
 
The government today faces some difficult decisions. What role does it want rail to perform, 
and how much is it willing to spend on it? Is it prepared to wear the political consequences of 
making tough decisions about rail, with all the economic and social changes that may flow 
from them? Fundamentally, to echo the words of the Railways Minister more than 80 years 
ago, it needs to decide: what are ‘the true interests’ of New Zealand when it comes to rail? 
 
10.8 SOME LESSONS FROM THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIENCE 
 
10.8.1 Rail-specific lessons 
 
New Zealand’s experience with rail may be different to that of other economies, but it is by 
no means unique. There are close parallels with the experiences of Victoria (2007) and 
Tasmania (2009) in Australia, where those governments purchased previously privatised rail 
networks following near-abandonment by their owners. Successful structural reform requires 
a solid understanding of the economics of rail in general, and how they play out given the 
specific circumstances and history of an economy’s transport system. While applying lessons 
from one economy to another should be done cautiously, the following observations from 
New Zealand are pertinent: 
• Rail assets are very long-lived, but the demand for specific types of rail services has 
changed over significantly shorter timeframes. When combined with the high costs 
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and sunk nature of rail infrastructure, this makes the problem of determining the 
optimum type and level of investment very difficult indeed. 
• The long life of rail assets means that it is possible to boost short-term financial 
performance by deferring maintenance and upgrades, and incentives exist for both 
public and private owners to defer these costs. The inevitable long-term consequence 
is a dilapidated and uncompetitive rail system. 
• The economic performance of rail in New Zealand has long been poor. Unable to 
cover its capital costs, it relies on taxpayer subsidies to cover its operating deficit. 
This performance can be attributed to the convergence of distinctive physical factors 
(low population density, topography and geographical isolation) with rail’s underlying 
economic characteristics: high proportions of sunk fixed costs, expensive maintenance 
and renewals, and diminishing returns on infrastructure investment.  
• Simply changing the ownership model – from public to private and back again – has 
not changed the fundamental economics of rail. 
• A lack of competition within the rail sector does not give a rail operator a natural 
monopoly. KiwiRail competes with other transport modes – with trucks and coastal 
shipping for freight, and with aeroplanes, buses and private cars for passengers. It is 
thus unhelpful to consider rail in New Zealand in terms of a natural monopoly. 
• Any given rail project may or may not have net environmental benefits – the existence 
and level of such benefits can only be determined once details of that specific project 
are known. The most environmentally beneficial projects are likely to be those in least 
need of government subsidy. 
• New Zealand’s experience suggests that increasing or maintaining the size of the 
network to achieve so-called economies of network size does not enhance economic 
performance. Railways are driven by the economies of density, which can be achieved 
by using a rail network more and better. Economies of density might be best achieved 
in New Zealand by focusing on a smaller, more heavily used subset of the current 
network – a scenario which would also allow rail’s potential economic and 
environment benefits to be realised. 
 
10.8.2 Structural reform lessons 
 
Some more general lessons about structural reform also emerge from this case study: 
• Structural reform needs to be very clear about its goals and how the reform will 
achieve those goals. All underlying assumptions should be clearly identified. 
• The goals of structural reform will shift over time. It is more appropriate to compare 
the outcomes of reforms against their original goals than against newly defined ones. 
• Intervention to reverse previous structural reforms is likely to have long-term 
ramifications: any future government wishing to pursue reform may find it cannot 
credibly commit to non-interference. 
• New Zealand’s experience points to an inherent conflict between financial and 
political goals for rail. Structural reform is unlikely to resolve such conflicts. 
• Reforms designed to create competition within a sector may not be necessary (or even 
desirable) if the sector faces effective competition in its product markets. 
• Some economic problems may be too large to be ‘fixed’ by structural reform. It may 
be necessary to recast the problem in a wider context. 
• The mere existence of externalities is insufficient cause for specific government 
interventions. Externalities need to be quantified, and if material, a least-cost 
approach should be adopted for their mitigation. The least-cost approach identified 
may be cross-sectoral or even focused on other sectors entirely.  
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Chapter 11 
 
RAIL TRANSPORT IN CHILE 
 
 
Raimundo Soto1
 
 
 
• Extensive reform was completed in the rail sector in Chile and different models were 
used, including full privatisation and concessions. 
• Both types of reforms achieved significant efficiency and welfare gains and reforms 
have improved the industry operations, particularly in freight. 
• Motivation for the reforms was to reduce subsidies: that issue remains, particularly in 
the passenger sector. 
 
 
11.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Railways played a significant role in social life in Chile for almost a century. Between 1860 
and 1950 railroads were an exemplar of modernisation, integration and economic 
development. By 1950, however, the industry had started to decline, unable to compete with 
more efficient means of transportation (buses and trucks). By the mid 1970s railroads were 
bankrupt, surviving through government subsidies. Two decades later, passenger services had 
almost disappeared (accounting for less than 1% of total traffic). Freight operations, on the 
contrary, had been privatised and revitalised, and concentrated on small profitable market 
niches usually in remote areas of the economy (Thompson & Angerstein 1997). 
 
This paper reviews the Chilean case and analyzes the current standing and operations of the 
industry, focusing on the reforms, public sector involvement, regulation, market entry, 
vertical integration, externalities and political factors. The Chilean economy underwent a 
massive restructuring in the mid 1970s. This included opening to foreign trade, complete 
market deregulation, inflation control, macroeconomic stabilisation and, most importantly for 
our study, a complete reallocation of government subsidies. In this economic turnaround, 
despite the waste and inefficiency associated with the publicly-owned railroad monopoly, no 
specific reforms were devised for railroads. Fiscal reforms led to a substantial reduction in 
subsidies to the sector which, in turn, prompted managers to change operations, eliminate 
redundancies and inefficiencies, and divest assets to cut financial losses. The government did 
not consider a transition phase or compensation mechanisms for those negatively affected. 
 
Perhaps uniquely, the Chilean reforms resulted in the coexistence of two different forms of 
private sector participation in freight operations: the privatisation of the entire Northern 
Railroad, including rolling stock and essential facilities (track, yards and terminals) without 
open-access clauses, and the contracting out or ‘concessioning’ of freight in the Southern 
Railroad to private carriers who pay a fee for the use of the track and terminals while sharing 
these essential facilities with the remains of the publicly-owned passenger-services company. 
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Both systems have led to substantial increases in transportation volumes, rising labour 
productivity and declining tariffs. Consumers benefited from the reforms, which are now 
discussed in more detail. The first step, however, is a review of the circumstances in which 
the rail system operates. 
 
11.2 CHILEAN GEOGRAPHY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF RAILROADS 
 
To a large extent, the development of railways depends on geography. Since their inception, 
entrepreneurs and government authorities looked at railroads as means to overcome isolation, 
improve connectivity, consolidate territorial integration and advance economic development. 
Historical and political events such as international conflicts have also shaped the 
development of railroads, not only in Chile but also in most economies (see Atack et al. 2009 
and references therein for the United States of America, and Thompson & Angerstein 1997 
for Chile). This section provides a brief summary of the geographical and historical events 
leading to the development of the Chilean railroad industry. Readers with more interest in the 
detail of the reform may move to Section 11.3. 
 
Chile is a long and quite narrow economy (4300km from north to south; and an average 
width of 180km), sandwiched between the Pacific Ocean and the Andes Mountains. The 
northern half is dominated by the Atacama Desert, rich in minerals but sparsely populated. 
The southern half, in contrast, concentrates most of the population and economic activities 
(except mining). 
 
In such a peculiar geographical environment, it would have been natural to expect railroads to 
play a crucial role in economic development and social life. Indeed, one longitudinal railroad 
track and a number of branches would service most of the population and economic 
enterprises, providing efficient and cheap transport services to the public and a reasonable 
profit for investors (Figure 11.1). That was the tenet of railroad managers and the Chilean 
governments for decades, but history proved otherwise. 
 
Chile’s first railroad track was laid in 1851 to transport silver from the mines in the north to 
the seaport of Caldera. Other tracks mushroomed in following years, but a railway system did 
not take shape until the 1870s (Alliende 2001). Private initiatives were initially supported 
with public funds, due to the insufficient development of Chilean financial markets and the 
lack of private capital. Dissatisfied with the slow pace of expansion, the government started 
to acquire private railroads in the 1880s and embarked on an ambitious investment program 
to connect all railways. From then on, the industry development was almost exclusively a 
public sector business. 
 
Between 1870 and 1915 the government completed the Chilean railway system (Table 11.1). 
Massive investments in the northern railway were justified by the significant territorial 
expansion after the Nitrate War (1879–84) and were easily financed by taxes on nitrate 
exports. By 1915 some 3500km of tracks were laid and interconnected. These tracks were of 
metric gauge (1m). The southern railway expanded similarly, laying around 3800km of track, 
but of broad gauge (1.676m). By 1910 a publicly owned railroad linked Chile and Argentina 
(250km) using a cogged metric track and reaching altitudes of 3200m. Finally, by 1913, a 
publicly owned railroad linked Chile and North Bolivia (500km) and one private company 
linked Chile and South Bolivia (c. 1000km). These were the last investments in rail tracks 
until the 21st century. 
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Figure 11.1: Main railroads in Chile. 
 
By 1915 the main companies (Ferrocarril del Norte and Ferrocarril del Sur) were 
consolidated in one firm called EFE. It has been argued that there was never a railway system 
because the two railroads remained disconnected by their differences not only in track gauge 
but also in market and development strategies. Later, this tacit separation would play a 
decisive role in the shape of the reforms. 
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Table 11.1 Main railroads in Chile. 
Name of company Length (km) 
Track 
gauge (m) Completed Current operational status 
Ferrocarril del Sur 1254 1.676 1913 Passengers: operated by public firm  Freight: private sector concessions 
Ferrocarril del Norte 1867 1.000 1915 Passengers: discontinued in 1975 Freight: privatised in 1997 
Ferrocarril Antofagasta-
Bolivia 700 1.000 1888 
Privately owned 
Transports freight and passengers 
Ferrocarril Transandino 250 1.000 1910 Closed since 1984 
Ferrocarril Arica-La Paz 204 1.435 1913 Privatised in 1996 Bankrupt and closed since 2005 
Ferrocarril Potrerillos 155 1000 1928 Privately owned by mining operation (freight only) 
Ferrocarril Tocopilla 124 1.067 1890 Privately owned by mining operation (freight only) 
Ferrocarril de Huasco 100 1.000 1892 Privately owned by mining operation (freight only) 
Ferrocarril de Romeral 38 1.000 1913 Privately owned by mining operation (freight only) 
Source: Elaborated from work of Thompson & Angerstein (1997) 
 
A report by the EFE directors notes the history of challenges of managing a publicly-owned 
firm, including political interference, financial mismanagement, lack of maintenance of 
tracks, buildings and rolling stock, the low quality human capital of its labour force and 
disregard for customer satisfaction (EFE, 2009). In contrast, the only private railroad with 
significant operations (Antofagasta–Bolivia) remained profitable and expanded its operations, 
despite continuous political turmoil between the two economies. 
 
By the 1950s EFE began to feel the very strong competition from trucks and buses as a result of 
the extension of roads and paving. Continuous financial losses throughout the 1960s and to the 
mid 1970s led to a significant decline in quality service and massive injections of public funds 
to maintain operations. At the peak of its popularity in the 1950s EFE transported around 35% 
on average of the freight and passenger markets in which it operated. However, by the mid 
1970s, the market share for both freight and passenger transport was in single digits. This 
declining market share contributed to the rising financial losses of the railway. 
 
Table 11.2: Traffic operations by EFE. 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2008 
Passengers (millions) 26.4 21.1 9.4 8.8 9.5 10.0 
Passenger*km (millions) 1,906 2,338 1,425 1,077 737 759 
Freight (million tons) 13.0 19.0 16.7 19.1 22.0 27.2 
Freight*km (millions) 1,952 2,532 1,942 2,804 3,134 4,292 
Source: Based on Anuarios de Transporte y Comunicaciones, Instituto Nacional de Estadísticas de Chile 
 
11.3 REFORMS IN CHILE’S RAILROAD INDUSTRY 
 
As in most economies, the reforms to the Chilean railroad industry were not devised as a 
sector program but stemmed from macroeconomic and fiscal reforms initiated in the mid 
1970s. As discussed in Thompson et al. (2001), a series of economic crises removed the 
government’s ability to pay for losses in the railway. Railway reforms in Chile, however, 
predate those in Latin America, Africa and Europe by two decades. The economy-wide 
reform process included a vast array of measures aimed at deregulating the economy, 
achieving effective vertical and horizontal disintegration, opening all sectors to foreign 
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competition and foreign investment, allowing and encouraging private sector initiatives and 
restricting public sector activities to subsidiary initiatives (poverty alleviation, control of 
externalities, human capital formation and the like) (Larraín & Vergara 2000). 
 
A significant goal of the Chilean reforms was the elimination of subsidies that could not be 
justified on social grounds. In this context the publicly-owned railroad monopoly was targeted 
for major restructuring. This did not include a transition phase or an adjustment plan. A second 
general goal of the reforms was to improve efficiency but in the case of the railroad, given the 
scale of the financial losses, efficiency was a secondary target (Thompson 2001). 
 
As a result of the fiscal reforms, all direct subsidies were eliminated, leading to the closure of 
a substantial number of branch lines and layoffs of personnel (the rail labour force fell from 
15 000 workers in 1978 to 7000 in 1981). Concurrently, the government deregulated the 
interurban passenger transport market and opened up imports of trucks and cars, thus 
increasing competition for EFE in both markets.  
 
In order to cut subsidies, the government also required EFE to downsize operations. The 
Northern Railroad ceased all operations in 1975, its tracks as well as its rolling stock 
abandoned or sold to local private operators (see below). The Argentina–Chile Transandino 
Railroad ceased operations in 1984, the track was abandoned and covered by snow and 
mountain landslides. The publicly owned Chile–Bolivia Railroad remained in operation 
largely as a result of the provisions of the Peace Agreement after the Nitrate War, but it 
reduced activities to a minimum until it was privatised in 1997. By 2005 the Bolivian private 
company that acquired the railroad was bankrupt and its operations closed. The Southern 
Railroad continued to operate, but the government had to impose branch closures and layoffs 
and reduce frequencies to regain financial balance. 
 
Despite the sizable government intervention, EFE did not become operationally profitable. 
The main longitudinal track of the Southern Railroad remained operative, yet financial and 
operative losses put continuous pressures on EFE and required further restructuring. More 
pressure came in the 1990s from the successful highway concession program that 
substantially improved the quality and availability of paved roads, thereby reducing costs for 
trucks and buses. Between 1988 and 1990 EFE sold the remains of the Northern Railroad that 
had been closed for around 15 years to a public holding that subsequently restructured the 
company and privatised it in 1996. Other EFE assets such as yards, buildings, crossings and 
even the ‘fiscal track’ (the land on which the railroad tracks are laid) were divested in order 
to raise funds for continuing operations. In spite of these adjustments, EFE still required 
major support: for example, in 1994 it transported around 9 million passengers (less than 
10% of total interurban traffic) and 17 million tons of freight, earning around USD39 million. 
Total costs, however, reached around USD80 million of which the payroll amounted to 
USD42 million. The USD51 million deficit was subsidised by the government. 
 
Studies undertaken by the government and EFE in the early 1990s concluded that a major 
legal restructuring of EFE was needed, that the freight business would be profitable if 
properly managed by private-sector carriers, and that passenger services were not profitable 
but could be provided as a social benefit by a restructured EFE. 
 
The legal restructuring of EFE was required in order to increase its capabilities to undertake 
new business, reinforce internal control and professionalise its management. In 1993 the 
government passed a new legal charter for EFE allowing for vertical and horizontal 
disintegration. The separation of freight and passenger activities was completed when EFE 
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created a separate company – Ferrocarriles del Pacífico (FEPASA) – to handle its freight 
operations. In 1995 FEPASA was privatised through a joint venture of Chilean and foreign 
investors in which EFE retained a participation of 18%. According to the concession contract, 
FEPASA has the right to carry freight for 20 years, accessing and using EFE tracks for which 
it has to pay fixed and variable tolls. FEPASA, nevertheless, does not hold exclusivity in 
access to the tracks. A second private carrier – TRANSAP – also signed contracts with EFE 
and started freight operations in 2001. In 2009 these two private carriers transported around 
11 million tons (equivalent to 3.6% of the total freight transport in southern Chile), in what 
has become a small yet profitable market. EFE had previously complained of unfair 
competition from trucks on the grounds that road tolls were too low to cover their marginal 
cost. The success of FEPASA and TRANSAP indicates the effect may be small. 
 
The second major restructuring of EFE was the creation in 1995 of several subsidiaries to serve 
the passenger market according to those segments of the railroad system where it was deemed 
to be socially justified. Only one of these new companies succeeded financially, while the 
others required sizable subsidies to operate. EFE maintained passenger services at a loss as 
competition from buses dwarfed its market share: in 2008 only 9 million passengers were 
served by EFE, less than 1% of the total number of passengers transported in southern Chile. 
 
The third change to EFE’s structure was to allow its current operations to be managed as a 
private company while the government retained control of its major investment plans. In 
principle, EFE was to inform the government on current operations but was required to obtain 
approval for capital investments. In practice the company operated as an unregulated unit due 
to loopholes in the 1993 law, while negotiating directly with the presidency for capital 
appropriations. The management of the company improved steadily over time, but for 
political purposes constraints on providing services continued to be an issue. 
 
Over 2005–08 EFE embarked on a USD1 billion investment project to restart passenger 
services in southern Chile with new and refurbished rolling stock, improved buildings and 
terminals and upgraded tracks. Contrary to Chile´s tradition, the government did not 
undertake the mandatory social evaluation of the project. The project did not succeed: no new 
services were implemented, the refurbished rolling stock did not operate, and new buildings 
and terminals await their opening. There are several ongoing legal inquiries to determine 
responsibilities.  
 
EFE’s financial position has deteriorated markedly. Operational losses in 2009 amounted to 
around USD65 million a year, or roughly USD3 per passenger. The losses are expected to 
increase to around USD100 million for years to come as a result of debt service. A World 
Bank study has found that EFE is losing money in every single business undertaking (World 
Bank 2007). 
 
11.4 REGULATION AND PERFORMANCE OF CHILE’S RAILROAD INDUSTRY 
 
This section reviews the rationale for government regulation in railroads and discusses the 
extent to which reforms and current regulations in Chile follow such rationale and how this, 
in turn, affects the performance of the Chilean industry. 
 
11.4.1 The rationale for regulation in railroads 
 
The fundamental rationale for government regulation in railroads is that infrastructure is 
almost inevitably a natural monopoly and is characterised by indivisibilities and economies of 
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scale and scope (ECMT 2005). Regulation becomes crucial when network industries are 
vertically separated and competition is introduced. There are, however, particular 
characteristics of railways in Chile that would affect regulation. Whilst there is a desire to 
promote competition – as a means of promoting cost-minimisation/productive efficiency and 
of fostering innovation and traffic growth – there is still a dominant publicly-owned operator 
and owner of the track, EFE. Therefore, the regulator’s role in promoting competition is 
particularly important, not only in preventing exploitation of monopoly power but also in 
facilitating access to the infrastructure. In practice this means not only regulating charges and 
access conditions but also the process of timetabling and the allocation of paths for trains, and 
possibly access to other essential facilities such as depots and terminals. 
 
A further crucial point about rail, that tends to make it different to most other regulated 
utilities, is that there is a prima facie case for subsidy in terms of economies of scale within 
the sector and in terms of the failure to charge appropriately on competing modes. For these 
and for other political reasons, European governments have typically intervened heavily in 
rail industry decisions, particularly in the passenger sector. However, there remain debates as 
to how much to subsidise the industry and whether to channel the subsidy into the 
infrastructure or the operations. In this situation, an essential role of the regulator may be to 
protect private entrants from arbitrary decisions by the government, for instance, in regard to 
the level of finance it will provide to the infrastructure manager and, therefore, the capacity 
and quality of the infrastructure over which the private operators run. This can create 
potential conflicts between the regulator and the government. 
 
In considering the arguments for regulating the access charges of the rail industry, there are 
three roles that a regulator might perform: in preventing the monopoly infrastructure manager 
from exploiting its market power to the detriment of the public interest, in facilitating access 
to the infrastructure, in particular where the infrastructure manager is linked with one or more 
of the train operators, and in protecting the train operators from arbitrary decisions by the 
government regarding the level of finance it will provide to the infrastructure manager. 
 
11.4.2 Railroad regulation in Chile 
 
There is no railroad regulation in Chile beyond general security and environmental 
restrictions in the legal codes that apply to the transport sector (CITRA 2008). Until 1993 
EFE – and implicitly the entire sector – operated under the 1931 Railway Transportation 
Law, even when most of its provisions only pertained to publicly-owned railways and were 
obsolete or in direct opposition to other more modern regulatory provisions. For example, the 
1931 Law granted EFE the monopoly of railroad operations in Chile and restricted asset 
divestiture. In spite of this, EFE has privatised a substantial share of its activities, including 
all of the Northern Railroad. As mentioned, in 1993 EFE was given a new charter which 
changed it rights and obligations, but de facto the private and public sector continues to 
operate according to the 1931 Law, which is a slightly amended version of the 1925 Law. 
Among other unusual provisions, it requires free transporting of mail, free transporting of 
rolling stock from universities and the granting of free passes for authorities. 
 
Likewise, there is no regulatory body in charge of railroad operations and no agency 
responsible for the strategic, long-term planning for the industry. Formally, the Ministry of 
Transport and Telecommunications is the industry authority (LIBRA 2007). But in practice it 
has never issued any significant regulation and its strategic planning activity comprises only a 
few, largely descriptive studies that do not relate directly to rail. 
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An historical explanation for the absence of regulation and regulatory agencies is the 
prevailing opinion that the publicly-owned monopoly would not require a regulatory body 
and that any regulation could be better channelled and implemented directly by EFE. In fact, 
over the years EFE has passed a series of internal regulations for its operations that became 
the norm for the few private-use railroads servicing mines and seaports in the north. 
However, this does not justify the lack of regulation after reforms and particularly after recent 
privatisations. 
 
The 1993 Charter Act for EFE gave the company the capacity to undertake new businesses, 
divest assets, form joint ventures and disintegrate its operations vertically and horizontally. 
This, in practical terms, corresponds to a major change in regulation for the sector and 
certainly affected the operation of the entire industry. 
 
The fact that this structural change was based in and affected mainly the public-sector 
indicates the nature of its limitations and the difficulties it poses for enacting much needed 
sector regulations (see below). In particular, the changes in the regulations channelled via the 
incumbent company used ad hoc procedures which increased regulatory risks and opened 
space for lobbying and capture. 
 
11.4.3 Unregulated privatisation 
 
Consider first the case of the Northern Railroad. In a competitive bid in 1995 FERRONOR 
acquired the complete railroad, i.e., tracks, rolling stock, fiscal land, buildings, terminals and 
other facilities. According to Chilean law, the bidding process did not discriminate between 
domestic and foreign firms, nor did it require licensing, quotas or any restriction on the 
participation of the private sector in the railroad industry. Nine companies participated in the 
auction of the Northern Railroad, including foreign companies (such as Spanish RENFE, 
American Railroad Development Corporation and British RAILTEX), large size Chilean 
companies (CAP and CSV) and consortiums formed for the sole purposes of participating in 
the auction. FERRONOR was owned initially by Chile’s APCO (45%) and USA’s Rail 
America (55%): APCO purchased Rail America’s share in 2001. 
 
As a result of the privatisation, the Northern Railroad now operates as an unregulated, 
vertically integrated enterprise. The privatisation process considered no provisions for 
preventing the infrastructure monopoly from exploiting their market power or for facilitating 
non-discriminatory access to essential facilities (i.e., the track), although the government 
required the winning company to undertake the maintenance of the entire track.  
 
Since privatisation FERRONOR has concentrated its operations in a few segments of the 
market, eliminating small volume loads and general cargo and focusing on large operations 
(e.g., minerals and sulphuric acid) and long-term contracts. As noted by Thompson (1999), 
private-sector railway managers were not interested in carrying freight at rates equal to or 
below their marginal costs, and they expected all the traffic transported to at least help to 
finance fixed costs. Therefore, although the volumes transported have more than tripled with 
privatisation, some types of freight ceased to be transported by rail.  
 
Table 11.3 provides information on the performance of FERRONOR after privatisation. 
There is evidence that the social benefits after privatisation may have been increased 
substantially. It can be seen that freight transport increased markedly for 2 years after 
privatisation, indicating that the privatised firm was able to restructure production towards 
more efficient use of resources. This is also indicated by the increase in physical labour 
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productivity: transport in tons*km per worker increased by around 200%. However, 4 years 
after privatisation physical labour productivity and transport volumes had not grown, while 
revenues continued to rise. This would indicate a restructuring of operations towards more 
profitable segments of the market, because tariff charges reduced after privatisation by 
around 36% (Thompson et al. 2001). 
 
A key, but largely unexplored, issue is whether forcing FERRONOR to grant access to its 
essential facilities would change market conditions for entry and efficiency. A mostly 
descriptive study by LIBRA (2007) indicates that entry in the short run is unlikely for several 
reasons, even if full access were granted. Firstly, the market for large volumes and long-term 
contracts is restricted to current mining operations and is unlikely to expand significantly in the 
future. Secondly, competition from trucks in general freight is intense and benefits from the 
absence of tolls on roads and lax environmental regulations. Thirdly, the rail track beyond what 
is being used (17% total) is in poor condition and would require substantial investment to yield 
the high-quality/low-cost services required for trains to compete effectively with trucks. 
 
Table 11.3: FERRONOR’s operations after privatisation. 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Freight transported (,000 tons) 1,300 3,900 5,900 6,300 
Total revenue (USD m) 7.9 15.3 21.0 23.7 
Expenditures (USD m) 6.3 10.6 15.3 17.7 
Productivity I (revenue per worker USD) 35,300 63,000 77,800 82,000 
Productivity II (m ton*km/worker) 0.84 2.11 2.57 2.57 
     Source: Elaborated from The World Bank Railways Database 
 
In addition, FERRONOR allows other carriers to use the track, charging an unregulated toll 
that is directly negotiated between the parties. In principle, the ownership of an essential 
facility such as the track would indicate that FERRONOR could exercise monopoly power. 
However, the consumers are large mining operations with substantial resources and the 
ability to present credible threats to the company. This may have counterbalanced the 
potential market power of FERRONOR, but certainly a regulated price could benefit small 
consumers unable to negotiate on equal footing with the company. But there have been no 
complaints to the Antitrust Commission against FERRONOR. 
 
11.4.4 Regulated concessions 
 
Consider, in contrast, the divestment of freight in the Southern Railroad. As indicated, EFE 
divested its freight operations by first creating a subsidiary FEPASA and then auctioning its 
concession to the private sector in 1995. Three companies bid for the 51% of FEPASA: 
Consorcio del Pacífico S.A., Compañía de Transportes Ferroviarios S.A. and Cruz Blanca 
S.A. The last named won with an offer of around USD30 million. The remaining 49% of the 
property was to remain in the hands of EFE (which expected annual dividends of around 
USD15 million), but it later sold an additional 30% of its participation to IFC and Latin 
American railway investors. A second private carrier – TRANSAP – entered the market in 
2001. Concessions consist of non-exclusive 20-year contracts that allow free entry of carriers 
to facilities and require the payment of fixed and variable tariffs for the use of the 
infrastructure. The track remained in the hands of the government and, consequently, EFE is 
required to provide maintenance for the tracks and facilities, and to the path, and to schedule 
services. 
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Following the trend in railroad reforms elsewhere, EFE concessions provided some elements of 
vertical disintegration and attempted to generate competition among carriers. As noted by 
Pietrantonio and Pelkmans (2004), vertical separation helps identify the true cost of running the 
railway and the eventual subsidy needed to allow safe and reliable infrastructure. Removing 
and preventing cross-subsidisation, in turn, creates fair conditions for potential entrants. Ideally, 
too, vertical separation helps reduce the asymmetries of information in the railway business, 
which is traditionally prone to hide cost structures and discourage performance. 
 
Thompson et al. (2001) have calculated that FEPASA tariffs are around 40% lower than those 
prevailing before privatisation, thus indicating a substantial benefit to consumers. Nevertheless, 
it should be acknowledged that both private carriers in the Southern Railroad have operated in 
the same manner as FERRONOR in the Northern Railroad (i.e., by exploiting market niches 
rather than providing a full range of services to the general public). They have concentrated 
their business on the transport of bulk commodities in large volumes (paper pulp, iron ore etc.) 
and not in general freight, where competition from trucks is intense. This would indicate that 
the freight operations have benefited mostly from better management, but not necessarily by 
improving efficiency to the point of being competitive with trucks beyond their current level. 
 
Table 11.4 presents data on the performance of FEPASA. The effects of the change in 
management can be seen: although traffic volumes did not increase in the initial years after 
privatisation, revenue and traffic per worker increased markedly. This slow beginning was 
the result of problems relating to labour and line rehabilitation. It was only after a decade of 
operations that traffic and revenue per worker expanded markedly, indicating the long-run 
development of the market. Note FEPASA’s relatively low profit levels. 
 
Table 11.4: FEPASA’s operations after concessioning. 
 1995 1997 1999 2001 2009 
Freight transported (,000 tons) 4,333 3,981 4,810 5,395 7,100 
Total revenue (USD m) 29.9 28.9 29.7 32.4 56.5 
Expenditures (USD m) 26.0 24.8 32.2 32.4 53.0 
Productivity I (revenue per worker USD) 57,700 68,800 68,000 64,800 114,342 
Productivity II (m ton*km/worker) 1.52 1.73 2.31 2.61 2.69 
     Source: Elaborated from The World Bank Railways Database and FEPASA 
 
The contract signed by FEPASA included the payment of a fixed fee to EFE for track 
maintenance and path and scheduling services. The subsequent entry of TRANSAP to the 
market indicates that this fixed payment was relatively low and did not deter entry. 
TRANSAP’s entry was motivated by a change in sanitary and environmental regulations that 
prohibited truck transport of sulphuric acid through urban areas, thus leading a major mining 
operation to transfer the service to the private railway. In time, TRANSAP operations began 
to diversify which suggests that long-term contracts may be an important requirement to start 
operations as they guarantee the amortisation and recovery of fixed costs (typically in rolling 
stock and reputation) and lower risk. 
 
Determining the fixed and variable fees is controversial. As noted by Pietrantonio and 
Pelkmans (2004) for the OECD, the adoption of marginal cost pricing is problematic on 
economic grounds. The drawbacks include arbitrary cost allocation rules in the presence of 
large economies of scope and relatively large common costs, a non-optimal incentive system 
and, possibly, the anti-competitive effects of two-part tariffs. EFE has complained of unfair 
competition from trucks as road tolls are too low to cover their marginal social cost and that 
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this, in turn, artificially lowers the demand for rail transport of freight. It has asked for a 
permanent subsidy of around USD0.1 per ton*km transported. 
 
Concession contracts are usually subject to renegotiation. In the Chilean case legal disputes 
arose with regards to EFE’s inability to upgrade (and even maintain) the quality of tracks as 
required by the original contracts. There have been, however, no complaints about the fixed 
and variable tolls that private carriers must pay for the use of the essential facility (tracks and 
other facilities).  
 
11.4.5 Remnants of the past 
 
EFE continues operating passenger services despite incurring heavy losses (USD65 million in 
2009 as noted above). The market share in interurban transport continues to shrink and the 
quality of services is low in terms of comfort and frequency. Accidents are relatively frequent 
(at a rate 10 times higher than that in the USA) and costly: the social cost of accidents is 
estimated at around USD16 million in 2007 only (LIBRA 2008). 
 
The continuing losses of EFE indicate that the original purpose of the reforms, namely, to 
avoid fiscal costs, has not been met, that subsidies continue to drain public resources and that 
a lack of safety leads to an increased social cost. Moreover, such losses negatively affect 
EFE’s ability to raise funds for other important tasks such as the maintenance of the track and 
facilities and the upgrading of several railway components that have become bottlenecks for 
the operation of the system. These include expanding single to double tracks to eliminate 
traffic bottlenecks, improving communication systems and so on. 
 
EFE’s board of directors have acknowledged that, from a social point of view, only two of its 
passenger services (Metrotren and Merval) are justifiable since their financial losses are less 
than the estimated social value of the positive externalities derived from their operations (EFE 
2009). Passenger services should be closed if they are not socially justifiable. The government, 
however, has been reluctant to undertake these measures and to bear the likely later political 
cost of closing down services. Decisions have been made in the opposite direction. As noted 
above, in 2003 EFE embarked on a USD1 billion investment project to restart passenger 
services. Likewise, despite a negative social evaluation of the project, a suburban train system 
was launched in 2005 in Concepción with an implicit subsidy of USD0.41 per km/passenger. 
 
This indicates the value of isolating the management of EFE from political pressures. 
Currently, the Chilean president directly appoints EFE’s chairman and board, thus adding the 
appearance of political considerations to the nomination and encouraging interest groups 
(e.g., regional authorities) to press for subsidised services. Measures aimed at higher levels of 
transparency, accountability and independence from political contingencies are an 
indispensible component of any successful reform proposal. 
 
In addition, it would be advisable to separate passenger services from track operations. EFE’s 
board has proposed creating a separate company to manage the railroad infrastructure, probably 
as a first step for further privatisation (EFE 2009). Independent observers have also suggested 
that subsidiaries should be created for the existing passenger services in order to make costs 
and resource allocation transparent. Alternatively, separating costs would provide sufficient 
information to undertake appropriate policy reforms, avoiding the coordination problems of 
having separate companies. Asmild et al. (2005) found that in 23 OECD economies there was a 
clear positive effect on operating efficiencies of the cost transparency following from 
accounting separation. But whether there is an additional benefit through complete separation 
or whether the potential coordination problems outweigh the benefits remains unanswered. 
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11.5 CONCLUSION 
 
For almost a century, railroads in Chile were an exemplar of modernisation, integration and 
economic development. By the 1970s railroads were bankrupt, surviving on government 
subsidies. Reforms initiated in the 1990s managed to revitalise freight transport by 
transferring operations to the private sector, but passenger services virtually disappeared.  
 
The process of this reform of the freight industry provides examples of different types of 
reform: unregulated vertically integrated privatisation and a regulated, vertically disintegrated 
concession with public control of the essential facilities. Neither of these reforms was 
designed to optimise the working of the industry, nor do they fit in an integrated transport 
regulated system. They stem from the government´s desire to cut financial losses and to avoid 
political damage in running a bankrupt system. Reforms were made to a large extent on an ad 
hoc basis. Nevertheless, they complied with the standard Chilean norm of divesting publicly-
held assets using competitive, non-discriminatory and largely transparent bidding processes. 
 
Both reformed sectors achieved significant efficiency and welfare gains and, in this sense, 
reforms have improved the industry’s operations. Nevertheless, as the starting point was quite 
low, it made it easier to achieve such gains. The question remains of whether alternative 
divestiture procedures would have achieved better results. 
 
In particular, the privatisation of the vertically integrated Northern Railroad without provisions 
for open access to essential facilities, such as the track, yards and terminals, raises the question 
of potential market power on the part of the incumbent. Declining tariffs and the absence of 
complaints indicates that potential monopoly power may have been counterbalanced by the 
large economic size of the mining operations that are the main customers of the railroad. 
 
In contrast, freight concessions in the Southern Railroad using long-term contracts seem to 
have bridged the open access issue successfully, but have not been able to provide an 
effective solution to managing the essential facility by the incumbent. While usage fees may 
provide for maintenance and system improvements, resources have been used to cover losses 
in passenger transport, a segment of the industry with no competitive advantages and 
apparently destined to disappear in the long run. 
 
Reforms were dictated by fiscal balance reasons rather than aiming at improving the working 
of the railroad industry for consumers or with a strategic vision of the future needs of the 
transport sector. Consequently, reforms fell short of providing a more complete and efficient 
regulatory framework for the industry, in particular with regards to regulation in several 
areas. Four issues remain: 
• Reforms reduced but did not stop the losses of the incumbent public firm in passenger 
transport. Subsidies continue to consume public resources. 
• The losses negatively affect EFE’s ability to undertake important tasks such as the 
maintenance of the track and facilities and the upgrading of those components that 
have become bottlenecks for the operation of the system. 
• The reforms did not provide for an adequate institutional setting capable of isolating the 
management of EFE from political pressures. Likewise it did not increase transparency. 
• The absence of a transport authority capable of integrating externalities, security 
considerations and environmental issues unnecessarily complicates the operation of 
the railroads. 
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Chapter 12 
 
ROAD TRANSPORT IN THAILAND 
 
 
Narong Pomlaktong, Rattana Jongwilaiwan, Prakai Theerawattanakul and Rapee Pholpanich1
 
 
 
• Regulatory constraints on regular bus prices encouraged the entry of new competitors in a 
less regulated part of the market, offering more choice to consumers. 
• Relaxation of quotas as well as infrastructure improvements led to lower prices and higher 
volumes of cross border road freight. 
• Road transport reform raises significant issues of coordination across agencies. 
 
 
12.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
There are many challenges in road transport policy development in Thailand. Many of the 
important issues are related to the population in Bangkok. Its size has made it difficult to 
create a well-designed urban public transportation system that meets the needs of the entire 
population. Other current domestic road transport issues include too great a focus on mega-
projects in urban areas and their associated infrastructure without considering the 
development of secondary roads, regulation in the market for passenger vans and price 
distortions such as lack of congestion and pollution charges. Thailand is also working with 
other economies in the South East Asian region to liberalise cross-border transport and to 
improve the transportation corridors which link their markets.  
 
Transport policy in Thailand has developed in concert with urban development planning. The 
first four development plans by the National Economic and Social Development Board 
(NESDB plans) from 1963 to 1981 aimed at accelerating economic growth by emphasising 
utility infrastructure development, including electricity, water, transport, educational 
institutions and public health. Besides this, the plans focused on export-led and import-
substitution industrialisation. The government, therefore, allocated a large amount of its 
budget to transport, energy and irrigation. The government invested highly in substantial 
projects such as the construction of dams, water-operated power plants and transport to 
connect the main provinces of the economy. 
 
Beginning with an outline of the context of Bangkok, the current issues and recent 
developments in passenger transport, freight transport and cross-border movements are 
reviewed in this chapter. 
 
12.2 THE ROLE OF BANGKOK 
 
The Bangkok metropolitan population is almost 8 times as large as the second largest city in 
Thailand (Table 12.1). Bangkok has become not only the capital city but also the centre of 
political, financial and business activities. It is estimated that the population of Bangkok and its 
                                                 
1 Thailand Development Research Institute: Narong Pomlaktong (pom@tdri.or.th), Rattana Jongwilaiwan 
(rattana@tdri.or.th) and Prakai Theerawattanakul (prakai@tdri.or.th). 
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nearby provinces will reach 13.6 million (over 19% of Thailand’s population) by 2017 (Table 
12.2). There are two major consequences: 
• Bangkok has become crowded due to the rising number of rural-urban migrants, leading 
to problems with housing shortages, a lack of basic infrastructure and impact on the 
public health service; and 
• The land price in Bangkok has been soaring due to urban development and speculation. 
 
Table 12.1: The population of Bangkok, Bangkok Metropolitan Area and Chiang Mai, 2003–08. 
Provinces 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Bangkok 5,844,607 5,634,132 5,658,953 5,695,956 5,716,248 5,710,883 
Bangkok Metropolitan Area1 8,554,751 8,395,838 8,524,158 9,930,634 10,065,126 10,161,694 
Chiang Mai 1,603,220 1,630,769 1,650,009 1,661,020 1,664,399 1,670,317 
Source: Department of Provincial Administration 2010. 
1 Bangkok Metropolitan Area is primarily Bangkok, Samut Prakarn, Nontha Buri and Pathum Thani provinces. 
 
Table 12.2: Forecast population growth in Bangkok and nearby provinces. 
Area Population (persons) Growth rate 
(% per annum) 2003 2017 
Bangkok (Bangkok Metropolitan Area) 6,502,000 8,066,000 1.6 
Nearby provinces     
    Samut Prakarn 1,025,000 1,347,000 2.0 
    Nontha Buri 906,000 1,346,000 2.9 
    Nakhon Pathom 800,000 1,007,000 1.7 
    Phatum Thani 702,000 1,211,000 4.0 
    Samut Sakhon 446,000 592,000 2.0 
Bangkok Metropolitan Region 10,381,000 13,569,000 1.9 
Thailand 63,665,000 70,016,000 0.7 
Source: World Bank 2007. 
 
As a result of the rising land price, rural migrants and the poor live in densely settled and run-
down areas, which have turned into slum communities, and many people live in areas where 
the land price is lower than the urban area. This, in turn, creates pressure for public transport 
services. The residents have to commute from the suburbs to Bangkok, thus contributing to 
traffic congestion in Bangkok.  
 
Accordingly, the government has implemented a passenger transport policy with the goal of 
universal service to keep the public transport between the city and outer Bangkok at a low cost. 
This has led to poor quality public transport. The middle class then prefer to use old cars or 
motorcycles. Cars and motorcycles are more prevalent than other vehicles in Bangkok: they 
account for approximately 75% of the total vehicles used (Table 12.3). 
 
The increase in the use of passenger vehicles has led to more traffic congestion and to air and 
noise pollution problems. The development of roads has also brought extensive negative social 
impacts. For example, the deterioration of urban areas, the rise in slum areas, an increase in 
ineffective land use and environmental impacts (such as encroachment on forest areas, carbon 
dioxide emissions, massive energy consumption and water pollution). Furthermore, the 
increase in the number of roads and traffic has affected the rates of deaths and accidents from 
vehicles in Thailand.2
                                                 
2 The accident rate declined from 1997 as a result of road improvements (e.g., separated and wider road lanes). But 
the 1998–2007 death toll was about 127 296 people (average of 12 729 per year). In 2007 the economic and 
social cost of road accidents to the nation was THB232 855 million (USD7216 million). This was equivalent to 
2.81% of the economy’s GDP (DOH 2007). Some 1.5 million road crashes occur annually, resulting in about 
9000 disabilities, 210 000 serious injuries and 750 000 slight injuries. The fatality rate on Thailand’s roads is 
about six times that of Japan and Great Britain’s (OECD database). 
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Table 12.3: The number of in-use vehicles in Bangkok, 1994–2010. 
Type of vehicle 1994 2003 2010 Average 
annual 
growth 
(%) 
2010 
Share of 
fleet in 
Bangkok 
(BMA) 
Bangkok 
fleet as % 
of 
Thailand’s 
Car 716,951 1,162704 1,203,764 3.77 36.14% 53.59% 
Microbus & passenger van 241,120 149,613 104,703 -5.78 3.14% 50.35% 
Van & pick up 245,942 583,045 522,511 5.53 15.69% 20.44% 
Urban taxi 22,256 63,228 49,224 5.83 1.48% 98.90% 
Motor tricycle taxi (Tuk Tuk) 3,645 7,394 4,876 2.10 0.15% 41.94% 
Motorcycle 851,853 857,460 1,299,637 3.06 39.02% 14.46% 
Truck 73,145 75,800 61,732 -1.20 1.85% 14.39% 
Bus  17,457 26,225 18,831 0.54 0.57% 27.26% 
Other 13,220 11,248 65,298 12.09 1.96% 27.30% 
Total 2,185,229 2,936,717 3,330,616 3.06 100.00% 22.51% 
Sources: World Bank 2007, Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. 
 
Due to the increased population and housing density in Bangkok (such as at the Bangkok 
port), the government launched an extended industrial estate policy, which has resulted in 
more extensive urbanisation and more sprawl. During three NESDB plans (1982–96), the 
government implemented a decentralisation policy and invested heavily in projects such as 
the Eastern Seaboard Project which consists of the Laem Chabang Deep Sea Port, Map Ta 
Phut Industrial Estate and the Northern Region Industrial Estate. Although the plans focused 
on investment in public infrastructure in Bangkok’s outskirts, the development also extended 
to central and eastern regions; but Bangkok and its vicinity was still the centre of 
development. 
 
With sound economic growth, a rising population and changing lifestyles resulting in 
increasing demand for goods and services, the urban areas attract the modern retailers, 
including the ‘mega markets’ (47 of Thailand’s 166 – 28.3% – are located in Bangkok.). The 
entry of these modern businesses had a mixed effect on traffic issues. On the one hand there 
is greater traffic congestion due to their location within inner Bangkok and other large cities 
of Thailand. On the other hand they brought innovative urban freight logistics management. 
Regarding the urban logistics management, the foreign modern retail businesses use 
information and communications technologies to improve the flow of their supply chains and 
optimise them by reducing the number of warehouses, centralising inventories and 
consolidating deliveries through a distribution centre or so-called ‘hub and spoke’ transport. 
The freight consolidation approach will lessen the number of vehicles and their trips by using 
bigger and fewer trucks, reducing the traffic at loading areas, reducing the supply chain cost, 
optimising inventory management as well as contributing to the improvement in air and noise 
quality and pollution in the city centre. 
 
12.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE ROAD TRANSPORT INDUSTRY 
 
For the past 20 years the Thai government has been investing heavily in a road network 
system. Road transport has become the most significant sector of the economy, despite its 
inefficiency in terms of energy consumption. The government’s policy is to encourage this 
development, since it may lead to the development of land use and its surrounding estates, 
which will finally bring about the economic growth needed for many regions. Not 
surprisingly, today Thailand’s transport sector of passengers and freight is dominated by 
road. Thailand’s Department of Land Transport (DLT), a government agency under the 
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Ministry of Transport, is the main regulator for bus and truck transport. Established on 11 
September 1941 (BE2484), the DLT is responsible for the systematisation and regulation of 
land transport by conducting the monitoring and inspection, which ensures the smooth 
running of and conformity with the relevant land transport rules and regulations.  
 
12.3.1 Passenger transport 
 
Passenger transport in Thailand consists primarily of personal vehicles, including cars, 
personal pick-ups and motorcycles. For passenger public transport there are four categories of 
fixed route (Table 12.4) and there are two government agencies that operate bus transport: the 
Transport Company Ltd and the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA), both of which are 
government enterprises that have the government as the primary shareholder with 51% while 
private shareholders have 49%. 
 
• The Transport Company Ltd is permitted to operate the routes of categories 2 and 3; 
• The BMTA is permitted to operate the routes of categories 1 and 4 in Bangkok; and  
• Private companies are entitled to operate the routes of categories 1 and 4 in the 
provinces, categories 1 and 4 in Bangkok and category 3. 
 
The DLT is the government agency authorising public bus regulations:  
• To supervise and control fixed-route buses to run on a fixed route and on the condition 
of picking up the passengers at specific locations according to a timetable, to collect bus 
fares at government-regulated rates and to stop at regulated bus terminals; 
• To stipulate, improve and revoke the bus route and to renew/withdraw bus operation 
licences; 
• To stipulate and improve the condition of vehicle operations, and the number and 
category of vehicles; 
• To give the information of fixing the fare rate to the Central Land Transport Control 
Board for approval; 
• To stipulate bus standards, to supervise the quality of the transport operators’ service to 
passengers, to control bus safety (speed, duration of parking and the age of the bus), and 
to control and examine the operation of the transport operators, crew and vehicles; and 
• To encourage and develop a system of mass transit by bus. 
Regulating the passenger transport market is done by licensing conditions and pricing.3
 
 
                                                 
3 Fixed-route bus regulation in Thailand is implemented under Land Transport Act 1979 (BE2522) by having 
the Land Transport Policy Committee, Central Land Transport Control Board and Provincial Land Transport 
Control Board that have the authority to approve fixed-route buses. The Central Land Transport Control 
Board has the authority as follows: To stipulate the category of fixed-route bus; Fix the routes, the number of 
bus operators and the number of vehicles for fixed routes in Bangkok, between provinces and between 
economies; Fix the rates of transport charges and other service charges; Designate the sites, arrange for or set 
up and regulate the bus terminal; Specify the types or conditions of vehicles not acceptable for registration; 
Prescribe the classes or categories of vehicles which must stop or park for picking up and setting down the 
passengers or for loading and unloading goods at the bus terminal; To stipulate places for parking to pick up 
passengers; Lay down measures for prescribing, permitting and controlling transport business; Carry on other 
actions as provided in the Act and according to the regulations of the Land Transport Policy Committee. The 
Provincial Land Transport Control Board has the authority to: Fix bus routes, the number of transport 
operators and the number of vehicles in the provincial area; Fix the rates of transport charge in the provincial 
area (the same criteria as prescribed by the Central Land Transport Control Board); Carry out other actions as 
provided in the land transport regulation according to the Land Transport Policy Committee and the Central 
Land Transport Control Board. 
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Table 12.4: The operations of passenger bus transport services by government and private sectors. 
Bus route category Government and private 
operations 
Maximum private equity 
permitted 
Category 1 in Bangkok  
Has contiguous routes in the 
perimeter area by running on the 
main road in the community area 
which is crowded by people, 
business centre, school and 
university, government agency etc. 
The BMTA has 89% (321 route 
licences) and allows private sub-
contractors. 
The Premier Metro Bus Company 
operates 10% (35 routes). 
The Thonburi Bus Service 
Company Ltd 1% (4 routes) 
The BMTA has the government’s 
share (51%); the private share is 
(49%). 
The other two firms are 100% 
private equity. 
Category 1 in provincial areas Many private firms operate in the 
market under the licensing system. 
100% private equity is permitted. 
Category 2  
Routes link Bangkok and the 
provinces. 
The Transport Company Ltd has 
all licences and allows private sub-
contractors. 
The Transport Company Ltd has 
the government’s share (51%); the 
private share is (49%). 
Category 3 
Interprovincial routes which link 
one province with another and 
may pass through other provinces 
Many private firms operate in the 
market under the licensing system. 
100% private equity is permitted. 
Category 4 in Bangkok 
Route mainly on subordinate roads 
and the feeder roads to the main 
road to link with Category 1 in 
Bangkok 
The BMTA operates 76% (113 
routes) and allows private sub-
contractors. 
Private firms operate 24% (36 
routes). 
100% private equity is permitted. 
Category 4 in provincial areas 
Services the community (village, 
district and city) in the provinces. 
Many private firms operate in the 
market under the licensing system. 
100% private equity is permitted. 
Source: TDRI 2010b. 
 
12.3.1.1 Route licensing 
 
Bus Route Category 1 in the provincial area is open for private company operation. 
Generally, the licence for a fixed route is THB7000 (USD217) and is valid for 7 years; for a 
non-fixed route it is valid for 5 years.4
 
 There is a ‘one licence per one route’ policy. Thus, 
each route is monopolised in the sense that once the operator is licensed to operate a route for 
7 years, the licence will be renewed as long as the firm complies with the DLT’s conditions. 
However, there is considerable competition for new route licences through a tendering 
procedure; a firm is able to apply for a licence to provide service for a fixed term. The firm 
that receives a licence usually will not operate the whole fleet but will sub-contract some of 
its operations to other operators without competitive tendering. Routes compete with each 
other (and some licences have a duplicated route section), which reduces the incentive for 
dynamic efficiency, introducing new technology or improving services to increase profit. 
The situation is different in Bangkok where only three companies have licences for the 360 
routes of Bus Route Category 1. The BMTA is entitled to operate 321 routes, the Premier 
Metro Bus Company Ltd has 35 concessional routes and the Thonburi Bus Service Company 
Ltd is the airport express bus service provider with four downtown routes.  
 
The Transport Company Ltd, a government-owned enterprise, is entitled to provide services 
for all Category 2 routes, and private companies are allowed to be sub-contract operators of 
the Transport Company. BMTA can also sub-contract its routes to private operators. The 
                                                 
4 A non-fixed route bus is a ‘for hire’ vehicle such as a taxi. The DLT only regulates the licence of drivers and 
vehicle standards. There is no regulation on entry to the taxi market. 
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companies collect a royalty fee which can be used to subsidise their loss-making routes. The 
royalty fee collected by the Transport Company is sufficient to subsidise its loss-making 
routes, which enables the government to maintain universal services. The royalty fee 
collected by the BMTA is inadequate for its loss-making operations: the sub-contractor pays 
the BMTA THB200–300/vehicle/day (USD6.2–9.2) and THB100–150/vehicle/day 
(USD3.06–4.60) for air-conditioned buses and non air-conditioned buses respectively. 
Therefore, the government has to subsidise the BMTA by loan guarantees (Table 12.5). 
 
Table 12.5: Characteristics of the passenger transport industry. 
Bus route category Characteristics of competition 
Category 1 in Bangkok Concessions are granted to three operators. The government-owned BMTA is 
entitled to grant sub-contracts to private companies and collect the royalty fee. 
The passenger van is the new mode which serves the niche market. 
Category 1 in 
provincial areas 
‘One licence per one route’ policy is implemented. The firms which receive the 
licence are able to sub-contract to small-scale operators. The market is highly 
competitive between overlapping route operators. 
Category 2 Only the government-owned Transport Company Ltd is entitled to provide 
services for all routes, to sub-contract to private companies and to collect the 
royalty fee. The passenger van is the new mode which serves the niche market. 
Category 3 ‘One licence per one route’ policy is implemented, which is a monopoly. The 
firms which receive the licence are able to sub-contract to small-scale operators. 
The market is highly competitive between overlapping route operators. The 
passenger van is the new competitor in this category.  
Category 4 in Bangkok ‘One licence per one route’ policy is implemented, which is a monopoly. The 
firms which receive the licence are able to sub-contract to small-scale operators. 
The market is highly competitive between overlapping route operators. 
Category 4 in 
provincial areas 
‘One licence per one route’ policy is implemented. The firms which receive the 
licence are able to sub-contract to small-scale operators. The market is highly 
competitive between overlapping route operators. The passenger van is the new 
mode which serves the niche market. 
 
Under this licensing and sub-contracting system, there are approximately 1256 companies (all 
but the BMTA and the Transport Company are private companies). The majority of the bus 
companies are small and family-owned firms: only 0.1% of the private companies have more 
than 50 buses, around 8% have between 2 and 48 buses, and around 92% own only 1 bus 
(National Statistical Office and TDRI survey). The BMTA and the Transport Company have 
the biggest market shares (21.02% and 13.77% respectively) followed by four private firms 
(Cherd Chai Motor 5.06%, Nakornchai Air 2.11%, Thep Sombat 1.74% and Bangkok 
Transport Company 1.29%). The market share of these six operators accounts for 45% of the 
sector. Other companies shared the rest of the market (Table 12.6). 
 
12.3.1.2 Bus fare regulation 
 
The public bus fare is regulated by the Land Transport Committee, the Land Transport Policy 
Committee, the Central Land Transport Control Board and the Provincial Land Transport 
Control Board (Table 12.7). Prices are based on a cost-plus formula, including a target rate of 
return and an allowance for an expected load factor. The fare rate (baht/km) is adjusted 
according to a change in the diesel price with 25 steps ranging between THB10.07 and 
THB40.57: for example, if the diesel price increases from THB28/L to THB30/L, the 17th 
fare rate (THB0.56/km) is used to multiply the actual operating vehicle kilometres to provide 
a new fare for travelling on that section. However, any increase in bus fares is a sensitive 
political issue in which the final decision is made by the Cabinet (Meakin 2005). 
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Table 12.6: Characteristics of the largest passenger transport firms in terms of revenue, 2007. 
Firm Year 
established 
Government 
equity (%) 
Domestic 
private equity 
(%) 
Foreign equity 
(%) 
Market share 
of total 
revenue (%) 
Bangkok Mass 
Transit 
Authority1 
1976 51 49 – 21.02  
Transport 
Company Ltd 
1930 51 49 – 13.77  
Cherd Chai 
Motors Sales 
Company Ltd 
1980 – 100 – 5.06  
Nakornchai Air 
Company Ltd 
1986 – 100 – 2.11  
Thep Sombat 
Company Ltd 
1978 – 100 –     1.74  
Bangkok 
Transport 
Company Ltd 
1984 – 100 –     1.29  
Others (1250 registered firms) 55 
Source: Based on Department of Business Development 2010 and survey data by TDRI (accessed on 2 March 
2010). 
1 The Bangkok Mass Transit Authority was established by Royal Decree BE2519 in August 1976. 
 
Table 12.7: Public bus pricing. 
Bus route category Pricing 
Category 1 in Bangkok 
Category 4 in Bangkok 
The Central Land Transport Control Board regulates the price based on the 
calculation of the cost/person/trip plus a 15% margin (excluding labour 
and fuel costs) and fluctuates according to the oil price. 
Category 1 in provincial areas 
Category 4 in provincial areas 
The Provincial Land Transport Control Board regulates the price based on 
the guidelines set by the Central Land Transport Control Board. The price 
differentiation depends on the cost of operation in each province. The 
calculation of margin is based on Minimum Retail Rate (MRR) plus 5% 
(i.e., MRR =13 +5, margin =18%). Price adjustment is used to cope with 
the oil price fluctuation and is tabulated in 25 steps. Yet the real price 
adjustment is subject to negotiation between the DLT and bus operators 
rather than being adjusted automatically. 
Category 2 
Category 3 
The Central Land Transport Control Board regulates the price adjustment 
according to the fuel price. The price differentiation depends on the cost of 
operation in each province. The calculation of margin is based on MRR 
plus 5% (i.e., MRR =13 +5, margin =18%). Price adjustment is used to 
cope with the oil price fluctuation and is tabulated in 25 steps. Yet the real 
price adjustment is subject to negotiation between the DLT and bus 
operators rather than being adjusted automatically. 
Source: TDRI 2010b. 
 
The bus fare calculation is based on the assumptions of a maximum of 7 years of vehicle use 
and a 70–90% load factor depending on the bus standard. In fact, this cost plus pricing does 
not take into account the addition to capacity and changes in load factor due to the issuing of 
new licences and the entry of passenger vans (see below). Therefore, regulated bus operations 
generally have a lower load factor and thus a lower margin of profit than the DLT’s 
assumptions. The bus operators, therefore, have less incentive to invest in their services and 
the fare regulation process contributes to falling quality. Not only does quality suffer, but 
maintenance and replacement do also. Nor can prices respond to demand shifts in the market: 
as the population increases, the gap between the quantity supplied and that demanded at the 
regulated price widens. This provides an incentive for the growth of an unregulated or 
‘illegal’ sector (see below). 
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12.3.1.3 Van transport 
 
Public bus provision was unable to meet the demand for bus services in suburban residential 
areas. The BMTA could not provide adequate convenient and comfortable services for those 
commuters who travelled from suburbs to work in the city. Leopairojna and Hanaoka (2006) 
explain that passenger van services were started by investors who saw benefits in responding 
to the needs of commuters in suburban Bangkok. The number of vans grew steadily from the 
mid 1980s to 1996. However, these vans operated outside the regulatory system and were 
technically illegal. In 1984 the DLT promulgated that operating vans as bus-like services was 
illegal, and the Ministry of Transport had a policy to eliminate the van services in 1986.  
 
Van operators can charge fares that cover their costs. These fares are usually higher than 
those of the regulated companies (see below). They also offer a different service quality 
(Table 12.8). Illegal vans provide alternative services on the profit-making routes. They offer 
shorter, faster routes with guaranteed seats and a door-to-door service. They are supposed to 
operate between passenger van terminals (in housing estates, markets or community centres) 
and they are not supposed to pick up passengers at bus stops (although in practice they do so). 
Although passenger van operations cause lower revenues for the normal bus services and the 
drivers were often criticised as reckless and undisciplined, they can bridge the gap between 
the lack of public air-conditioned buses and the increasing demands of Bangkok-vicinity 
commuters. Leopairojna and Hanaoka (2006) found that passengers who travelled by van 
valued the shorter travel times and comfort from a guaranteed seat. The downsides according 
to those who travelled by bus were the narrower space and the higher fares. 
 
Table 12.8: Advantages of vans over buses by category. 
Bus route category Advantages of vans over buses 
Category 1 in Bangkok  
Has contiguous routes in the perimeter area by running 
on the main road in the community area which is 
crowded by people, business centre, school and 
university, government agency etc. 
Passenger vans have to pick up passengers only at 
origins and drop off them at bus stops along routes or 
at destinations. In fact, they undercut the bus operators 
since they operate on more profitable route (cutting 
routes), pick up and drop off passenger at the bus 
stops, residential areas, markets, community (more 
like a door-to-door service). 
Category 2  
Routes link Bangkok and the provinces. 
 
Category 3 
Interprovincial routes which link one province with 
another and may pass through other provinces. 
Buses of the Transport Company Ltd and its sub-
contractors are required to pick up passengers at 
official bus terminals (only one or few terminals in a 
province). However, passenger van terminals are 
usually located in residential areas (in housing estates, 
markets or community centres) which are not 
proclaimed officially. They also provide door-to-door 
service by charging extra, which is actually prohibited. 
 
Leopairojna and Hanaoka (2006) also report average trip lengths for the vans were less than for 
buses. They say that the gap between van fares and bus fares increased with trip length. Bus 
fares tend to be flatter over long distances, so competition from vans on shorter routes 
undermined the ability of buses to cross-subsidise longer routes (to cater for low-income 
households living further from the city centre) from shorter ones. The study reports that the 
incumbent operators such as BMTA and its sub-contractors complained to the DLT. They 
identify research that showed a link between these complaints and the new policy on vans 
introduced in 1999. At that time, only BMTA was granted licences to operate passenger van 
services, but it was able to sub-contract this work to van drivers. The licences were allocated on 
the existing routes of the vans between important locations in the city and suburbs with 
distances of 8–56km. The services had to comply with DLT standards, have insurance for 
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passengers and pay fees to BMTA. Maximum fares were also regulated. The quota of legal 
vans was set according to the number of van drivers who applied for a BMTA sub-contract and 
then was adjusted according to passenger demand. The van service was established originally 
by investors who constructed the van terminals and set up the services. Establishing the 
terminals required the ‘support from influential figures (who were) paid … in return’ 
(Leopairojna & Hanaoka 2006, p. 6). According to some passenger van operators, the drivers 
made an unofficial payment to the police who enforce the transport laws. The van drivers also 
had to be ‘members’ of the terminals for which they paid a membership fee. They report that in 
1998 these fees were THB100 000 for entry and THB4000/month. After the vans were 
legalised the fees rose to THB250 000 and THB5000/month. This may reflect the expectation 
that the legalisation process might actually make it more difficult to enter the market. 
 
Although the van fare in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region is more expensive than for the 
air-conditioned buses (Table 12.9), the number of legal vans has increased from a few 
hundred in 1995 to 5555 in 2004 and 6582 in 2008 (Table 12.10). However, illegal vans 
continue to operate. They do not have to comply with the DLT’s conditions and can operate 
on disallowed (profit-making) routes in peak hour, for example. Furthermore, they can charge 
more for offering extra services such as door-to-door and dropping passengers off in small 
Soi (lanes). Economies in vehicle size in passenger transport are also argued to be not 
significant (Gwilliam 2008). Leopairojna and Hanaoka (2006) report that a Senatorial 
Subcommittee found there were 8000–9000 vans in Bangkok in 2001. 
 
Table 12.9: Characteristics of urban public transport modes in the Bangkok  
Metropolitan Region (Bus Route Category 1), September 2008. 
Transport mode Fare (THB/ride) 
1. Non air-conditioned bus  7 
2. Air-conditioned bus Regular Bus: 11–19 
Euro I and Euro II: 12–24 
3. Micro bus 20–40 
4. Mini bus (Non air-conditioned) 6.50 
5. Van (legal) 10–45 
    Source: Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. 
 
Table 12.10: The number of passenger vans in the Bangkok Metropolitan Region (Bus Route Category 1). 
 Before legalisation After legalisation 
Year 1995 1999–2002 2004 20083 
Quota Limit  n.a. 4,789–8,505 
(115 routes) 
3,964–5,574 
(144 routes) 
6,950 
(127 routes) 
Legal Vans1 Approx. 300 5,566 5,555 6,582 
Illegal Vans2 unknown 3,690 unknown 
Source: 1Leopairojna & Hanaoka 2006; 2APEIS 2004;  3Bangkok Mass Transit Authority 2010. 
 
In 2009 the DLT legalised another 6400 passenger vans to provide services on 60 routes from 
Bangkok to other provinces (Bus Route Category 2). According to the DLT regulation, Van 
Route Categories 2 and 3 offer the same price as normal air-conditioned buses for the same 
section. However, passengers are willing to pay extra because the vans’ smaller size means 
they can provide a door-to-door service. Vans have pick up/drop off points in city centres while 
the large buses (Bus Route Categories 2 and 3) must stop at the regulated bus terminals. 
 
The legalisation of passenger vans is a good lesson in basing regulatory reform on market-
driven demand. Since the existing regulation did not meet the demand of the market, there was 
a gap between the demand and the legal bus services (supply). This gap has been filled by the 
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entry of illegal vans to the market. The DLT, therefore, has a policy to legalise illegal vans’ 
operation. However, a large number of vans apparently continue to operate illegally which 
affects the number of passengers on a legal route, particularly air-conditioned bus routes, and 
the ability of the bus system to meet its service obligations.  
 
12.3.2 Freight transport 
 
Truck transport dominates the freight transport industry in Thailand. More than 80% of freight 
is transported by trucks, with 2% of cargo moved by rail (427.5 and 11.5 million tonnes out of 
the total freight quantity of 507.7 million tonnes respectively). The rest is split among inland 
waterway, coastal and air transport (Figures 12.1–2). At present Thailand’s freight transport 
services exhibit some undue inefficiencies, including aged fleets of trucks with low load limits 
and low fuel efficiency, low penetration of multi-modal logistics providers, limited capital for 
new investment by small firms and limited use of Electronic Data Interchange for facilitating 
shipment and delivery and supply chain management (World Bank and NESDB 2009).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.1: The modal share in freight transport in 2008 (tonne). (Source: Ministry of Transport 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12.2: Freight transport split by mode, 2006. (Source: Ministry of Transport 2010) 
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Freight transport is a free competitive market without price regulation. The DLT only regulates 
vehicle standards through licensing conditions, with very simple requirements. The licence for 
a fixed route costs THB2500 (USD77.4) and is valid for 5 years. A new domestic entrant must 
present the Contract of Carriage and vehicles must comply with the DLT standard.  
 
In the past the Express Transportation Organization of Thailand (ETO), a government 
enterprise, was the largest freight firm with the largest transport network and the most 
extensive route coverage. Private firms used the ETO price as the reference and adjusted their 
price according to the ETO price fluctuation. However, the ETO was closed down in 2006 
due to its inefficient operation and the financial burden it created. 
 
Private ownership in the provision of services is allowed for 100% of private equity. Foreign 
firms are allowed up to 49% of equity for passenger transport firms but must be registered 
under Thai laws according to the Foreign Business Act AD 1999. 
 
In terms of the market share, SCG Logistics and Thai Beverage Recycle, who are own 
account operators, are now top of the freight transport market share. The former is ranked in 
the high revenue group while the latter is in the upper middle revenue group. In the lower 
middle revenue group are NYK Logistics, SSO Transport Company, Hatyai Kor-Chaisang 
and Linfox Transport. The majority of truck companies are small to medium firms which are 
in the low revenue group (Table 12.11). 
 
Table 12.11: Characteristics of the six largest freight transport firms in terms of revenue, 2007. 
Source: Calculated on Department of Business Development 2010 and survey data by TDRI (accessed on 2 
March 2010). 
Note: Due to data limitations, the market size of truck operators cannot be calculated exactly. However, we 
grouped the truck operators with respect to the revenue into four intervals based on the Bank of Thailand 
exchange rate of 2007: low revenue, < USD57.8 million; lower middle revenue, USD57.8–115.7 million; 
upper middle revenue, USD115.7–173.5 million; high revenue, > USD231.4 million. 
 
Based on DLT data, there were 3668 truck transport operators and truck rental operators in 
2007. The total number of trucks then registered for transport companies was 135 996 while 
the number of privately owned trucks was 611 739 (DLT 2009). Besides, there were 3813 
registered road freight transport operators based on Department of Business Development 
(2010) data. The majority of the truck operations are not cost-efficient since there is a high 
cost per kilometre and economy of scale is lacking. 
 
Firm Year 
established 
Government 
equity  
(%) 
Domestic 
private 
equity 
(%) 
Foreign 
equity  
(%) 
Market size of 
total revenue 
(%) 
SCG Logistics Management  
Company Ltd 
1990 – 100 – High revenue 
Thai Beverage Recycle 
Company Ltd 
1986 – 100 – Upper middle 
revenue 
NYK Logistics Thailand 
Company Ltd 
1969 – 61.84 38.16 Lower middle 
revenue 
S.S.O. Transport Company Ltd 1989 – 100 – 
Hatyai Kor-Chaisang 
Partnership Ltd 
1984 – 100 – 
Linfox Transport (Thailand) 
Company Ltd 
1993 – 100 – 
Other 3807 operators     Low revenue 
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The freight transport industry in Thailand has also been affected by the liberalisation of retail 
trade services in 1997. The modern trade businesses have dominated the domestic consumer 
goods freight by using efficient supply chain management and sub-contracting the transport 
function to a local haulage company. Being transport operators only, Thai freight firms gain a 
small profit margin and cannot develop their capacity to compete in the logistics and supply 
chain management market.  
 
The road freight transport market by truck is highly competitive among small operators. 
Competition forces operators to carry overweight loads and, without incentives to do 
otherwise, use older and polluting truck fleets. This leads to the abrasion of roads, air 
pollution and a high accident rate. One response has been for the DLT and police to enforce 
the regulations on vehicle standards strictly. It is also important that road pricing reflect the 
externalities involved in road transport. Without that pricing, road transport would be greater 
and freight would be diverted from rail and inland waterways (when for some types of cargo 
those options would be more productive in terms of the use of fuel). 
 
Road pricing is also debated in the context of the liberalisation of cross-border road transport. 
The absence of charges for access and externalities allows foreign vehicles to use the national 
road infrastructure free of charge while the cost is subsidised by taxpayers. 
 
12.3.3. International road transport 
 
Apart from the development of the domestic road transport network, globalisation has 
brought a demand for goods and services that requires improved infrastructure and more 
efficient transport systems as a precondition for economic development. Thailand, which has 
paid attention to the inter-city road transport linkages with neighbouring economies and sub-
regional groups, recently has signed several agreements to facilitate cooperation in the road 
transport sector. 
 
Currently, international road transport service is not open to competition. Cross-border 
transport between Thailand and neighbouring economies is allowed only between border 
cities (i.e., up to 7km from the borders). Cross-border transport must be operated under a 
bilateral agreement; for example, Thailand–Malaysia and Thailand–Lao (Box 12.1) or 
multilateral agreements such as the ASEAN Economic Cooperation Agreement and the 
ADB-Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program (see below). The 
government regulates the international haulage by having an international haulage licence 
quota (except the cross-border transport between Thailand–Lao PDR; see Section 12.4.2). 
The operators are selected and approved by DLT: under section 25 of the Land Transport Act 
AD 1979 the operators carry out the transport under the bilateral and multilateral 
international road transport agreements between Thailand and neighbouring economies. 
 
Under these agreements an international road transport operator must be a Thai juristic 
person, whose head office must be located in Thai territory,. Foreigners are allowed to have 
equity participation of no more than 49%. International road transport under the Land 
Transport Act BE2522 (1979) is categorised as:  
 
• Fixed Route and Non-Fixed Route International Road Transport Services – the 
providers must be either a limited company, a limited public company or a Thai 
government organisation; and  
• Private International Road Transport Services (Commercial) – the providers must be 
either a registered ordinary partnership, a limited company or a limited public company.  
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The international road transport service providers must have been domestic road transport 
service providers beforehand. The licence fee of THB2500 (USD77.4) is for a 5-year period. 
 
Box 12.1: Bilateral agreements on road freight transport services. 
• Thailand–Malaysia: Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Thailand and Malaysia on the 
Movement in Transit of Perishable Goods by Road from Thailand through Malaysia to Singapore 1979. 
Under this bilateral agreement cross-border transport is allowed only for perishable goods from Thailand 
to Singapore, travelling through Malaysia. It also has an annual quantitative limitation of goods as well 
as a specific transport route. The cross-border road transport service between Thailand and Malaysia is 
an oligopoly in which there are currently three transport operators under this agreement. 
• Thailand–Lao PDR: MoU between the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of 
Malaysia, Agreement Between the Government of the Kingdom Thailand and the Government of the Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic on Road Transport, 1999 and Subsidiary Agreement Specifying Road 
Transport Arrangement between the Government of Thailand and the Government of the Lao PDR, 
2001. 
 
This bilateral agreement is the first liberalisation of international road transport services. The background of the 
liberalisation is: 
1978–90: cross-border transport between Thailand and Lao PDR was a monopoly under the ETO. 
1991: The ETO had its licences terminated because Lao PDR appealed its expensive service fee. Cabinet 
approved the joint venture firm of Thailand and Lao PDR, named T.L. Enterprise, and it became the 
monopoly transport operator. 
1992: Ministry of Transport opened the market for competition since there were many complaints about the 
monopoly of T.L. Enterprise. In this year, there were five transport operators. 
2004: Lao PDR and Thailand agree to open the free market of cross-border transport of both passengers (non-
fixed route) and freight without quota limitation since previously the transport costs were very high. 
 
Source: Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. 
 
12.3.3.1 Thailand–Lao PDR 
 
Cross-border transport between Thailand and Lao PDR was liberalised under a bilateral 
agreement. After liberalisation in 2004 the number of international freight transport operators 
increased from two (only Thailand–Malaysia transport operators) to 123 (including Thailand–
Lao PDR transport operators) (Table 12.12). 
 
Table 12.12: The number of international transport operating licences issued per year, 2000–07. 
International Licence 
Year 
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Bus – – – – 13 25 7 15 
Truck  3 2 2 2 123 63 51 75 
Source: Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. 
 
Cross-border transport between Thailand and Lao PDR is highly competitive among 
domestic operators (226 international truck licences and 57 international non-fixed route bus 
licences have been issued) (Table 12.13). In comparison, international freight transport 
between Thailand and Malaysia is an oligopoly as it has a quota limitation and only allows 
the transport of perishable goods from Thailand to Singapore through Malaysia. Banomyong 
(n.d.) reports that as a result of the agreement, freight rates fell by 20–30% between Vientiane 
and Thai ports. Banomyong points out some logistical constraints on the agreement’s impact 
on routes other than between the major points. One of these is the report by Thai operators 
that Lao authorities continue to insist that some Thai trucks be reloaded on to Lao trucks at 
the border. Also, partnership operators may have difficulty in meeting the legal requirements 
of the agreement (which refers to ‘juristic persons’).  
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Table 12.13: The number of international transport operating licences for 2007. 
International licence Total no. of 
licences 
Total no. of 
vehicles 
Non-Fixed Route Bus 57 177 
Fixed Route Bus 2 – 
Non-Fixed Route Truck (Transport Operators) 229 8,979 
  Thailand–Malaysia (only perishable goods) 3 79 
  Thailand–Lao PDR 226 8,900 
Private Transport (Own Account)   
   Truck (Thailand–Lao PDR)  84 861 
Source: Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. 
 
The operation of a cross-border non-fixed or chartered route bus was also liberalised between 
Thailand and Lao PDR. However, the fixed route international bus between Thailand and Lao 
PDR is a monopoly run by Transport Company Ltd (Thailand), a government-owned 
enterprise of Thailand, and the government-owned Bus Enterprise of Laos. Currently, there 
are five fixed routes of international transport between Thailand and Lao PDR: Nongkhai–
Vientiane, Udonthani–Nongkhai–Vientiane, Ubonratchathaini–Pak se, Vientiane–Khon Kaen 
and Savannakhet–Mukdahan. Fares are difficult to compare between bus routes because of 
the differences in service quality, but the entry of chartered buses provides consumers with 
more options. 
 
12.4 MULTILATERAL AGREEMENTS 
 
Multilateral agreements are also important for the structure of the road transport markets. 
 
12.4.1 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services  
 
ASEAN started its services liberalisation project with the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services (AFAS). The liberalisation of international road freight transport service is expected 
to be achieved by 2015. ASEAN nationals will be allowed an equity participation of no less 
than 49% by 2008, 51% by 2010 and 70% by 2013. AFAS also includes customs facilitation 
for transit goods which will be exempt from customs formalities procedures. The transport 
facilitation will allow 500 vehicles in each member economy to operate cross-border 
transport5
 
, develop multimodal transport and facilitate trade to allow the door-to-door 
delivery of goods. This will reduce logistics, time and cost, harmonise road transport laws to 
facilitate movement across land borders and support the regional supply chain and logistics 
network.  
12.4.2 ADB–Greater Mekong Sub-region Economic Cooperation Program 
 
The Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) regional economic cooperation framework was 
formulated in 1992 and funded by the ADB with the aim of facilitating efficient freight and 
passenger cross border transport, which will improve intra-regional market access for GMS 
products and trade competitiveness. The GMS program covers nine sectors – agriculture, 
energy, environment, telecommunications, human resource development, investment, tourism, 
trade and private sector development, with the priority being on the transport sector (JICA 2007). 
The coverage is on international road transport, specifically the multimodal transport related 
to the roads covering six member economies, namely Cambodia; southern China; Lao PDR; 
                                                 
5 In January 2009 the Thai Parliament approved the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Facilitation of Inter-
State Transport. (Source: Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning)  
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Myanmar; Thailand; and Viet Nam. Each member economy is entitled to 500 GMS transport 
permits for cargo transport and non-scheduled passenger transport: the permit quota is 
divided into 400 for commercial trucks and 100 for buses. Member economies will allow 
foreign vehicles granted the ‘GMS transport permit’ by the contracting economy to enter the 
economy on designated routes. GMS members will also consider the transition from quota 
limitations to a free market system in the future.  
 
Several flagship infrastructure projects were identified, and three ‘Economic Corridors’ – the 
North–South Economic Corridor (NSEC; covering southern China–Lao PDR–Myanmar–
Thailand), the East–West Economic Corridor (EWEC; covering Myanmar–Thailand–Lao 
PDR–Viet Nam), and the Southern Economic Corridor (SEC; covering Thailand–Cambodia–
Viet Nam) were prioritised in the GMS transport sector development plan. Other corridors 
identified in the initial framework were: Western (Tamu–Mawlamyine); Eastern (Kunming–
Ho Chi Minh City and Nanning–Bangkok/Laem Chabang), Central (Kunming–
Sihanoukville/Satthaip) and Southern Coastal (Bangkok–Namcan). 
 
The time and cost reduction on transport from Bangkok–Danang Port demonstrates the 
Economic Corridors’ performance. There has been a significant improvement through the 
infrastructure investment, particularly the Second Mekong International Bridge and cross 
border formalities facilitation agreement. These initiatives led to drastic reductions in the 
logistics cost and time (Figure 12.3). The overall transport cost fell from approximately 
USD3000 to USD2070 and the transport time improved by almost 13 hours (from 40 hours 
40 minutes in 2000 to 28 hours in 2007).  
 
The prospective significant reduction in logistics time and costs in these economic corridors 
will benefit the transport of perishable goods in particular, as ‘time’ is the most crucial factor 
for the traders’ ability to ensure quality control. The GMS economic corridor development 
will enable Thailand to export fruit to China within 4 days. This will leave more days to 
distribute fresher and higher quality fruit in that nation (Box 12.2). 
 
Furthermore, a GMS infrastructure improvement project, the Second Mekong International 
Bridge as the link of EWEC, has had a considerable impact on the increase in trade value 
between Thailand and Lao PDR (Box 12.3). 
 
The GMS agreement also covers the removal of non-physical barriers to the cross-border 
movement of people, vehicles and goods such as facilitating border crossing formalities and 
exchange of traffic rights through a GMS Cross-Border Transport Agreement. There are 17 
Annexes and 3 Protocols which allow flexibility for ratification by economies: all member 
economies have ratified the Annexes and Protocols except Thailand, which has not ratified 
Annexes 1, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 14 and Protocol 3, and Myanmar which has not ratified any of 
the Annexes and Protocols. In liberalising international road transport, the agreement allows 
the admission of foreign vehicles registered in member economies for those who satisfy the 
technical requirements (e.g., weight limit and vehicle length). The implementation is divided 
into two phases. The first phase is committed to the reciprocal recognition of foreign vehicles 
by the quota limitation: the 500 permits that can be issued are subject to limits on frequency, 
capacity and the number of transport operators. The second phase will open a free market 
system without any restrictions. The governments of the contracting parties are authorised to 
regulate the safety and weight limit of vehicles while the pricing of cross-border transport 
will be determined by market forces. The government is entitled to regulate the market 
domination under the supervision of the Joint Committee. 
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Sources: JICA (2007), MOU IICBTA between Lao PDR and Thailand (2007), JETRO (2008), ADB (2009) 
Notes: Year 2000 – the transport on the Bangkok–Danang route goes via Nong Khai and crosses the First 
Mekong International Bridge to Vientiane, Lao PDR, and then goes to Savannakhet. 
 Year 2007a – the transport on Bangkok–Danang route goes via Mukdahan and crosses the Second 
Mekong International Bridge to Savannakhet, Lao PDR, and then to Lao Bao, Viet Nam. 
 Year 2007b –May 2007, the Step I of Single Stop Inspection (SSI) and Single Window Inspection (SWI) 
was implemented at Lao Bao–Dansavanh border. Besides, as of June 2007, minimal inspection was 
implemented at Mukdahan–Savannakhet border. 
 Cost is for chartering a 20-foot container for land transport. 
 The estimated logistics cost in 2009 is slightly higher than the cost in 2007 due to the increase in the fuel 
price (from approximately USD2070 to USD2282). 
Figure 12.3: Time and cost improvement on the Bangkok–Danang route. 
 
One major breakthrough is the trial of the Customs Transit System and Exchange of Traffic 
Rights among Thailand, Lao PDR and Viet Nam which allows registered trucks in these 
economies to go through foreign territory on the R9 route from Mukdahan Province in 
Thailand to Savannakhet (Lao PDR), and then to Lao Bao, Dong Ha and Danang Port in Viet 
Nam. The trial of the ‘go-through’ trucks was initiated on 11 June 2009 and 400 trucks of 12 
Thai truck operators were issued GMS road transport permits by the Board of Trade of 
Thailand. Despite this trial, the cross-border transport under the Initial Implementation of the 
Cross-Border Transport Agreement has not genuinely taken place: there were problems 
relating to the Customs Transit System with the guaranteeing organisation and the transit fee 
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Box 12.2: Benefits from the GMS Economic Corridors development. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
that needed agreement among member economies. Cross-border transport from Thailand to 
southern China (NSEC) and from Thailand to Viet Nam through Lao PDR (EWEC), still 
requires cargo transshipment at the Lao PDR border since Thai trucks are only allowed to 
enter into Lao territory and not beyond. 
 
There are other barriers along the GMS Economic Corridors that hamper the efficient 
utilisation of the transport infrastructure. These constraints could derive from customs 
procedures, lack of supporting policy frameworks as well as human and institutional 
capacities which add to the stopping time at the borders. The price distortion as a result of 
unofficial payments also leads to the current high logistics cost.6
                                                 
6 Based on an interview with a Thai operator, the freight cost on route R3A (Bangkok–Yunnan) is much higher 
than the actual cost. The operator has to pay THB60 000 (USD1860) for actual transport costs plus another 
THB120 000 (USD3721) for unidentified costs along the route. 
 
Under GMS economic cooperation, Thailand can exploit the benefit from routes R3 and R12 which are the 
effective and efficient transport routes from Thailand to China. These routes will reduce logistics cost and 
time and allow more days to distribute the goods within China. The transport from Thailand to China 
normally uses sea freight from Laem Chabang Port to Guang Zhou Port, which takes around 8–10 days and 
leaves only a few days to distribute the goods. However, with R3 routes on the NSEC, it will take only 3 
days to transport fresh fruit from plantation areas through northern Thailand and Lao PDR to arrive in 
Kunming, Sichuan and Chongqing. More importantly, it will then have 7 days to distribute the goods in 
China. Additionally, routes R9 and R12 on the EWEC will shorten the period to transport fresh fruit from 
plantation areas in Thailand to Nanning in China via Lao PDR and Viet Nam to 3-4 days. 
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Box 12.3 Impacts from the GMS East-West Economic Corridor, Mukdahan checkpoint. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More importantly, the major problem of GMS is the unequal sharing of costs and benefits 
among member economies. In the case of transit economies like Lao PDR, the facilitation of 
cross-border transport means that the benefit goes to other economies while leaving the costs of 
road maintenance, infrastructure investment, and social and environmental impacts to the 
transit economy. To counteract such circumstances, Lao PDR might resort to the strategy of 
assembling the traffic in its territory with little incentive to expedite customs, immigration and 
quarantine inspection processes. If this is the case, unfortunately it will be counterproductive. 
Given that there is more time taken for customs formalities in Lao PDR at the Mukdahan–
Savannakhet border, compared to Thailand, Lao PDR logistics providers will obtain more than 
the road usage fee (Figure 12.4).7
 
 This, in turn, would hinder rather than facilitate trade flow (of 
both passengers and freight) among the member economies. Furthermore, neighbouring 
economies could also give financial aid for infrastructure investment and maintenance cost to 
Lao PDR by allowing transit fee collection to relieve the burdens of transit economy. 
Although the regional transport agreement results in reduced transport cost along the 
corridors, there are informal stakeholders who must be included as crucial participants who 
could hamper the development of corridor efficiency. Corruption and informal payments are 
common along some of the borders. By harmonising the necessary requirements for engaging 
in cross-border trade, it will be more difficult for local government officials, customs workers 
                                                 
7 Based on the Time Release Study (2007), the Customs import procedure is: Mukdahan, 40 minutes and 
Savannakhet, 120 minutes; and the export procedure is Mukdahan 46 minutes and Savannakhet 90 minutes. 
The major consequence of infrastructure development project, a Second Mekong International Bridge, 
is the increase in trade value between Thailand and Lao PDR. The total trade value between Thailand 
and Lao PDR at the Mukdahan checkpoint has grown rapidly from THB4 billion in 2003 to 
THB24 billion in 2009. The export value has increased from THB3 billion in 2003 to THB9 billion in 
2009 while the import value has significantly increased from THB665 million to THB15 billion. The 
average annual growth rate for the past 7 years of import value is 68.1% and of export value is 18.7%. 
 
Notably, the Second Mekong International Bridge has resulted in a significant increase in the import of 
copper, wooden products and metal from Lao PDR. The bridge allowed the transport of heavy goods 
like wood and metal products through the Mukdahan checkpoint since it could not be transported by 
ferry.  
 
 
Source: TDRI 2010a. 
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Figure 12.4: The problem of possible cross-border truck flow at Mukdahan–Savannakhet. 
 
and others with authority to act corruptly. Meanwhile, the resistance to fully implementing 
the agreement is continuing. The practice of corruption leads to an unreasonably high 
transport cost, resulting in the imperfect competition of international transport and hampering 
new entrants into the market. 
 
The regional liberalisation of road transport is the forthcoming scenario, namely 500 
interstate transport permits for each member economy under the GMS agreement and another 
500 permits under AFAS.8
 
 These agreements will lead to further reductions in transport cost 
along the corridors. However, the cross-border transport requires mutual agreement among 
member economies on the clear definition of international haulage permission regarding 
service duration, frequency, periodicity and continuity. Otherwise it could result in disputes 
over cabotage transport which has a large impact on domestic providers. There is also a 
concern about negative impacts such as an increase in smuggling goods and illegal 
substances. 
The liberalisation will allow foreign firms to invest in domestic transport businesses in the 
economies. However, foreign firms will have to offer some differentiated service, particularly 
with the use of standards and information and communications technology, if they are to 
compete. There are many competitors in the market already and foreign firms might not be able 
to compete with local firms which have advantages of geography (they are more familiar with 
the towns), rules, regulation familiarity and the requirements of the customers, especially local 
                                                 
8 In January 2009 Parliament approved this action under AFAS according to the Constitutional Law of Thailand, 
Article 190, Paragraph 2. 
 
 
The drivers will stop to unload/reload at Savannakhet if the customs formality at Savannakhet takes a 
longer time. Concerning the customs clearance, it must be noted that the inspection procedures are 
divided into the inspection of people and goods. The procedure related to person checking can be 
accelerated, but the goods inspection process should be carried out at an equivalent speed for the 
proportionate benefits of both economies’ domestic logistics providers. 
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businesses). However, domestic operators could be affected by the entry of ‘brand name’ 
manufacturing firms which only hire local transport firms to operate their transport. 
 
12.5 VALUE OF COORDINATION 
 
Institutional barriers can arise through the agencies involved, as each has their own objectives 
and jurisdiction. The past implementation of road transport and land-use plans was carried 
out by five committees and 14 agencies under two ministries, the Ministry of Interior (MOI) 
and the Ministry of Transport (MOT) (Table 12.14). A review of institutional problems by 
the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, (NESDB 1991) noted 
the following issues: 
• Conflicting mega-projects: As demonstrated by the intersections between elevated 
structures. 
• Duplication of capacity: Enormous duplication of capacity is evident in the mega-
projects, but there are other instances: for example, the Public Works Department and 
ETO that both appear to be planning a north–south road in Thonburi west of Middle 
Ring Road, on alignments close to each other. 
• Unbalanced road hierarchy: An enormous expansion of main road capacity into the 
city centre is being planned, but there are no corresponding plans to expand the 
collection/distribution network. 
 
A key problem in overlapping agencies is the lack of effective coordination, consultation and 
control. Sometimes this is due to differences in the cultures of the agencies. The allocation of 
the budget is also important, since each agency expects to maintain its share of ‘the cake’. 
 
It has been recognised since the Sixth Plan (1986–91) that there is an imbalance where the 
investment for road improvement occurs. There is a bias towards substantial projects, at the 
expense of needed supporting investment in secondary roads, including distributor and local 
roads. The absence of sufficient distributor and local roads had led to the development of 
‘superblocks’ which are large tracts of uncoordinated urban development and vacant land 
parcels within, and following, the primary road corridors within which discontinuous narrow 
local roads provide access to individual housing developments. The problems of this form of 
development include: 
 
Table 12.14: Implementing and planning agencies. 
Agency or committee Reporting to 
1. Department of Land Transport  MOT 
2. Department of Highways  MOT 
3. Bangkok Mass Transit Authority  MOT 
4. The Transport Company Ltd MOT 
5. Express Transportation Organization of Thailand MOT 
6. Harbour Department MOT 
7. Public Works Department  MOI 
8. Department of Town and Country Planning MOI 
9. Accelerated Rural Development Department MOI 
10. Expressway Authority of Thailand MOI 
11. Office of the Committee for the Management of Road Traffic  MOI 
12. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration  MOI 
13. Traffic Police Division MOI 
14. Department of Local Administration MOI 
15. Bangkok Metropolitan Region Development Committee  Independent Agency 
16. Committee to Consider Construction of Elevated Roads over Canals  
17. Committee for the Management of Road Traffic  MOI 
18. Land Transport Policy Committee  MOT 
19. Land Transport Control Board  MOT 
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• Excessive congestion on primary roads – in the absence of a good secondary (i.e., 
distributor) road network the primary roads must be used for local and long distance 
trips; 
• Inconvenient and circuitous travel for private and public modes of transport 
attempting to access or egress developments within the superblock; and 
• Large parcels of underutilised land with poor accessibility and high servicing costs 
(World Bank 2007).  
 
However, policy reform began in 2002 through the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy 
and Planning (OTP) and the Ministry of Transport, with oversight by the Commission for the 
Management of Land Traffic. There are still problems of overlapping agencies; for example, 
the Departments of Highways and of Rural Roads are the two main agencies in the provision 
of roads, with responsibility for major highway and rural roads construction, respectively. 
Another overlapping operation is the expressway network systems that are operated by the 
Expressway Authority of Thailand with private sector participation. Finally, there is no single 
regulator that can set all transport-related prices and taxes so as to maximise social welfare 
throughout the system (Rietveld & Stough 2004). 
 
12.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The Thai case highlights a number of topical and widespread issues in road transport policy. 
In urban bus markets, for example, attempts to provide a universal service in a regulated 
environment have created incentives for entry in substitute but unregulated markets. 
Passengers have benefited from the wider options available. But this entry has challenged the 
capacity of the incumbents in the regulated markets to meet their service obligations. The 
response has been to widen the scope of regulation; however, a significant unregulated set of 
operators continues to exist. The significance of the impact of the growth of the unregulated 
sector is exaggerated in the absence of both pricing for traffic congestion and measures to 
capture other externalities associated with urban passenger transport systems.  
 
The road transport industry involves externalities that may justify a certain degree of 
government intervention. A regulatory framework in road freight can contribute to public 
safety and reduce environmental impacts. An appropriate road pricing and vehicle taxation 
system to reflect the actual cost of the road freight industry is valuable. The value of 
including the costs of externalities will be even more significant once the cross-border 
transport market has been liberalised. 
 
The liberalisation of cross-border transport facilitates intra-regional trade. Several agreements 
on cross-border transport facilitation allowing foreign vehicles to enter the economy will 
reduce logistics costs. But new issues will emerge, including the treatment of cabotage. 
Managing the infrastructure at border crossing points will be important for preventing the 
gains from lower transport costs being captured by the providers of those critical 
infrastructure services. 
 
This study also highlights the value of coordinating policies for operations and for 
infrastructure with those for the environment. This coordination at government level will be 
difficult to obtain, not only because of the amount of information that has to be shared but 
also because of the nature of the agencies involved. The Thai government has begun a 
process of reorganisation to resolve these issues, but challenges remain. 
 
288 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
 
12.7 REFERENCES 
 
ADB 2009. Strategy and Action Plan for the East-West Economic Corridor. Asian Development Bank. 
 
ADBI 2009. Transport Infrastructure and Trade Facilitation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region. Working Paper 
Series No. 130. Asian Development Bank Institute. 
 
ATRANS 2008. Transportation Research Challenges in Thailand Sub-Project on Thailand road safety. Special 
Research project 2007 Project No: A-07/ 003-1. Asian Transportation Research Society. 
 
APEC 2005. Thailand’s Transport Progress towards the Bogor Goals, September 2005. Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation. 
 
APEIS 2006. Research on Innovative and Strategic Policy Options (RISPO). Good Practices Inventory. Van 
Transit System in Bangkok Metropolitan Region. Asia-Pacific Environmental Innovation Strategy Project. 
 
Banomyong, R n.d., c. 2006. ‘Logistics impact on trade and economic development in Lao PDR: the Thai 
factor’, Report written for the World Bank, Thammasat University. 
 
Department of Business Development 2010. Business Online data, http://www.thairegistration.com. 
 
Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. http://www.ltpcenter.com. 
 
Gwilliam, K 2008. ‘Bus transport: Is there a regulatory cycle?’, Transportation Research Part A: Policy and 
Practice, 42(9), pp. 1183–94. 
 
JETRO 2008. Current Status and Issues of Logistics Network in ASEAN-Outline of ASEAN Logistics Network 
Map Project, Workshop on Statistics of Asian Traffic and Transportation, March 2008. The Japan External 
Trade Organization. 
 
JICA 2007. The research on the Cross-border Transportation Infrastructure: Phase 2, Final Report, December 
2007. Japan International Cooperation Agency. 
 
Department of Land Transport, Land Transport Promotion Center 2010. http://www.ltpcenter.com. 
 
Leopairojna, SK & S Hanaoka 2006. Market analysis of passenger vans in Bangkok. In Macario, R, JM Viegas 
& D Hensher (eds) Competition and Ownership in Land Passenger Transport: Proceedings of 9th 
International Conference on Competition and Ownership of Land Passenger Transport, Elsevier. 
 
Meakin, R 2005 A Study of Urban Public Transport Conditions in Bangkok. A Case Study Forming an Input to 
the Global Toolkit on Bus Transport Reform. 
 
Ministry of Transport http://www.mot.go.th. 
 
NESDB 1991. The Seventh Plan Urban and Regional Transport (SPURT) FINAL REPORT. Office of the 
National Economic and Social Development Board. 
 
Rietveld, P & R Stough 2004. Barriers to Sustainable Transport: Institutions, Regulation and Sustainability. 
 
TDRI 2005. Transport Liberalization and Competition Concerns in ASEAN. TDRI Quarterly review, December. 
Thailand Development Research Institute. 
 
TDRI 2010a. Sharing the Benefits from Transportation Linkages and Logistics Improvements in the GMS: A 
Study of the East-West and North-South Corridor. Bangkok, Thailand. 9–10 February. 
 
TDRI 2010b. The Study of Bus Cost Structure. Thailand Development Research Institute. 
 
World Bank 2007. Strategic Urban Transport Policy Directions for Bangkok. Available online at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTTHAILAND/Resources/333200-1177475763598/2007june_bkk-
urban-transport-directions.pdf. 
Road transport in Thailand 289 
 
World Bank 2008. Thailand Infrastructure Annual Report. Available online at http://www.awex.be/fr-
BE/Infos%20march%C3%A9s%20et%20secteurs/Infossecteurs/Pages/THAILANDE_DOC_THAILANDEI
NFRASTRUCTUREANNUALREPORT2008.aspx. 
 
World Bank and NESDB 2009. Thailand: Making Transport more Energy Efficient. World Bank and NESDB, 
Bangkok, March. .  
 
 
 
Chapter 13 
 
MARITIME TRANSPORT IN AUSTRALIA 
 
 
Fabien Bertho1
 
 
 
• International shipping markets are becoming more competitive, though restrictions on 
operations remain in some high income economies. Lower income economies are 
more likely to have restrictions on foreign investment. 
• The Australian experience of a more liberal application of rules on cabotage is 
associated with lower freight rates and higher productivity in the remaining domestic 
fleet. 
• Becoming more important are the terms of access to port services and their 
performance. 
 
 
13.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper is an analysis of the Australian maritime transport sector and addresses maritime 
transport in the widest sense, while focusing strictly on shipping (international and domestic) 
and on port infrastructures and related services. 
 
The Australian regulatory framework is, overall, one of the most open and liberal in the 
world. This analysis examines the sectors that have been reformed in the last few years, those 
where reforms are still being debated and others where regulatory reform is still obviously 
necessary for reasons such as poor performance, congestion and bottlenecks. It explains the 
drivers of past and potential reforms, highlights the consequences of these reforms and 
provides recommendations, as appropriate, to show room for progress. 
 
More particularly, it focuses on three themes: coastal shipping, competition rules in liner 
shipping, and cargo handling and related infrastructures. In the first, it explains in what way 
the Australian coastal shipping regulation is very liberal in comparison with other economies, 
in the second, why the exemption of carrier agreements from competition law is a non-issue 
in Australia and in the third why, despite there being no restrictions in the cargo handling 
sector, some problems remain. 
 
Although geography makes maritime transport of crucial importance for Australia, at first 
sight this does not show up from data on worldwide maritime transport. The Australian flag 
registered fleet represents just a tiny share of the world fleet – 0.18% (UNCTAD 2009). 
Moreover, in 2008 Australia’s merchandise trade represented only 1.2% of world 
merchandise trade in value (UNCTAD 2009). By volume, however, the picture is quite 
                                                 
1 University of Adelaide and Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (Sciences-Po, Paris) (fabien.bertho@sciences-
po.org). I thank Howard Dick (Universities of Melbourne and Newcastle), Henry Ergas (University of 
Canberra), and Michael Sutton and Susan Bell (Australian Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional 
Development and Local Development) for extremely helpful discussions and comments. Any errors are the 
author’s. 
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different. Despite Australia being a modest trader of general and containerised cargoes, it is a 
huge exporter of bulk cargoes. Indeed, in 2004 Australia’s seaborne export volume of coal 
and of iron ore represented one-third of the world’s coal and iron ore seaborne trade (ISL 
2006). Port traffic shows a similar picture. In 2005 the two leading Australian ports in terms 
of the volume of cargo handled were Dampier and Port Hedland in Western Australia, ranked 
between 20th and 30th in world terms. Both ports handle only bulk exports and a single 
commodity at that – iron ore. On the other side of the continent, Newcastle in New South 
Wales is the world’s largest coal port. In terms of container traffic, however, the busiest 
Australian port is Melbourne, which in 2008 ranked 56th with 2.11 million 20-foot equivalent 
container units (TEUs) handled. 
 
13.2 CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
This section is divided in two parts: shipping, and port infrastructures and related services. 
Shipping, port and auxiliary services focus on the restrictions on market access and national 
treatment (and most particularly on barriers to entry), on discrimination between domestic 
and foreign providers and on competition rules. Port infrastructure addresses the regulatory 
regime and the roles and status of the regulators.  
 
Broadly speaking, Australia is one of the most liberal economies in a sector which is 
relatively open worldwide. Table 13.1 identifies key features of the Australian regulatory 
framework and compares Australia with its APEC partners. 
 
Table 13.1: Regulatory framework in maritime transport in APEC economies. 
 
Source: World Bank Survey, 2008 
Note: Darker shading corresponds to a less restrictive implementation of the measure; n.r. = not relevant. 
 
9.2.1 Shipping 
 
International shipping involves no barriers to entry for domestic providers by way of 
licensing requirements or restriction on the number of providers. There are also few barriers 
to entry for foreign providers. In regard to cross-border trade (mode 1), a liner shipping 
operator providing transport services to or from Australia must be represented in Australia by 
an Australian resident. In regard to commercial presence (mode 3), international activities 
carried out in Australia must for reasons of tax and legal liability be conducted by a legally 
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registered Australian firm. This is a restriction on the form of commercial presence. 
Although, technically, both measures are considered by the General Agreement of Trade in 
Services (GATS) to be impediments to trade, their main objectives are not protectionist but 
fiscal, safety and juridical: they establish practical Australian jurisdiction over maritime 
incidents in Australian waters and ensure that ships do not leave port without paying their 
bills. Additionally, there is no discrimination between domestic and foreign providers: no tax 
exemption, no preferential subsidy, and no discrimination in access to port facilities and 
related services. The one exception is in liner shipping, with the Bass Strait Freight 
Equalisation Scheme. According to this program, in order to avoid transport cost 
disadvantages for Tasmanians, the Australian government subsidises shippers transporting 
certain types of cargo between Tasmania and mainland Australia. 
 
Australia still maintains an exemption from domestic competition laws on international liner 
shipping agreements (Box 13.1). However, if the agreement contains any anti-competitive 
provisions, it must be registered under Part X of the Trade Practices Act in order to qualify 
for the exemption. Carriers of registered agreements must publish specified details in a public 
register and the parties to them are also required to negotiate with, and provide information 
to, representative shipper bodies. In general all types of agreements are liable to be registered. 
 
Box 13.1: A typology of agreements in liner shipping. 
Historically, economies exempt liner shipping carriers agreements from the competition rules. The objectives of 
this measure are to: 
- make the service more reliable; 
- make the market more stable; and 
- take advantage of economies of scale. 
 
Various types of agreements have different aims and different competitive outcomes. These agreements are 
classified into three categories: 
 
Conferences are route-specific agreements between carriers on conditions for the carriage of cargo. The main 
characteristics of conferences are the regulation of capacity and the application of uniform or common freight 
rates. They can be seen as a kind of entente between carriers that restrict competition. 
 
Operational agreements provide for cooperation by means of technical, operational or commercial 
coordination. They take various forms: vessel-sharing agreements, managing port installations and managing 
marketing activities. They do not affect competition directly and may improve the efficiency of market 
outcomes. 
 
Discussion agreements are non-binding agreements between conferences or between conference and non-
conference members servicing a particular route. They are a forum to discuss and share commercial information 
relevant to a specific route (e.g., forecasting the introduction of a new capacity) 
 
Source: Productivity Commission 2005. 
 
Table 13.1 shows Australia to be one of the more liberal economies in relation to coastal 
shipping. The Australian regulatory framework is considered as such because many 
economies still reserve domestic shipping for vessels flying their own flag. Although these 
requirements are burdensome, they are restrictions on foreign ownership and on the 
employment of foreign crews. Australia does not reserve domestic shipping for Australian-
flag vessels. The least open case is that of the United States of America (USA): under the 
well-known Jones Act, it reserves cabotage for vessels built in the USA.  
 
According to the Australian regulatory framework, two systems co-exist in coastal shipping: 
a general scheme (the licence system) and a special scheme (the permit system) (Australian 
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Parliament, House of Representatives 2008). To be licensed, carriers must comply with two 
main requirements. Firstly, the vessel’s crew must be paid at Australian wages while it trades 
on the Australian coast, and secondly, the vessel must not have been subsidised in the 
previous 12 months. Permits to transport coastal trade are issued without these licence 
requirements but under certain conditions: if there are no suitable licensed ships available and 
if the issuing of the permit is considered desirable in the public interest. 
 
13.2.2 Port infrastructure and related services 
 
Under the Australian Constitution, the responsibility for ports and harbours is decentralised, 
so that regulation is a matter for the states and territories. Port regulators are therefore state 
government agencies and most of them are not institutionally independent (Annex Table 
A13.1). At the main container ports the infrastructure (e.g., piers, berths and quays) is 
publicly owned through the port corporations under a landlord system, whereby private 
terminal operators lease terminals from the public authority and operate them as private 
businesses. At bulk-loading ports various schemes apply. For example, at the coal port of 
Hay Point the infrastructure is owned and operated by a private company, at Gladstone the 
infrastructure is managed and operated by the publicly owned port corporation, at the coal 
port of Dalrymple Bay the infrastructure is managed by a private firm under lease from the 
port authority and the port of Newcastle has both public and private terminals under a state-
owned port corporation. 
 
Commercial regulation of port and auxiliary services involves no barriers to entry for either 
domestic or foreign providers, except in sectors where there are market failures. Indeed, in 
ports generally, the number of some services providers – cargo handling, storage and 
warehousing and pilotage – is limited by economies of scale or because of a scarcity of port 
space. On the one hand, companies seeking to provide cargo handling, storage and 
warehousing services must obtain concessions from port authorities through auctions or 
tenders (in the absence of competition in some markets, the port authorities may even 
introduce competition) while on the other hand, pilotage services are regulated monopolies. 
 
Port services can be defined as activities related solely to the management of ships in port, 
such as pilotage, berthing, anchorage, whereas auxiliary services are defined as activities 
related to cargo manipulation in and on ships, such as cargo handling, storage and 
warehousing and customs clearance. 
 
13.3 FORCES FOR POLICY CHANGE 
 
This section deals with sectors which have been subject to recent policy changes or which 
face policy and regulatory challenges, with an initial focus on coastal shipping that has 
undergone various reforms since 2008. For details about recent policy changes see Table 
A13.2 in the Annex. The section then explains why the exemption of shipping agreements 
from competition rules can be considered a non-issue, and finally it reveals how inefficient 
regulatory regimes and poor management of infrastructure has led to problems such as a lack 
of competition in container handling, and congestion and bottlenecks at bulk port terminals.  
 
13.3.1 Coastal shipping 
 
The core legislation that regulates Australian coastal shipping is the Australian government’s 
Navigation Act 1912. The Act is supported by the Ministerial Guidelines for Granting 
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Licences and Permits to Engage in Australia’s Domestic Shipping (the Ministerial 
Guidelines) which provide guidance for administering the coastal trade provisions of the Act. 
Although the Australian coastal shipping legislation has not changed much over several 
decades, its interpretation and application by the government has changed a good deal. 
 
Until the early 1990s coastal shipping permits were issued to foreign-flag vessels in 
exceptional circumstances only and the share of coastal trade transported under the permit 
system was small (Figures 13.1–2). 
 
 
Figure 13.1: Total coastal trade and permit tonnage issued by the government. (Source: Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government [2009]) 
 
 
Figure 13.2: Share of coastal trade transported under permits (%). (Source: Department of 
Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and Local Government [2009]) 
 
In the early 1990s the small number of permits issued combined with the licensing 
requirements and high Australian labour costs allowed the Australian-flag vessels to remain 
competitive. In other words, government policy supported the national fleet. Since the mid 
1990s the government’s decision to take a more liberal approach was justified as a way of 
reducing the cost of coastal shipping. Indeed, a parliamentary report on Australian coastal 
shipping stated that the gap between operating a foreign and an Australian crew ranged from 
AUD1 million to AUD3 million per year, depending on the size of the vessel (Australian 
Parliament, House of Representatives 2008). 
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The relaxation of cabotage in the 1990s had two effects. At first, due to technological factors 
and the rationalisation of manning scales introduced by the Australian government, it 
sustained a downward trend that had been observable in real interstate non-bulk freight rates 
from the early 1980s. The impact of the change in coastal shipping policy was clear from the 
mid 1990s, however, as the decrease in freight rates for journeys to and from Perth 
accelerated despite rising fuel prices (Figure 13.3).2
 
 
 
Notes: Shipping rates on the left scale (2000–01 = 100) and oil price on the right scale. The basis of 
the shipping freight rates is full container load (FCL) wharf-to-wharf (that is, excludes local pickup 
and delivery). Rates for Tasmanian non-bulk shipping are weighted by route. (a) Annual average of 
weekly all economies spot price fob weighted by estimated export volume, in AUD/barrel. 
Figure 13.3: Real interstate non-bulk freight rates and world oil price. (Sources: BITRE 2008, Energy 
Administration 2010) 
 
The second effect was more obvious. The Australian fleet decreased in deadweight tonnage 
(dwt; carrying capacity) by almost half between 1999 and 2007, with the much larger 
decrease in the coastal fleet (Table 13.2). This is a direct effect of the market share loss of 
Australian-flag vessels in favour of foreign permit vessels (Australian Parliament, House of 
Representatives 2008). From 1994 the permit tonnage has increased much faster than the total 
coastal trade. Hence, the share of coastal trade transported under permits increased steeply 
from around 7% in 1999 to around 25% in 2007 (Figures 13.1–2). However, the decrease of 
the Australian-flag coastal shipping fleet had been accompanied by an increase in the 
productivity of the fleet. Indeed, in 1999, the ratio of costal trade transported by the 
Australian-flag fleet (in tonnes) divided by the capacity of the Australian-flag fleet dedicated 
to coastal shipping (in dwt) was 27.7; in 2007 the ratio was 66.9 (computed from BTE 
[2000], BITRE [2009a] and Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development 
and Local Government [2009]). 
 
In 2007 a Labor Government replaced the long-serving conservative coalition. The new 
government held the view that it was in the national interest to maintain a strong Australian 
fleet, for strategic reasons that included security of trade and to provide a training ground for 
                                                 
2 There are two reasons for using Perth freight rates as the example. Firstly, the increase in the number of 
permits did not affect freight rates on the Tasmanian route because of the support of the Australian 
government through the Bass Straight Freight Equalisation Scheme. Secondly, coastal shipping to and from 
Perth represents more than 50% of the total interstate coastal shipping activity (in billion tonne kilometres) 
and the majority of this is transported in permit vessels. The port of Perth is Fremantle. 
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Table 13.2: Summary of the Australian registered trading fleet, 1999 and 2007. 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: BTE 2000, BITRE 2009a 
Note: Vessels have a capacity greater than 2000 dwt. 
 
the maritime expertise necessary to an island economy.3
 
 This has led the government to 
encourage Australian vessels to provide coastal shipping services but not to give preference 
to Australian-flag vessels in international trade. 
The new policy was implemented through two reforms of the Ministerial Guidelines in 2008 
and 2009. According to a new preamble to the guidelines in 2008, the government’s intention 
was ‘to enhance the competitiveness and sustainability of the Australian coastal shipping 
sector’. In 2009 some terms of the guidelines were clarified in the interests of transparency 
and accountability. For example, one condition for the issuing of a permit is that there is ‘no 
suitable licensed ship available’. A new guideline now defines what are an ‘available licensed 
ship’ and a ‘suitable licensed ship’. 
 
Nevertheless, the main policy change has been wrought through the coverage of licensed and 
permit vessels in the Fair Work Act (FWA), the legislation that governs employment terms 
and conditions in Australia. The Seagoing Industry Award 2010 is the regulation that among 
other things applies the FWA to the coastal shipping sector. According to the new regulation, 
since 2010 licensed vessels are now subject to scrutiny (licensed vessels were required to 
offer Australian crew wages and conditions before the coverage by the FWA, but there was 
no formal inspection regime). According to the Seagoing Industry Award 2010, from 2011 
permit vessels will also have to comply with requirements in terms of minimum wages, hours 
of work and rest periods. These requirements are high and, in fact, very close to prevailing 
Australian domestic conditions. 
 
13.3.2 Shipping agreements 
 
In 2005, following a review of Part X of the Trade Practices Act by the Productivity 
Commission, the government reformed the legislation on the exemption of liner shipping 
agreements from the Act. The main changes consisted in the introduction of new provisions 
on contract confidentiality. Even before the reform, the majority of cargo was carried under 
individually negotiated service contracts between carriers and shippers and thus at freight 
rates differing from, and usually below, listed conference rates. As in the airline industry, this 
trend reflected competition between carriers in a situation of rapidly increasing capacity. This 
Australian reform has strengthened market forces, just as reforms in other economies have 
had a direct impact on their liner shipping sectors. Since 1998, when the USA took similar 
measures to Australia concerning confidentiality, conferences have less and less influence on 
the routes between the USA and Australia. Finally, in 2008, the European Community (EC) 
decided to repeal the exemption on shipping agreements and as a result, conferences are now 
prohibited on the routes to and from Australia and the EC. 
 
A review of all Australian shipping agreements registered since 2000 shows 112 active 
agreements (Australian Department of Infrastructure, Transport, Regional Development and 
                                                 
3 Of 38 Australian flagged vessels in 2007, four were tankers (two each for crude oil and petroleum product) and 
four were LNG tankers (BITRE 2008). 
1999 2007 1999 2007 Change in %
Coastal trade 41 28 1 562 588 644 807 -59
Overseas trade 10 10 673 467 543 808 -19
Total 51 38 2236055 1188615 -47
Number of vessels Dwt
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Local Government pers. comm.). Most of these agreements are operational (Table 13.3), yet 
only four still active conferences serve the following routes: 
• eastern and southern Australia to Japan and Korea; 
• Australia; Papua New Guinea; and the Pacific Islands; 
• ports in the Philippines; Borneo; Hong Kong, China; Chinese Taipei; China; Japan; 
and Korea to ports in Australia; and 
• Australia northbound to ports in the Philippines; Hong Kong, China; China; Japan; 
and Korea. 
 
Table 13.3: Active shipping agreements by type as at February 2010. 
 
Source: Australian Department of Transport 2010. 
 
Thus, conferences appear to serve less and less routes to or from Australia. Furthermore, 
according to most experts, conference rates are seldom applied. It may therefore be 
concluded that Australia’s liner shipping market is competitive. Considering the now minor 
importance of conferences, it may be said that the relevant section of the Trade Practices Act 
about conferences is now almost redundant and that shipping agreements are a non-issue in 
Australia. This situation is unlikely to change until demand for liner shipping catches up with 
the overcapacity that existed even before the global financial crisis. 
 
13.3.3 Infrastructure and related services 
 
In Australia, as for most developed economies, the regulatory problems involved in 
international shipping deal with port infrastructures and related services. Australia faces several 
challenges in this area: to ensure competition and contestability in regulated services (most 
particularly in the container handling sector), to provide a consistent regulatory framework for 
the funding of infrastructure and to promote coordination between the different parts of the 
supply chain. This section addresses container terminals and bulk terminals. 
 
13.3.3.1 Container terminals 
 
This section focuses on the five main Australian container ports: Melbourne, Sydney, 
Brisbane, Fremantle and Adelaide, each a main port of one of the mainland Australian states. 
In 2008 they represented 35%, 29%, 15%, 9% and 4% respectively of the total TEUs handled 
in Australia (Ports Australia 2010). In 2008 the port of Melbourne handled more than 
2 million TEUs. 
 
Comparison of performance between Australian and overseas ports can be made in terms of 
three indexes: the crane rate, TEUs throughput per berth metre and TEUs throughput per gross 
hectare. The crane rate is computed by dividing the containers handled by the total allocated 
crane hours and is expressed in containers per hour. The TEU throughput per berth metre is 
computed by dividing the TEU throughput by the total length of container terminals berths. 
Finally, TEU throughput per gross hectare is a measure of container yard productivity with 
respect to the transfer of containers to and from the ships. All these data come from a report led 
by the Bureau of Infrastructure, Transport and Regional Economics (BITRE 2009b). 
 
As cranes are big investments for terminal operators, the crane rate could be seen as an index 
of capital productivity. The crane rate in the five Australian ports is lower than leading 
international ports like Hong Kong, China, Shanghai and Long Beach (Figure 13.4). 
Operational 
agreements
Conferences Discussion 
agreements
Others Total
71 4 17 20 112
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Nevertheless, the crane rate in Australian ports is higher than in smaller ports like Hamburg 
or Gothenburg. Interestingly, the crane rates of Australian ports are very close to each other. 
 
 
Figure 13.4: Crane rate at selected ports, 2005–07. (Source: BITRE 2009b) 
 
As regards the TEU throughput per berth metre index, the picture is even worse than the 
crane rate, except in Melbourne and to a lesser extent in Sydney (Figure 13.5). 
 
 
Figure 13.5: TEU throughput per berth metre, 2006–07. (Source: BITRE 2009b) 
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Not surprisingly, both TEU throughput per berth metre performances and yard utilisation 
measured as TEU throughput per gross hectare are very close (Figure 13.6). 
 
Overall, we can say that the performance of all five main Australian ports is quite low in 
terms of international comparisons. In order to explain this poor performance, we suggest two 
arguments: a lack of exploitation of economies of scale and a lack of inter- and intra-port 
competition. 
 
 
Figure 13.6: Yard utilisation measured as TEU throughput per gross hectare, 2006–07. (Source: BITRE 
2009b) 
 
In regard to economies of scale, the number of TEUs handled in Australia is quite small in 
comparison with most overseas ports in the sample (Figure 13.7). This is due to the logistics 
of international shipping and ports in Australia. Indeed, most container vessels serving 
Australia call at least three and often four or five main ports, being the main port in each 
state. Australian ports are organised as hinterland ports (i.e., they only serve their own 
hinterland unlike a hub and spokes system). 
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Figure 13.7: TEUs handled in overseas ports, 2006-07. (Source: BITRE 2009b) 
 
This system of fragmented logistics has a direct impact on the number of containers handled 
in each port and makes it very hard for Australian ports to take advantage of economies of 
scale. This presumption is reinforced by simple correlations computed between the number of 
TEUs handled and port performance indexes: see Figure 13.8.4
 
 
A second explanation for the poor performance of Australian ports could be the lack of 
competition in stevedoring. In the four largest ports the market is characterised by a duopoly 
with the same duopolists present; and one of them is the monopolist in Adelaide (Table 13.4). 
More importantly, each provider has almost the same capacity in each port – measured in 
terms of berth length and in cranes. This situation can lead to inefficiencies in the sector.5
 
 The 
small number of providers in each port harks back to the lack of economies of scale, that is to 
say the traffic in each port would not justify the entry of a new terminal operator if 0.5–
1.0 million TEU per annum is taken as a minimum efficient scale. The modest growth in 
container traffic also means that a new entrant would need to attract a substantial amount of 
custom from existing terminals.  
 
  
                                                 
4 These are simple correlations and many factors could explain port performances. Nevertheless, it is interesting 
to see the positive correlation between the volume of TEUs handled and the indexes of performance. 
5 Moreover, assuming symmetric costs and competition a la Cournot (i.e., on quantity), firms make over profits. 
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Figure 13.8: Simple correlations – TEUs handled and port performances, 2006-07. (Source: Computed 
from data from BITRE 2009) 
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Table 13.4: Market structure and capacities at the main Australian ports, early 2010. 
 
Source: Ports Australia 2010. 
Notes: (a) Metres; (b) In brackets, the number of Post Panamax Cranes; (c) The Port 
Corporation of Melbourne announced it will host a third container stevedore by 2013; (d) 
The NSW government announced in December 2009 that Hutchinson Port Handling 
(HPH) will be the operator of the new third container terminal at Port Botany from 2012; 
(e) HPH signed a 42-year lease agreement in January 2008 to operate a third container 
terminal, commencing in 2012. 
 
Since 2003 the Australian Consumer and Competition Commission (ACCC; the government 
agency in charge of monitoring competition in Australia) has drawn attention to the lack of 
intra-port competition with statistical evidence. In its Container Stevedoring Monitoring 
Report the ACCC (2003) stated: ‘The existence of monopoly or duopoly suppliers 
immediately raises questions about the extent of competitive pressures within the markets. 
The evidence available to the ACCC in that regard is mixed but does raise some concerns 
about the contestability of the market’. Then the ACCC (2007) stated: ‘The amount paid for 
[the takeover of] Patrick reflects expectations of profits that are available when a small 
number of firms operate in an industry where price competition is less effective’. The ACCC 
(2008) said: ‘It is clear that some of the planned expansion in terminal capacity creates the 
possibility of new entry to at least some ports. Thus potentially, the number of competitors 
could rise from two to three’. The global financial crisis in 2009 increased the presumption of 
a lack of competition within Australian ports: ‘The ability of the stevedores to sustain price 
levels despite reduced demand and short-term increases in unit costs while also making 
strong positive returns reinforce the ACCC’s concerns about the intensity of competition’ 
(ACCC 2009). 
 
The lack of intra-port competition along with the concerns of shippers has led to some policy 
response. In 2006 the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), being the Federal and 
state and territory governments, came to an agreement concerning infrastructure competition. 
The Competition and Infrastructure Reform Agreement (CIRA) sought to achieve a simpler 
and more consistent national approach to economic regulation in significant infrastructure. It 
also asked state governments to review their regulations to ensure that ports are managed 
efficiently, to allow for competition in the provision of port and related infrastructure and to 
maximise the opportunity for competition. The main objective of the CIRA was to promote 
competition, as this would lead to efficiency gains that would finally benefit all consumers. 
 
One important impact of the agreement has been to trigger the entry of new container 
handling providers in the ports of Brisbane and Sydney and soon also in the port of 
Melbourne (Table 13.4, notes). However, there have been almost no changes to state 
government regulations (the relevant level of decision making for port regulations). The only 
change occurred in New South Wales where the state government has issued a new 
framework for infrastructure leases which provides incentives for the stevedore to meet 
performance benchmarks in return for discounts on rental leases. It also threatens to scrap a 
lease agreement if the terminal operator fails to follow through on investment commitments. 
Port Operators Berths length [a] Portainers [b]
Melbourne [c] Patrick 885 8 (3)
DP World 944 8 (3)
Sydney - Port Botany [d] Patrick 1006 8 (n.a.)
DP World 936 7 (n.a.)
Brisbane [e] Patrick 900 5 (2)
DP World 900 6 (4)
Fremantle - Inner Harbour Patrick 726 3 (3)
DP World 526 3 (0)
Adelaide - Outer Harbor DP World Adelaide Pty Ltd 660 4 (0)
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13.3.3.2 Bulk port terminals 
 
Because of the importance of raw materials exports for the Australian economy, efficient 
bulk port terminals are crucial. Yet in recent years, with the rapid and unanticipated growth in 
demand, there has been under capacity and congestion in many ports, especially at coal 
terminals. Table 13.5 shows the dramatic situation in coal terminals: as at May 2009 the 
waiting time for loading coal at the port of Newcastle and the Dalrymple Bay terminal at Hay 
Point could be 14 days. No other overseas coal ports suffer from this level of congestion. 
 
Table 13.5: Waiting time for vessels at major coal terminals as at 21 May 2009 (days). 
Economy Pacific Ports Days   Economy Atlantic Ports Days 
Australia Newcastle (Kooragang Terminal) 10–14  Colombia Puerto Bolivar 0–3 
Australia Newcastle (Dyke Terminal) 8–12  Colombia Cartagena (Colclinker) 0–1 
Australia Hay Point (Dalrymple Bay 
Terminal) 
7–14  Colombia Prodeco (Santa Marta) 0–1 
India Haldia 1–6  Colombia Puerto Drummond 0–1 
Australia Hay Point (Hay Point Coal 
Terminal) 
1–5  Netherlands Rotterdam (EECV) 0–1 
Australia Gladstone 1–4  Netherlands Rotterdam (St Laurenshaven 
Terminal) 
0–1 
India Chennai (Madras) 1–4  Netherlands Amsterdam (OBA 
Terminal/Rietlanden) 
0–1 
India Paradip 0–7  Netherlands Rotterdam (EMO) 0–1 
Australia Port Kembla 0–5  Netherlands Ijmuiden (Outer Quay No.2–Corus) 0–1 
China Xingang (Tianjin) 0–2  USA (EC) Norfolk (Norfolk Southern Coal Pier ) 0 
Chinese Taipei Kaohsiung (TPC Terminal) 0–2  USA (EC) Norfolk (Dominion Coal Terminal) 0 
Australia Abbot Point 0  USA (EC) Norfolk (Pier IX Terminal) 0 
Australia Brisbane 0  USA (EC) Baltimore (Consol CMTI Terminal) 0 
China Qingdao 0  South Africa RBCT 0 
China Rizhao 0  Brazil Praia Mole Coal Terminal 0 
China Lianyungang 0  Brazil Itaguai (Sepetiba) 0 
China Qinhuangdao 0  Brazil Vila do Conde 0 
China Huangpu 0 
India Tuticorin 0 
India Pipavav 0 
Canada (WC) Ridley Island Coal Terminal 0 
Canada (WC) Roberts Bank (Westshore Terminal) 0 
Canada (WC) Vancouver (Neptune Terminal) 0 
Chinese Taipei Kaohsiung (CSC Terminal) 0 
Source: Global Port 2010. 
 
At iron ore terminals the situation is less acute but waiting times for the loading of vessels are 
also significant (Table 13.6). Congestion and bottlenecks in coal port terminals leads to loss 
of sales and reduced profits and taxes, which leads to export revenue losses for Australia. 
 
Because of differences in regulatory regimes between states and because of differences in the 
schemes of exploitation of terminals within states (see Section 13.2) it is difficult to provide a 
common analysis. Because coal is one of Australia’s leading exports, the main focus is on 
these terminals, specifically the ports of Newcastle and Hay Point (Dalrymple Bay and Hay 
Point Coal Terminals), where the waiting times are longest. In January 2010 the Financial 
Times reported that ‘Ships are queuing for an average of 27 days to collect coal at Dalrymple 
Bay in Queensland, Australia’. As at midnight 3 March 2010, 48 vessels were anchored off 
Newcastle waiting to load coal (Hunter Valley Coal Chain Coordinator 2010). 
 
There are various reasons for the now notorious congestion at Australian coal terminals, 
including periodic bad weather and interruptions to shipments on the landward side. Another 
is the shipowners’ habit of placing their ships in the queue to improve their prospects of 
charter. This market imperfection is being addressed by the introduction of an advance 
booking system that requires a vessel to be fixed for a specific cargo. Nevertheless, long 
vessel waiting times are primarily the result of lags in investments in port capacities.  
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Table 13.6: Waiting time for vessels at major iron ore terminals as at 21 May 2009 (days). 
Economy Port Days 
 
Economy Port Days 
China Rizhao 3-10 
 
China Lianyungang 0 
China Beilun (Ningbo)  3-4 
 
Australia Esperance 0 
China Caofeidian 2-16 
 
Australia Whyalla 0 
China Qingdao 2-9 
 
China Qinhuangdao 0 
India Chennai (Madras) 2-3 
 
Australia Port Latta 0 
Australia Port Hedland 1-7 
 
Australia Port Kembla 0 
Australia Port Walcott 1-6 
 
Chinese Taipei Kaohsiung (CSC Terminal) 0 
India Mangalore 1-4 
 
China Huangpu 0 
Australia Dampier 1-2 
 
Australia Geraldton 0 
China Baoshan (Baosteel) 1-2 
 
Brazil Itaguai - CPBS-CVRD (Sepetiba) 1-2 
China Xingang (Tianjin) 0-19 
 
Brazil Tubarao (North Pier 1) 0-5 
India Haldia 0-5 
 
Brazil Tubarao (Pier 2) 0-4 
China Fangcheng 0-4 
 
Brazil Itaguai - CSN Terminal (Sepetiba) 0-3 
China Nantong (Yaogang Terminal) 0-3 
 
Brazil Ponta da Madeira (Pier 2) 0-2 
China Lanshan 0-3 
 
Brazil Ponta da Madeira (Pier 3)  0-2 
China Yantai 0-2 
 
Netherlands Ijmuiden (Outer Quay No.2-Corus) 0-1 
India Paradip 0-2 
 
Netherlands Rotterdam (EMO) 0-1 
China Dalian 0-2 
 
Brazil Guaiba Island 0-1 
China Shanghai (Luojin Terminal) 0-1 
 
Brazil Ponta da Madeira (Pier 1) 0-1 
China Shanghai (Luhuashan Terminal) 0-1 
 
Brazil Ponta Ubu 0-1 
China Bayuquan 0-1 
 
Brazil Tubarao (South Pier 1) 0 
China Baoshan (Majishan) 0-1 
 
Brazil Salvador 0 
Source: Global Port 2010. 
 
Although the lack of port capacity was identified at Newcastle and Hay Point in 2003, the 
first investment was not committed until 2005 and did not come on stream until 2007 (Table 
13.7). Investors have argued that these lags were attributable to the inefficient regulatory 
framework, which also differs between states (Annex Table A13.1). The complexity of the 
regulation and long decision times within and between government agencies leads to delays 
in project design, approval and implementation. On average, approval by state government 
regulators takes more than a year (Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce 2005). 
 
Waiting times are not just a problem of terminal loading capacity, there are also bottlenecks 
in the supply chain, most notably in rail freight infrastructure. Lack of coordination in 
investment in port and rail infrastructure is especially a problem in the port of Newcastle, 
where 99% of coal is transported from mines to the port by rail. In 2005 the Australia 
Export’s Infrastructure Report stated ‘In early 2000, in the Hunter Valley, the throughput 
increased 20% without any significant capital investment in rail infrastructure for the 
movement of coal from the mine to the port’ (Exports and Infrastructure Taskforce 2005). In 
 
Table 13.7: New infrastructure projects – coal. 
 
Source: ABARE various years. 
Project Company Capaci ty Phase Timing Capi tal  exp.
Feasibility  study 2nd semester 2006
Government approval 2nd semester 2007
Under construction 1st semester 2008
Expected Startup 2010
Feasibility  study 2nd semester 2005
Under construction 1st semester 2006
Startup 2007
Commitment 1st semester 2007
Under construction 1st semester 2008
Expected Startup 2010
Feasibility  study 2nd semester 2006
Expected Startup n.a.
Commitment 2nd semester 2005
Under construction 2nd semester 2006
Startup 2008
Commitment 2nd semester 2006
under construction 2nd semester 2007
Expected Startup 2009
Under construction 1st semester 2006
Startup 2007
feasibility  study 1nd semester 2006
Expected Startup 2014
Capacity increase from 60 to 68 Mtpa
Capacity increase from 68 to 85 Mtpa
Capacity increase from 40 Mtpa to 44 Mtpa
Capacity increase from 44 Mtpa to 55 Mtpa
New capacity of 30 Mtpa
Capacity increase from 89 to 102 Mtpa
Capacity increase of 11 Mtpa
Capacity increase of 27 Mt
Hay Point Coal Terminal - Phase 2
Hay Point Coal Terminal - Phase 3
NCIG
Port Waratah Coal Services
Port Waratah Coal Services
Port Waratah Coal Services
Babcock & Brown Infrastructure
Babcock & Brown Infrastructure
BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance 
(BMA)
BHP Billiton Mitsubishi Alliance 
(BMA)
Newcastle
Hay Point
US$1.1b (A$1.3b
$170m
$456m
$1b
$600m
$679m
$70m
$500m
NCIG export terminal (Newcastle Coal 
Infrastructure Group)
Kooragang Is land coal terminal expansion - 
Phase 1
Kooragang Is land coal terminal expansion - 
Phase 2
Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal 7X expansion 
project - Phase 1
Dalrymple Bay Coal Terminal 7X expansion 
project - Phase 2 and 3
Kooragang Is land coal terminal expansion - 
Phase 3
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the Hunter Valley, activities along the supply chain are vertically separated, so bottlenecks 
might be explained by a problem of coordination between the various players of the logistic 
chain. The Australian Rail Track Corporation (ARTC) manages 311km of coal rail 
infrastructure in the Hunter Valley and Pacific National, a private operator, transports most of 
the coal transported by rail. There are three terminal operators – two in operation and one 
being commissioned. 
 
The Australian government has taken some steps to address congestion and bottlenecks. In 
2008 it passed the Infrastructure Australia Act, creating a new government body called 
Infrastructure Australia (IA) with a charter to take an intermodal approach. The IA’s role is to 
advise Australian governments on policy and regulatory reforms and on barriers or 
disincentives to investment. Its operational mission is to define infrastructure priorities to be 
financed by the Building Australia Fund. A major achievement of IA so far is the publication 
of the National Public Private Partnership Policy and Guidelines (the PPP Guidelines), which 
provide a clear, consistent and predictable framework for awarding contracts through a more 
rigorous process and following more streamlined procedures. The PPP Guidelines have been 
endorsed by all state governments. 
 
Concerning the Hunter Valley coordination issue, some improvements have also been 
achieved. In 2004 an agreement was taken to lease the Hunter Valley coal railways to ARTC 
(Table 13.8). The lease agreement began to have effect from 2005. The rail capacity in 
Newcastle was increased to 60Mtpa in 2006. Nevertheless, because of the lags involved, it 
took some time for the necessary investments to be designed and contracted out. 
Furthermore, problems of coordination persist in the Hunter Valley. Indeed, many rail 
projects are under way but they have been at the first stage of development for a long time. 
This is due to the functioning of the rail network access regime. Actually, in the Hunter 
Valley the rail track is ‘open access’ and the principle of non-discrimination is applied (i.e., 
the rail operator cannot refuse to supply the service). According to this system, in the current 
situation of congestion an increase of demand of one unit leads to an equivalent decrease in 
the supply for the other consumers. The capacity constraint is managed by the quantity, and 
as a result consumers face the average cost and not the marginal cost if the outcome is not 
efficient. The price of the service is too low and does not cover the cost of the necessary 
investments. This explains the lack of investment in rail in the Hunter Valley. By contrast, in 
Dalrymple Bay, coal transport is provided on a fully commercial basis, with contracts 
between miners and transport service providers. There is no problem of vertical coordination 
in investment between the quayside and the landside operators. 
 
Table 13.8: ARTC coal infrastructure expansion projects in New South Wales. 
 
Source: ABARE various years. 
Note: (a) Includes cost of development, plant and equipment. 
Project Location Phase Timing Expected Startup New Capacity Capital Expend. [a]
Minimbah Bank third rail line - stage 1 Minimbah to Whittingham (10km) Under construction Since second 
semester 2009
2010 n.a. $134m
Scone - Parkville duplication Scone - Parkville Feasibility study 
under way
Since second 
semester 2009
2013 n.a. $60m
Koolbury - Aberdeen duplication Koolbury - Aberdeen Feasibility study 
under way
Since second 
semester 2009
2013 n.a. $60m
Export terminal arrival tracks Newcastle Feasibility study 
under way
Since second 
semester 2009
2011 n.a. $50m
Drayton Junction rail upgrade 13 km S of Muswellbrook Feasibility study 
under way
Since second 
semester 2008
2010 n.a. $270m
Minimbah - Maitland third road rail Minimbah to Maitland (30km) Feasibility study 
under way
Since first semester 
2008
2012 n.a. $270m
Minimbah - Bank third road rail 10km S of Singleton Feasibility study 
under way
Since second 
semester 2008
2010 n.a. $100m
Muswellbrook - Koolbury duplication Muswellbrook to Koolbury (5km) Feasibility study 
under way
Since first semester 
2008
2011 n.a. $35m
Liverpool Range rail project Willow Tree to Murrurundi (30 km) Feasibility study 
under way
Since second 
semester 2007
2012 Capacity increase of 
12.5 Mtpa
$290m
Sandgate rail grade separation Sandgate, between Newcastle and Maitland In operation Since 2006 -
Capacity increase of 
60 Mtpa $68m
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13.3.4 Consequences of changes and scope for further reform 
 
13.3.4.1 Coastal shipping 
 
The recent changes introduced by the government do not change the regulatory regime of 
coastal shipping but they will affect its implementation. The reforms of the Ministerial 
Guidelines and, most particularly, the extension of the Fair Work Act to licensed and permit 
vessels will increase the labour operating costs for foreign-flag vessels. At the same time it 
will make the Australian-flag fleet more competitive with foreign-flag vessels. The higher 
operating costs of foreign-flag vessels are likely to lead to some increase in freight rates over 
the next few years, depending on how strictly the Act is applied. It remains to be seen how 
willing foreign owners will be to meet Australian labour standards and how interested 
Australian investors will be to place Australian-flagships in coastal trades. 
 
Finally, it is important to note the argument that there is a substantial benefit to Australia as 
an island economy in maintaining a viable maritime industry of its own, with the supply of 
skills to all ancillary areas that this entails. 
 
13.3.4.2 Shipping agreements 
 
Within the area of competition, Part X of the Trade Practices Act may now validly be 
regarded as a non-issue. Nevertheless, the current system is burdensome for carriers and 
expensive to manage for the government. Some adjustments to the regulations could improve 
this situation. 
 
Actually, we can imagine a system which would be similar to the EC regime. The conference 
element of the regulations, which is outdated, could be repealed and substituted by a new and 
softer regulation that would cover only operational agreements that have market outcomes. 
 
13.3.5 Infrastructure and related services 
 
13.3.5.1 Container port terminals 
 
The lack of exploitation of economies of scale in the container handling sector can be seen as 
part of a more general problem, one of either competition or coordination between ports. The 
absence of port rationalisation raises not only the question of lack of economies of scale but 
also of the duplication of costs for port authorities, notably the cost of dredging because of 
the increasing size of container ships. Nevertheless, in the absence of massive investments in 
rail and road infrastructure, a hub and spokes system is not sustainable in Australia. Given 
Australia’s geography and infrastructure, a hinterland system is more efficient for carriers 
and route patterns are adjusted accordingly. For example, on the busy Singapore–Australia–
Singapore route it is more efficient for carriers to take the western route and use the 
favourable ocean currents than to sail around Australia from Fremantle, on to Adelaide, 
Melbourne, Sydney and Brisbane and then back to Singapore. In other words, Australian 
ports are complementary and not substitutable. 
 
Regarding competition in the container-handling sector, port productivity increased 
substantially in the early 2000s but has stagnated since 2003 (Figure 13.9). The entry of new 
providers in the main three ports will increase competition and may lead to improved 
performance in the next few years. 
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Notes: The vessel working rate as a measure of labour productivity is computed as the total 
containers handled divided by the elapsed labour time. The ship rate measures the 
combined stevedoring productivity of capital and labour. Both indicators and the crane rate 
are expressed in containers per hour. 
Figure 13.9: Port performance indicators, average of the five main ports, in TEUs per hour. (Source: 
BITRE website 2010) 
 
Nevertheless, the entry of new terminal operators will not of itself lead to better productivity 
and pricing outcomes. State governments, through their port corporations, still own the 
channels, land and immobile port infrastructure, and regulate the entry of new providers. 
There is a clear conflict of interest between these responsibilities. State governments have 
little incentive to reduce returns on their assets when port revenues represent a significant 
share of state revenues (McInerney et al. 2007). 
 
There may be scope for an independent regulator (at federal or state level) whose role would 
be to ensure competition and contestability in the market. Although ACCC might have the 
regulatory power to mandate the entry of a new service provider to port corporations it only 
nominally plays this role, as it is in fact just a monitor and an adviser. So another solution 
might consist in enhancing shipper pressure through the ACCC. 
 
13.3.5.2 Bulk port terminals 
 
The new terminal and landside capacities coming on stream will relieve the immediate 
problems of port congestion (see Table 13.7). The implementation of the new booking system 
will also help to coordinate the arrival of vessels in ports and limit the number of vessels 
queuing. 
 
The PPP Guidelines do not cover direct private investment in infrastructure such as bulk 
terminals. While public-private partnership is a sensible mode of funding port infrastructures, 
especially in ports where there are only a few main users, more care by state governments in 
the design of the PPP Guidelines would reduce uncertainty and improve the investment 
climate. The pernicious pressure from state treasuries to require up-front payments creates an 
unbalanced structure of debt and an excessive burden of debt service. This is another reason 
why there is much to be gained from improvements to the PPP Guidelines, for instance, in 
coordinating the regulatory framework between states, the issuing of new guidelines and 
limiting the time for project approval. 
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Over the longer term, Infrastructure Australia (IA) should help to overcome delays in 
scheduling and financing further necessary investments. Prioritisation of public investments 
in infrastructure would give clarity to investors and allow long term strategic planning 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009). It would also decrease the uncertainty for private investment 
in infrastructure. 
 
IA should also help to overcome the lack of coordination in infrastructure investments, 
especially by way of integration across the national freight network – a lack of coordination 
in investment that is also true for other infrastructures and other parts of Australia, An 
example is the bottleneck in Sydney between the port and the southbound road. But IA will 
not help to address the persistent problem of coordination between ports and rail users in the 
Hunter Valley. One solution could consist of shifting from the open access system to access 
by auction, a system that would reveal the real price of the service and make funds available 
for investment in new capacities. 
 
13.4 CONCLUSION 
 
In Australia the maritime transport industry is characterised by fairly open markets under 
liberal commercial regulations. Indeed, for most maritime services there are neither artificial 
barriers to entry nor restrictions to trade. 
 
Coastal shipping is the best example of the openness of Australia in comparison with many 
overseas regimes. This remains the case despite the Australian government’s decision to re-
introduce Australian wages and conditions to the manning of foreign-flag ships engaged under 
permit in coastal trade. While this may be viewed as a step towards the reintroduction of 
cabotage, in fact it removes an exceptional loophole in Australian labour regulations. The 
reform does not discriminate between ownership and flag of operation. There is a further 
objective of strengthening the Australian-flag fleet, which is justified by the strategic need of an 
island nation to sustain a maritime capability. A tonnage tax is presently under consideration. 
 
The exemption of liner shipping agreements from the competition rules has become a non-
issue because the liner shipping market is now highly competitive and conference agreements 
no longer have binding force. Nevertheless, the registration system could be simplified to 
maintain transparency but reduce the cost and burden of administration. 
 
In Australia, as indeed for most of economies, the balance between light-handed and heavy-
handed regulation is difficult to find. Australia provides good examples of these difficulties. 
Thus, in the container-handling sector, regulation needs to be firmer in order to ensure 
competition and contestability, while by contrast, in Newcastle’s coal terminals, regulation is 
heavy-handed, even though market driven mechanisms would lead to better outcomes. 
 
The other big challenge concerns the ability of the government to adopt an intermodal approach 
that takes into account the logistics revolution of recent decades. The big task is now to 
facilitate coordination between the different modes, both in the harmonisation of regulation 
between the states and in the prioritisation and financing of large components of infrastructure. 
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ANNEX 13 
 
Table A13.1: Port regulatory regimes in various Australian states. 
 
Sources: State government websites 2010. 
Agencies and regulators Status Mission
DoT Not independent Strategy and safety
Essential Services Commission independent Price monitoring for shipping channels, berths and short term storage and cargo marshalling facilities
Department of Planning and Community Development Not independent Planning and project approval
NSW Maritime             Not independent
Providing strategic advice to the three NSW Ports Corporations, coordination of 
maritime security arrangements across NSW, development of advice on shipping 
and safety matters at NSW ports, oversight of the implementation of the NSW 
Ports Growth Plan
Department of Planning Not independent Planning and project approval
independent Pricing And Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) independent
Oversees regulation in the electricity, gas, water and transport industries and 
undertakes other tasks referred to it by the NSW Government.
Queensland Competition Authority  [c] independent
Assess and approve access undertakings for ports declared for Third Party 
Access, arbitrate access disputes, enforce breaches of access obligations, 
investigate and monitor prices for ports declared for monopoly prices oversight 
and assess competitive neutrality
Maritime Safety Queensland Not independent Maritime safety, delivering essential maritime services such as pilotage 
Department of Transport and Main Roads Not independent
Policy and strategic advice on the planning, funding and performance of 
Queensland's port, overseeing the operation of the state's port authorities, 
provides policy and procedural advice about government-owned corporations 
Department of Infrastructure and Planning Not independent
The Coordinator-General is responsible for deciding if QueenslandÕs most 
important and complex private and public projects require whole-of-government 
management as significant projects, and coordinates an environmental 
assessment process on behalf of the state government
DoT Not independent
Security and safety, formulating and implementing suitable policies relative to 
ports, funding for the WA Port Operation Taskforce
Department of Planning Not independent Planning and project approval
WA Port Operation Taskforce Not independent
Identify operational impediments to passage of goods and vessels through 
Western Australian ports, determine practical measures to overcome those 
impediments
Economic Regulation Authority independent
Maintain a competitive, efficient and fair commercial environment, particularly 
where businesses operate as natural monopolies, for the benefit of the Western 
Australian community.
South Australia Department for Transport, Energy, Infrastructure Not independent
Safety, security, environment, Policy and Planning, identifying infrastructure 
priorities for South Australia (SA), coordinating infrastructure planning and 
development and facilitating the timely delivery of key projects.
Western Australia
New South Wales
Queensland
Victoria
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Table A13.2: Recent policy changes in maritime transport. 
 
Notes: (a) Agreement between the members of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG); (b) In New South Wales. 
 
Sector Area of policy change Associated regulation Year of change Description of change
2008 Introduction of a preamble setting new objectives of the government
Clarification of key terms in a concern of transparency and accountability
Coverage of licensed and permit vessels by legislation that governs workplace 
relations 
Liner shipping Competition rules Review of Part X of the Trade Practice Act 2005 Introduction of new provisions on contractÕs confidentiality
Infrastructures [a] Regulation and competition
The Competition and Infrastructure Reform 
Agreement (CIRA)
2006
Objective to achieve a simpler and consistent national approach. State 
Governments have to review their regulations to ensure competition
Infrastructures
Creation of a new governmental 
body
Infrastructure Australia Act 2008
IA Provides advices to Australian governments about policy and regulatory 
reforms, it define infrastructure priorities, it issued PPP Guidelines. IA is the only 
Australian institution with an intermodal view
Port infrastructures [b] Lease framework Port and Maritime Administration Amendment 2008
Provides incentives for the stevedore to meet performance benchmarks in return 
for discounts on rental leases. Carries threats if the terminal operator fail to 
follows investment commitments
Coastal shipping
2009
Review of the Ministerial GuidelinesRegulation
  
Chapter 14 
 
MARITIME TRANSPORT IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 
Fabien Bertho1
 
 
 
• The USA retains a restrictive cabotage regime because it has decided to prioritise 
strategic factors. The high cost of maritime domestic freight has led to a substitution 
by other modes and the volume of domestic freight by sea has fallen, as has the size of 
the US fleet: the shipbuilding sector has also declined.  
• Businesses which consign freight have been lobbying against the regulation but have 
not been effective in comparison with the concentrated influence of the remaining 
shipping companies (now a duopoly in the domestic container transport sector); the 
complexity of the policy package and the lack of transparency make its assessment 
more difficult. 
• Container handling is characterised by open and competitive markets and regulation is 
efficient and in line with good practices: the main challenge is the expected increase 
in traffic and the risk of congestion, both inside and outside ports: coordination across 
modes in future will be valuable. 
 
 
14.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter analyses the maritime transport sector in the United States of America (USA). It 
addresses maritime transport in the widest sense possible with a focus on international and 
domestic shipping, and port infrastructure and related services, particularly container and 
intermodal facilities. It deals with commercial and competition regulations. Measures of the 
impact of these policies on the maritime sector in particular and on the USA’s economy in 
general are examined. The US pursues a policy of explicit support to the maritime industry, 
which means to both the fleet and the shipyards. The cornerstone of this policy is security of 
supply. The aim is to ensure that the fleet is sufficient to carry US domestic water-borne 
foreign trade and is capable of serving as a naval military auxiliary in times of emergency. 
This study identifies some economic consequences of the policy, contrasts the treatment of 
the shipping sector with that of the port sector and identifies emerging issues. 
 
The US’s focus on security follows from the significance of maritime transport in US trade. 
In 2008, 48% of the value of international trade was transported by sea and in 2007 12% of 
domestic trade was transported by water (US Department of Transportation 2009). Maritime 
transport also represents an important part of the US economy, accounting for 
USD30.9 billion of gross output and employing over a quarter of a million workers (in 2008, 
of whom about a quarter were in transportation, a third in port services and the balance (40%) 
in the shipbuilding and repair sector). The US accounts for a large share of world sea-borne 
trade (17%), mostly petroleum products (44% of the total volume) and containers (in 2008 
                                       
1 The University of Adelaide (Adelaide, South Australia) and Groupe d’Economie Mondiale (Sciences-Po, 
Paris, France) (fabien.bertho@sciences-po.org). I thank David Jacks (Simon Frazer University, Burnaby, 
British Columbia) for extremely helpful discussions and comments. Any errors are the author’s. 
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US container traffic represented 10% of world traffic). While it has some large ports, only 
one (Los Angeles) is ranked in the top 20 in the world. 
 
14.2 THE CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
The first part of this section deals with international shipping and the second part focuses on port 
infrastructures and related services, most particularly on container and intermodal facilities. 
 
14.2.1 Shipping 
 
14.2.1.1 International shipping 
 
There are no barriers to entry in the market for domestic providers in the maritime transport 
sector; however, there are significant barriers to entry for foreign providers. In cross-border 
trade the US maintains some cargo preferences (also called cargo reservations). According to 
the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), cargo preferences are a restriction to 
market access under mode 1. (GATS splits supply of services into four modes. Mode 1 is cross-
border supply, and it applies when service suppliers resident in one economy provide services 
in another economy, without either the supplier or the buyer/consumer moving to the physical 
location of the other. [Francois & Hoekman 2009]). According to this restriction, some types of 
cargo (e.g., government-generated, strategic, military or that financed by certain government 
programs) can only be transported by vessels that fly the flag of the economy. At the same 
time, requirements to fly the US flag are quite restrictive. In order to fly the flag the vessel must 
be owned by a US entity (but may be owned up to 100% by non-citizen interests), the vessel 
must be crewed by US citizens or lawful permanent residents, all licensed officers must be US 
citizens and the vessel must be certified by the US Coast Guard. Foreign seafarers are allowed 
to work on US-flag vessels in the domestic and international trades if they hold a green card but 
are limited to only 25% of the licensed crew members. 
 
Cargo reservation is a precedent which in the past has widely applied in the maritime 
transport industry across nations. Nevertheless, although since the 1970s and 1980s most 
economies have repealed this type of restriction, the US is one of the OECD economies that 
still applies it. Moreover, as can be seen in Table 14.1, cargo preference laws in the US cover 
many types of cargoes. Furthermore, considering cross-border trade restrictions, the US is 
party to a bilateral maritime agreement with Brazil. This agreement includes a cargo sharing 
clause; that is, it establishes a system of ‘cargo reservation’ between partners based on shares 
of bilateral or international trade transported by sea. The agreement signed with Brazil states 
that ‘National-flag carriers of each party shall have equal and discriminatory access to the 
government-controlled cargo of the other party’. Nevertheless, according to the Brazilian 
Maritime Transport Agency (Agência Nacional de Transportes Aquaviários), the reservation 
is not applied (Brazilian Maritime Transport Agency e-mail 2009). 
 
Table 14.1: US cargo reservation schemes. 
 
Sources: MARAD website 2010. 
Notes: (a) Includes military contract cargo, commercial contractor cargo, personal property cargo, POV 
shipments; (b) Includes Congressional supplementary for Iraq reconstruction, Federal Transit 
Administration, AID loans and grants, etc. (c) Includes programs PL480 (Title I to III), Food for 
Progress, Section 416(b) and Food for Education; and (d) Ex-Im Bank. 
Types of cargo reserved Regulation associated Share reserved to US-flagged vessels
Military cargo [a] Military Cargo Preference Act (1904) 100%
Government generated cargo [b] Cargo Preference Act (1954) At least 50% of the GT
Petroleum Cargo Preference Act (1954)
Agricultural cargoes under some foreign assistance programs [c] Food Security Act (1985) At least 75%
Exports for which a government agency makes export loan or credit [d] Public resolution 17 (1934) 100%
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There are almost no restrictions concerning the establishment of a commercial presence for a 
foreign provider, for example, restrictions on foreign ownership. Nevertheless, there is a 
measure considered by GATS as an impediment to trade under mode 3, namely, that 
international activities carried out in the US cannot be conducted by a branch. The requirement 
enables the US to have jurisdiction over the companies, in case of shipwreck for instance. It is 
also a means for the government to ensure that ships do not clear port without paying their bills. 
 
Concerning discrimination between domestic and foreign providers, there is an important 
scheme in place with the aim of supporting the US maritime industry as a whole, which 
means the US-flag fleet, the vessels’ owners and operators and also US shipyards. These 
support programs are described in Table 14.2. The support can be applied to both 
international and domestic trade vessels and takes various forms: subsidies, credit guarantees 
and tax deferrals. 
 
Table 14.2: Support programs to the US maritime transport industry. 
 
Source: Source: Global Insight 2009, MARAD website 2010. 
Note: (a) VISA is not really a subsidy. Nevertheless, the effect of the program is similar as it ensures a 
given level of resources for the carriers involved. 
 
With only two exceptions, there is no discrimination in access to port infrastructure and 
related services for foreign vessels. First, national security measures may deny access to US 
ports to vessels from some economies. The second exception deals with the maintenance and 
repair of vessels. The US applies the principle of reciprocity, that is, it assesses tariffs when 
those services are rendered on US vessels in foreign ports. 
 
Finally, the US applies an exemption on shipping agreements (conferences, consortia, 
discussion agreements) from US competition laws. Agreements among liner operators and 
marine terminal operators to discuss, fix, or regulate transportation rates and other conditions 
of service or cooperate on operational matters must be filed with the Federal Maritime 
Commission (FMC). The FMC reviews them to avoid anti-competitive behaviour.2
 
 
14.2.1.2 Domestic shipping: cabotage 
 
In general, economies reserve domestic shipping for vessels that fly their own flag, but the 
requirements in order to provide cabotage service are more demanding in the US. According 
to the Merchant Marine Act of 1920 (the ‘Jones Act’), vessels must be registered under the 
                                       
2 Given the evolution of US regulations (with OSRA in 1998) and that of other economies (the repeal of the 
exemption in the European Union, for instance) the number of conferences calling at US ports is negligible. The 
market share of conferences on these routes is also negligible. In other words, in the US, liner shipping is a 
competitive market. Thus, the exemption of carriers’ agreements from competition law is considered a non-issue. 
Programs Support Mechanism
The Maritime Security Program (MSP) US flag merchant marine - operators Fixed payment to US-flag vessel operators
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Program 
(VISA) [a]
US flag merchant 
marine - operators
Participants obtain priority consideration in the award of Department of 
Defence peacetime ocean freight contracts
Title XI - Federal Ship Financing Program US merchant marine 
and shipyard
Credit guarantee to private entity seeking to finance the construction or 
modernization of vessels in US shipyards and for US shipyards seeking to 
invest in technology
Capital Construction Fund (CCF)
US flag merchant 
marine - owners and 
operators
Deferment of Federal income taxes on certain deposits of money or other 
property placed into a CCF
Small Shipyard Grant Program Smaller shipyards Grants for capital and related infrastructure improvements
Technical Assistance Program Shipbuilding Various programs to aid the development of more advanced technologies
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US flag and also be owned by a US corporation, of which the maximum amount of foreign 
equity is 25% and at least 75% of its employees must be US citizens.  
 
More importantly, under the Jones Act, cabotage is reserved for ships built in the US. This 
building requirement has the effect of providing support for US shipyards. The US defines 
cabotage as ‘cargo services between two points in the US, including its territories and 
possession either directly or via a foreign port’. According to the cabotage regulations, any 
domestic leg of an international journey is also considered cabotage. This is an important 
restriction and more inclusive than that used by some other economies, even if, in practice, 
many waivers are issued (as reported by experts in 2009).  
 
There are exemptions from the Jones Act. For instance, there is no building requirement for 
the transport of crude oil from Alaska. Also, with the exception of activities reserved for the 
US government, the US territories of American Samoa, Virgin Islands and Northern Mariana 
Islands are also exempt. 
 
These restrictions stem in part from the long decline in the size of the US maritime industry 
prior to World War I. In 1913 the US fleet was very small in comparison to the US’s 
engagement in international trade. From the beginning of World War I foreign-flag ships 
were diverted away from US routes. In order to satisfy the demand for shipping for 
commercial and military purposes, the US government subsidised the shipbuilding industry. 
As a result, the shipbuilding industry obtained not only substantial financial resources and but 
also experience of interaction with policymaking, adding to its capacity to influence the 
content of the Jones Act. 
 
14.2.2 Port infrastructure and related services 
 
This section focuses on port services (pilotage, towing and tug assistance, provisioning, 
fuelling and watering, garbage collection and disposal, port captain’s services, navigation 
aids, shore-based operational services and emergency repair facilities) and auxiliary services 
(cargo handling, storage and warehousing, customs clearance, container station and depot, 
maritime agency and maritime freight forwarding). 
 
It is the task of the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to provide expertise on port 
financing and port infrastructure, ensure port and cargo security, and license deepwater 
liquefied natural gas ports. Meanwhile, the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), which is 
an independent regulatory agency, regulates certain port activities and is responsible for the 
registration of Marine Terminal Operators (MTOs). These two entities are both port 
authorities and private terminal operators. All MTOs are obliged to file a notice with the 
FMC that they will provide regulated marine terminal services. The FMC reviews 
agreements, monitors the concerted activities of ocean common carriers and MTOs and 
produces a market analysis with a focus on activities that are substantially anti-competitive. 
 
The US system is decentralised. Most commercial regulations dealing with ports are issued 
by local governments and the state governments are responsible for environmental regulation. 
In the main US container ports, a public port authority owns and maintains the docks and 
other facilities and is responsible for the overall administration of the property, terminals and 
other facilities. In these ports, the port authority acts as a landlord; that is, it leases terminals 
to private operators. 
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Ocean Transport Intermediaries (OTIs; freight forwarders or ‘non-vessel operating common 
carriers’) must obtain a licence in order to enter into the market. The FMC issues the licences 
after the submission of a form, the payment of a fee and a proof of financial responsibility has 
been provided. Moreover, a company officer has to provide proof of his or her experience.  
 
There are restrictions on the number of port and auxiliary service providers. In general the 
number of service providers in some areas (e.g., cargo handling, storage and warehousing and 
pilotage) is limited in ports because of the existence of economies of scale and the scarcity of 
port space. Thus, it is not uncommon that companies that want to provide these types of 
services must obtain concessions from port authorities through auction or tender. Major US 
ports are landlords, so they are responsible for the introduction of new providers when 
necessary. The right to operate port facilities then is driven by the operators’ financial 
capacity and willingness to meet safety and security requirements. Various schemes apply to 
pilotage services in ports: they might be operated by private monopolies (e.g., Long Beach), 
by pilotage associations (e.g., New York/New Jersey and Houston) or by port authorities 
(e.g., Los Angeles). 
 
14.3 FORCES FOR POLICY CHANGE 
 
This section deals with the main policies that have been put in place to support shipping in 
the maritime transport industry; that is, the cargo preferences system, various subsidy 
programs and the Jones Act. It also includes reference to container and intermodal facilities 
because of their importance in US freight transport. 
 
14.3.1 Cargo preferences 
 
The US government grants preference to US-flag vessels for transporting various types of 
cargo. From 2005 to 2007 the volume of cargo transported under preference schemes 
represented a very small share of the total US foreign trade (1.4–1.6% of total US seaborne 
trade depending on the year). Nevertheless, the revenue generated by cargo preferences 
transportation was sizable (Table 14.3). For each of the fiscal years between 2005 and 2007 it 
represented more than USD1.3 billion. Thus, it represents an important share of the total 
revenues of carriers operating US-flag vessels.  
 
Table 14.1: Importance of various cargo preference schemes, since fiscal year 2005. 
 
Source: MARAD website (2010) 
Note: Data not available for petroleum reservation scheme. ‘Share really reserved’ is expressed in 
percent of the total tonnage. (a) Does not include revenue for petroleum.  
 
Military cargo preference is the most important scheme in volume and in value. In 2007 the 
scheme represented 84.7% of the volume of cargo reserved and 68% of the revenue generated. 
The share generated by military cargo over the last number of years has undoubtedly been 
inflated by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the share of cargo that should be 
reserved according to the law and the share of cargo actually reserved are noticeably different. 
Total 
tonnage 
(1000)
Share 
really 
reserved
US 
revenue 
(1000)
Total 
tonnage 
(1000)
Share 
really 
reserved
US revenue 
(1000)
Total 
tonnage 
(1000)
Share 
really 
reserved
US 
revenue 
(1000)
Total 
tonnage 
(1000)
Share 
really 
reserved
US revenue 
(1000)
Military cargoes 17 225 92.0 853 086 15 349 88.2 784 848 [a] 19 086 74.0 919 363 n.a. n.a. n.a.
Agricultural cargoes 3 779 67.7 379 396 3 655 72.8 414 403 2 554 83.1 319 760 2 796 79.3 430 788
Civilian agencies 859 92.0 80 434 900 93.2 122 951 822 93.2 88 719 841 94.0 95 659
Ex-Im Bank 30 55.7 10 939 27 70.9 16 657 67 42.3 24 724 8 65.7 4 659
Total 21 893 87.7 1 323 855 19 931 85.6 1 338 859 [b] 22 528 75.6 1 352 566 3 644 82.6 531105 [c]
FY2005 FY2006 FY2007 FY2008
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This discrepancy is most likely due to the limited shipping capacity of the US-flag fleet. 
Because the general fleet is relatively small in size, the first issue is gross capacity. There is 
also the issue of the Department of Defense’s need for specialised carriers, such as Roll-
on/Roll-off (Ro/Ro) ships, which are insufficient in the US-flag fleet. Moreover, the share 
reserved to US-flag vessels comes with the condition ‘to the extent that such vessels are 
available at fair and reasonable rates’, which means that the various agencies are allowed to 
contract for foreign-flag vessels if there is a documented lack of availability of US-flag vessels. 
 
From a commercial policy point of view, cargo reservation works much like a quota, by 
protecting the vessels registered under the American flag. Contrary to the situation in most 
other economies, there are no restrictions on foreign ownership in order to fly the flag. 
However, the cost of operating a foreign-flag vessel is lower than the cost of operating a US-
flag vessel. Therefore, the operating cost differential comes, above all, from the American 
crew requirement, which makes for higher labour costs (Table 14.4). This crew-related 
expenses differential is responsible for more than 75% of the total operating expenses 
differential for a tanker and 80% for a container ship. Protection of the domestic fleet leads to 
an increase in the price of shipping services, which results in an opportunity cost for the 
reserved cargoes’ shippers – to transport the cargo on a US-flag ship rather than on a cheaper 
foreign ship. Most reserved cargoes are consumed by US government departments (e.g., 
Defense, Agriculture and Transport) so that it is the taxpayers who bear the cost. 
 
Table 14.2: Daily operating expenses for US-flag vs foreign-flag vessels, in 2005 (USD). 
 
Source: MARAD 2006 (replicated from USITC 2007) 
Notes: (a) These costs are estimated for 40-50 000 dwt tankers that are less than 10 years old; (b) These 
costs are estimated for a container ship with a volume of 4000 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) that are 
less than 10 years old; and (c) includes food, supplies and other vessel expenses. 
 
There is little information in terms of impact assessments relating to cargo preferences, as there 
has not been regular analysis allowing for the monitoring of this policy. Furthermore, there is 
only one analysis dealing with all schemes in combination, as most studies focus on one 
particular type of reservation scheme only. Table 14.5 shows the results from various studies. 
 
Table 14.3: Results of various assessments. 
 
Sources: Various reports, for details see references. 
Note: (a) Not available, information reported from OECD (2001). 
 
US-Flagged Foreign-Flagged US-Flagged Foreign-Flagged
Expense Category
Crew 11 000 2 300 12 705 2 940
Fuel 2 600 1 100 4 410 3 045
Maintenance and Repair Costs 1 200 700 2 310 1 470
Insurance 11 000 11 000 13 335 13 335
Other [c] 2 100 1 500 1 500 1 400
Total 27 900 16 600 34 260 22 190
Tanker [a] Containership [b]
Study Period of Assessment Schemes Assessed Estimation Main conclusion
White (1988) 1984
Agricultural commodities (P.L. 480), 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve, other 
shipments
-
Cost for the Federal government are respectively 
of 130, 43 and 93 MUSD
GAO (1990) 1986-1988 Food Aid (P.L. 480)
Based on ocean freight 
differentials
The cost differential is in average 128.1MUSD per 
year - i.e. 9.5% of total program expenditures
GAO (1994) 1989-1993 All schemes
Comparison with charges to carry 
cargo on foreign vessels
Federal agencies' transportation costs are 
increased by 578MUSD per year
Department of Defense (1994) [a] - Military cargo scheme - Additional costs of 476 MUSD on a total bill of 1.15 
BUSD for the DoD
Barrett and Maxwell (2005) 1999-2000 Section 416(b) and Food  for 
Progress
A premium of 78% is paid for ocean freight due to 
cargo preference
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The highest estimated cost is associated with military cargo – with estimates ranging from 
USD352 million to USD969 million according to the year and the study. The difference 
between assessments can be explained by the different methodologies used to compute the 
cost of the measure as well as the variation of the quantity of cargo transported under the 
various schemes. This is particularly true for military cargo, where the difference between 
cargo transported in peacetime and in wartime is important. 
 
Finally, the various impact assessments do not focus solely on the pecuniary costs of the 
measures; e.g., the 1990 assessment by the GAO highlights the impact of cargo preferences 
on the quality of services provided. According to the report, because of the schemes a sizable 
share of cargoes are loaded late (GAO 1990). 
 
For all these reasons it is very difficult to draw general conclusions from this work beyond 
the assessment that cargo preferences are costly for the American economy. 
 
If the main objective of cargo preferences is to support the US-flag fleet involved in 
international trade. Figure 14.1 shows that this objective has not been reached. Indeed, the US-
flag fleet decreased substantially over the last two decades. Cargo preferences have not 
prevented the decline in the size of the US-flag fleet. It may also isolate carriers operating US-
flag vessels from international competitive standards and reinforce the fleet’s inefficiency. 
 
 
Figure 14.1: Size of the US-flag merchant fleet, ocean-going ships of ≥1000 gross tons (in million dwt). 
(Source: BTS 2010) 
 
14.3.2 Subsidy programs and the Jones Act 
 
This section examines the MSP and VISA programs and also focuses on Title XI and the 
Capital Construction Fund (CCF) programs (Table 14.6). The objective of these programs is to 
support the fleet involved in international trade, whereas the aim of the MSP and VISA 
programs is more precise. The MARAD website states that ‘These programs are designed to 
assure the availability of sufficient US commercial sealift capability and the US intermodal 
system to sustain US military operations overseas in an emergency’. The MSP establishes a 
fleet of privately-owned, militarily useful vessels and the operators involved in the MSP have 
to make their ships and commercial transportation resources available on the request of the 
Secretary of Defense. With the VISA program participants commit to capacity in exchange for 
priority consideration in the award of Department of Defense peacetime ocean freight contracts. 
The MSP was created in 1996 because cargo preferences were not able to support the fleet and 
to achieve the national security objective. 
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Table 14.4: Importance of each subsidy scheme, various years. 
 
Sources: MARAD website 2010. 
Notes: (a) VISA is not strictly a subsidy. Nevertheless, the program’s effects is similar as it ensures a 
given level of resources for carriers involved. (b) These programs are linked directly to the Jones Act. 
 
The MSP and VISA programs as a consequence work in conjunction, so that more than 90% 
of the militarily useful vessels in the US-flag fleet are committed to the VISA program and 
over 77% of that capacity comes from MSP vessels.3
 
 Carriers can legally be engaged in 
either or both of the MSP and VISA programs and at the same time transport reserved cargo, 
which means they can benefit from multiple support schemes. For instance, since military 
cargo is reserved for US-flag vessels and consequently is highly lucrative for carriers, the 
Department of Defense pays them to commit to capacity in the VISA program. Clearly, 
because of this ‘double dipping’, this type of support is more costly for the taxpayer but 
without any corresponding enhancement of benefits. As shown in Figure 14.1, the creation of 
the MSP in 1996 may have prevented the decline of the fleet’s size for a few years, however, 
after only 3 years the MSP was already insufficient and the decline began again. Furthermore, 
the complexity of the system leads to a lack of transparency, which further complicates the 
effective monitoring of these programs. 
Finally, the MSP subsidises the operators of US-flag vessels even though maritime regulation 
does not require national ownership in order to fly the flag. Hence, an important share of the 
US-flag fleet is operated by foreign carriers. This leads to the situation where the US 
government, in supporting its fleet by allowing preferences, is directly subsidising foreign 
carriers. For instance, as of 1 July 2009 the container ship fleet in the MSP program 
represented 2 million dwt and more than 80% of the capacity of the entire MSP fleet. Among 
this fleet, 98% of the deadweight tonnage was operated by three foreign-owned carriers.4
 
 
The Jones Act in effect works like a cargo preference system, reserving domestic maritime 
transport for US built and operated vessels. This adds to the costs of providing the services, 
due to the higher building costs and crew costs compared to ships from the rest of the work. 
There are, however, subsidies to offset this cost increase for the shipyards (Title XI – see 
Table 14.6) and for companies that want to buy a Jones Act vessel (the CCF). 
                                       
3 Carriers with vessels enrolled in the MSP agree to make their ships available to the Department if VISA is 
activated. In Stage III of VISA, those ships which receive the MSP subsidy must devote 100% of their 
capacity to Defense cargo; but those ships which opt into VISA but do not receive the MSP subsidy must 
devote only 50% of their capacity to Department of Defense cargo. 
4 They are APL Marine Services (subsidiaries of Neptune Orient Line, Singaporean ownership), Maersk Line 
Ltd and Farrell Lines (subsidiaries of AP Moller-Maersk Group, Danish ownership) and Happag Lloyd 
(German ownership). The fourth carrier, Waterman Steamship Corporation, is US owned. 
Programs Budget Associated fleet
The Maritime Security Program (MSP) 156 MUSD authorized annually for 2006-
2008 and 174 MUSD for 2009-2011
59 vessels - of which 38 containership. 2.5M 
of dwt - of which 2M of dwt for containership
Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement Program 
(VISA) [a]
-
49 Companies, 133 Ocean Going Ships, 
178 Tugs, barges and other vessels (More 
than 90% of the militarily useful vessels in 
the U.S.-flag fleet are committed to the 
VISA program)
Title XI - Federal Ship Financing Program [b]
Commitement of 178 MUSD in 2005, no new 
commitment in 2006-2008, 351 MUSD for 
2009
In 2009, for 5 articulated tug or barges 
(185000 bbl), 9 asphalt tank barges and 30 
open hopper barges
Capital Construction Fund (CCF) [b] n.a -
Small Shipyard Grant Program 10 MUSD in 2008 -
Technical Assistance Program n.a n.a.
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Table 14.7 lists impact assessments that have computed the cost of the Jones Act system. The 
first conclusion is that the Jones Act is much more costly than other support programs. This is, 
above all, due to the huge differential in construction cost. The difference is presented in Table 
14.8. The price of a vessel built in an American shipyard was two, three or even four times 
higher than the representative new construction price reported by UNCTAD for an equivalent, 
or a larger, vessel of the same category in the same period. The additional operating and 
construction costs are supported by taxpayers via subsidies and by the consumers of the 
services, that is, first the shippers, but ultimately the final consumers of the goods. 
 
Table 14.5: Results of various Jones Act impact assessments. 
 
Sources: Various reports, see references. 
Notes: (a) The report is not available; information comes from Papavizas & Gardner 2009; (b) Partial 
equilibrium for assessing the removal of the domestic build requirement of the Jones Act. 
 
Table 14.6: Major US commercial shipbuilding programs and representative  
new building prices, selected years (USD million). 
 
Sources: Shipbuilding history website 2010, UNCATD 2009. 
Notes: In this table are presented prices for buyers. Hence, data includes subsidies directly paid to 
shipyards. (a) For tanker of 110 000 dwt, 2000. (b) For tanker of 1100 00 dwt, 2005. (c) For tanker of 
110 000 dwt, 2006. (d) For full container ship of 2500 TEU, 2005. (e) For full container ship of 
2500 TEU, 2006. 
 
The various methodologies explain the variability of the results presented in Table 14.7. 
Nevertheless, contrary to the assessments of cargo preferences, the studies of the Jones Act 
are more interesting for the purposes of this case. Of particular interest will be the most 
recent of the periodically released United States International Trade Commission (USITC) 
assessments because, as they use a similar methodology, they will allow a comparison with 
the Jones Act’s cost over time. According to various USITC studies since 1995, the cost of 
the Jones Act to the US economy has decreased. The USITC computed that if the Jones Act 
had been repealed in 1992 there would have been a welfare gain of USD2.8 billion; for 1996 
the welfare gain of the repeal had decreased to USD1.3 billion; and to USD656 million for a 
repeal in 1999. Interestingly, the reduction in the cost of the Jones Act could potentially be 
explained by the decrease in the volume of domestic shipping as shown in Figure 14.2 
(USITC 2002). 
Authors Methodology Period assessed Cost estimation
White (1988) [a] Based on government transfers 1984
Higher cost of $2 billions to transport goods in the 
coastal trade
Congressional Budget Office (1994) [a] Based on government transfers 1983 Cost of $1.3 billion for the US economy
Hufbauer and Elliot (1993) Partial equilibrium model 1990 Net cost of $1.1 billion for the economy
ITC (1995) 1992
Net welfare gain of 2.8 billions USD in case of 
repeal of the Jones Act
ITC (1999) 1996
Net welfare gain of 1.3 billion USD in case of 
repeal of the Jones Act. Gain of 380 MUSD for 
the build liberalization only
ITC (2002) 1999
Net welfare gain of 656 millions of USD in case of 
repeal of the Jones Act. Gain of 261 MUSD for 
the build liberalization only
ITC (2004 and 2007) No quantitative assessment
Computable General Equilibrium - 
Operating and capital costs [b]
Original Name Builder Capacity Delivery Price Representative newbuilding price
Price differential in 
%
Crude Carriers
Polar Endeavour NGSS Avondale 140,000dwt 2001 166 41 [a] 405
Alaskan Explorer GD/NASSCO 193,000dwt 2005 210 58 [b] 362
Alaskan Adventurer GD/NASSCO 193,000dwt 2005 210 58 [b] 362
Alaskan Legend GD/NASSCO 193,000dwt 2006 210 81 [c] 259
Containerships
Manulani Aker Philadelphia 2502 TEU 2005 145 42 [d] 345
Maunalei Aker Philadelphia 2503 TEU 2006 145 46 [e] 315
322 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
 
Figure 14.2: Volume of foreign and domestic shipping, in millions of tonnes. (Source: BTS 2010) 
 
During the same period the operating cost differential had increased – for example, between 
2003 and 2005, from USD8700 to USD11 300 for a tanker and from USD11 500 to 
USD12 070 for a containership. The building cost differential is presumed to have increased as 
well. Thus, the decrease in cost could be explained by a volume effect and not a price effect. 
 
Furthermore, the Jones Act results in a high cabotage service price. Moreover, between 2003 
and 2008 the producer price of coastal shipping increased much more than the freight 
trucking rate. The producer price for rail transport increased at the same rate (US Department 
of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 2010). Hence, consumers substituted other modes of 
transport for coastal shipping (Figure 14.3). This in turn has reduced the volume of domestic 
shipping and thus raised the cost of the Jones Act. The reduction in volume can also be 
explained by reductions in domestic production and the shipment of crude oil. Additionally, 
substituting rail and road transport for domestic shipping leads to congestion on land. 
 
 
Figure 14.3: US domestic transport share by modes (ton/miles of freight). (Source: BTS 2010) 
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The combination of cargo preferences (on various types of international trade and on domestic 
shipping) and the various subsidy programs could not prevent the decline of the US-flag fleet 
(Figure 14.1). Additionally, since the mid 1980s, the Jones Act and related subsidies have not 
prevented the decline of the shipbuilding sector. There has been a strong decrease in the 
number of shipyards and in employment in the shipbuilding and repair sector (Figures 14.4–5). 
 
In conclusion, cabotage regulation has had an important impact on the cost of domestic 
shipping but it has also had implications for international shipping. The definition of cabotage 
used by the US considers the domestic part of an international journey as cabotage. In theory, 
foreign carriers providing international shipping services cannot call at multiple US ports 
without employing a ‘Jones Act vessel’. Thus, the law prevents carriers involved in 
international shipping from rationalising the use of their vessels. It leads to higher costs for 
providers and higher prices for consumers. Even if waivers are issued, according to experts 
the system is burdensome and inefficient. 
 
 
Figure 14.4: The number of shipyards in the US. (Source: Shipbuilding history website 2010) 
 
 
Figure 14.5: Employment in the shipbuilding and repairing sector (,000). (Source: Shipbuilding history 
website 2010) 
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14.3.3 Port infrastructure and related services 
 
This section examines the challenges faced by US ports, focusing on capacity constraints and 
congestion risks, including congestion within ports and rail and road bottlenecks in and 
around ports. 
 
14.3.3.1 Congestion in ports 
 
During the 2000–07 period container throughput more than doubled (Table 14.9). Despite a 
decrease in 2008 and 2009 because of the global financial crisis, container traffic is expected 
to increase again in the coming years. This is particularly true for West Coast ports because 
of trade growth in manufactured goods from East Asia (Figure 14.6). Thus, in 2020 port 
capacity would need to have increased by 107% in major Pacific ports and by 59% in major 
Atlantic ports in order to satisfy future demand. 
 
Table 14.7: Evolution of container throughput in the first 10 US ports (in TEUs). 
 
Source: Containerisation International 2010, US Department of 
Transportation 2009 
Notes: In brackets is the world rank of the port in terms of container 
throughput; (a) West Coast. (b) Reported from July to June. 
 
 
Figure 14.6: Capacity and demand by 2020 by major ports (million TEU). (Source: MARAD 2009) 
 
Such a huge increase in port traffic could lead to congestion, which would increase costs for 
shippers and consumers. It also gives incentives for shippers to shift from US ports to less 
congested ports in Canada or Mexico (MARAD 2009a). This issue can be seen in two 
different ways: as a problem of investment in new infrastructure and as a problem of full and 
efficient use of existing capacities. Indeed, the performance of ports in the US measured by 
two different indexes is low by comparison with other international ports (Figures 14.7–8). 
Given the main international ports’ performance, US ports have room for progress to attain 
2000 2007 Evolution 2000-2007
1 Los Angeles (13) [a] 3 227 743 8 355 039 159
2 Long Beach (15) [a] 3 203 555 7 312 465 128
3 New York/New Jersey (19) 2 200 343 5 299 105 141
4 Savannah (40) 720 231 2 604 509 262
5 Oakland (45) [a] 988 773 2 387 911 142
6 Norfolk (52) 850 400 2 128 366 150
7 Seattle (57) [a] 959 883 1 973 504 106
8 Tacoma (59) [a] 647 017 1 924 934 198
9 Houston (65) 733 134 1 768 687 141
10 Charleston (66) [b] 1 246 181 1 750 000 40
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the full potential of berths and of port surfaces. Therefore, it would seem that, before 
investing in new capacity, US ports could rationalise existing ones. This would allow ports to 
handle increased numbers of containers with the same level of infrastructure. 
 
 
Note: Computed as the total TEUs throughput divided by the length of container berths. 
Figure 14.7: Port productivity in international ports, 2009. (Source: Data from Containerisation Online 
2010) 
 
 
Note: Computed as total TEU throughput divided by total container terminal surface in squared metres. 
Figure 14.8: Port productivity in international ports, 2009. (Source: Data from Container International 
2010 and related port authority websites) 
 
14.3.3.2 Rail and road bottlenecks in port surroundings 
 
As noted in Section 14.3.3.1, ports have witnessed a strong increase in container traffic in the 
last decade. Whereas the cargo throughput increased in ports, too few investments have been 
made in other modes of transport. This leads to rail and road bottlenecks, notably in the ports’ 
surroundings. Bottlenecks slow access to ports and increase delays within ports because of 
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the waiting time to unload cargoes, which in turn decreases the efficiency of the entire 
logistics chain. In this respect bottlenecks are partly responsible for poor port performance.  
 
Table 14.10 gives an indication of the congestion of land transport in port surroundings. For 
instance, in 2005 in the areas of Long Beach and Los Angeles, the annual delay per container 
was 72 hours on average. Again we can note that congestion is particularly prevalent on the 
West Coast. 
 
Other data gives us some indication of bottlenecks around ports. For instance, in 2007 the 
area where the average truck speed was the lowest was close to ports (US Department of 
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration 2008). All this data highlights the 
importance of building new infrastructure and improving the efficiency of existing ones. 
 
Table 14.8: Landside annual traffic delay per container in surrounding urban areas, 2005. 
 
Source: US Department of Transportation, 2009 
Notes: (a) West Coast ports; (b) San Francisco Bay Area ports: 
Oakland, Redwood City, Richmond, San Francisco and Stockton; and 
(c) Virginia ports: Norfolk, Richmond and Newport News. 
 
14.4 SCOPE FOR FURTHER REFORM 
 
The last policy change in shipping was the Ocean Shipping Reform Act (OSRA) in 1998. It 
dealt with the exemption from competition law of liner carriers’ agreements. In spite of many 
proposals to reform the maritime regulatory framework, in particular the Jones Act and cargo 
preferences, nothing has been done since that time. This section considers why those changes 
have not occurred and discusses the most recent changes that have occurred in container and 
intermodal infrastructures. 
 
14.4.1 Shipping 
 
US policy is motivated by concerns about the security of supply. It involves the use of cargo 
preferences and cabotage regulation. However these are costly for consumers and taxpayers 
with significant effects on the allocation of resources within the economy. Some of the 
consequences of the policy are apparently inconsistent with its purpose, since even the 
legislation which was designed to support US-flag vessels could not prevent the decline of 
the US fleet. In these respects, it might be expected that the policy package would come 
under pressure for change. There are, however, several sources of countervailing pressure. 
 
The first difficulty for policymakers comes from the likely impact of reforms on employment. 
The maritime transport sector employs hundreds of thousands of people (Table 14.11, Figure 
14.5). Repealing the cargo preferences measure would directly affect the shipboard jobs of 
6000 Americans (GOA 1994). According to the USITC report (2002), abolition of the Jones 
Hours Rank
Los Angeles/Long Beach [a] 1-2 72 1
New York 3 46 16
Savannah 4 n.a. n.a.
San Francisco Bay Area ports [a] [b] 5 60 2
Virginia ports [c] 6 30 42
Seattle [a] 7 45 19
Tacoma [a] 8 45 19
Houston 9 56 7
Charleston 10 31 40
Container 
traffic rankPort
Delay
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Act would affect about 7700 maritime workers (full time equivalent; FTE) and about 3100 
FTE workers in the shipbuilding sector. These changes would be associated with responses 
through the political system. 
 
Table 14.9: US employment in water transport and related industries, 2003–08 (,000). 
 
Source: US Department of Transportation 2009 
 
Another difficulty in reforming the maritime transport policy comes from the fact that the 
‘losers’ are diffuse and not easily organised whereas the ‘winners’ are few and very well 
organised. Government support to the maritime industry represents an important share of the 
revenue of some carriers. In relation to cargo preferences, 118 US-flag vessels participated in 
moving preferential cargo in 2006. At the same time, more than 50% of the revenue of some 
operators was derived from this trade in preferential cargo (Global Insight 2009). Whereas 
the aim of the system was to support the fleet, in fact it only subsidises a very few companies. 
In relation to the Jones Act, at the end of 2008 only two carriers operated Jones Act container 
vessels – Horizon Lines Inc. and Matson Navigation Inc.: 67% and 87% of the fleets of these 
carriers, respectively, were involved in the cabotage market. At the end of 2008 the domestic 
container transport was a duopoly, with Horizon Lines operating 55% of the fleet and Matson 
Navigation 45%. Experiences from various studies of regulation indicate that the more 
concentrated is a market, the easier it is to organise and defend a favourable regulation.  
 
There are groups in the US which oppose the Jones Act. In 1995 an initiative called the Jones 
Act Reform Coalition, mostly comprised of shippers, was formed with the objective to repeal, 
or at least to reform, the regulations on cabotage. The Coalition relied on the economic 
arguments surrounding the inefficiency of the present system. In the same year, by way of 
reply, some carriers, shipyards and other maritime interests involved in the domestic shipping 
market formed the Maritime Cabotage Taskforce. Despite the evidence provided, the efforts 
of the Coalition were not seriously considered by Congress (Papavizas & Gardner 2009). 
 
14.4.2 Port infrastructure and related services 
 
Over recent years, most of the port and related regulation reforms have concerned security 
issues (see Annex Table A14.1), the one exception being the creation of the Office of Port 
Infrastructure Development and Congestion Mitigation (OPIDCM) in May 2009. The 
objectives of the OPIDCM are manifold: coordinating port infrastructure projects for a 
variety of entities, coordinating and directing studies of port and intermodal facilities and 
leading national efforts to reduce congestion, including highways and railways. 
 
In relation to port congestion, during fiscal years 2007–10 the projected annual capital 
expenditures in public ports were on average more than USD2.3 billion, representing an 
increase of 125% in comparison with 2006 (Table 14.12). The most prominent expenditures 
were to be on container facilities. Despite the fact that the West Coast represents a market 
share of 55% of the containers entering the US (vs 40% for the East Coast and 5% for the 
Gulf ports), only 30% of the investments were allocated to West Coast ports (vs 50% for the 
East Coast and 20% for the Gulf ports). 
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Transportation 54.5 56.4 60.6 62.7 65.5 65.2
Port Services 93.8 91.5 93.9 99.3 100.1 97
Cargo Handling 40.8 40.8 42.8 45.6 46.2 44.9
Handling 53 50.7 51.1 53.7 53.9 52.1
Shipbuilding and Repair 92.6 90.8 92.2 95.1 101 104.5
Total 240.9 238.7 246.7 257.1 266.6 266.7
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Table 14.10: US public port capital expenditures by region, historical and projected (USD,000). 
 
Source: MARAD, 2009 
Notes: (a) Equipment (computer, maintenance etc.), buildings/improvements (maintenance, fire stations, 
administration etc.), real estate development, crane electrification conversion, customer facilities, terminal 
development, maintenance, administration, property/infrastructure, land, new accounting systems, HVAC 
systems, new roof on administration buildings, feasibility studies, marinas, moorage, fireboats, 
environmental, recreation, information technology and boat launches; (b) Rail, road and utilities inside or 
outside of terminals. 
 
As can be seen in Figure 14.6, most of the demand for TEU capacity in ports will be covered 
by proposed investments. An important question concerns the placement of these 
investments. Because main ports are located close to megalopolises where land is scarce and 
expensive, they are close to their maximum sizes. This points to a need for the development 
of secondary ports, which means an extensive development of US ports. In this respect the 
OPIDCM would help to coordinate investments in various ports, thereby helping to make the 
US port network coherent and avoiding duplication of investments. 
 
Yet bearing in mind the bad performances of US ports, the question is whether investing in 
new capacities is the most efficient way to address the congestion issue. As already noted, 
congestion could be addressed by the intensive development of facilities. The poor 
performance of the three main US ports cannot be explained by a lack of competition 
between terminals within ports – which is the norm in the US (Table 14.13). In these ports 
the container handling market is competitive. 
 
Table 14.13: Container handling operators in the three main US ports. 
 
Sources: Port corporations’ websites 2010 
Notes: (a) Feet; (b) Number of container cranes with height in feet in brackets – SPP=Super Post 
Panamax, PP=Post Panamax, P=Panamax. 
General cargo - 
Ro/Ro
Container Bulk Passenger Other [a]
Atlantic 95 715 157 431 2 550 27 507 30 718 10 896 78 228 21 418 424 463
Gulf 26 660 110 996 28 449 26 960 63 578 45 086 40 309 17 464 359 502
Pacific 36 409 72 212 2 383 2 158 92 757 16 921 25 529 8 559 256 928
Total 158 784 340 639 33 382 56 625 187 053 72 903 144 066 47 441 1 040 893
Atlantic 178 691 328 101 20 484 63 410 214 890 56 388 201 952 17 350 1 081 266
Gulf 163 764 141 834 59 851 5 804 65 063 58 920 26 728 26 834 548 797
Pacific 14 250 204 883 21 080 62 718 252 621 124 740 12 527 23 270 716 089
Total 356 704 674 817 101 416 131 932 532 573 240 048 241 207 67 454 2 346 152
Evolution 
Total, in % 125 98 204 133 185 229 67 42 125
Total
2 006
Annual 
average 
(2007-2011)
Type of facility
Infrastructure 
[b]
Dredging Security
Port Operators Berths length [a] Portainers [b]
West Basin Container Terminal LLC [a] 1200' 4SPP
West Basin Container Terminal LLC [a] 3500' 5PP - 3P
Trans Pacific Container Service Corporation [b] 4050' 11PP
Port of Los Angeles Container Terminal [c] 2180'  3 (50') - 1 (34')
Yusen Terminal [d] 5800' 4SPP - 4PP - 2P
Seaside Transportation Services LLC [e] 4700' 8PP
APL Terminal - Global Gateway South 4000' 12SPP
APM Terminal 7190' 14SPP
California United Terminals [f] 2100' 5 (50')
Total Terminals International [g] 5000' 14 (100')
International Transportation Service, Inc. [h] 6379' 17 (50 and 100')
Long Beach Container Terminal, Inc. 2750' 7 (100')
Pacific Maritime Services 5900' 15 (100')
SSAT Long Beach LLC 3600' 10 (100')
SSA Terminals 1800' 3 (100')
American Stevedoring - ASI Terminals 2080' 2 (80') - 1 (90) - 1 (100')
Global Marine Terminal 1800' 6PP
Port Newark Container Terminal 4400' 3 (170') - 6 (220')
Maher Terminal 10128' 9 (120') - 7 (100') - 
APM Terminal 6001' 4SPP - 8PP - 1 (85')
New York Container Terminal 3012' 3 (80') - 6 (120')
Los Angeles
Long Beach
New York/New Jersey
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Various reports by the MARAD or by independent bodies highlight ways to improve US port 
performances. One proposal concerns investment in new technology to improve the 
organisation of arrivals and the management of containers in terminals. Indeed, this is the 
objective of various OPIDCM programs: Agile Port Systems, the Centre for the Commercial 
Deployment of Transportation Technology (CCDoTT) and the Cargo Handling Cooperative 
Programme (CHCP). Another requires changes in labour regulations to allow extended hours 
of work in ports, such as the opening of truck gates and access to warehousing. Other reports 
advise procedural changes that would allow port authorities to offer proper incentives to limit 
the time containers stay in the port, for instance through higher demurrage costs. 
 
With respect to bottlenecks in port surroundings, the most dramatic increase in capital 
expenditure for the next few years concerns infrastructure – rail, road and utilities inside or 
outside terminals (Table 14.12). The increase of 239% is encouraging. Moreover, it is to be 
hoped that this effort will be sustained by the OPIDCM, whose role is to coordinate 
investments between different transport modes. But it will have to focus on investment in 
new capacities and in improved infrastructures such as high speed trains. 
 
14.5 CONCLUSION 
 
While governments pursue non-economic objectives, there are often available a variety of 
policy tools for those purposes. Some are more costly than others, and may also be less 
effective. Regular processes for making transparent and then assessing policy in quantitative 
terms relative to its objectives can contribute to effective structural reform. The case of 
shipping policy in the US highlights the value of establishing these processes and also linking 
them to policy-making processes. 
 
US policy is designed to support a US-flag fleet and American shipyards. The policy which 
applies to both international and domestic shipping entails costs for the American economy, 
according to a series of assessments. One objective of the policy is to have a strong fleet that 
will help to maintain maritime skills within the workforce. Another is for security reasons. 
These objectives are laudable. Nevertheless, the policy package has incurred significant costs.  
 
Furthermore, measures to curb the costs did not reach their goals. In order to cut major 
sources of inefficiency, and to be in line with the OECD’s maritime regulation, the US would 
have to repeal cargo preferences and abandon its building requirement in cabotage. The cargo 
preference system represents only a tiny share of the economy’s waterborne international 
trade and this would be a symbolic reform. The building requirement of the Jones Act would 
lead to much higher gains. Yet despite the economic analysis, the government maintains all 
these policies in place at a cost to consumers and taxpayers and to the benefit of a limited 
number of carriers (and even foreign carriers). The difficulties of reform can be explained in 
part by the operations of well-organised interest groups and the effectiveness of their efforts 
compared to those who are in favour of reform. 
 
The decision to implement reform is difficult, considering the cost for those who now gain 
from the policy and in loss of employment. In addition, the regulatory framework relating to 
shipping is complex, with overlaps between supporting measures that lead to a lack of 
transparency that makes the assessment of the various policies difficult. Regular work on the 
assessment of the policy is likely to assist the development of lower cost options for the same 
policy objectives. 
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In contrast to shipping, the auxiliary services, and in particular container handling, are 
characterised by open and competitive markets. Regulation is efficient and in line with good 
practices in the major US ports. The main challenge is the expected increase in traffic and the 
risk of congestion inside and outside ports. In order to cope with congestion, a balance will be 
sought between extensive and intensive development of the major ports, which entails the 
development of secondary ports, and the improvement of performances at them. An effort 
towards coordination and a harmonious development between modes would be valuable. 
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ANNEX 14 
 
 
Table A14.1: Recent policy changes in maritime transport. 
 
Sources: MARAD website 2010, MARAD 2009a 
 
Sector Area of policy change Associated regulation Year of change Description of change
Liner shipping Regulation and competition Ocean Shipping Reform Act 1998
Abolition of the obligation for carriers to publish publicly freight rates and service 
contracts. Shippers and carriers are allowed to engage in confidential agreements
Port and infrastructures Security Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002
Plan to coordinate action between federal, state, and local governments to 
respond to security incidents involving maritime assets and infrastructure Š and 
various measures.
Port and infrastructures Security Critical Infrastructure Information Act 2002 Framework for the submission of information regarding critical infrastructures
Port and infrastructures Security Container Security Initiative 2002
The "24-hours rule" requires detailed description to be reported on cargoes 
travelling to the US 24 hours prior being loaded onto vessels.
Port and infrastructures Security
Security and Accountability for Every Port 
Act
2006
Required the development of the National Strategy for Transportation Security. 
The objective is to secure the national transportation system and to prepare to 
respond to terrorist threats or attacks to transportation infrastructure
Port and infrastructures Creation of a new agency
Office of Port Infrastructure Development 
and Congestion Mitigation
2009
Objectives are to coordinate port infrastructure projects for a variety of entities, to 
coordinate and to direct studies of port and intermodal facilities and leading 
national efforts to reduce congestion (including highways and rails).
Port and infrastructures Security
Security and Accountability for Every Port 
Act
2009
Develop and implement a strategic plan to enhance the security of the 
international supply chain
 
Chapter 15 
 
ELECTRICITY IN KOREA 
 
 
Seung-Hoon Lee1
 
 
 
• Korea’s electricity reform has been partially implemented. 
• There is some evidence of improved performance in the generation of electricity. 
• Further reform is valuable to remove remaining distortions to price and the use of 
electricity. 
 
 
15.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Stable power supply in a sufficient amount was, and still is, the most important condition for 
a developing economy in undertaking ambitious industrialisation projects. The Korea Electric 
Power Corporation (KEPCO), which supplies electricity to the entire economy as a state 
monopolist, was created in 1961 by consolidating three state-owned and operated electricity 
supply companies in Korea: one generation–transmission company and two distribution–sales 
companies. KEPCO supported the rapid industrialisation of Korea by supplying sufficient 
power at low tariffs without outside subsidies, and by successful expansion of the capacity 
for generation and the transmission–distribution grid in a timely manner. 
 
The growth of KEPCO was paralleled by the rapid industrialisation of the Korean economy. 
In the 1980s it became the largest company by asset value and the second largest by the 
number of employees, behind Korea Telecommunications. The Korean government then 
decided to sell 49% of its stock in KEPCO to the general public in an attempt to invite private 
capital to the power sector. The government still holds over 50% of the total stocks in 
KEPCO. Also, a small portion of new investment was allowed to private generators in the 
form of independent power plants under long-term power purchase agreements with KEPCO. 
 
The operation of the Korean economy depended upon public sector investment to a 
substantial extent, since the Korean government made extensive use of public enterprises 
during the process of economic development, not only in basic infrastructure but also in 
energy and material industries such as oil refining, gas, electricity, steel and petrochemicals. 
In other economies the petrochemical and steel industries are usually under private, not 
public, control. The Korean petrochemical and steel industries, however, began through state 
initiative in the early stages of economic development when private capital was not able to 
invest in these capital-intensive industries. The Korean government established many public 
enterprises in those sectors, aiming at the import substitution of basic materials. The major 
market for their outputs was Korea’s manufacturing sector, which was rapidly growing as a 
successful export industry under the vigorous export drive policy of the Korean government. 
The public enterprises had once produced as much as 15% of the total value added of the 
entire economy. 
                                                 
1 Professor, Seoul National University; former Chairman of the Korean Electricity Commission (2001-2004); 
President of Korean Society of Electricity Industry Studies (shoonlee@snu.ac.kr). 
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With the accelerated growth of the private sector, the Korean government initiated 
privatisation of many public enterprises. Though there were no objections to privatising 
material industries, public opinion was divided over privatising network industries such as 
telecommunications and electricity. A substantial portion of the population maintained the 
idea that there must be proper mechanisms for the provision of these universal services, and 
the regulated operation under public ownership was essential for this purpose. 
 
At the same time, other economies shifted towards competition by restructuring network 
industries. Research institutes and academics advised the Korean government to initiate 
restructuring in line with this trend. Meanwhile, the industries and their labour unions opposed 
what they referred to as an ‘untested’ experiment. 
 
There are differences and similarities between sectors. Consider the trends of change in 
electricity and telecommunications. Due to technological change and after only slight 
institutional re-arrangement, it is now possible for a new entrant to compete in the 
telecommunications industry. More extensive change is required for electricity, in particular, 
to unbundle generation from grid operation in order to guarantee fair open access of energy 
traders to the grid. Third party access under functional unbundling prevailed in systems 
where traditional grid operators were private utilities under regulation who objected to 
attempts to intrude upon their property rights. But open access under structural unbundling 
seems more likely in systems where traditional monopolies were state enterprises. Examples 
of the former are the USA, Germany and Japan, and examples of the latter are the UK and 
Nord Pool economies. However, resistance to change from the incumbent could still be 
expected in those cases. 
 
In the case of Korea, the size of KEPCO was a matter for consideration in the design of 
reform. KEPCO had not only monopolised the supply of electricity, but also now comprised 
many associated businesses. In particular, it had undertaken all the construction works of its 
own generation plants: other construction and engineering companies could join in projects 
only as subcontractors. This approach added to its size but also invited criticism of its 
corporate governance structure, which contributed to the pressure for reform. 
 
The proposal for restructuring the electricity industry to accommodate competition attained 
political support, and the Korean government finally decided to initiate restructuring. The 
National Assembly passed the relevant legislation in 2000, and restructuring began in April 
2001. 
 
15.2 RESTRUCTURING AND REACTION 
 
The original restructuring plan comprised three stages: 
• divesting the generation sector from KEPCO to initiate the creation of a competitive 
wholesale market; 
• divesting the distribution sector from KEPCO to complete the wholesale market; and 
• creating a competitive retail market. 
Stage 3 was planned to be completed by 2009. 
 
To begin Stage 1 the Korean government created six generation companies (one nuclear-
hydro and five thermal). It also established the Korea Power Exchange (KPX) which was to 
take charge of the system’s operation and to mediate the wholesale trading of power between 
generators and retail suppliers, including other buyers such as large-scale customers. Thus the 
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function of KEPCO was to be limited to being a grid company and a retailer, without 
engaging in generation. Though KEPCO would become the only buyer, the wholesale price 
was to be determined by the KPX. 
 
The Korean Electricity Commission (KOREC) was established under the Ministry of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE). KOREC was headed by a chairman and eight 
commissioners, all part-time members except for one full-time commissioner who would be 
the chief energy policy maker of MOCIE, whose role was also to take care of the remaining 
tasks of restructuring the industry. 
 
KOREC was not an independent body, since it was designed to report to the Minister of 
Commerce, Industry and Energy. This structure was due to the fact that KOREC was also in 
charge of the implementation of further restructuring, for which the Minister had to be 
responsible. It was understood that KOREC would be made independent as soon as the task 
of restructuring was completed. 
 
KOREC was to approve electricity tariffs and oversee the quality of electricity and security of 
the system. It also was to review the fundamental qualifications of the applicants for business 
in the electricity industry, such as generation, transmission, distribution and retail. All 
applications were to be approved unless they violated conditions stipulated in the law, and 
without discriminating against foreign entrants. Approval was permanent as long as 
applicants abided by the regulations and there were no licence fees. Since the transmission 
business was to be monopolised by KEPCO for the time being, and the distribution–supply 
business would be made open in later stages, all the applications were expected to be, and 
were, concentrated in generation. 
 
Long-term power purchase agreements (PPAs) under pre-existing contracts with private 
generators who had obtained approval before restructuring were honoured. New private 
power plants, however, were no longer eligible for PPAs. They had to sell their power only 
through the KPX at market prices, and could only sell it directly to consumers when trading 
was made feasible.  
 
There was no explicit legal restriction on foreign ownership: there had been, and are still, 
several generators under full or partial foreign ownership. Most of them sold off their shares 
and withdrew their investment from Korea during the past decade. The withdrawals, however, 
were not due to the government’s restriction on foreign ownership but were a voluntary choice. 
As for portfolio investment, about 25% of the total outstanding KEPCO shares were in the 
hands of foreign investors in September 2008, and a similar level has been maintained. 
 
15.2.1 Basic nature of the Korean model 
 
The KPX operated a cost-based pool (CBP) to determine real time wholesale equilibrium 
prices, which equate electricity supply and demand on an hourly basis. Demand was 
determined by the amount of power consumption and supply by marginal cost, reflecting the 
merit order of the generators adjusted for the real time availability. So the equilibrium price 
was determined by the marginal cost of the marginal generator, called the system marginal 
price (SMP). 
 
Since the pricing by SMP may not recover fixed costs, for the marginal generator in particular, 
a fixed amount of compensation was allowed under the title of a ‘capacity payment’. So the 
final payment to the generators was composed of the SMP, which represents the level of the 
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marginal cost for generation, a capacity payment and compensation for ancillary services. 
This system was essentially similar to the old UK system – the England-Wales pool. 
 
The Korean wholesale market, however, differed from that in the UK in its dual structure. 
The KPX priced wholesale power in two ways, with generators divided into two groups: 
nuclear and coal-fired (baseload group) and oil-fired and gas-fired (general group). Each 
group had its own marginal price and capacity payment. The marginal cost of the ‘marginal’ 
baseload generator, usually a coal-fired one, was called the baseload marginal price (BLMP), 
while that of the real marginal generator maintained its original name of SMP. The BLMP is 
much lower than the SMP. Baseload generators are paid for their energy by BLMP and the 
general group is paid by SMP. Since the baseload generator is more costly to build, its 
capacity payment is set higher than that of a general generator. A baseload generator that 
incurred losses through the BLMP recovered them through the higher capacity payment. 
 
This feature of the Korean CBP was introduced to comply with ongoing retail tariff 
regulation. If the same SMP were paid to all the baseload generators, KEPCO would 
encounter a substantial rise in cost for its acquisition of wholesale power. This would drive 
KEPCO to a deficit under the fixed retail tariff. The government had to either repeal the tariff 
regulation or adopt dual wholesale pricing. As a transitory measure, the government adopted 
the dual pricing system. 
 
The new law allowed large-scale customers direct purchase of power from generators. 
However, this measure was delayed until the transmission tariffs could be established and 
retail tariffs liberalised. Direct purchase was not likely to take place then. All the large-scale 
customers, most of whom were industrial consumers, were enjoying subsidised low tariffs. 
Also, the big residential complexes which paid high tariffs to subsidise industrial consumers 
were not ready to form collective units to bargain. 
 
This model was only supposed to last until deregulation of the retail tariff and the start-up of 
retail market operations in subsequent stages. The CBP market was to be replaced by an 
elaborate price-bidding pool, which would have involved the following measures: 
• the generating companies (Gencos) were to be privatised individually; 
• genuine open access to the grid was to be implemented; 
• trading by bilateral contracts between customers and generators was to be introduced; 
• retail tariffs were to be liberalised in order to accommodate the market determination 
of energy prices; and 
• retail supply market was to be made fully open. 
The initial mechanism was designed only to cover the transitory initial phase. 
 
The divestiture of the generation sector was incomplete in the sense that it was designed to let 
KEPCO own the entire share of stocks of each generation company. This was also just a 
transitory feature, since the Korean government planned to privatise all the thermal Gencos 
according to the original plan. Privatisation, however, would not be possible unless all the 
future conditions surrounding the electricity market became clear and reliable. Apparently, 
the uncertainty about future restructuring had the effect of discouraging potential buyers in 
the early stage of restructuring and none of the Gencos were sold. 
 
15.2.2 Reform put on hold 
 
In 2002 the Gencos’ unions undertook a month-long strike against the restructuring when the 
government attempted to privatise a Genco. However, the restructuring proceeded on schedule 
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under the support of the president who had initiated the restructuring. This support continued 
while he was in office but things began to change in 2003. Although the new president of that 
year belonged to the same political party as the outgoing president, there was evidence that he 
was sceptical about privatising the power industry. The labour unions continued to demand a 
repeal of the entire restructuring plan.2
 
 The issue at hand was the divestiture of the distribution 
sector, scheduled as part of Stage 2. The unions threatened another strike if the government 
proceeded according to the original restructuring plan. 
The new president then decided not to push restructuring any further but to maintain it in its 
present status. There was no further restructuring but there was no return to the previous 
system either. The consequence was a higher level of uncertainty among private investors. 
Private investment in the generation sector was limited only to capacity expansion of pre-
existing generators, and no new private generator entered the market. Though the total 
installed capacity expanded from 55GW to 75GW during the past decade, the expansion was 
mainly driven by the six Gencos owned by KEPCO. Exceptions to this are the renewable 
generators of 803.64MW capacity, which are subsidised by a scheme independent of the 
market, and the district suppliers with approved capacity of 1.5GW (see below). 
 
15.2.3 Retail tariffs and cross-subsidisation 
 
The retail rates of electricity in Korea are set by the standard principle of rate of return 
regulation. Although the figures vary over time, it is generally accepted that the rates for 
agricultural and industrial users are set below cost, while those for other users are above cost. 
There is a special discounted rate for late night consumption, which is set just to cover the 
marginal cost of nuclear generation and intended to encourage the consumption of residual 
midnight power from nuclear plants. 
 
Table 15.1 summarises trends in electricity prices for each usage and total. Retail tariffs are set 
by the rate of return regulation modified by some progressive schemes. So the figures in the 
table are not the market prices but the average of regulated tariffs, and they do not directly 
reveal any effect of restructuring. The prices have been rising consistently, reflecting the rising 
costs. In 2008 KEPCO incurred a loss of KRW1 trillion due to the substantial increase in fuel 
prices. 
 
This rate structure generated cross-subsidisation in Korean electricity consumption. Firstly, 
residential and commercial consumers paid higher tariffs for power in order to subsidise 
agricultural and industrial consumers. Industrial consumers represent up to half of Korea’s 
total power consumption. Such cross-subsidisation provided incentives for Korean industry to 
rely heavily upon high electricity consumption, while other economies are endeavouring to 
conserve energy. This is a legacy of an export-driven policy, which provided the 
manufacturing industry with a wide range of subsidies. While cheap power helped the export-
led growth of the Korean economy significantly, at the same time it nurtured an industry 
structure which consumes too much power and which cannot survive with a price that would 
recover costs. 
 
Secondly, urban consumers paid much higher tariffs than the incurred costs. This was done in 
order to subsidise consumers residing in remote mountain regions and isolated islands who 
pay the same rates as the urban consumers. It is interesting to note that the tariffs for tap 
                                                 
2 During the campaign, the president maintained it was desirable that network utility industries be under public 
control, except telecommunication which had already been privatised. 
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water, which is as essential as electricity, differ across regions. Perhaps this is because water 
is supplied by separate municipal governments while electricity is supplied by a monopoly. 
 
Thirdly, the midnight discount rate is only for power consumed by approved heating and air 
conditioning equipment. This program is intended to encourage consumption of midnight 
power that is left over from nuclear generation. It has proven very effective. Load factors 
have improved so much that costly liquefied natural gas (LNG) must be burned now in order 
to meet increased midnight demand for power. At the same time, the program generated a 
strong interest group, led by the equipment producers, who strongly opposed its repeal, even 
though the need for the program is no longer present. 
 
Table 15.1: Trends in average prices per kWh (KRW). 
Year Residential Industrial Agricultural Total 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
2000 
2001 
2002 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
2008 
85.95 
86.47 
88.95 
92.05 
96.60 
96.41 
94.72 
91.57 
87.01 
88.00 
90.94 
91.07 
93.70 
94.78 
97.58 
46.14 
47.14 
48.37 
49.86 
55.01 
54.78 
58.30 
61.56 
59.02 
60.30 
60.23 
60.25 
61.92 
64.56 
66.24 
34.59 
36.17 
37.11 
38.96 
44.31 
44.04 
43.04 
43.51 
42.37 
43.45 
41.95 
41.67 
42.96 
42.45 
42.38 
59.39 
61.28 
62.99 
65.26 
72.08 
71.59 
74.65 
77.06 
73.88 
74.68 
74.58 
74.46 
76.43 
77.85 
78.76 
Source: KEPCO statistics 2010. 
 
15.2.4 Emergence of district suppliers 
 
As the electricity rates for residential consumers were set high, there was strong demand from 
the private sector to enter the power market for large residential complexes. They built gas 
turbine generators in urban residential complexes, mostly doing cogeneration, and sold power 
to the complexes at rates slightly lower than KEPCO’s. Furthermore, they were allowed to 
sell power in excess to KEPCO at reasonable rates. This emergence of district suppliers 
prompted KEPCO and KOREX to set the transmission tariff, opening the door for direct 
trading by bilateral contract between generators and large-scale customers. 
 
District suppliers sell their power to their customers at prices which are similar to the retail 
tariffs of KEPCO. They may obtain back-up power from KEPCO at industrial or general rates, 
which are lower than the residential rate, or directly from the wholesale market. Their 
leftover power may be sold back to KEPCO at the real time SMP. However, rising oil prices 
have discouraged their activities. 
 
In total, 22 district suppliers were approved across 28 districts from October 2004 to July 
2008, and the total capacity approval reached 1512.25MW. Operations started in four districts 
and suppliers withdrew from two districts. The initial enthusiasm cooled down, because the 
soaring oil price substantially eroded its profitability. The cross-subsidising rate structure 
removes the incentive for large-scale customers to trade directly with generators, even though 
the transmission tariffs are set clearly. 
340 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
15.3 PRESENT STATUS 
 
The lack of continued restructuring has had a number of consequences. No new private 
generator has entered the market except for the renewable generators and the district 
suppliers. Also the tightly controlled retail tariff has caused a serious financial unbalance 
between KEPCO and the Gencos. Every spot price then became subject to a ceiling to try to 
solve this problem and the wholesale market shifted to serving the role of allocating earnings 
artificially between KEPCO and the Gencos. 
 
A new president belonging to a different party was elected in 2008 and to date the new 
president has not announced further reforms in the electricity industry. Meanwhile the labour 
unions continue to encourage the government not to pursue further restructuring actions. The 
Minister of Commerce, Industry and Energy, in his nomination hearing at the National 
Assembly, then said he would subject the restructuring of the power industry to a thorough 
review by the Korea Development Institute (KDI), a national think tank. KDI has recently 
released its final report, which proposes to resume restructuring by divesting the retail sector 
from KEPCO to begin retail competition. The Minister, however, announced that it is not yet 
the right time to begin retail competition. Instead he decided that all the Gencos will be 
controlled not by KEPCO but by government, in contrast to the demand to repeal all the 
restructuring and go back to the old system. He also promised to introduce an electricity rate 
system chained to oil prices.  
 
15.4 STATISTICAL FEATURES OF KOREA’S ELECTRICITY INDUSTRY 
 
15.4.1 Price trends 
 
KEPCO attained a good reputation for its supply of electricity at a low price to support the 
industrialisation of Korea. Figure 15.1 shows the trend of average prices from 1994 to 2008. 
 
The trend does not indicate any direct effect of restructuring. The price of KRW78.76/kWh 
(USD0.066) in 2008 is much cheaper than the price of USD0.0974 in the USA in the same 
year. Except for the recent years of soaring oil prices, KEPCO managed its operations 
without requiring fiscal support from the government. 
 
Figure 15.1: Trend of average power prices in KRW/kWh, 1994–2008. 
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15.4.2 Trend of total power losses 
 
Transmission–distribution loss has reduced over time to 4.01% in 2008 (Figure 15.2). 
Improvement was evident well before the restructuring, and the trend was not interrupted by 
restructuring (though the trends in Figure 15.2 do not reflect the effect of restructuring). 
Figure 15.2: Trends of power losses (%), 1993–2008. 
 
The loss rate of 4.01% is remarkable in comparison with the USA’s 6.5% in 2007. While 
Korea cannot be compared with the USA in terms of area, it appears that KEPCO has 
managed the grid operation extremely well. 
 
15.4.3 Efficiency gains from restructuring? 
 
Although the future of restructuring is quite uncertain, several studies have examined if any 
efficiency gains were made through restructuring. The restructuring is incomplete and the 
relevant data are insufficient so, as yet, there are no convincing conclusions.  
 
Since there has not been market competition in earnest, any gains would appear to arise from 
improved management after the divestiture. The planned outage, which in 2000 required 25.0 
days across 109 units of generators, dropped following restructuring to be 19.4 days across 
117 units in 2003 (Samil Consultant 2003). The heat efficiency of the generation facilities 
and the maintenance of frequency and voltage also seem to have improved after restructuring 
(Tables 15.2 and 15.3, respectively; The Korean Society for Electricity Industry Study, 2007). 
 
Table 15.2: Trend of heat efficiency of generators (%), 1998–2004. Restructuring started in 2001. 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Heat efficiency 39.45 39.51 39.45 39.57 39.96 39.94 40.66 
 
Table 15.3: Maintenance of frequency and voltage (%). Restructuring started in 2001. 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Frequency 99.17 99.28 99.33 99.41 99.45 99.70 99.74 99.70 
Voltage 99.35 99.57 99.79 99.84 99.88 99.94 99.96 99.96 
 
There was a substantial rise in the capacity utilisation rate of coal-fired plants and a 
subsequent reduction in generation cost of the Gencos after the divestiture (The Korean 
Society for Electricity Industry Study 2005). The rate rose from 74.8% in 1999 to 89.0% in 
2003, and the cumulative cost savings were estimated as KRW602 billion for 2001–03. Kim, 
Knittel and Cho (2006) and Kim and Kim (2008) reported similar results. It is important to 
note, however, that Lee and Kim (2008) criticise the models used, claiming that they give rise 
to conflicting conclusions about the efficiency gains of restructuring. 
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In terms of financial performance, the recent hike in oil and coal prices drove up the 
wholesale price of power. As a result, KEPCO was pushed into deficit under the fixed retail 
tariff. This resulted in price ceilings on the wholesale price and substantially reduced the 
Gencos’ profits. At the same time KEPCO has observed that the Gencos have paid higher 
prices for the coal they import, since each Genco was not able to command the same strong 
market power that KEPCO did before the restructure. However, this point can be debated, 
since even KEPCO is not likely to have substantial buying power in the world coal market. 
 
15.5 POLITICS OF REFORM 
 
All reform encounters political resistance as well as support. When the Korean electricity 
industry reform was begun, this author’s observation was that the bureaucracy, following the 
president’s instruction, pushed the reform very aggressively. The management of KEPCO 
also complied with the government’s direction. The labour unions objected to the reform 
explicitly, although their month-long strike was in vain. The general public was not sure of 
the reform, since the idea of a competitive power market was novel. However, the move to 
reform was firm and steady while the political leader was clearly fully convinced of its merits. 
 
The situation changed substantially when a new president signalled that he was not convinced 
about the value of reform. This author’s assessment and observation was that bureaucrats lost 
their enthusiasm; KEPCO managers began to express their opposition publicly. For example, 
the present chief executive officer of KEPCO said before the National Assembly that he 
believes that the electricity industry must go back to its original form, that is, a KEPCO 
monopoly. The labour unions started systematic campaigns involving opponents from 
academia and industry. People generally appeared to become more sceptical, and the negative 
impact of the Californian electricity situation contributed to this. 
 
Some recent experience provides an example of how competition might work and therefore 
could help reinvigorate the progress of reform. This involves the use of smart grids in line 
with a green power policy. To improve the efficiency of energy consumption, the Korean 
government promoted the introduction of the smart grid into the electricity system. Jeju 
Island was selected for testing a smart grid and an extensive experiment is underway. A smart 
grid will inform each consumer of the real time cost and price of power if the competitive 
market is at work. A display panel will provide the information so the consumer can decide 
then whether to use power or not. Consumers are unlikely to respond to the real time cost if it 
does not reduce their power bill, but many certainly will respond to the real time price in 
order to save money. 
 
This experience could deliver the message that a competitive market is more appropriate for 
the system based on the smart grid than the traditional regulated monopoly. The large 
telecommunications companies KT and SK are aggressive with respect to the smart grid. 
There is the prospect of competition between the traditional giant of the electricity sector and 
two giants of telecommunications. 
 
The patterns of electricity consumption in Korea remain an issue, and may also contribute to 
the momentum for further reform. Consumption data indicates that the Korean electricity 
industry is characterised by ‘too much consumption’, which is encouraged by the low tariffs. 
Per capita power consumption of Korea was very close to Japan’s in the same year but 
Korea’s per capita income was only half that of Japan. Korea consumed 497kWh of 
electricity in order to produce USD1000 of GDP, while Japan, the USA and the UK each 
consumed only 30–60% as much. 
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15.6 CONCLUSION 
 
As explained in this case study, an extensive program of reform was proposed in Korea but a 
change in circumstances and apparently in the evaluation of the reform by political leaders 
has altered the process of its implementation. The main reform to date has been the separation 
of the generation companies, although without a change of ownership. There is some 
evidence of an effect on various dimensions of efficiency, though its significance is debated. 
Competition has not been introduced. Drivers of further reform may not be fiscal constraints, 
since KEPCO has performed well in financial terms. However, there is evidence of the 
benefits of competition emerging in new models of systems of supply and an apparent 
interest from the telecommunications companies in the electricity market. Prices have risen 
closer to world market benchmarks but remain below them. This approach to pricing, and the 
cross subsidies to industry, led to higher levels of consumption which remains an issue. 
 
What might be the next steps in reform? In 2007 a research group proposed that KEPCO 
divest its retail sector so that each Genco could take over the retail business and start 
competing in the retail market, without divesting its distribution sector (The Korean Society 
for Electricity Industry Study 2007). The idea was motivated in part by the experience in 
Texas, where fierce retail competition was used to drive retail prices down. However, it also 
resulted in certain retailers becoming insolvent so that customers who had signed contracts 
with insolvent retailers were stranded without a supply of electricity. However, if a retailer is 
backed by its own generation business, this acts as a ‘physical’ hedge against fluctuations in 
the wholesale electricity price. As a result, the retailer is less likely to fall bankrupt easily and 
the customers are less likely to be left stranded. Such an approach is common amongst 
electricity generators/retailers in Australia. This proposal, while opposed by those against 
further restructuring, deserves attention. 
 
Further restructuring could also involve: 
• divesting the construction and retail businesses from KEPCO; 
• bringing the Gencos into the retail business; and 
• creating an energy market by abandoning regulation of the retail rate. 
There would be resistance from interest groups who gain from the current structure of cross-
subsidisation. Their position seems to be supported by political leaders as well as the general 
public, based on the perception that KEPCO is an excellent utility that supplies electricity at 
low prices without state subsidy. In many efficiency measures KEPCO is indeed an excellent 
utility. But it is not desirable for the present system to continue to encourage high electricity 
consumption in Korea. More extensive and convincing analysis and presentation of 
information is valuable for successful further restructuring of the Korean electricity industry.  
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Chapter 16 
 
ELECTRICITY IN RUSSIA 
 
 
Alexandra Sidorenko1
 
 
 
• There has been a transformation of the system to separation and a wholesale market. 
The motivation was the urgency to mobilise investment in capacity.  
• The steps include restructuring and private ownership (2003–08); price deregulation 
according to a schedule and full competition in generation (by 2011); and competition 
by ensuring third party access to network infrastructure. Price regulation remains to 
2015 for retail consumers. 
• The consequence was significant increases in capacity. The 2010 Russian budget 
commits to further electricity tariff increases to reduce the extent of the subsidies. 
 
 
16.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Russian Federation has embarked on, and achieved, significant progress on what seems 
to be the ‘textbook version’ of the comprehensive electricity sector privatisation, 
restructuring, competition and regulatory reform program (Joskow 2008), following the lead 
of the United Kingdom and applying the market design of the Pennsylvania–New Jersey–
Maryland (PJM) model from the United States of America (USA). 
 
As Pollitt (2007) remarks, ‘what seems to be the case is that the pursuit of electricity reform 
through to its logical conclusion is only likely to happen in jurisdictions where there is strong 
ideological commitment to competition in energy markets. This will partly be driven by 
resource conditions … but significantly by whether there is a fundamental belief that 
electricity prices should be left to the market’. 
 
In the case of the Russian Federation, the progress to date demonstrates that strong 
commitment to market reform and leadership has been the key condition for keeping the 
reform on track despite its unpopularity. It looks like the Russian reform has successfully 
passed the point of no return and the only way is forward, fine-tuning the wholesale market 
mechanism, aligning price signals and incentives, enforcing competition policy, increasing 
energy efficiency and fostering investment in modern technology, both public and private. 
 
This case study outlines the scope and progress of the reform and some of its effects to date. 
 
16.2 ELECTRICITY SYSTEM IN RUSSIA 
 
The Russian Federation is one of the top electricity generating economies in the world: 
• it is the fourth largest generator after the USA; China; and Japan, producing 5% of the 
world’s electricity (IEA 2009); 
                                                     
1 Consultant to the World Bank (alya_s@yahoo.com). More details of the legal documents associated with the 
reform are available on request. 
346 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
• in 2009 there were more than 700 generating plants in Russia with a total installed 
capacity of 211 846 MW; 
• domestic electricity generation was 957.1 million MWh, domestic consumption 
942.8 million MWh (SO 2010b); 
• Russia is a net exporter of electricity (exports account for 2% of domestic supply, 
imports 0.3%) (FSS 2010); 
• the composition of the installed generating capacity in Russia by type of fuel is 68% 
thermal, 11% nuclear and 21% hydro; 
• the regional composition varies, with Siberia relying on hydropower stations (47% of 
capacity), the North-East on nuclear generation (27%) and the Urals almost 
exclusively on thermal generation (94% of installed capacity) (SO 2010b). 
 
Russia’s unified electric energy system was created during the Soviet times as the backbone for 
the economic growth in an industry-oriented planned economy. Following the Soviet Union’s 
collapse, in 1992 the Russian Federation government transferred most of the electricity assets 
to the open joint stock company ‘United Energy Systems of Russia’ (RAO-UES). 
 
At the onset of the reform, RAO-UES owned 72% of the economy’s installed generating 
capacity and 95% of its transmission grid.2
 
 It had 72 regional vertically integrated subsidiaries 
called AO-Energos. The dispatch and system operation services also belonged to RAO-UES. 
In 1998 Anatoly Chubais became the president of RAO-UES. His team was behind the 
concept of electricity reform and its implementation in Russia. Chubais’ background as one 
of the architects of voucher privatisation and major market-oriented reforms of the early 
1990s shaped his approach to the task of reforming the electricity sector. Chubais was 
responding to a number of challenges faced by RAO-UES. 
 
Chubais faced a number of issues. Payment arrears were plaguing RAO-UES’s bottom line 
during the transition years and there were no funds to maintain, even less to expand, the 
infrastructure.3 A related motivation for the reform of the electricity sector came from the so-
called ‘Chubais cross’, a diagram based on the existing and projected installed capacity, with 
the intersection in 2008 (Chubais 2007). Chubais observed that in 1990 electricity 
consumption was 1074 billion kWh. This fell to 809 billion kWh in 1998 and then steadily 
increased. By 2006 it had reached the 1992 level and Chubais estimated that at the rate of 
growth at that time the historic high of 1990 would be reached again in 2008. He went on to 
forecast consumption of 1198 billion KWh in 2010. He then estimated it would be necessary 
for Russia to build a substantial amount of capacity over the 2006–10 period to meet this 
growth in demand.4
 
 
The observations by Chubais were the basis of a case for reform in order to finance the 
construction of the new capacity. In retrospect, the timing of the capacity exhaustion could 
                                                     
2 http://www.rao-ees.ru/ru/info/history/show.cgi?prof.htm. 
3 In 1998 salaries and wages of RAO-UES staff were on average 3 months in arrears, cash payments for 
electricity supply were less than 17% of the total owing, and more than 20 RAO-UES companies were on the 
verge of bankruptcy. Corporate debts of RAO-UES had reached about USD10 billion at the beginning of 
1998. http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/invest/reporting/reports/report2007/4.htm  
4 Chubais’ estimate was that Russia would require 40.9GW of capacity over the period 2006–10 and the context 
was that Russia had built only 23GW over the previous 15 years. Cook (2005) had produced a similar forecast 
of the growth of consumption, although meeting the 1990 level by 2010, rather than 2008. Cook argued that 
the majority of the investment would be required after 2010. 
Electricity in Russia 347 
have been delayed by the current financial and economic crisis: as noted above, consumption 
in 2009 was actually only 943 billion kWh and capacity in 2009 was about the same level as 
it was in 1991. But at the time, the perception was that the value of the reform was acute. 
 
Reform was conceived around the idea of maintaining government regulation over the natural 
monopoly components of the sector, while introducing competition and private investment in 
the generating segment. The large-scale reform of the electric power sector was launched in 
2001.5
• private ownership (2003–08); 
 The stated goals of the reform included: 
• price liberalisation and full competition in generation (by 2011); and 
• third party access to network infrastructure. 
 
Pricing mechanisms for electricity tariffs were to be changed to stimulate investment, which 
had been inadequate for many years: 
• The average annual input of new generating capacity over 1991–2000 was just 600–
1500MW compared to 6000–7000MW over 1976–85 (Palamarchuk & Voropai 2006). 
• In 2007 about two-thirds of all installed capacity had been commissioned at least 25 
years earlier (Abdurafikov 2009 and Figure 16.1). 
• With the accepted power infrastructure lifetime values, the depreciation of 
transmission lines had reached 50% in 2009, thermal generation 60–70% and 
hydroelectric power generation 80%.6
• The August 2009 accident at Sayano-Shushenskaya hydropower station highlighted 
the need for urgent investment in replacing aging and failing infrastructure.  
 
• By the estimates of KPMG, the Russian electric energy sector would require 
investment of USD550 billion by 2020,7 which exceeded the official figure of 
USD420 billion over 2008–20. The Russian Federation government’s Energy Strategy 
2030 estimates investment needs in the electricity sector between USD572–
888 billion over 2009–30.8
 
 
Manufacturing and mining are among the largest users of the electric power (Figure 16.2), 
and a competitive modern electricity sector is essential for their performance. Energy saving 
measures are also becoming more important and are recognised in the recent legislation. 
Main elements of the policy to increase efficiency in the electricity energy sector using 
renewable sources were adopted by the Russian Federation government on 8 January 2009. 
The share of renewable energy (excluding hydropower generators with installed capacity 
greater than 25 MW) in total generation is scheduled to increase from 1.5% in 2010 to 4.5% 
in 2020.9
 
 
16.3 POLICY REFORM 
 
Table 16.A1 summarises the current industry structure. Reform of the electric energy sector 
has been discussed since 1997, with the draft resolution ‘The main directions of the State 
                                                     
5 Reform began with the signing of Resolution #526 ‘On the Restructuring of the Electric Power Industry of the 
Russian Federation’. 
6 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2010/01/25/3316190.shtml. 
7 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2010/01/25/3316190.shtml. 
8 http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/energostrategy/pr_4.php. 
9 http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/plan/2010-2012_3/1.php. 
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Figure 16.1: Distribution of installed capacity by commissioning year, 2007. (Source: Abdurafikov 2009) 
 
 
Figure 16.2: Electricity consumption by final use, 2007. 
 
Table 16.1: Market concentration. 
Name of firm 
Service provided: 
Generation 
Transmission 
Retail 
Year the firm 
first offered 
services 
Market share 
Owners of capital and 
their respective shares 
(domestic/foreign/ 
government) 
FGC Transmission 2002/1992 100% 25%-1 private/ 75%+1 gov 
MRSK Transmission (regional) 2003 90-100%  
System Operator Network technical 
supervision 
2002 100% 100% govt 
RusHydro Generation (hydro) 2004 13% 40 %/60% govt 
Rosenergoatom Generation (nuclear) 1992 12% 100% govt 
Distribution/retail 
companies  
More than 540 Various 
(reorganised 
during reform) 
Some regions are 
highly concentrated 
Various (public/private with 
different level of local 
governments share) 
Generating 
companies: see 
below 
More than 700 Various 
(reorganised 
during reform) 
HHI=601 on the 
national level, but 
concentrated on 
regional level 
analysis 
Mostly private, with foreign 
equity participation in three 
large WGCs (control about 
11% of generating 
capacity). 
1991-
2006, 
11.03%
1981-1990, 
24.89%
1971-1980, 
31.16%
1961-1970, 
23.24%
1951-1960, 
8.35%
before 1950, 
1.32%
1991-2006
1981-1990
1971-1980
1961-1970
1951-1960
before 1950
Mining, 
manufacturing 
and utilities
53%
Agriculture 
and fishing
2%
Construction
1%
Transport and 
communication
s
9%
Other
12%
Residential 
customers
11%
Losses
12%
Mining, manufacturing 
and utilities
Agriculture and fishing
Construction
Transport and 
communications
Other
Residential customers
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Policy on Restructuring the Electric Power Industry in the Russian Federation’ adopted by 
the government in 2000. The Arthur Andersen consulting company was chosen to assist in 
the development of the restructuring model. The large-scale reform of the electric power 
sector was launched in 2001 with the signing of Resolution #526 ‘On the Restructuring of the 
Electric Power Industry of the Russian Federation’. As of 1 July 2008 RAO-UES ceased to 
exist as a company, having completed both horizontal and vertical separation. 
 
16.3.1 Ownership 
 
The proposed industry structure and market design was based on international best practice in 
electricity sector restructuring. There was political will to implement liberalisation of the 
generation sector and to introduce third party access to the transmission and distribution 
infrastructure, which was to remain under majority government control. Incumbent 
hydroelectric power stations (previously part of RAO-UES) were transferred to the RusHydro 
company, with mandatory majority government ownership. Nuclear generation remained 
under full government ownership and supervision through the RusEnergoAtom Company. 
 
In 2007, 48.5% of companies in the electricity, gas and water sector were private, 
contributing 54% to the total sector revenue and 34.5% employment. There were 1469 
companies with (joint) foreign ownership – 3.8% of the total number of companies in the 
sector – producing 13.5% of the total sector revenue and employing 5.2% of the sector’s 
workforce (Industry of Russia 2008). A Federal Law had imposed a 25% limit on foreign 
participation in the assets of the corporatised incumbent UES.10
 
 This restriction has been 
removed in the course of the reform. 
The first foreign entry into electricity assets was by portfolio investors and private funds who 
bought shares in RAO-UES and then its spin-offs. In 2007–08 strategic investors entered. 
Currently, E.ON (Germany), Enel (Italy) and Fortum (Finland) are the three largest foreign 
investors in Russian generation assets. Newspapers report the following experiences of 
foreign investors in the Russian electricity sector. The Director-General of Italian Enel, the 
owner of WGC-5, comments that current electricity tariffs in Russia are four to five times 
lower than in the EU. Enel invests RUB20 billion per year in the generating capacity of its 
Russian company. The current level of tariffs is too low to support the investment activity. 
There are various social obligations attached to the balance sheets of the privatised entities 
which the private investor has to support. Low payment discipline creates another problem, 
with chronic payment arrears (Baumgartner 2009). 
 
16.3.1.1 Generation 
 
Restructuring of AO-Energos was launched at the end of 2001, starting with Belgorod-
energo. In parallel with this, a wholesale market for electricity (and capacity) was set up to 
enable trading in electricity at unregulated prices. The active divestment of RAO-UES’s 
generating assets has been underway. Foreign investors have gained control over 17 300MW 
capacity (30% of capacity privatised in 2007; 8% of total national stock (UniCredit 2008).11
 
 
                                                     
10 № 74-FZ of 7 May 1998 ‘On managing common stock of the Russian joint-stock energy and electricity 
company ‘United Energy System of Russia’ and stock of other joint-stock electric energy companies in 
Federal ownership’. 
11 In 2007 eight large generating companies (WGC-2,3,4,5 and TGC-1,3,5,8) were sold by RAO UES for 
USD20 billion (installed capacity 57 400 MW, about 27% of the national installed capacity). WGC-4 was 
bought by foreign investor Enel (Italy) and WGC-5 by E.ON (Germany). 
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16.3.1.2 Transmission 
 
The Federal Grid Company (FGC, or FSK in the Russian acronym) was established in June 
2002 as an open joint stock company fully owned by RAO-UES. The transmission assets of 
its regional subsidiary AO-Energos were brought under FGC control in March 2003. There is 
mandatory majority government ownership of the national transmission grid incumbents FGC 
(75% + 1 share) and System Operator (100%). 
 
The network assets of FCG are spread over 73 regions of the Russian Federation, covering an 
area of 13.6 million km2. They include 118 000km of trunk transmission lines and 757 
transformer stations with a total capacity of over 286 000MVA (voltage 35–1150kV).12
FGC requires significant investment in modernisation and in the extension of the national 
high-voltage grid. According to FGC data, in 2010 the average depreciation of the network’s 
physical assets is 41%, including 65% depreciation of transformer and other auxiliary 
equipment, 35% depreciation of transmission lines and 23% depreciation of buildings and 
facilities.
 
13
 
 
Special rules apply to the new transmission assets built by other operators. Article 10.2 of the 
Federal Law ‘On Electric Power Industry’ stipulates that any entity can construct a 
transmission grid subject to building approvals (Article 42). Once connected to the national 
grid, transmission assets with a rated capacity greater than or equal to 330 kV, and other 
transmission assets with a rated capacity 220–330 kV providing a critical connection between 
significant generation and load centres, become part of the national grid. The owners cannot 
exit without the approval of FGC, which collects transmission charges on their behalf based 
on the established tariffs and reimburses the owners.14
 
 
16.3.1.3 Distribution 
 
Before the reform 72 vertically integrated regional energy companies (AO-Energos) 
controlled most of the distribution lines in Russia. Subsidiary companies of RAO-UES hold 
85% of distribution lines, with the rest belonging to four independent AO-Energos and 
municipal utility companies (Standard & Poor’s 2008). 
 
RAO-UES coordinated the reform of its regional subsidiaries with regional authorities: 
• In August 2002 procedures for establishing the wholesale and territory generation 
companies (WGCs and TGCs), distribution grid companies and interregional grid 
companies were approved by the RAO-UES Board.  
• As part of the restructuring process, 66 AO-Energos belonging to RAO-UES were 
unbundled and their distribution assets transferred to separate companies. Seven 
interregional grid companies were established in December 2003.  
• In April 2004 the configuration of interregional distribution grid companies (IDGC, or 
MRSK in the Russian acronym) was approved15
                                                     
12 http://www.fsk-ees.ru/investors_about.html. 
 and 12 interregional distribution 
13 http://www.fsk-ees.ru/evolution_strategy.html. 
14 Article 7.2 of Federal Law ‘On Electric Power Industry’ and Russian Federation Government Decree № 41 of 
26 January 2006 ‘On Criteria for the Assignment of Electric Grid Facilities to the Unified National (All-
Russian) Power Grid’. 
15 The first four IDGCs were established in October 2004: MRSK-1 UES of Centre and Northern Caucasus, 
MRSK-2 UES of North-West, MRSK-3 UES of Urals and MRSK-4 UES of Siberia.  
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companies (IDGCs) spin-offs had been formed.16
 
 IDGCs are publicly listed and 
majority government-owned (53%), with more than 300 000 shareholders.  
16.3.2 Regulation 
 
The basic model of WGCs was approved in September 2003. Discussion of mergers between 
AO-Energos to form a single TGC started in December 2003. A lease-based model was used. 
The first WGC (#5) and the first two TGCs (#9 and #14) were established in September 2004. 
Hydroelectric power assets were consolidated in a separate WGC, RusHydro, in October 2004. 
 
Mandatory unbundling provisions in force from 1 April 2006 mean that a company is 
forbidden to own or lease assets in the transmission/dispatch of electricity and in its 
generation and/or distribution. Since 1 January 2008 the same measures apply to a company’s 
affiliates operating in the same price zone of the wholesale market (currently there are two 
price zones – Europe/Urals and Siberia). 
 
Exemptions include Guaranteeing Suppliers (the Suppliers of Last Resort) – that is, 
designated distribution companies with universal service obligations to residential and other 
consumers; isolated systems where there is no competition, and where electricity is generated 
for the provider’s own use. Most of the regions in the Russian Federation have companies 
which are exempt from the unbundling requirement. 
 
The types of economic entities allowed bundled operations are:  
• supplying network companies – activities in transmission and distribution; 
• supplying companies with subscribers – transmission and distribution to connected 
customers as part of the operations but not the main economic activity; 
• energy-industrial conglomerates – combined transmission and distribution; not the 
main activity but a secondary function (e.g., large production facilities in metallurgy, 
the paper industry, oil refineries, the petrochemical industry etc.); 
• nuclear power facilities; and 
• suppliers to military and other strategic entities. 
 
Unbundling was performed in several ways, including the transfer of network assets to a 
different owner or the transfer of customer supply contracts to another distribution company 
or guaranteeing supplier. 
 
16.3.2.1 Independent power producers 
 
The entry of independent power producers was facilitated by the development of the 
wholesale electricity market and the setting of rules for third party access to transmission 
lines (see below). Independent generators with a total generating capacity of at least 25MW 
and 5MW minimum at each connection node can become participants in the wholesale 
market. 
 
It was envisaged that the development of new generation capacity would be largely funded by 
private investors but until recently regulated electricity tariffs in Russia had failed to reward 
investment in new capacity (Table 16.2). 
 
                                                     
16 http://www.holding-mrsk.ru/about/facts/spravka/. The grid network of 10 voltage categories (0.4–220kV) 
under MRSK-Holding is 2 million km; 637 million MWh were transferred through the grid in 2008. 
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Some features of the electricity markets include a long lag between committing to new 
capacity and the ability to supply it, the high cost of new energy compared to ‘old’/installed 
energy, the lack of certainty of future electricity prices and the presence of generating plants 
with different cost structures (competition with hydro and nuclear generating facilities) 
(Belyaev 2005). 
 
In 2004 electricity tariffs were US1.5 cent/kWh in the European part of Russia. Belyaev 
(2005) explains such low tariffs as a failure to account for capital costs as a result of ‘gratis’ 
privatisation of electric power industry assets in the early 1990s which led to the creation of 
the RAO-UES monopoly and its regional electricity monopolies AO-Energos. Prices for 
natural gas, a major fuel for thermal power generators, were regulated and the level was low. 
There was virtually no investment activity in replacement and new assets, hence there was no 
investment component included in the electricity tariffs. 
 
Based on the analysis of cost structure for new and installed generation capacity (Table 16.3), 
Belyaev concludes that the deregulated electricity market will be characterised by a 
permanent capacity shortage. A similar argument recognises that the investment in new 
 
Table 16.2: Selected comparisons of international electricity prices, 2007 (US cent/kWh). 
Economy Industrial Households 
Austria 15.41 25.72 
Czech Republic 15.12 19.15 
Denmark – 39.60 
Finland 9.69 17.24 
France 5.95 16.90 
Hungary 16.97 22.34 
Ireland 18.59 26.72 
Italy 28.98 30.53 
Korea 6.02 8.86 
Mexico 12.60 9.61 
Netherlands – 24.26 
New Zealand 7.14 16.44 
Norway 6.36 16.39 
Poland 11.93 19.30 
Portugal 13.13 21.97 
Slovak Republic 17.39 21.96 
Spain 12.52 21.80 
Switzerland 9.38 15.43 
Chinese Taipei 6.72 8.56 
Turkey 13.88 16.48 
UK 14.59 23.13 
USA 7.02 11.35 
Russia* 4.50 4.50 
Source: IEA 2009, *data for Russia MED 2007. 
 
Table 16.3: Cost components of old and new generation plants, 2005 (US cent/kWh). 
OLD NEW 
Type Depreciation O&M Fuel Cost 
of 
capital 
Total Depreciation O&M Fuel ROI Total 
CFP 0.54 0.69 1.19 - 2.42 0.54 0.53 1.19 3.68 5.94 
GFP 0.40 0.44 1.84 - 2.68 0.40 0.34 1.34 2.05 4.13 
NPP 0.44 0.53 0.40 - 1.37 0.44 0.41 0.40 3.76 5.01 
Source: Belyaev (2005). CFP = coal-fired plant, GFP = gas-fired plant, NPP = nuclear power plant; 
ROI = return on investment, O&M = operation and maintenance 
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generation capacity should be rewarded either through higher tariffs or through capacity 
payments. Recent changes to the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) should help to attract new 
entry by independent power providers (see Box 16.1 below). 
 
16.3.2.2 Third party access 
 
The 2003 legislation stipulated the rules for gaining non-discriminatory access to 
transmission and distribution networks. Transmission tariffs and technological connection 
fees are regulated by the Federal Tariff Service (FTS). In 2008 there were 120 companies 
with direct connection to FGC, including distribution network companies (56% of 
connections), independent network companies (9%), retail distributors (17%) and large 
consumers of energy (18%).  
 
The formula for transmission tariffs changed in 2006 from the actual amount transmitted (in 
MWh) to a declared capacity (in MW per month). Base transmission tariffs increased from 
USD1478/MW per month in 2006 to USD2236/MW per month in 2008, with additional 
payments for transmission losses differentiated by region.17
 
 
Distribution tariffs are also set by the FTS (FTS Order № 20-e/2 6 August 2004, as amended 
on 31 December 2009, ‘On approval of instructional guidelines for the calculation of 
regulated tariffs and prices for electric (thermal) power in the retail (consumer) market’).  
 
16.3.2.3 Wholesale electricity (capacity) market 
 
The Administrator of Trading System (ATS) was founded by 28 bodies representing market 
participants (generators and consumers) and regulators.18 ATSis a not-for-profit organisation 
whose responsibilities include managing trading and settlement in the wholesale electricity 
market (maintaining a registry of participants, registering contracts, data collection, 
development of rules and methodologies, dispute resolution etc.). A Market Council oversees 
operations of the wholesale electricity (capacity) market.19
 
 
The ‘System Operator - Central Dispatch Administration of the Unified Energy System’ (SO-
CDA) was established in July 2002 to provide paid dispatch services. On 1 April 2003 the 
dispatch functions of AO-Energos were transferred to regional dispatch administrators – 
subsidiaries of SO-CDA – increasing the number of SO dispatch branches from 20 in 2003 to 
                                                     
17 Transmission tariff is differentiated by voltage of the lines required to supply the energy. Four categories are 
specified: high voltage (110kV and above); medium first (35kV), medium second (20kV down to 1kV) and 
low (0.4kV and below). The higher the voltage, the less transformation losses are associated with electricity 
delivery to the customer, hence the lower the tariff. Distribution surcharge is included in the final tariff and is 
also regulated by the FTS. 
18 The wholesale market for electric energy and capacity was first tested in Russia in the late 1990s. The earlier 
model, FOREM, was based on Federal Law № 41-FZ of 14 April 1995 ‘On State Regulation of Tariffs for 
Electric and Thermal Power in the Russian Federation’, and the Decree # 793 ‘On Federal (national) 
wholesale electricity power (capacity) market’ (12 July 1996). The rules and structure of the new wholesale 
market, NOREM, are based on Federal Law № 35-FZ, ‘On the Electric Power Industry (26 March 2003); #36-
FZ, ‘On Specific Features of Functioning of Electric Power Industry During the Transitional Period and on 
Introduction of Amendments into Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation and on Recognizing 
Certain Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation to Have Lost Their Force in Connection with Adoption’ 
(26 March 2003) and Russian Federation Government Resolution № 576 ‘On Federal Bodies of Executive 
Power Authorized to Provide State Control over Activities Performed by the Administrator of Trading System 
of the Wholesale Power (Capacity) Market’ (16 September 2003).  
19 http://www.np-ats.ru/. 
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60 by 2004. SO is a technical body responsible for the technical security/uninterrupted supply 
of the national electrical grid.20
 
 
• Simulation trading at the new wholesale market started in September 2002. 
• Originally there were 87 wholesale market participants. During 2002 wholesale 
market rules were developed, including payments for the ATS and SO services.  
• The wholesale market model during the transitional phase was approved in March 
2003.  
• In October 2003 wholesale market regulations were adopted. Template contracts for 
joining the wholesale market were approved and the dispute settling mechanism 
established.  
• The first trading in the competitive power sector (‘5–15% total’) was on 1 November 
2003, with 6 registered buyers and 7 sellers and 13 000MWh traded at average 
weighted price RUB260/MWh.  
• By the end of the first year of operation, the Russian wholesale electricity market 
became the 5th in Europe and the 9th in the world in terms of the volume traded.  
• Out of 128 participants of the wholesale market in the first year, 54 were independent 
from the incumbent.21
 
 
The current design of the wholesale market has been influenced by the Pennsylvania–New 
Jersey–Maryland (PJM) interconnection model, including its nodal pricing approach and 
Financial Transmission Rights (FTR) mechanism to hedge price differences between the 
nodes. The role of the latter is fulfilled by Free Bilateral Contracts (Oksanen et al. 2009). 
 
The Russian national electricity system is comprised of six united energy systems: Centre, 
Middle Volga, Urals, North-West, South and Siberia. The energy system of the East operates 
as a separate synchronous zone, with manual control over the 220kV connection with the 
Siberian system. 
 
The national wholesale market is divided into two price zones for geographic reasons –
European Russia/Urals and Siberia. The transmission links between the zones are weak. The 
third large region, Russia’s Far East, is not part of the wholesale market due to its remoteness 
and lack of connections (Palamarchuk & Voropai 2009). There are also non-price 
zones/islands with limited connections to the wholesale market. Transmission capacity even 
within the same price zones is often congested, including the links between the Urals and the 
Middle Volga/Centre, and the North-West to and from the Centre (SO 2010a).  
 
At the end of 2009, 82% of the technological reserve capacity was used in the Central 
subdivision of the market, signalling the need for additional capacity and facilitation of flows 
between the zones. Newly installed or modernised generating capacity comprised 1377MW, 
or 0.7% of the existing stock at the beginning of 2009. 
 
The major suppliers to the wholesale market are six WGCs with cross-territorial operations, 
14 TGCs and the government-owned nuclear energy consortium ‘RusEnergoAtom’, 
importers and independent generators (with total generating capacity of at least 25MW and 
5MW minimum at each connection node). Buyers are distribution companies, including 
                                                     
20 http://www.so-ups.ru/. 
21 The balancing market was launched in October 2005 (Government Decree № 620 of 17 October 2005 ‘On 
Amending the Russian Government Decree on the Deviations Sector of the Transitional Wholesale Power 
[Capacity] Market’). 
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guaranteeing suppliers, exporters and large industrial consumers (with connected demand 
capacities of at least 20MVA and a minimum 2MVA at each connection node. For direct 
consumers and local distribution companies the latter limit was reduced to 1 MVA from 1 
August 2007, and then to 750 kVA from 1 February 2008). In 2009 there were 7913 nodes 
and 12 151 branches in the wholesale electricity (capacity) market trading model (SO 2010a). 
 
Until the introduction of the wholesale market, most of the electricity was supplied at 
regulated prices through long-term (usually 5-year) vested contracts. These regulated ‘take-
or-pay’ contracts defined both the volume and prices of the electricity (capacity), and 
customers were required to make the full agreed payments regardless of actual consumption. 
The phasing out of regulated (vested) take-or-pay contracts has allowed for a gradual 
transition to market liberalisation.  
As part of the liberalisation process, the share of electricity which can be traded on the 
wholesale market at unregulated prices is being increased gradually. The share of the 
regulated sector has been reduced as follows: 
1 January 2007 to 30 June 2007 90–95% 
1 July 2007 to 31 December 2007 85–90% 
1 January 2008 to 30 June 2008 80–85% 
1 July 2008 to 31 December 2008 70–75% 
1 January 2009 to 30 June 2009 65–70% 
1 July 2009 to 31 December 2009 45–50% 
1 January 2010 to 30 June 2010 35–40% 
1 July 2010 to 31 December 2010 15–20%. 
Full liberalisation of the wholesale market is envisaged for 1 January 2011, with all 
electricity sold at free (competitive) prices. The regulated sector covers generators registered 
with FTS in 2007. All new generators and new capacity will be able to supply electricity at 
competitive prices. 
 
The capacity market was launched on 1 August 2008, with buyers making payments to the 
generators for having a declared installed capacity ready to be employed at request. 
 
The difference between the FTS regulated tariffs and the equilibrium wholesale market price 
is significant. In the European Russia/Urals price zone in 2008 the average market price was 
RUB708/MWh compared with the FTS price of RUB425/MWh (or US2.8 cent/kWh vs 
US1.7 cent/kWh). In the Siberian zone it was RUB500/MWh compared to RUB219/MWh (or 
US2.0 cent/kWh vs US0.9 cent/kWh), respectively (ATS 2010). The highest prices were 
observed in the South (due to high transmission losses), and the lowest in the Urals (low 
generation costs and large proportion of price-taking suppliers).  
 
There are two major forms of electricity (capacity) trading in the ‘unregulated’ wholesale 
market – bilateral contracts and on a day-ahead market.22
                                                     
22 http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/reforming/market/show.cgi?market.htm. 
 Bilateral contracts allow the parties 
to supply electricity directly to buyers (wholesale market participants) at contractual prices. 
The day-ahead market is composed of bids from suppliers and buyers for next day 
consumption. Buyers with excess capacity purchased through bilateral contract can sell their 
spare electricity on a day ahead-market. Similarly, a generator who needs additional capacity 
to fulfil contractual obligations can purchase additional amounts on a day-ahead market. The 
bids are processed by the ATS and the equilibrium price is determined using the nodal 
pricing model. As a result, an hourly supply schedule is designed with dispatch instructions 
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sent to the suppliers and buyers for the day ahead. The balancing market ensures that 
deviations from the scheduled supply/demand are met in real time (here, the participants are 
unsuccessful bidders from the day-ahead market who are offered to supply electricity, and 
buyers with controlled loads). Prices are calculated for more than 6000 nodes in European 
Russia/Urals and more than 600 nodes in Siberia, taking into account generation costs, 
transmission losses and congestion charges (Oksanen et al 2009) 
 
16.3.2.4 Trade and interconnections 
 
Electricity grids of several neighbouring economies work in parallel with the Russian grid: 
Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, Moldova and 
Mongolia. Electricity grids of Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic and (until the end 2009) 
Tajikistan are also connected via the Kazakhstan grid (SO 2010b). Direct transformation 
links exist with the grids of Finland (through Vyborg), Norway (several generators in the 
Kolsk system are supplying directly), and connection from the Far East to China (SO 2010b). 
The operating system frequency of the Russian national grid is 50Hz. Peak loads occur in the 
winter months, with historic demand maximums reached or exceeded during 17–21 
December 2009 in all regional energy sub-systems of the national grid (SO 2010b). 
 
Power failures can occur when the grid frequency falls outside the normal range, which is 
50Hz+- 0.05Hz. This can happen during peak demand when there are insufficient spinning 
reserves to ensure normal frequency. The Moscow blackout of 25 May 2005 was caused by 
the failure of local distribution lines (110kV), raising concern about the classification of 
network lines as ‘transmission’ or ‘distribution’ in terms of government supervision 
(Renaissance Capital 2005). Figure 16.3 illustrates deviations from optimal frequency over 
2004–09. Note that there is no clear trend in terms of changes in system reliability following 
the structural reform. 
 
 
Figure 16.3: Technical reliability of RAO-UES operations, 2004–09. (Source: SO 2010a) 
 
Russia imports electricity from Kazakhstan (Northern regions) and Kyrgyzstan 
(transit)/Central Asia, Ukraine and Lithuania; and exports to Finland/Nord Pool, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan (Western regions), and Georgia, Armenia, Mongolia and China (Inter RAO 
2008). 
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The electricity system of Russia’s Far East is independent from the European and Siberian 
markets and accounts for less than 10% of national total generation and consumption 
(Palamarchuk & Voropai 2006). Growing demand from neighbouring China creates an 
opportunity for developing this regional system. China has approved plans to construct 
5000km of 500kV transmission lines along the Russia–China border. Since 2005 about 
492 000 MWh of electricity has been exported annually to China, with the planned increase 
to 3.8 million MWh/year by 2015 (Drugov 2008). Various interconnection projects have been 
proposed and discussed (e.g., Belyaev et al. 2005; Yoon et al. 2006; Lee et al. 2007). 
 
16.3.2.5 Industrial users choice 
 
Large industrial users (with connected demand capacity of at least 20MVA, and a minimum of 
2MVA in each connection node) can purchase electricity (capacity) directly from the wholesale 
market. For direct consumers and local distribution companies the required capacity limit was 
reduced to 1MVA from 1 August 2007, and then to 750kVA from 1 February 2008. This move 
facilitated further entry into the wholesale market by potential buyers. 
 
16.3.2.6 Residential choice 
 
There is limited competition in retail distribution to date. Section 16.3.10 contains examples 
of Federal Antimonopoly Service (FAS) investigations into the state of competition in the 
distribution sector. It is worth noting that the introduction of retail competition has been slow 
in many economies undertaking reform (Joskow 2008), and Russia does not appear to be an 
exception. 
 
16.3.2.7 Consumer tariffs 
 
The guaranteeing supplier receiving electricity through vested (regulated) contracts is obliged 
to sell the full amount at regulated retail tariffs. Residential customers are supplied 
exclusively at regulated tariffs. Any amount of electricity purchased at free wholesale market 
prices can be supplied at prices above the regulated tariffs. Independent distribution 
companies – participants in the wholesale market – can supply to any customer at unregulated 
prices. While the free bilateral contracts allow wholesale market participants to hedge their 
risks for future increases in the wholesale price, similar contracts do not exist for retail 
market participants. 
 
Previously the rules for setting wholesale electricity tariffs were based on cost-plus 
reimbursement (Russian Federation Government Resolution № 109 of 26 February 2004 ‘On 
Formation of Prices for Electric and Thermal Power in the Russian Federation’). The 
allowable rate of return on invested capital was set to be between the government bond rate 
and the refinancing rate of the Central Bank of RF (13–14% in 2004 and 8.5–9% in 200923). 
A similar approach was followed in the methodology for setting transmission charges.24
 
 
The allowable rate of return in the cost-plus formula often underestimated risk premiums 
associated with the economic activity of the regulated utilities, did not stimulate necessary 
investments and did not promote efficiency.25
                                                     
23 http://www.cbr.ru/eng/print.asp?file=/eng/statistics/credit_statistics/refinancing_rates_e.htm. 
 An Investment Guarantee Mechanism was 
24 Federal Tariff Service Resolution № 56-e/1 of 21 March 2006 ‘On approval of methodology for calculation of 
tariffs for transmission services in the unified national (all-Russian) electricity grid’. 
25 Tariff levels for 2004–06 were set in the Russian Federation Government Decree № 1754-r of December 1, 
2003 ‘On Approval of the Program for Changing State Regulated Prices (Tariffs) in Electric Power Industry’. 
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briefly introduced to compensate for investment in new capacity by levying a surcharge on 
the SO’s tariff.  
 
In the distribution/retail sector, residential tariffs were price-cap adjusted for CPI. One of the 
criticisms was that the expected inflation was lower than realised over 2002–05, and the 
prospective adjustor failed to compensate for an actual increase in costs. The real revenues of 
the sector were stagnant in 2002–05: the average profitability dropped from 15.7% in 2002 to 
below 10% by 2005, with half of all enterprises making losses (Milov 2005). 
 
The deficiency of cost-plus pricing was recognised, and a new RAB formula for distribution 
tariffs was introduced in July 2008. The new formula was implemented in five regional pilot 
projects, with the consequent roll-out to other regions in 2009–10. Challenges include the 
determination of the asset base for RAB regulatory purposes: all new investments are 
included in the RAB calculations for the next accounting period. Hence there is a delay 
between the outlay of funds and the opportunity to recoup them through higher tariffs.  
 
16.3.2.8 Regulators 
 
The Federal Energy Commission (FEC) was established in 1995.26
 
 In 2001 the FEC assumed 
other anti-monopoly control functions in infrastructure sectors (transport etc.) and 
government regulation of tariffs. Regional Energy Commissions were formed to support the 
FEC activities with the role of regulating local tariffs for electricity and heat. In 2004 the FTS 
was formed to take over the FEC’s functions. Responsibilities of the FTS include developing 
pricing and tariff methodologies and setting maximum and minimum price caps and tariffs 
(Box 16.1). Regional tariffs are set jointly with the Regional Energy Commissions (RECs). 
Other regulators include: 
• Federal Antimonopoly Service: competition supervision, including approval of 
mergers and acquisitions, regulation of market conduct and consumer protection. 
Oversees non-discriminatory third-party access to the transmission grid. Regulates the 
activities of the Administrator of Trading System. 
• Administrator of Trading System – NOREM (wholesale electricity/capacity market 
operator) is a not-for-profit organisation with government involvement. 
Responsibilities of ATS include managing trading and settlement in the wholesale 
electricity market (maintaining a registry of participants, registering contracts, data 
collection, development of rules and methodologies, dispute resolution etc.). 
• Rostekhnadzor (Russian Technical Supervision Agency) regulates technical protocols 
and norms in the construction and operation of the components of the electricity 
sector. 
• System Operator – the technical body responsible for the technical 
security/uninterrupted supply of the national electricity grid. 
 
Market competition and abuse of monopoly power in the electric energy sector is under the 
direct supervision of the FAS, a government agency in the Russian Federation. For the 
purposes of market definition, there is a single market for electric energy and capacity in 
                                                     
26 Presidential Decree № 1194 ‘On Federal Energy Commission of Russian Federation’ to regulate natural 
monopoly in the energy sector (based on the Federal Law № 41-FZ of 14 April 1995 ‘On State Regulation of 
Tariffs for Electric and Thermal Power in the Russian Federation’, and Federal Law № 147-FZ of 17 August 
1995 ‘On Natural Monopolies’). The FTS was formed based on the Russian Federation Government Decree 
№ 204 ‘On Federal Tariff Service’ (9 April 2004). 
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Box 16.1: RAB formula for distribution of tariffs. 
The cost-plus formula was superseded with the Regulated Asset Base (RAB) methodology (Russian Federation 
Government Resolution N 459 of 18 June 2008 ‘On changes to the RF Government Resolution N 109 of 26 
February 2004 On Formation of Prices for Electric and Thermal Power in the Russian Federation’, with 
technical details provided in Annex to the Federal Tariff Service Resolution N 231-e of 26 June 2008 
‘Methodology for regulation of tariffs using the return on invested capital approach’). The new methodology 
formulated the rules for calculating regulatory capital value, reporting requirements for new investments and a 
formula for an allowable rate of return. Tariffs set for longer term (3–5 year) contracts are adjusted on an annual 
basis. Operating costs are adjusted for CPI, anticipated changes in business assets and an efficiency parameter 
(currently 1%, but possibly up to 2.5% reduction in operating costs pa). Any efficiency gains due to the 
reduction of transmission/distribution losses and to the reduction of operating costs remain with the company 
and are not taken into account in the annual review of tariffs (do not affect the allowable total revenue figure). 
The allowable return on capital (both equity and debt) is set once for the whole regulation period using the 
WACC formula. Return on debt is set to the average of return on corporate bonds issued by the regulated 
industries. Return on equity is set equal to the return on government bonds (4–6 year duration) plus risk 
premium for the regulated companies. Investment plans of the regulated company are coordinated with the FTS 
and, with the regulator’s approval, earn the rate of return including the regional adjustor (higher allowable return 
in the areas of shortage). The investment activities are a separate item for accounting purposes and separated by 
geographic region (a Federal subject of the Russian Federation). Calculation of the initial regulatory capital 
value is performed by an independent expert. Transmission assets which are being fully funded by connecting 
charges are not included in the calculation of invested capital. The regulator receives an annual update on 
implementation of the agreed investment program and adjusts the values of the RAB and the return on RAB, 
and tariffs accordingly. In the distribution sector, RAB regulation has been in place for eight MRSK regional 
branches and the Tomsk distribution company since 1 January 2010, with an additional 22 branches switching to 
RAB by 1 July 2010. All the remaining regions will be on the RAB tariff formula by 1 January 2011. The 
regulators (FTS and Regional Energy Commissions) approve RAB parameters for each of the MRSKs. There is 
a perceived problem of regulatory valuations of the capital base being lower than accepted market valuation 
(ATON 2010). 
 
Russia. Distribution companies supply electricity to the retail markets through retailers and 
guaranteeing suppliers. In 2008 both regulated and free (wholesale market determined) tariffs 
were in place. Supply to residential customers and other customers classified as such, 
including municipal utility companies, was conducted using regulated tariffs. The 
regions/territories outside the boundaries of the wholesale market were supplied using 
regulated tariffs (FAS 2009a).  
 
The FAS registry in 2008 included 540 distribution companies, including 260 guaranteeing 
suppliers in 82 regions of the Russian Federation. Most of the regions have several 
distribution companies, usually coinciding with municipal divisions. At this level of 
geographic disaggregation, many sub-regional distribution markets appear highly 
concentrated. 
 
Distribution companies belong to one of the following categories: 
• Distributors – spin-offs from RAO-UES AO-Energos (‘AO-energosbyt’). There are 
70 such distributors on the FAS registry, all of them participants in the wholesale 
market. Some of these distributors were active in more than one region: ‘Far East 
energy company’ operates in several regions of the Russian Far East; Mosenergosbyt 
in both Moscow city and Moscow oblast (region); Petersburg energosbyt company in 
St Petersburg city and Leningradskaya oblast; 
• Independent distribution companies – participants in the wholesale electricity 
(capacity) market and serving primarily large industrial customers. Some of these 
were also present in more than one geographic subdivision of the retail market: 
Rusenergosbyt (Moscow) is active in trading and supply of electric energy in 45 
regions, serving the needs of the Russian Railways; Mezhregionenergosbyt (Moscow) 
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is active in 39 regions; Siburenergomanagement (Voronezh) is active in 13 regions; 
RN-Energo (Moscow) is in 6 regions; Energoservice Trading House (Moscow) is in 7 
regions; Transneftservice (Moscow) is in 34 regions; and Mechel-Energo is in 4 
regions; 
• Other retailers, including municipal companies and non-members of the wholesale 
market. These distributors purchase energy from guaranteeing suppliers, other 
distributors or directly from generators, some of whom are second-tier guaranteeing 
suppliers.  
 
According to FAS (2009b), the share of type (1) distributors in most of their geographic 
markets exceeds 75%; in some regions they are the monopolistic suppliers. All of these 
distributors have the guaranteeing supplier status. In the regions with multiple distributors, 
often only AO-Energos can purchase electricity on the wholesale market and re-sell it to 
other guaranteeing suppliers. At the same time, there is increased competition between retail 
distributors.  
 
Since 1 April 2006 a company has been forbidden to own or lease assets in the 
transmission/dispatch of electricity or in its generation or distribution. Since 1 January 2008 
these measures have applied also to a company’s affiliates operating in the same price zone 
of the wholesale market (currently European Russia/Urals and Siberia). 
 
Challenges facing FAS in enforcing this law include enforcement mechanisms which are not 
clearly specified and the difficulty of keeping track of the owners of affiliated entities. 
Breaches of the law on the separation of natural monopoly and competitive activities in the 
electric energy sector are brought by FAS to courts on a case-by-case basis. Uniform 
practices in solving such cases are not yet established. 
 
Some third-tier distribution companies attempting to purchase electricity for further 
distribution from large distributors/guaranteeing suppliers complain about anti-competitive 
requests, such as pre-payment for the electricity or other arbitrary conditions.  
 
Overall, FAS estimates that the level of competition in distribution and retail remains low and 
that most markets appear highly concentrated. In 2008 there were almost 3000 complaints to 
FAS regarding anti-competitive behaviour in the electricity sector. About one-third of these 
cases were investigated, with 60% of them resulting in orders by FAS to stop the offending 
action. Most of the complaints pertained to the refusal of guaranteeing suppliers to grant 
connections to the independent distributors, unreasonable conditions of supply, disconnection 
of services etc. Box 16.2 outlines some of the barriers to entry in distribution. 
 
16.3.2.9 Universal service obligations and cross-subsidisation 
 
Guaranteeing Suppliers (Suppliers of Last Resort) are designated distribution companies with 
universal service obligations to residential and other consumers. The guaranteeing supplier 
receiving electricity through vested (regulated) contracts is obliged to sell the full amount at 
regulated retail tariffs. Residential customers are supplied exclusively at regulated tariffs. The 
situation is to be preserved until 2015. Residential customers account for 11% of total 
electricity consumption (data for 2007). 
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Box 16.2: Barriers to market entry by new distributing companies. 
1) Administrative barriers, such as: 
o postponement of tendering for the status of guaranteeing supplier within the established geographic market to 
2010; 
o failure by the Ministry of Energy to approve rules and develop sample documents for the earlier tender to provide 
guaranteeing supplier services, in breach of the May 2008 deadline;  
o control over retail tariffs for guaranteeing suppliers; 
o lack of consistency in the application of tariff policy (e.g., approval of one-part tariffs for transmission charges by 
local tariff regulators while the two-part tariffs were still contractually in place) 
 
2) Economic barriers, such as: 
o requirements to reimburse the guaranteeing supplier when switching to an alternative supplier if breaking the 
contract within its duration (normally one year); 
o high cost of installing metering equipment to connect to the wholesale market; 
o customer receipts arrears; 
o unauthorised or unaccounted for electricity consumption; 
o cross-subsidies; 
o arrears of payments for supply to communal utilities; 
o investment needs to maintain infrastructure; 
o inefficiencies in transmission and distribution networks, including technical dilapidation, disputed ownership of 
distribution lines, large distances from the point of connection to wholesale purchasers to final consumers; and 
o abuse of market power by guaranteeing suppliers, barriers to entry by independent distributors by refusing them on 
the grounds that they are not final consumers. 
 
3) Technological barriers: 
o lack of automatic metering and accounting systems to participate in the wholesale electricity market. 
Source: FAS 2009a. 
 
The need to bring electricity tariffs in line with economic costs has long been publicly 
recognised in Russia.27
 
 Residential electricity tariffs were often used as a policy instrument in 
election campaigns at sub-federal level, with tariffs kept artificially low in pre-election years 
(Yudashkina & Pobochy 2007). 
By 2004 the residential tariffs reached the level of industrial tariffs and in 2005 exceeded 
them at 1 RUB/kWh (or US3.4 cent/kWh) (Kurronen 2006).  
 
The government provided USD90 million in direct subsidies for electricity tariffs in the Far 
East in 2004, in addition to USD280 million fuel subsidies in the Far North.28 Cross-
subsidisation takes different forms in Russia between industrial and residential users, heat 
and electricity tariffs, geographic regions, implicit subsidies from regulated natural gas prices 
and electricity tariff discounts for special categories of customers (e.g., veterans, pensioners, 
low income). The full extent of cross-subsidies is difficult to estimate. The range is USD4.5–
12 billion per year (Milov 2005, Renaissance Capital 2006). RAO-UES estimated electricity 
cross-subsidies in 2007 to amount to RUB115 billion (USD4.5 billion), a 34% annual 
increase over USD3.3 billion subsidies in 2006.29
 
 
Major steps in the elimination of cross-subsidy between residential and industrial customers 
occurred over 2003–04, with the gap between residential and industrial tariffs closing by 
2004. Retail tariffs still remained below the full economic costs but were expected to rise to 
reflect the full costs of distribution and retailing. The efficiency of electricity use remained 
low, and the need for energy-saving measures became apparent. 
                                                     
27 The Government Decree № 1231 ‘On gradual elimination of cross-subsidies in electric power industry and on 
bringing residential electricity tariffs in line with actual costs of generation, transmission and distribution’ of 
26 September 1997 has set the elimination in action. 
28 http://budgetrf.info/?tag=dotacia. 
29 http://www.rao-ees.ru/en/invest/reporting/reports/report2007/8_3.htm. 
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The 2010 Budget of the Russian Federation’s assumptions of average electricity tariffs 
include:30
• an increase in average electricity tariffs for all users from US4.5 cent/kWh in 2007 to 
US7 cent/kWh in 2011 and US10.5 cent/kWh in 2020; 
 
• residential tariffs to increase more steeply from US4.5 cent/kWh in 2007 to 
US7.1 cent/kWh in 2011 and US15.3 cent/kWh in 2020 (Table 16.4); 
• residential tariffs to be subject to government regulation at least until 2015; 
• 60% of all electricity will be purchased at the unregulated wholesale market from 1 
January 2010 but residential customers will continue to be supplied at regulated tariffs 
(tariffs in the regulated segment of the electricity market are set annually); 
• full elimination of cross-subsidies in residential electricity tariffs in 2015; 
• domestic prices for natural gas to be brought in line with the world price by 2020; and 
• residential electricity tariffs increasing 1.35–2-fold over 2011–15. 
Following the budget announcement there were public protests across Russia against the 
forthcoming increases in electricity, transport and residential utility tariffs. 
 
16.3.3 Review of the implementation of reform 
 
The changes in policy since 2003 are summarised in Table 16.5. Implementation of a reform 
of such depth and magnitude in a relatively short time (one decade) has presented multiple 
challenges. The population in general resisted the reform, unimpressed by the idea of higher 
retail electricity tariffs. Keeping the residential segment shielded from free market prices was 
a trade-off to liberalising other segments of the electricity sector. 
 
During 2002–05 there were delays in passing the necessary legislation and starting the 
reform. The Duma (2007) and Presidential (2008) elections added to the uncertainty as to the 
future progress of the reform. The Renaissance Capital (2005) report highlighted the 
industry’s disappointment with the discrepancy between the announced reform milestones 
and their implementation. 
 
Note that there are essentially two wholesale electricity markets in Russia – capacity and 
electricity. Wholesale electricity prices at a day-ahead market are based on marginal 
(variable) costs, covering mostly the fuel component. Fixed costs of generation are covered 
through capacity payments, with an annual competitive selection of future capacity suppliers 
(to supply starting year of selection +4). The amount of capacity payment is differentiated by 
new/old energy, between type of fuel (nuclear, hydro, gas and coal) and is calculated for each 
generator based on the rate of return formula. Clarifications of the capacity payment rules and 
mechanisms and liberalisation of tariffs would help to resolve the uncertainty that has stifled 
investment in the generation sector.31
 
 
Tightly regulated by regional energy commissions, consumer tariffs often did not leave any 
room for regulated distributors’ required capital expenditure. The shortfall between the usage 
fees and costs was often covered through connection fees introduced in 2006. For 2008–12 
the connection fees for new customers and for existing users requiring additional capacity are 
expected to cover the capital costs and investment. Reliance on connection fees has the
                                                     
30 http://budgetrf.info/?tag=dotacia 
31 Russian Federation Government Decree № 238 of 13 April 2010 ‘On pricing parameters of capacity traded in 
wholesale electricity/capacity market during transition period’ and Russian Federation Government Decree № 
89 of 24 February 2010 ‘On issues of competitive tendering of long-term capacity in the wholesale 
electricity/capacity market’. 
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Table 16.4: Electricity tariffs for 2006, and projected for 2007–20. 
Electricity 
tariffs 
(US c/kWh) 
Scenario 2006 2007 estimate 
Forecast 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 
All users 
1 3.9 4.5 5.4 6.1 6.6 6.8 6.5 6.0 6.3 6.4 6.6 6.7 6.9 7.0 7.2 
2 3.9 4.5 5.4 6.1 6.8 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.5 8.0 8.4 9.1 9.6 10.1 10.5 
3 3.9 4.5 5.4 6.1 6.8 7.0 7.2 7.3 7.6 7.9 8.2 8.5 8.9 9.2 9.5 
Residential 
1 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.6 6.4 6.8 6.9 6.7 7.4 8.0 8.6 9.2 9.7 10.2 10.7 
2 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.7 6.5 7.0 7.5 8.1 8.9 9.8 10.8 12.1 13.3 14.3 15.3 
3 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.6 6.5 7.1 7.7 8.2 8.9 9.7 10.6 11.4 12.4 13.2 13.9 
Source: http://budgetrf.info/?tag=dotacia 
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Table 16.5: Recent changes in policy. 
Area of policy change Year of change Description of change 
Structure 2003–08 Restructuring of incumbent operator RA-UES based on: 
•vertical unbundling of contestable activities from network services 
and system operation; first accounting and then structural separation; 
and 
•horizontal unbundling of contestable components of the value 
chain, to facilitate competition in generation, retail and 
repair/maintenance services. 
Ownership, structure 2003–08 All assets owned or controlled by RAO-UES, all existing assets of 
regional energos and any other public utility enterprises owning or 
operating electricity infrastructure were subject to restructuring. 
Restructuring of RAO-UES resulted in the creation of 6 wholesale 
generating companies, 14 territory generation companies and an 
international trading/generating company (Inter RAO). All hydro-
electric power assets were transferred to RusHydro. Nuclear 
generation assets are under Rosenergoatom. All high-voltage 
transmission grid assets were transferred to the Federal Grid 
Company, and regional distribution networks to an Inter-regional 
Transmission Company. Technical supervision of the electricity 
network is performed by the System Operator. Privatisation of 
generating assets. 
Market access, competition 2003 Third party access to the grid for independent generators and 
reorganised wholesale and regional generating companies. Horizontal 
unbundling of retailing functions, including the creation of 
guaranteeing suppliers to serve regulated consumers and to operate as 
a retailer of last resort. 
Regulation, market access 2003 Wholesale electricity and capacity market has allowed competitive 
supply in the market not covered by vesting (regulated) contracts. 
Creation of an Administrator of Trading System. Next-day market, 
balancing market, financial transfer rights market and market for 
derivatives. 
Regulation 2003 Elimination of licensing requirement for economic activity 
‘generation, transmission and distribution of electric energy’. 
Technical standards and norms (Rosteckhnadzor). 
Market access 2003–08 Entry of foreign utilities/strategic investors in electricity infrastructure. 
Currently, E.ON (Germany), Enel (Italy) and Fortum (Finland). 
Regulation 2008– Move from cost-plus to RAB tariff formula for regulated activities. 
 
drawback of increased volatility of MRSK’s revenues. In an economic downturn, the demand 
for new connections and additional capacity falls, so funding for investment projects dries up 
(Standard & Poor’s 2008). 
 
The incentive for distribution companies to recoup shortfalls of tariff revenues over the cost 
of investment and maintenance through connection charges created a significant barrier to 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) seeking a new connection. In response, the Russian 
Federation Government mandated a simplified procedure for technical connections.32
 
 
It is important to recognise that the original investment program, formulated in the economic 
boom years, has been halted by the financial and economic crisis of 2008–09. As noted 
                                                     
32 By Resolution № 334 of 21 April 2009, since 5 May 2009 the connection fee for the maximum capacity of 
15kW should not exceed RUB550 (USD18). Customers requiring connection of 15–100kW are given the 
option to pay the connection charge in instalments within 3 years from the connection date. Information 
disclosure requirements were imposed on distribution companies to facilitate transparency of their connection 
fee decisions (FAS 2009b). The decision has led to a 30% increase in connection applications from SMEs 
over 2008–09 (for <15kW connections), and a 50–60% increase in the requested total capacity (MED 2010a). 
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above, electricity consumption failed to grow at the rate that Chubais has expected and in 
hindsight the growth in capacity was not required as urgently as he had predicted. 
 
The data from the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade demonstrates that, despite 
the recession, the electricity, water and gas sector fell by only 5.2% in physical output, and 
actually increased 2.4-fold in revenue over 2008–09 to RUB200 billion (USD8 billion) 
(MED 2010b). Improved financial performance of the sector was definitely attributed to the 
increase in tariffs as part of the reform implementation. Processing and manufacturing 
industries in energy-using sectors were hit particularly hard by both falling demand for their 
goods and rising electricity costs. This is a (rather painful) example of when price signals 
generate incentives to increase efficiency – both technical efficiency, through energy-saving 
measures, and allocative efficiency, by considering the longer term viability of the energy-
using sector – given the true economic cost of electricity and other energy sources. These 
efficiency gains, and the reductions they make possible in the energy intensity of the 
economy, have been an important benefit of the reforms to date and of the further stages of its 
implementation which are planned. 
 
Investment targets for 2008 and thereafter were not fully met, however.33
 
 Russian Prime 
Minister Vladimir Putin recently criticised private owners of generating assets for lagging 
behind with their investment programs. The industry response was that recent changes in 
economic conditions forced the postponement. 
16.4 CONCLUSION 
 
The electricity sector in Russia has experienced significant reform since 2003, in terms of 
ownership, pricing and access to new competitors. The commitment to price reform has led to 
the scope for efficiency gains in energy use. The transition of pricing to world market levels 
has been an important contributor to support for the implementation of reform, but the 
commitment remains to reach the global benchmarks.   
 
One of the prime motivations for the reform was to create incentives for new investment. 
Foreign investors have been attracted to the sector. However, the slower than expected 
growth in electricity consumption, including the impact of the global financial crisis, has 
allowed a delay in those investments. The maintenance of an investment program remains an 
issue, and some uncertainties related to the design of the reforms are yet to be resolved. 
 
The progress of reform and its significance in Russia can be put into context by consideration 
of the lessons from the experience in California in 2001. Several issues underpinned the 
electricity crisis there at that time: the lack of investment in new generating capacity during 
the reform period when market rules were being developed; the strategic behaviour of the 
generators to withhold capacity and bid up wholesale prices, and the inability of retailers to 
pass the increased wholesale costs to consumers due to retail price caps. 
 
The following observations not only highlight the new stages of the reform but also illustrate 
the ways in which the reform program in Russia has learnt from the experience in California: 
 
                                                     
33 In 2008 the national energy system received an addition of 11 000km of transmission/distribution lines (76% of 
the planned facilities), transformation stations with total capacity 22 570MVA (90% of planned capacity) and 
2004MW of generating capacity (68% of the planned) http://minenergo.gov.ru/activity/plan/2010-2012_3/1.php. 
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• Investment in new capacity 
It appears that investment in new capacity has been postponed until the rules of the 
wholesale market become clear and tested. Owners of the privatised RAO-UES 
generating assets have had their investment programs approved but much of the 
investment concentrates in replacing dilapidated assets and upgrading existing assets. 
There have been virtually no green-field investments until recently. The latest 
clarifications of the capacity payment mechanisms have created the conditions that 
would allow them to recoup fixed investments in the new projects. 
 
• Strategic behaviour of generators and market power 
The new rules for capacity payments impose heavy penalties on generators 
withholding declared capacity or using a different mix of capacity from that approved 
by the System Operator. Generators operating in the markets with limited 
interconnection are subject to price-cap regulation by FTS and FAS. Base-load 
nuclear and hydro-generating assets remain fully/majority publicly owned, with the 
majority of private suppliers operating thermal plants with comparable cost structure. 
All of the above make the occurrence of California-type changes to the market design 
less likely. 
 
• Retail price caps and inability to pass costs to final users 
With the scheduled liberalisation of the wholesale market to 2011, most customers 
will be supplied at unregulated wholesale market tariffs. Residential customers will be 
supplied at regulated tariffs until 2014, with the level of residential tariffs gradually 
brought in line with the full economic cost. Industrial and other users will be supplied 
at market prices. Voluntary bilateral contracts between suppliers and buyers of 
electricity/capacity allow retail distribution companies to hedge their price risks and 
purchase contractual amounts at mutually agreed prices. Any price increase at 
wholesale markets can be passed on to industrial and other non-residential customers, 
who are not subject to price caps. 
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Chapter 17 
 
GAS IN CHINA 
 
 
Weixian Wei,1
 
 Xiangyu Peng, Yixin Hou, Baolong Chen, Jian Du and Gang Wang 
 
• A significant reform to gas pricing began in 2005 when pricing was changed from 
cost-plus to a system based on links to world energy prices. 
• The hooking mechanism did begin to correct a problem of pricing gas too low which, 
in 2009, led to gas shortages in some cities: prices remain low relative to world levels.  
• Growing demand, environmental pressures and rising world or LNG prices are not 
likely to permit this situation to continue, and further pressure for price rises is 
expected. The mechanism for arranging those changes has been established. 
 
 
17.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
China is the second largest gas consumer in Asia and its consumption of gas is growing faster 
than production. The volume of its gas consumption is high in absolute terms: in 2008 it was 
80.7 billion m3 while the production was only 70.08 billion m3, leading to imports of 
10.62 billion m3 (Figure 17.1). However, the share of gas in total energy consumption in 
China remains low, at about 3% in 2006 and slightly higher at 3.5% in 2007 (Figure 17.2) as 
compared to a global average of 20%. The rising levels of urbanisation with its growing 
demand for energy and rising expectations of response to environmental pressures all lead to 
greater attention to the use of gas which, in turn, is driving policy reform. 
 
 
Figure 17.1: China’s natural gas production and consumption, 1990–2008. (Source: National Bureau of 
Statistics of China 2010) 
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Figure 17.2: Energy consumption in China, by type, 2006. (Source: US Energy Information 
Administration 2008) 
 
In 2008 gas for industrial fuels accounted for 30.5% of total use, gas for the chemical 
industry accounted for 31.5%, gas for electricity generation accounted for 10% and 28% was 
for civil natural gas. The share of gas used in electricity consumption is relatively low, and in 
some major coal production areas its use is restricted. 
 
Since 1998 the Chinese government has sped up the pace of regulatory reform in the oil and 
gas industry and those changes are reviewed in this paper. One major issue has been the lack 
of an institution to guide policy. Following the abolition of the Department of Energy in 1998, 
there had been no single central government department responsible for energy policy and 
management matters. This situation has led to questioning whether the goals of regulation 
and the economic principles that are guiding prices are sufficiently clear and consistent (Liu 
2004). In addition, no integrated natural gas legal system had been built, so government 
regulations could not seek effective legal support. More recent changes, including the 
establishment of the National Energy Administration in March 2008 and the State Energy 
Resources Commission in January 2010, are discussed below. 
 
The time is now critical for regulatory reform in China. As explained by Wong (2010):  
... without a suitable modern regulatory system, economic reform of China’s city-gas 
industry will not overcome the pricing reform threshold necessary for future expansion 
and the creation of a level playing field for all stakeholders, including upstream gas 
producers, midstream long-haul pipeline operators, and downstream city-gas companies. 
In other words, market forces would better determine progress rather than reliance on 
central planning for investment, procurement and pricing decisions given the [economy] 
has to increasingly look to the international market to meet its (natural gas) needs. 
 
This paper covers the scope of operations of the three main companies in the gas sector in 
China and other regional groups. It also provides details of the systems for pricing gas, 
including the recent changes, and reviews the restrictions on entry to various parts of the 
natural gas sector, including the trends in imports and the regulation of gas prices. 
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17.2 RESTRICTIONS ON ENTRY 
 
Until recently, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical 
Corporation (Sinopec group) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), all 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) which were active in the production and distribution stages of 
the industry, were the dominant firms in the gas market (Zhibin 2008). Table 17.1 shows the 
equity structure of these major SOEs. 
 
Table 17.1: The equity distribution in three state-owned enterprises. 
Corporations 
Year of 
offering 
services 
Government 
equity 
Private 
equity 
Foreign 
equity 
China National Petroleum Corporation 1988 86.42% 11.38% 2.00% 
China Petrochemical Corporation 1983 75.84% 19.24% 4.92% 
China National Offshore Oil Corporation 1982 54.74% 34.06% 11.20% 
Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China 2010 
 
According to the Chinese Oil and Gas Industry Annual Report (2009), CNPC is still the 
biggest gas producer in China, accounting for almost 80% of total production. But the 
Sinopec group has found the Pu Guang oil field in Sichuan, and its output will increase. 
  
Until now, the city gas companies have been the sole purchasers of natural gas from the three 
SOEs, which they then resold to consumers (Liu, D 2009). However, following city gas 
market-oriented reforms, foreign and private capital is also entering the city gas business 
(Liu, D 2009). City gas supply is now franchised: companies with franchise rights have the 
monopoly on all the business of purchasing and selling gas in their area. 
 
Because the SOEs’ businesses were separated by region, there was no intense competition 
among them. They were also highly integrated, and the driver for this was the need to provide 
security for the large investments that are required in each link of a gas chain as it develops. 
Contracts to buy and provide gas are valuable to secure gas field development and to ensure 
the financing of new transmission facilities and the construction of the large consuming units, 
such as power plants, that will ‘anchor’ the gas demand (IESM 2002). 
 
Table 17.2 shows details of all major companies in China in this sector up to 1999, including 
those with foreign investment, particularly in transmission and distribution where the 
restrictions on foreign investment were lighter. Overall, the number of gas-related enterprises 
in China then amounted to 8560.2
 
 
17.2.1 Production 
 
In exploration the three major SOEs operated according to their territorial allocations and had 
exclusive cooperation with overseas partners, which made it hard for other forms of capital to 
enter the market. According to The Mineral Resources Law of the People’s Republic of 
China Implementation Rules, all mineral resources within a territory are owned by the state; 
any firm that wants to exploit a mineral resource must first apply to the relevant government 
department for registration in accordance with law to obtain a mining licence and consequent 
mining rights (State Council [SC) 1994). 
 
                                                 
2 See http://china.exactdw.com/zhongguotianranqi.html. 
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Table 17.2: The characteristics of all major facilities-based operating companies providing gas services. 
Company Service provided: 
production/import transmission 
distribution (LNG noted) 
Year 
services 
first 
offered  
Market share Owners of capital and their 
government, domestic, foreign shares 
China National Petroleum Corporation Production/import transmission 
distribution LNG 1988.9 
c. 70% in production Government 86.42% 
Foreign (H stock) 11.38% 
Domestic 2.00% 
China Petrochemical Corporation Production/import transmission 
distribution LNG 1983.7 
c. 11.7% in production Government 75.84%  
Foreign (H stock) 19.24% 
Domestic 4.92% 
China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation  
Production/import transmission 
distribution LNG 1982.2 
NA Government 54.74 % 
Foreign (H stock) 34.06% 
Domestic 11.2% 
Beijing Gas Group Co. Ltd Transmission distribution 1999.9 Monopoly in Beijing Market  Government 100% Not listed  
Shaanxi Provincial Natural Gas Co. Ltd  Transmission distribution 1995.1 The only pipeline operator in Shan Xi Province  
Government 62.19% 
Foreign and domestic 37.81% 
Sichuan Datong Gas Development Co. 
Ltd  
Production city pipeline 
distribution 1994 
Operates in Chengdu Dalian 
ShangRao Mudanjiang 
Domestic 100% 
Changchun Gas Co. Ltd Production and distribution  1993 Operates in Changchun and Yanji Domestic 100% 
Shenergy Company Ltd Production city pipeline 
distribution LNG 1993 
Operates in Shanghai  Government 50.56% 
Domestic 49.44% 
Xinjiang Guanghui Industry Co. Ltd LNG 1999 Operates in Xinjiang province Domestic and foreign 
XinAo Gas Holdings Ltd City pipeline 
distribution LNG 1992 
Operates gas distribution business 
in over 60 cities 
Foreign and domestic (H stock ) 100% 
Wuxi China Resources Gas Co. Ltd City pipeline 
distribution 2004 
Operates gas distribution business 
in over 30 cities 
Foreign and domestic (H stock ) 100% 
China Gas Holdings Ltd City gas pipeline 
distribution LNG 1995 
Doing business in c. 20 provinces Government, foreign and domestic 
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Until recently only the three SOEs were authorised by the State Council to exploit oil and gas 
resources throughout the economy (NDRC 2007, SC 2001, SC 2007b). In 2009 CNPC 
accounted for 80% of the domestic market share in natural gas production and Sinopec about 
13%. The state allowed foreign firms, other economic organisations and individuals to 
explore and exploit mineral resources in accordance with the relevant laws and administrative 
regulation. However, a foreign firm’s involvement in natural gas exploration and 
development was limited to joint ventures (JVs) and cooperation with one of the SOEs. Then 
on 23 December 2009 the first private enterprise to invest in a natural gas production project 
obtained the permission of the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). 
From that time onwards, 100% private equity would be allowed in natural gas production. 
 
In recent years the use of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has developed rapidly in China. The 
construction of LNG facilities requires sophisticated technology and high investment, so most 
LNG projects have been conducted in JVs between foreign firms and local stated-owned 
energy firms. In May 2007 the Ministry of Commerce cancelled the automatic import licence 
administration of natural gas and LNG, which means stricter supervision of gas imports. 
CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC are also the three largest gas importers of China. 
 
17.2.2 Transmission 
 
Natural gas pipelines are listed in the ‘encouraged’ category, meaning that they need not be 
controlled by Chinese companies (NDRC 2007). However, the government has not 
established a corresponding access system and regulatory measures, so the implementation of 
investment projects continues to follow miscellaneous examination and approval systems. 
Transmission refers primarily to natural gas long-distance pipeline transportation, the 
intermediate link between manufacturing enterprises and the city gas companies. At present, 
China’s natural gas transmission pipelines basically belong to CNPC and Sinopec, including 
the China Petroleum Pipeline Bureau that is owned by CNPC, and the Sinopec Pipeline 
Storage and Transportation Company, the gas pipeline agency that is owned by Sichuan 
Petroleum Bureau. There is no regime that provides access to these pipelines to third parties 
(Yang, J 2005). Most of CNOOC’s gas supplies are imported from offshore oil and gas 
installations, transported either by offshore pipeline or by transport ship.  
 
LNG is imported from abroad, then stored, re-gasified, compressed and distributed to special 
customers through long gas pipelines, and also sold through truck loading stations. LNG 
receiving terminals and short-distance pipelines have been constructed in coastal areas. There 
are no long-distance pipelines in mainland China.  
 
Since February 2004 independent operators have been allowed to enter the LNG import 
market. Then the Guangdong Dapeng LNG Company Ltd, a Sino-foreign JV energy 
company that is the construction and operation entity of the Guangdong LNG Terminal 
Project, began its pilot operations for the importation of LNG into China. The project 
comprised fourteen separate but interrelated projects run by independent legal entities. 
 
Each independent operator of an LNG project must undertake the purchase (import), 
transport, storage and re-gasification of the LNG. They sell and transport the natural gas and 
its by-products to the Pearl River Delta and other areas, construct and manage the LNG 
reception terminals, gas pipelines and other additional extended facilities, charter, lease and 
operate LNG carriers, and purchase and sell LNG and do other relevant business inside or 
outside the economy. 
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Legally, foreign gas companies are not required to establish in JVs. In the past gas companies 
had to seek the co-operation of local companies but an amendment to the Industrial Catalogue 
for Foreign Investment in 2007 ruled that foreign investment in the construction and 
operation of oil (gas) pipelines and oil (gas) storage is to be ‘encouraged’ (NDRC 2007). 
 
17.2.3 Distribution 
 
Because of limited pipeline route resources, cities cannot accommodate several natural gas 
pipeline networks belonging to different companies. Generally, to avoid duplicate 
construction and the waste of resources, local governments would monopolise the 
construction and the management of the local natural gas pipeline. On 27 December 2002 the 
Ministry of Construction issued ‘Opinions on Speeding up Marketization Process of 
Municipal and Public Sectors’. Article 1 of which ruled that private and foreign capital were 
to be encouraged to participate in the construction of municipal public facilities. This could 
occur in single proprietorship, JV, cooperation and other forms. Construction projects of 
water supply, gas supply, heat supply, sewage treatment, garbage treatment and other 
municipal public facilities should choose main investors by a system of competition through 
open tendering (MOC 2002). Bid-winning enterprises would be franchises authorised by the 
government.  
 
Regionally, the natural gas distribution business is monopolised by several large state-owned 
companies, overseas-funded gas companies and JVs. Examples of two of these companies are 
presented below. Retail customers must deal with the local franchised provider. 
• China Gas Holdings Limited is a Sino-foreign JV. It engages principally in the 
investment, operation and management of city gas pipeline infrastructure, the 
distribution of natural gas to residential, commercial and industrial users, the 
construction and operation of gas stations and the development and application of 
natural gas related technologies in China. Its business scope has already been involved 
in 20 provinces. Its main shareholders are The Centre of Strait Economy & Science-
Technology Cooperation, China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation, Oman Oil 
Company, Gail (India) Ltd, SK Group and Asian Development Bank. 
• Xinao Gas Holdings Ltd was the first private enterprise to operate a natural gas 
transmission and distribution business in China. Its main business portfolio consists of 
clean energy distribution, including city pipeline natural gas (LPG), vehicle refuelling 
gas (CNG and LPG) and DME (dimethyl ether), non-pipeline energy delivery and 
other value added services on the basis of energy distribution. Now Xinao has 
businesses in 60 cities in China (Xinao Gas Holdings Ltd 2008). 
 
Wong (2010) refers to a current issue in distribution: 
As the project owner of the second West–East Gas Pipeline project (WEGP2), which 
runs across thirteen provinces from Xinjiang in the west to the Yangtze River Delta in 
the east and Pearl River Delta in the south, CNPC will … control the vast amounts of NG 
imported from Turkmenistan. Recently, CNPC is thought to have begun talks with the 
provincial governments of Hebei, Gangsu and other provinces along WEGP 2 for an 
exclusive franchise to operate city-gas businesses in these regions. This is causing some 
disquiet as it would be easy for such a large organization as CNPC, with its upstream and 
midstream domination, to forward integrate into city NG projects to the detriment of the 
long-term development of China’s city-gas industry. An enhancement to the regulatory 
system contiguously covering downstream, midstream and upstream operators would 
avoid such a monopolistic situation from occurring. 
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The right to operate a city gas business can only be obtained through tendering, and of course 
CNPC has the opportunity to bid. There is, however, some advantage in establishing rules on 
separation between production/transmission and distribution, because it could bring in more 
competition and thus add to efficiency compared to the situation in which outside bidders 
were constrained. 
 
17.3 IMPORTS OF GAS 
 
China’s imports of LNG and natural gas showed considerable changes in volume between 
2003 and 2008. From 2003 to 2005 the annual imports of LNG were less than 500 tonnes. 
China began to import large quantities of LNG in 2006, more than 100 times as much as in 
the past. In 2008 the LNG import volume rose 14.5% and its import value rose 55% (Table 
17.3). 
 
Table 17.3: China’s imports of LNG. 
Year Imports 
(tonnes) 
Value 
(USD million) 
Average unit 
price of imports 
(USD/tonne) 
2003 0 1  
2004 400 14 350.00 
2005 483 18 372.67 
2006 687,543 11,543 167.89 
2007 2,913,122 60,058 206.16 
2008 3,336,000 93,084 279.02 
  Source: Liang 2009 
 
Natural gas demand in 2010 is expected to reach 110 billion m3, while domestic natural gas 
production will be able to provide only 90 billion m3 and the gap will be 20 billion m3. 
China’s natural gas demand for 2020 is expected to be 250 billion m3, and its natural gas 
consumption in 2030 is expected to reach 320 billion m3. Of that 320 billion m3 domestic 
output is expected to be 250 billion m3 with 70 billion m3 imported from abroad (which 
according to some estimates will be made up of 30 billion m3 from Turkmenistan, 
10 billion m3 from Myanmar and 18 billion m3 from LNG, leaving more that 10 billion m3 to 
be determined). 
 
The growth in China’s gas demand will lead to a radical change in its energy policy, which 
up until now has been dominated by the search for self-sufficiency. From 2003 to February 
2008 China had not imported any natural gas products through pipelines. But building a 
transmission pipeline network linked to neighbouring economies will soon be essential for 
the economy’s energy security. The Central Asia Gas Pipeline (with a length of 1801km) will 
transport about 300 billion m3 of natural gas from Central Asia to China each year. The 
West–East Gas Second-line Project referred to above is linked to the Central Asian pipeline, 
on which construction began in 2008; this pipeline will transport natural gas to the Pearl 
River Delta and the Yangtze River Delta. China and Russia are negotiating gas contracts in 
which Russia may supply to China 68 billion m3 of natural gas a year from 2014 or 2015. The 
China–Myanmar pipeline will also be built to increase domestic gas supplies (Table 17.4). 
 
Another option is to import gas in the form of LNG. In 2008 China imported 4.44 billion m3 
of LNG, from Australia (81%), Egypt (5.6%), Nigeria (5.4%), Algeria (3.8%) and Equatorial 
Guinea (3.6%). Several major oil companies in China have further accelerated the pace of 
signing long-term LNG purchase contracts with international sellers. Purchase agreements 
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were signed with QATARGAS and Shell International Gas Ltd in 2008, and CNOOC also 
signed a framework agreement to buy LNG with QATARGAS and Total Petrochemicals of 
France. Table 17.5 summarises LNG projects under development. Higashi (2009) reports that 
‘most’ LNG is used in electricity production with the rest going to city gas. 
 
Table 17.4: The planned international gas pipeline. 
Natural gas pipeline Length (km) Capacity Remarks 
Russia’s eastern line n.a. 30–40 b m3/year Expected to run through 2010 
Russia’s western line (‘Altai’) n.a. 30–40 b m3/year Expected to run through 2010 
Myanmar–China 2380 n.a. March 2009 signed  
Turkmenistan–China (Xinjiang) 1818 30–40 b m3/year Expected to run through end of 2009 
Source: Liang 2009 
 
Table 17.5: China’s operating and under construction LNG projects. 
LNG terminal Province Status Start year Capacity 
(million tonnes/year) 
Dapeng Guangdong Production 2006 3.9 
Xiuyu Fujian Production 2009 2.6 
Zhongximentang Zhejiang Under construction 2009 4.0 
Dalian Liaoning Under construction 2012 3.7 
Rudong Guangdong Plan 2011 3.5 
Hainan Hainan Feasibility study 2012 2.5 
Qingdao Shandong Feasibility study 2010 3.7 
Tianjian Tianjin Feasibility study 2013 2.0 
Gaofeidian Tangshan Feasibility study 2013 4.3 
Qinzhou Guangxi Feasibility study 2012 3.7 
Macao Guangdong Feasibility study 2013 3.7 
Rizhao Shandong Feasibility study 2012 1.8 
Taizhou Jiangsu Feasibility study 2013 3.7 
Weihai Shandong Feasibility study 2013 3.7 
Ninpo Zhejian Feasibility study 2010 4.0 
Source: Liang 2009 
 
17.4 PRICE REGULATION 
 
The NDRC decides price policy. It determines a ‘guiding price’ at the factory level (Zheng, 
Luo & Yang 2006). The consumer retail price is determined by the local price bureau and 
also by the big SOEs, based on the government-guided factory price plus the transmission 
and city distribution costs and a profit in each link of the industry chain, which differs across 
areas. The government’s pricing policy, which divides natural gas users into fertiliser, 
industrial, civil and commercial users according to the direction of natural gas, also provides 
for different prices. 
 
The State Council has identified some problems in this process, since it does not reflect the 
degree of scarcity of gas, supply and demand or the price’s relationship to alternate resources 
(SC 2007a). The direction of reform of this price mechanism should be market-oriented. 
Higher consumption, the inequities between regions and the inability to pay for rising imports 
have all created pressure for change in the price of gas. Recent pricing reforms are discussed 
in more detail below. 
 
As explained above, since the abolition of the Energy Industry Ministry in 1993 there has not 
been a unified energy regulatory administration. The National Energy Bureau established in 
2008 did not unify China’s energy management functions. In March 2010 the State Energy 
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Resources Commission was established by the State Council with the Premier as director, the 
Vice Premier as deputy director and a committee consisting of the heads of 21 central and 
national ministries such as the NDRC, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Industry and Information Ministry. There had previously been a Department 
of Energy and an Energy Commission but these had not formed any effective management 
processes, in our view, because of a division of interests. As a result, the final authority had 
been redistributed to the various departments listed above. In 2008, during the super-ministry 
reform period, the failure to re-create the Department of Energy may also have been related 
to the difficulty of reconciling the different interests involved. Therefore, whether the new 
structure will be able to solve the existing problems in the energy sector remains to be seen. 
 
17.5 UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
 
‘Universal service’ is defined as having natural gas replace oil in status by becoming the 
major energy source for urban residents. The policy instruments used to pursue this objective 
include improvement of the relevant laws and regulations, consumer subsidies to encourage 
urban consumption and improved supply provided by the incumbent operator; expansion of 
the range of uses of natural gas, and lowering the tariff on gas imports in order to increase the 
volume of gas imported. 
 
China’s natural gas consumption is at present mainly concentrated on the chemical industry. 
But it is expected that the direction of natural gas utilisation will change in the future to more 
urban consumption and gas-based power generation.  
 
By the end of the ‘11th Five-year Plan’ period, China will have built the backbone of the 
economy’s natural gas pipeline network, which will inevitably bring about the development 
of the terminal sales market. The number of cities supplied with natural gas is expected to 
increase to 270 in 2010 (compared to 140 in 2005); 70% of Chinese cities are expected to 
have a supply of natural gas by the middle of this century. To achieve these objectives, the 
Chinese government plans to take the following measures: 
• establish and improve the relevant laws and regulations relating to natural gas;  
• encourage and develop new ways to use natural gas through the initiation of new gas 
projects, the reduction of appropriate income tax and the offer of preferential low-
interest loans to gas users;  
• expand the government’s own use of natural gas, such as by using it to generate 
electricity and smelt steel and by the development of gas-fired air-conditioning; 
• reduce the expense of using natural gas for some low-income families by providing 
subsidies and by trying to reduce gas supplier’s charges.  
• lower the import tariff on natural gas. 
 
17.6 RECENT CHANGES IN POLICY 
 
Major changes in policy since 2004 presented so far are summarised in Table 17.6. In this 
section we concentrate on the 2005 changes in pricing policy. 
 
As noted earlier, the gas pricing policy is decided by the NDRC and there are two associated 
prices: the factory price and the consumer retail price. Before 2005 the factory price was 
determined by a cost-based fixed-price formula of production cost plus a reasonable profit. 
Higashi (2009) reported an internal rate of return of 12%. This pricing mechanism did not 
take into account the scarcity of gas, the imbalance of supply and demand, the fluctuation of 
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Table 17.6: Major changes in market access policies, ownership rules and regulations since 2004. 
Area of policy change Year of change Description of change 
Regulation 2005 
Reformed the gas pricing mechanism and increased the factory price 
appropriately: 
(i) divided gas factory price into two levels; 
(ii) changed the form of price; and 
(iii) rationalised the price structure and set up the price hooking 
mechanism. 
Regulation 2006 
In 2006 applied universally acknowledged two-part pricing system 
(i.e., ‘pipe capacity fees’ and ‘pipe utilization fees’) to the Zhong 
Wu pipeline. 
Regulation 2007 
NDRC issued ‘The Policy of Gas Usage’ which would guide and 
regulate the downstream of gas usage. Wong (2010) says that: 
‘[e]ffectively the Directive requires local governments to regulate 
growth of (natural gas) markets giving priority to residential cooking 
and water heating, with less encouragement to space heating and 
industrial applications, and positive discouragement to gas power 
and petrochemical production projects.’ 
Regulation market access 
and ownership 2007 
‘The Energy Law of the People’s Republic of China’ (Exposure 
Draft) was issued. This is the basic law which would reflect China’s 
future overall energy strategy and involve much of the important and 
sensitive issues such as the framework of energy administration, 
pricing mechanism and strategic reserves. 
‘The Gas Law of the People’s Republic of China’ was under 
preparation. 
Regulation 2008 
‘The Energy Conservation Law of the People’s Republic of China’ 
was issued. This law applied to all kinds of energy resources, 
including coal, oil, gas, biomass energy, electricity, heating power 
and other resources obtainable through processing and 
transformation. 
Regulation 2010 The State Council declaration to set up the National Energy Commission was issued. 
 
natural gas prices in the international market or comparisons with the market prices of 
competitive fuels. 
 
Compared with prices of natural gas abroad and of alternative sources of energy, China’s 
natural gas prices were too low and far lower than the world gas price. This caused many 
problems. The low price of natural gas led to a rise in the quantity demanded and contributed 
to inefficient gas usage. This exacerbated supply-side challenges. In some cases, industrial 
prices were also lower than residential prices. Take the first West–East pipeline for example, 
where the city gas price was CNY1.16–1.46/m3 while the industrial gas price was lower, at 
CNY1.12–1.3/m3. This ‘dual-track’ pricing system led some gas-using companies to rely 
excessively on the low-price policies, which then also added to the difficulty of reform (Li & 
Wang 2006). 
 
The process of reform began in 2005, when NDRC reformed the gas pricing mechanism and 
increased the gas factory price appropriately (NDRC 2005). The main content is as follows: 
• Use a benchmark to set prices 
In order to increase the flexibility of pricing and to reflect the market supply of and 
demand for gas, the gas factory price was changed to a government guiding price. 
Based on the benchmark price decided by the government, the gas factory price could 
either be negotiated between suppliers and buyers within a 10% range around the 
benchmark for some gas fields or at most be 10% above the benchmark but without 
limit below it for other gas fields. 
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• Hook the benchmark to the prices of substitute forms of energy 
The hooking mechanism means that the benchmark gas factory price would link to the 
substitute forms of energy and it would be adjusted once a year. The adjustment 
coefficient is determined with regard to the recent 5-year moving average change of 
the crude oil price, the LPG price and the coal price. The weights are 40%, 20% and 
40% respectively and the successive yearly adjustment cannot be more than 8%. The 
crude oil price is decided by the arithmetic mean of MOPS WTI, Brent and Minas 
FOB prices, the LPG price is the Singapore FOB price and the coal price is the 
arithmetic mean price of Datong quality mix, Shanxi quality mix and Shanxi large 
mix coal at the QinHuangdao station. Figure 17.3 shows this hooking mechanism. 
LNG prices are decided according to the imported gas price and are different from the 
factory price determination systems. 
• Increase the factory price appropriately 
The consequence was an increase of CNY50–150/1000 m3 for industrial and urban 
gas use and CNY50–100 for fertiliser gas use (the range reflects the different systems 
for level 1 and level 2 gas). NDRC argued that the effect of this price increase was 
limited. If measured by the maximum increase of CNY150/1000 m3 for a single 
family who consume 20 m3 gas/month, the monthly expense would only increase by 
CNY3 (which is less than USD0.50). If measured by the maximum increase of 
CNY100/1000 m3 and consumption of 800–900 m3/tonne of fertiliser production, the 
per tonne production cost would only increase CNY80–90 (or about USD12).  
 
 
Figure 17.3: The price hooking mechanism. 
 
The consumer retail price is then determined by the gas factory price plus the pipeline 
transport charge and the city distribution charge. The first two components are controlled by 
NDRC and the third is decided by local government. The consumer price differs at different 
cities because of the distances to gas fields and sources of gas (Table 17.7). The price of gas 
in cities such as Wulumuqi, Chengdu and Chongqing, which are close to a gas field, are 
relatively low. Gas prices in cities such as Beijing and Shanghai, which are in the 
downstream of a long-distance pipeline, are higher. The highest price is in cities whose gas is 
imported from abroad, either by pipeline or as LNG (e.g., Quanzhou). 
 
Despite the initial round of reform, natural gas prices remained low relative to world prices. 
In November 2007 the average price for the industrial sector rose by 50% but remained less 
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Table 17.7: Urban gas prices, August 2008 (CNY/m3). 
City Price City Price City Price 
Beijing 2.05 Nanjing 2.20 Taian 2.00 
Tianjin 2.20 Suzhou 2.20 Heze 1.70 
Shijiazhuang 2.20 Yangzhou 2.20 Zhengzhou 1.60 
Tangshan 2.50 Hangzhou 2.40 Luoyang 2.60 
Qinhuangdao 3.38 Taiyuan 2.10 Xinxiang 1.75 
Xingtai 2.20 Wenzhou 3.50 Wuhan 2.30 
Datong 2.00 Jiaxing 2.90 Huangshi 2.10 
Changzhi 1.70 Shaoxing 2.80 Yichang 2.20 
Huhehaote 1.57 Quzhou 2.90 Xiangfan 2.20 
Baotou 1.57 Hefei 2.10 Jinmen 2.10 
Shenyang 2.40 Huainan 2.10 Changsha  2.36 
Anshan 2.20 Anqing 2.30 Changde 2.53 
Jinzhou 2.40 Chuzhou 1.97 Shaoguan 3.95 
Changchun 2.00 Quanzhou 3.80 Shantou 4.10 
Jilin 2.20 Jiujiang 3.45 Jiangmen 3.80 
Yanbian 2.70 Ganzhou 3.90 Ganjiang 3.50 
Haerbin 2.00 Jinan 2.40 Nanning 4.35 
Daqing 1.65 Qingdao 2.40 Liuzhou 5.93 
Jiamusi 2.00 Zaozhuang 2.00 Beihai 3.65 
Shanghai 2.10 Yantai 2.40 Guigang 3.65 
Wulumuqi 1.37 Hami 2.00 Bayinguoleng 1.30 
Haikou 2.60 Leshan 1.54 Yulin 1.35 
Sanya 2.40 Dazhou 1.52 Lanzhou 1.45 
Chongqing 1.40 Shaotong 3.60 Xining 1.25 
Chengdu 1.43 Xian 1.75 Geermu 1.20 
Zigong 1.38 Baoji 1.75 Yinchuan 1.40 
Panzhihua 1.43 Weinan 1.75 Shizuishan 1.50 
Mianyang 1.52 Yanan 1.50 Wuzhong 1.40 
     Source: http://oil.chem99.com/channel/Naturalgas/ 
 
than half world prices.3
 
 Gas shortages re-emerged in 2009 in a number of cities. In Chong 
Qing taxis had to wait for a long time before filling with gas and passengers had to pay a 
CNY2 cover charge because of the increased price. In Hang Zhou the gas supply for 44 
industrial enterprises was cut and a similar phenomenon appeared in other cities. The 
severely cold winter in China had caused a surge of heating gas usage. Supply-side factors 
were also important. CNPC said that it had already reached the maximum per day supply, 
which meant that the company did not have enough gas storage to meet the unexpected 
increase in gas demand. The separation of transmission pipelines among the giants also made 
it more difficult to allocate gas to areas that needed it. The relatively low gas price remains a 
key factor in the overall gas shortage, because it leads to the overuse of gas and reduced 
incentives for domestic suppliers to increase production. 
17.7 CONCLUSION 
 
China has undertaken substantial reform in the gas sector, including the participation of a 
wider range of investors, at least in transmission and distribution. A clear separation remains 
between production and transmission and its distribution. Major users are unable to ‘buy 
direct’ from producers but have to buy from local distributors who, since 2002, win a 
franchise through a bidding process. A major reform was also undertaken in pricing from 
2005, with the introduction of the influence of world prices and substitute fuels. 
                                                 
3 Prices rose from CNY800/1000 m3 (USD3.04/MBtu) to CNY1200/1000 m3 (USD 4.57/MBtu) (Higashi 2009; 
CNY1 = USD0.14404). International prices peaked at around USD13/MBtu in 2008. 
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Despite this significant progress, differences remain between prices on average in China and 
world prices, between cities for the same types of users and between users in the same cities. 
The low gas price tends to bring about overuse and adds to the risk of gas shortages in China.  
 
Declining self-sufficiency and the price gaps will likely force further price changes. Aligning 
the now low domestic price with the higher international price would no doubt be the trend of 
further gas reform, however, at present there is a lot of argument about the reform policy. 
Among the options, the use of a weighted average of domestic and international prices seems 
to be more acceptable in the short term. 
 
A further reform policy document is likely be issued later in 2010. 
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Chapter 18 
 
GAS IN THAILAND 
 
 
Deunden Nikomborirak1
 
 
 
• A comprehensive plan for gas reform in Thailand was designed but only partially 
completed. 
• The privatisation stage that has been completed is associated with increases in supply.  
• Subsidies for some forms of consumption are rising and in the longer term provide 
new forces for further change. 
 
 
18.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In 2009 Thailand ranked 27th in terms of natural gas production (28.7 million m3) and 40th in 
terms of proven natural gas reserves (317 100 million m3) according to the US Central 
Intelligence Agency (2009). Thailand has a vast natural gas supply in the Gulf of Siam and 
the Andaman Sea. However, domestic supply was not able to keep up with the surge in 
demand prompted by escalating global petroleum prices and government subsidies of the use 
of natural gas for vehicles (NGV) and home cooking (liquefied natural gas; LNG). During 
2004–09 demand for natural gas increased on average 5.26% per year compared with 0.4% 
for petroleum. Thailand has been an importer of natural gas since 1998 (Figure 18.1). 
 
The bulk of the demand for natural gas in Thailand comes from the power generation sector 
which relies heavily on natural gas. In 2009 more than 70% of consumption went to 
electricity generating plants, with the remaining 17% going to gas separation plants and 11% 
to industrial use (Figure 18.2). Thailand relies heavily on natural gas for power generation. 
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Figure 18.1: Thailand’s natural gas supply, 1986–2009. (Source: Energy Policy and Planning Office) 
                                                 
1 Research Director at Thailand Development Research Institute (deunden@tdri.org.th) and Secretary to the 
Minister of Finance, Finance Ministry (2007–08). 
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A reform plan for the gas sector was developed in the late 1990s. This plan included 
extensive change. However in 2001 a new government adopted a policy of support of 
national champions which focused on privatisation and corporate development rather than 
market reform and the introduction of competition. This study case explains how the reform 
plan was adjusted in the light of the adoption of that policy and identifies some of the 
economic consequences of doing so. The first step is to provide some background 
information on the gas industry. 
 
18.2 THE CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE GAS INDUSTRY IN THAILAND 
 
18.2.1 Domestic competition 
 
The gas industry in Thailand is dominated by two players – the Petroleum Authority of 
Thailand (PTT) on the supply side and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand 
(EGAT) on the demand side. Both entities are majority government owned, although PTT is 
now a listed company with 49% of its equity share floated on the stock market and the 
remainder held by the Ministry of Finance. 
 
PTT, with few minor exceptions, acts as the sole purchaser, transporter and distributor of 
natural gas in Thailand. PTT purchases all indigenous gas from the producers, including its 
subsidiary PTT Exploration and Production (PTTEP), and transmits this through its pipeline 
system to consumers. Its network of pipelines in Thailand currently stretches 3100km, linking 
all commercial offshore gas fields to EGAT’s power plants, its own five gas separation plants 
(GSPs) as well as some 200 industrial users. Many of the industrial users are petrochemical 
companies and gas distribution companies in which PTT owns a controlling share. 
 
In the petroleum sector, the company holds a majority equity share in several refineries 
whose production capacity contribute to more than 80% of the economy’s total refinery 
capacity. It is also the largest player in retail distribution (petrol stations), international 
trading activities and the downstream petrochemical industry.  
 
Limited private participation in pipeline construction (at the distribution level) has been 
introduced with the establishment of PTT Natural Gas Distribution Company (PTTNGD), a 
joint venture pipeline owned 49% by PTT and the balance by private investors. However, 
there is no mandatory third party access to PTT’s gas transmission pipelines network, and so 
there is no competition in the distribution market. Certain power plants construct their own 
pipelines to connect to PTT’s. 
 
On the demand side, EGAT is by far the largest consumer of natural gas in Thailand. 
Although Figure 18.2 shows its gas consumption share is only 32%, the government-owned 
electricity generating enterprise holds a major equity share in many of the independent power 
producers (IPPs). As a result, sales to EGAT’s group of electricity generating plants accounts 
for roughly half of Thailand’s total natural gas supply. 
 
The second largest group of customers is the gas separation plants, all of which belong to 
PTT. The third largest group are the small independent power producers (SPPs). These power 
producers supply electricity to EGAT’s grid at a predetermined price. As for industrial 
customers, whose number totalled roughly 240 in 2009, many are downstream petrochemical 
companies affiliated with the PTT. All PTT contracts, whether with suppliers or consumers, 
are on a long-term (25–30 years) take or pay basis. 
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To conclude, there is little market competition in the vertical structure of the natural gas 
industry. Exploration and production where foreign players maintain a majority share in the 
market may be an exception. Although PTTEP’s market share in exploration is roughly 25% 
in terms of sales, the company also holds equity shares that range from 5% to 40% in many 
of the exploration projects undertaken by its main competitor, Chevron.  
 
 
Figure 18.2: The current structure of the Thai gas industry. 
 
18.2.2 Foreign commercial presence 
 
The presence of foreign operators in the Thai gas industry has been confined to the 
exploration and production of natural gas. The Petroleum Act 1971 and the Energy Industry 
Act 2007 are the two main laws governing the gas industry. However, foreign investment 
issues are dealt with by the Foreign Business Act 1999. The foreign equity share is not 
restricted for businesses related to the production of tangible products. But foreign equity is 
limited to a minority portion for service businesses. Hence, foreign companies that seek to 
operate gas transmission, trading and distribution services are required to seek a joint venture 
with a local partner.  
 
The employment of foreigners in Thailand is governed by an Act entitled the Working of 
Aliens Act BE2521 (1978). Generally, when considering whether to allow a foreign worker 
to enter the economy to work, the Department of Employment will consider whether the 
opening can be filled by a Thai, whether the foreign worker is qualified and whether the job 
fits the need of Thailand. Moreover, all foreign and Thai companies are required at all times 
to observe the 4:1 ratio of the number of Thai to foreign employees according to the Order of 
Immigration Office No. 110/2546 (2003). This may pose a problem for companies that 
require highly specialised staff to undertake work before production that will require local 
workers. The Board of Investment is able to waive this restriction. Promoted companies are 
allowed to bring in skilled workers and professionals. Gas exploration and production 
businesses are not among the list of promoted companies, unlike their downstream gas 
transmission and petrochemical counterparts. 
 
18.2.3 Cross-border competition 
 
While there is cross-border supply of natural gas both through pipelines and in the form of 
LNG, cross-border competition in natural gas is not established. Presently, there are several 
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joint development gas exploration and production projects between PTT and its counterparts 
in neighbouring economies such as Myanmar, Malaysia and Cambodia (Figure 18.3). 
 
 
Figure 18.3: Thailand’s regional natural gas pipeline network and its neighbours. (Source: PTT) 
 
Pipelines connect offshore gas fields to electricity generation plants or gas liquefaction, 
condensation or separation plants mainly to serve Thailand’s domestic demand.  
 
The cross-border pipeline network between Burma and Thailand includes the Yadana–
Ratchaburi pipeline (completed 1999) and the Yetagun–Ratchaburi pipeline (completed 
September 2000). On the horizon are projects to deliver gas to Malaysia and Thailand from 
the Malaysia–Thailand Joint Development Area.  
 
Work to develop a regional natural gas market has been in progress for over a decade. 
ASEAN’s proposal for a ‘Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline’ and APEC’s concept of an ‘Asian 
Gas Grid’ both recognise natural gas’ superior fuel qualities and the logic of linking 
ASEAN’s natural gas production centres with markets in neighbouring economies. Both 
concepts are designed to catalyse cross-border linkages connecting national gas grids. 
According to Sovacool (2009), the establishment of national gas grids faces three challenges. 
Firstly, Lao PDR, Myanmar and Cambodia are poorer economies with vast reserves of 
natural resources relative to Thailand, which is perceived to be a much more advanced 
economy with a large demand for energy. Thus, the flow of energy within the region is likely 
to be one way. Secondly, the energy business in the region remains dominated by government 
enterprises – PTT (Thailand), Petronas (Malaysia) and Pertamina (Indonesia). Competition 
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that would undermine the status of each of these enterprises may be resisted by their 
government owners in order to protect national assets. Thirdly, the planned integrated natural 
gas pipeline is estimated to require an investment totalling USD16 billion to construct the 
additional 5600km of pipeline needed to connect centres of demand in the region. It is 
unlikely that private investors would be willing to inject capital into a project of such a scale, 
given that there is a lack of certainty concerning the pricing, that regulatory regimes are yet to 
be harmonized across borders and that gas market structures may continue to accommodate 
single-buyer regimes. 
 
Competition from compressed LNG is conceivable, especially since Indonesia and Malaysia 
are among the five largest worldwide exporters of LNG. Indeed, to secure its gas supply, 
besides developing new gas fields in joint cooperation with neighbouring economies, 
Thailand has come to rely increasingly on imported LNG. PTT has undertaken to construct 
Thailand’s first LNG terminal (in Rayong in the northern industrial zone on the eastern 
coast). The facility includes a tank terminal, a jetty and a 5 million ton storage facility that 
will be enlarged to accommodate 10 million tons in a second phase. The terminal is 
scheduled to start operating in 2011. However, in the absence of third party access to PTT’s 
pipeline, there is unlikely to be any competition in the import of LNG. 
 
18.3 GOVERNMENT POLICY 
 
Greacen (2005) categorises the Thai government’s policy towards the development of the 
domestic energy market into three distinct periods – the ‘Nationalist Era’ (1950–90), the 
‘Neo-liberal Era’ (1990–2000) and the ‘National Champion Era’ (2001–05), the time of his 
presentation. 
 
The Nationalist Era saw the establishment of government-owned utilities that were self-
regulating monopolies based on the cost-plus price regulatory scheme. PTT was established 
in 1978. 
 
The Neo-liberal Era was a period during which the government was dominated by 
technocrats whose concerns were focused mainly on introducing greater competition into 
utility markets monopolised by government enterprises. During the period, some EGAT 
power plants were spun off to become listed companies on the stock market. IPPs and SPPs 
were introduced to foster private competition in the power generation market. The National 
Energy Policy Office (NEPO)2
 
 floated the idea of creating a ‘power pool’ in 2000. A draft 
law on the rules governing the power pool was also proposed in the following year. 
Although no reform took place in the gas industry during this era, the Ministry of Finance 
introduced a comprehensive plan for government enterprise reform. It proposed restructuring, 
liberalisation and regulation of the markets in which government enterprises dominated – 
telecommunications, transport and energy (gas, oil and power). This ‘Master Plan for State 
Enterprise Reform 1998’ offered a clear direction for developing the gas industry (Figure 18.4). 
 
The competitive market model described in the plan contained two key reforms: the 
separation of the transmission network from production and trade functions and third party 
access. The separation of PTT’s gas transmission pipeline function, either by accounting or 
legal methods, from its gas trading business was a pre-condition to promoting competition. 
                                                 
2 The office is currently known as the Energy Policy and Planning (EPPO), Ministry of Energy. 
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Figure 18.4: Future gas industry structure as perceived in 1998. (Source: Master Plan for State 
Enterprise Reform 1998, http://www.mof.go.th/sepc/sepcfn2.htm) 
 
Full legal separation by a corporatised entity would not only facilitate competition in the 
production, trade and distribution of gas but would also allow more transparent and efficient 
regulation of the industry. 
 
The establishment of third party access to gas transmission pipelines is a means of facilitating 
the development of competition in gas supply. The provision of access to these facilities by 
third parties on fair terms and conditions would allow consumers to purchase gas from 
upstream producers or continue to purchase the bundled service of gas transmission and 
supply from the pipeline owner.  
 
‘Special Purpose Pipelines’ were proposed in the plan of 1998. Developers of new pipelines 
were to be granted a franchise under terms that would have allowed them to negotiate use of 
the pipeline with a limited number of customers. Under this approach, the broad framework 
for access would be well defined but the actual terms and conditions (such as tariffs) would 
be set by negotiation. This would have allowed a level of commercial control on the part of 
the owner, which may have led to an abuse of this position in terms of monopolistic pricing 
of the transmission service. To balance these matters, a dispute resolution process would have 
been necessary to address disputes arising from the negotiation process, with recourse to a 
predefined means of arbitration. 
 
The Neo-liberal Era ended in 2000 and was replaced, under a new government, by the 
‘national champion model’. PTT was listed on the stock market in 2001 so that public 
funding could be mobilised to facilitate the planned expansion of the enterprise. However, the 
government retained a majority equity share: only 49% of the equity was floated.  
 
Under the national champion strategy, privatisation took place without any of the market 
reform envisioned in the 1998 master plan. There was no separation of the monopolistic gas 
transmission business from the potentially competitive trading and distribution businesses 
and an independent energy regulatory body was not immediately established. Privatised 
operations conferred some benefits on the company, but without the introduction of 
competition these were not likely to be passed to consumers. As a listed company, for 
example, it was able to mobilise private capital to finance its expansion while its 
commitments to shareholders provided it with a framework to respond to community or 
government expectations about the services it might provide. 
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PTT shares sold out in 77 seconds. The price of the share went from THB35 at its IPO in 
November 2001 to THB183 at the end of 2003. The share price went up 70% in a single 
month when the government approved the proposed THB100 billion gas transmission 
pipeline plan with a guaranteed rate of return at 16% (Greacen & Greacen 2004). PTT now 
contributes 48.7% of the Thai Stock Exchange’s total value (Nikomborirak & Sirikarn 2009). 
 
A landmark court case decision in which the Supreme Court ruled against the privatisation of 
EGAT prompted the same group of NGOs to try to revisit the case of PTT. In August 2006 
the Federation of Consumers and its affiliated organisations filed lawsuits, petitioning for the 
two Royal Decrees pertinent to the privatisation to be revoked and the company re-
nationalised. In December 2007 the Administrative Court delivered a verdict that fell short of 
delisting the company, but required it to transfer all land acquired through expropriation and 
all assets (i.e., gas pipelines) attached therewith to the Ministry of Finance (PTT website, 
2007). In practice, PTT continues to operate these pipelines as if they were its own but it does 
not have legal ownership of these particular pipelines and it has to pay the Ministry of 
Finance an annual access fee calculated as a fixed percentage of its total transmission revenue 
(this is 10–30% depending on the size of the revenue). 
 
Corporate governance in the government-owned enterprises remains an issue. The National 
Anti-Corruption Commission is proposing a ban on government officials becoming directors 
in government-owned enterprises due to the conflict of roles. Members of Parliament and 
Senators raised concerns in Parliament about this conflict of roles among directors of 
government-owned enterprises. These issues may also limit the scope for further reform. 
 
The National Champion Era came to an end in 2006 when the government originally elected 
in 2001 was replaced. During the period from September 2006 to February 2008 the Neo-
liberal Era was revived. The Energy Industry Act, which established a fully fledged energy 
regulatory body, was passed in 2007. But the time span of that government was too short to 
implement the reform. A new government was elected in 2008 but there has been no further 
policy change since that time. 
 
18.4 THE REGULATORY REGIME 
 
18.4.1 The institution 
 
The gas industry in Thailand is governed by two major laws; the Petroleum Act 1971 
stipulates rules concerning the extraction and production of natural gas and the Energy 
Industry Act 2007 prescribes rules on the transmission of natural gas, compression of gas into 
liquid form, distribution of gas and wholesale and retail sale of gas. The Petroleum Act 
assigns the regulatory power to the Electricity Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) in the 
Ministry of Energy, which also oversees energy policy work. The Energy Industry Act 
established a regulatory body, the Electricity Regulatory Commission (ERC), for the gas and 
electricity generation industry. Regulations governing the petroleum industry and the 
exploration for and production of fossil fuel (including gas) were not included in this law. 
This was to preserve the Ministry of Energy’s regulatory role, set out in the Petroleum Act. 
 
Section 9 (6) of the Energy Industry Act stipulates that the Minister of Energy is responsible 
for setting the quality and standard of energy services. Section 64 similarly grants the 
Minister (with approval from the National Energy Policy Commission) the authority to set 
policy and guidelines with regard to the pricing of energy services. As a result the ERC 
applies the form of regulation (rate of return regulation or price cap) chosen by EPPO, but 
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decides on the actual tariff within that method. The ERC was granted the power of whether to 
allow the service provider to pass on certain costs to consumers. For example, it refused to 
allow PTT to pass on costs incurred from the destruction of its offshore gas exploration 
platform near the Oceania Islands. 
 
It is interesting to compare the ERC’s regulatory power with that of its telecommunications 
counterpart, the National Telecommunication Commission (NTC), which was established by 
the Telecommunications Act in 2001. The NTC’s broad regulatory power and financial 
independence guarantee its autonomy. This is partly due to the fact that, unlike the NTC, the 
independence of the energy regulator was not mandated in the constitution. However, issues 
of accountability and transparency of the NTC remain, and need to be balanced with 
independence (Nikomborirak & Cheevasittiyanon 2009). 
 
18.4.2 Regulatory rules 
 
The key features of the existing regulatory regime governing the structure of the natural gas 
market, the access to the market and the tariff regulation are discussed below. 
 
There are no legal restrictions on the structure of gas undertakings (no vertical separation 
requirement). PTT and its subsidiaries are engaged in the entire gas supply chain from 
exploration, production and transmission through to trade, import and distribution to retail. 
 
There are no legal restrictions on new entries into any of the natural gas business subsectors, 
including the importation of LNG. However, PTT’s monopoly in transmission, and hence the 
buying and selling of gas, amount to barriers to entry. As there is not yet third party access to 
PTT’s proprietary transmission network and no third party access to its gas terminal facilities, 
entry is practically impossible.  
 
While the market oriented reforms have not been adopted, there is an extensive system of 
price regulation, at least for natural gas. While some of its parameters could be debated (for 
example, the rates of return on investment built into the formulas), the regulatory system 
covers the key areas where there is a risk of the application of monopoly power over prices.  
 
The wholesale gas price comprises the wellhead gas price, a marketing margin, the 
transmission tariff and the distribution tariff. These components are determined as follows: 
• The wellhead gas price is specified in the gas purchase contract signed between the 
producer and PTT. It is normally indexed with the price of fuel oil, the exchange rate, 
and the consumer and producer price index. The price for natural gas produced from 
the Gulf of Thailand is roughly USD2 per million BTU, one-half the price of that in 
the USA and one-third of that in Japan where it is in the ranges of USD5–6 (Energy 
website n.d.). Gas procured from joint development with neighbouring Malaysia and 
Myanmar is slightly more expensive at USD2.3–2.75. Significantly lower wellhead 
gas prices are common for less mature gas fields. 
• The marketing margin is regulated by the EPPO. The current rate of the pooled gas 
price (the weighted average price of gas purchased from various production sources) 
is 1.75% for sales to IPPs and EGAT and 9.33% for SPPs. The higher margin reflects 
the higher risks that PTT has to bear as SPP contracts are shorter (5 years vs 20–25 
years) and allow an SPP to switch from one source of energy to another, depending on 
the price level. For example, an SPP may choose to use LPG instead of natural gas. 
However, the rate is currently being revised downward as statistics show that SPPs 
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rarely exercise the option. Hence, the risk involved with the contract may have been 
overestimated. But since 1999 a cap of THB2.15 (which translates into less than 1% 
considering the current price of natural gas) has been imposed. 
• The transmission tariff is set by EPPO with approval from the Minister of Energy. 
The tariff is uniform for all gas customers. The current tariff is made up of the 
demand charge (TD) component to cover fixed costs and CPI - X for the commodity 
charge (TC) to cover variable costs. The rate of return on capital used for the demand 
charge is 18% for older pipelines and 12% for new pipelines (pipelines installed after 
2007). The x value used in the price cap has always been 2%; the cap is revised every 
5 years or when a new investment qualifies for a revision of the capital allowance. 
• The distribution tariff is unregulated. PTT negotiates a price with its customers. 
 
In contrast to the cost-based approach to pricing natural gas, the wholesale price of LPG has 
been capped since 2006 at USD330 per ton compared with USD550–700 per ton for imported 
LPG. The government pays the difference between the import price and the capped price: this 
gap has increased since 2004 when those prices were about the same and the gap is now 
around THB9/kg. This system also discourages PTT from manufacturing LPG as the 
government only subsidises imported LPG. The production of domestic LPG is 350 000 tons 
per month, which is not enough for the likely increase in demand, resulting at present in 
74 000 tons of LPG being imported monthly. The additional 1-year extension of the LPG 
price cap will be a burden for the Oil Fund since it will require a subsidy of THB740 million 
per month (USD22.42 million) for imported LPG (EPPO n.d.) 
 
Similarly, the price of NGV has been capped since January 2007 at USD258 per ton, while 
the global price is roughly USD424 per ton. Originally, the regulated price was to be adjusted 
upward gradually under a laddering model so that it would reflect actual costs by 2014. 
Governments have chosen to postpone these increases.3
 
 
Unlike the case of domestic production of LPG, however, PTT is promptly compensated for 
the NGV it produces. Thus, there is no shortage of domestic supply as in the case of LPG. 
EPPO estimated that maintaining a price cap on NGV will cost taxpayers roughly 
USD9 million per month. LPG demand has been increasing so the cost of the subsidy may 
increase.4
 
 Another issue in meeting this demand is that the controlled price leaves no room 
for a distribution margin which reduces the incentive to open new stations. 
18.5 THE PERFORMANCE OF THE THAI GAS INDUSTRY AND PTT 
 
How has this regulatory model performed in terms of the development of the gas market and 
the players involved? Broadly, the results of this assessment show a strong growth in the 
capacity of the distribution system, but questions remain about the level of gas prices 
compared to those in the rest of the world. 
 
18.5.1 The Thai gas industry 
 
The demand for and supply of natural gas in Thailand expanded at a very high rate from 1986 
to 1999 when large reserves of natural gas were discovered in the Gulf of Siam (Table 18.1). 
 
                                                 
3 For example, http://www.siamdailynews.com/2009/09/29/govt-to-pin-prices-of-lpg-ngv-ft-until-aug-2010/. 
4 http://www.bangkokpost.com/breakingnews/156365/ptt-ngv-usage-soars. 
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Table 18.1: Gas supply and demand growth, 1986–2009 as calculated from data provided by EPPO. 
Average per period Supply Demand 
1986–94 15.23 15.23 
1995–99 12.54 12.55 
2000–04 3.06 14.2 
2005–09 6.55 5.77 
 
Domestic supply was able to keep up with demand until the end of the 20th century. During 
2000–04 demand outpaced supply as there was no new investment in new transmission 
pipeline capacity. However, when the ownership issues were clarified, in 2006–07 PTT was 
able to mobilise capital from the equity market to expand its transmission pipeline network 
by connecting new offshore gas fields to its onshore gas separation plants and its onshore gas 
fields to various power plants (Figure 18.5). As a result, the growth in domestic gas supply 
during 2005–09 exceeded that of demand such that the volume of imported gas fell (Figure 
18.1). 
 
 
Figure 18.5: The length of natural gas pipeline, 1981–2012. (Source: PTT Annual Report 2009. History of 
Gas Transmission. www.pttplc.com/Files/Document/Pdf/Gas/Gas_en2.pdf, pipelines investment plan). 
 
The natural gas industry, therefore, has undergone relatively healthy growth in terms of 
supply. PTT has been effective in seeking and developing new sources of natural gas supply 
overseas and investing in transmission capacity. The relatively high allowable rate of return 
on investment (internal rate of return on equity of 18%) is above the risk-adjusted rate for 
capital borrowing in the market place. These conditions have provided the incentives for PTT 
to expand its transmission pipeline network to facilitate growth in domestic gas supply. 
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) as a proportion of net sales for the gas operation has 
been higher than that in the petroleum and petrochemical businesses, which operate in more 
competitive markets (Figure 18.6). 
 
PTT has performed well to meet the rapid growth of domestic demand for gas. The enterprise 
has also been one of the most efficient among its government-owned peers. A study by Hunt 
and Mantajit (2005) found that the pre-privatisation PTT was relatively efficient when 
compared with its counterparts in Japan, UK and Malaysia. The company was therefore able to 
take good advantage of access to direct financing once it became a listed company. 
 
18.5.2 Gas prices 
 
The price of natural gas depends on the wellhead prices plus the various margins. As noted 
above, the wellhead price is relatively low in Thailand. Lower wellhead gas prices due to lower 
cost of production and proximity of gas supply to demand also allowed the retail price of 
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Figure 18.6: PTT’s EBIT/net sales ratio, 2002–09. (Source: PTT annual reports) 
 
natural gas to be lower than that prevailing in other economies that do not have their own gas 
supplies, while also allowing PTT to retain its margins. According to the study by Asia Pacific 
Energy Research Centre (2003), retail natural gas prices in Thailand have always been well 
below those of Chinese Taipei, Korea or Japan. Meanwhile NGV users enjoy subsidised retail 
tariffs. 
 
18.5.3 Gas quality 
 
According to Laoonual et al (2007), Thailand did not have a quality standard of natural gas 
like that established by the California Air Resource Board (CARB), the ‘clean air agency’ of 
California. The quality of NGV produced varied widely depending on the particular gas field. 
Natural gas from onshore fields in northeastern Thailand on average contains 76% methane 
and 13% carbon dioxide, while that from offshore fields in Myanmar contains 72.4% 
methane, 6.2% carbon dioxide and 16% nitrogen. According to the CARB, natural gas traded 
must have a combined carbon dioxide and nitrogen component not exceeding 1.4% and a 
methane number not less than 80 (except in some locations which have a minimum of 73). In 
standards found in other economies, the carbon dioxide component is usually required to 
remain below 3%. Hence, the quality of natural gas in Thailand, in particular that from the 
onshore fields in the eastern region, is below the international standard. NGV in Thailand 
may not be cleaner than LPG or gasoline in the absence of proper separation of carbon 
dioxide from the raw gas supply. In July 2009 the Department of Energy Business established 
a standard for natural gas to be used for NGV, but these standards are still inferior to the 
international ones. 
 
18.6 CONCLUSION 
 
The case of gas in Thailand illustrates a number of aspects of structural reform. These include 
the forces which cause an extensive reform strategy to shift and evolve in the process of 
implementation. At the same time, this case illustrates that a reform plan which is less 
extensive than originally conceived can have significant effects. Thailand’s gas sector also 
illustrates a situation common in the region of energy prices below world market levels – 
substantial energy subsidies. As energy prices rise, this policy, however, may not be 
sustainable for fiscal reasons, and the forces which might emerge in Thailand may also be 
important in other economies. 
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The sequence of events was that a 1998 master plan laid out the reform of the gas sector in 
Thailand. This included the separation of production and transmission and the introduction of 
competition at all stages. The government entity, PTT, would be corporatised and privatised. 
An independent regulator would be established. This plan was overtaken, however, by a 
change of government in 2001 and its adoption of a strategy of focusing on the promotion of 
national champions, which involved more emphasis on development of some key enterprises 
to contribute to a wider set of policy goals than on competition in the marketplace. A 
minority share of PTT was sold to private owners but other elements of market reform were 
not adopted. More recently, and following another change of government in 2006, a 
regulatory agency has been established with extensive systems of cost-based regulation at 
least for natural gas. Other elements of the market reform agenda have still not been 
implemented.   
 
One of the significant consequences of this reform package has been rapid growth in the 
capacity of the gas system. Since its listing in 2001, PTT has grown rapidly and performed 
well to meet the rapid growth in domestic demand for natural gas by its constant search for 
and development of new sources of gas in neighbouring economies and expansion of 
transmission capacity accordingly. Its rapid infrastructure roll out was a response to the 
relatively generous allowable rate of return for its transmission tariff.  
 
Meanwhile, because of a large domestic and regional gas supply and a government subsidy at 
the wellhead level gas prices have remained relatively low. This approach to pricing involves 
distortions in consumption decisions. The low prices are not a reflection of competition in 
distribution and transmission, which remains absent. 
 
The two current issues are therefore pricing and the lack of competition in distribution and 
transmission. Competition could be introduced, and the steps to doing so include: 
• requiring PTT to divest its equity share in many of upstream and downstream gas 
businesses and to allow third party access to the transmission pipelines; and 
• enforcing the competition law, which is important in a market that is so highly 
concentrated – PTT’s current immunity from the Trade Competition Act 1999 would 
be abolished in that case. 
 
On the other main issue of pricing, there are no significant forces for further reform either 
from within the sector or from its customers. PTT’s main customers are power plants and its 
own gas separation plants. Although fewer than 300 customers are industrial users, many of 
them are petrochemical plants and natural gas distribution companies also affiliated with 
PTT. PTT’s integrated operations and its control of the critical infrastructure reduce the 
incentives for it to maximise throughput in order to earn its target rate of return. Meanwhile, 
the retail price of NGV and the wholesale price of LPG are controlled at a rate well below 
cost. Thus, consumers enjoy low gas prices and have less interest in reforms of gas policy. 
 
However, because of the fiscal consequences of the current policy package this situation may 
not be sustainable. A source of pressure for reform may be that the local gas supply is 
running out and PTT will have to import an increasing volume of more expensive LNG from 
distant places. For now, government import subsidies have sheltered consumers from rising 
costs but the pressure for reform could mount if fiscal pressures cause these subsidies to be 
abolished. But because LPG is used in many households for cooking, a change of policy 
involves political risks, despite the fiscal implications of the lack of reform. 
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Chapter 19 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN CHINESE TAIPEI 
 
 
Roy Chun Lee1
 
 
 
• A liberalisation program began in Chinese Taipei in 1997, first in mobile then in fixed-line 
services. The subsequent change in performance was remarkable in comparison with other 
APEC member economies. 
• Fixed-line, mobile and broadband service penetration significantly improved over the last 
two decades, while price has been decreasing rapidly over the same period. 
• Some access charges for mobile services fell to zero in 2004, after the introduction of 3G 
mobile services: this pricing model facilitates access to services, while suppliers recoup 
costs through use charges. 
 
 
19.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The structural reform of Chinese Taipei’s telecommunications sector is a recent development. 
Entry was prohibited prior to 1996. The integrated and monopolist incumbent was an 
administrative branch of the government, which was at the same time the regulator. 
 
Until 1987 the Directorate General of Telecommunications (DGT) of the Ministry of 
Communications and Transport enjoyed a statutory monopoly under the Telecommunications 
Act of 1978 on all telecommunications services and equipment supplies in Chinese Taipei. Any 
party other than the DGT that provided services or apparatus faced administrative penalties 
enforced by the DGT. 
 
While paging and other value-added services had been liberalised earlier, in 1996 the 
government passed three major pieces of legislation – the Telecommunications Act, the 
Organization Act of Directorate of Telecommunications and the Organization Act of the 
Chung-Hwa Telecom (CHT) Co. Through this legislation, structural reform began in the 
telecommunications sector. The legislation underpinned the introduction of structural reform 
through the separation of service provision from the public sector and the creation of 
licensing regimes that allowed the entry of private telecommunications operators.  
 
Specifically, the Telecommunications Act mandated that service provision be separated from 
the DGT and transferred to the newly established CHT. In the lead up to market liberalisation, 
the Act created a licensing regime by defining the legal relationship between the regulator and 
operators in the new multi-player context. A pro-competition regulatory regime, consistent with 
the WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications, (hereinafter WTO Reference Paper) 
was also created to promote competition post market opening.2
                                                 
1 Associate Research Fellow, Taiwan WTO Center, CIER (roy.lee@cier.edu.tw). 
 
2 Chinese Taipei undertook the obligations contained in the reference paper as an additional commitment in its 
WTO Schedule of Commitments (GATS/SC/136/Rev.1, July 2002). 
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According to the government’s Liberalization Policy White Paper (1997), the objectives of 
the structural reform effort were to ‘promote fair competition’, ‘remove barriers to new 
technologies’ and ‘improve operational efficiency’. The White Paper also specified a 
timetable for subsequent liberalisation initiatives, beginning with second-generation (2G) 
mobile services open to competition in 1997 and fixed-line operation in 2001. The sequence 
of liberalisation will be discussed in Section 19.2. 
 
The timetable was influenced by external pressures and considerations. Chinese Taipei was at 
that time negotiating its WTO accession with major trading partners, including the USA and 
the European Union, who requested a clear market opening time schedule. 
 
According to Chinese Taipei’s privatisation law, the incumbent operator CHT was considered 
a privatised company (i.e., with the government’s shares below 50%) in 2005 – 4 years after 
the liberalisation of the fixed-line market. The privatisation process faced little resistance 
from unions, as market competition was sufficient for CHT to be free from the constraints 
applicable to public sector institutions. The government, however, remained the single largest 
share holder of the company (around 34% of total equity), with controlling power over the 
appointment of the directors and senior management positions. This makes the CHT 
essentially still a government-controlled operator.  
 
Recent developments include the creation of a new and independent regulator, the National 
Communications Commission (NCC), in 2006. The NCC is responsible for regulating both 
the telecommunications and broadcasting sectors. Table 19.1 provides a chronicle snapshot of 
major policy milestones in Chinese Taipei’s telecommunications structural reform process. 
 
Table 19.1: Sequence of telecommunications reforms in Chinese Taipei, pre-1996–2008. 
Reform initiative Pr
e 
19
96
 
19
96
 
19
97
 
19
98
 
19
99
 
20
00
 
20
01
 
20
02
 
20
03
 
20
04
 
20
05
 
20
06
 
20
07
 
20
08
 
Paging service liberalised               
Basic telecommunications 
legislation               
2G mobile market licensed               
Fixed-line market liberalised               
3G mobile market liberalised               
Acceded to the WTO               
Incumbent operator 
privatised               
Converged regulator 
(telecommunications + 
broadcasting) established 
              
Wireless broadband access 
(Wimax) licensed               
Source: NCC 2009. 
Note: The basic legislation, the Telecommunications Act, established the pro-competition regulatory regime; the 
Organizational Act, the independent regulator; and the Incorporation Act, the incumbent operator. 
 
19.2 LICENSING REGIME AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
19.2.1 Licensing regime 
 
In accordance with the Act, every telecommunications operator in Chinese Taipei, regardless 
of the nature of the service it provides, must be licensed. Apart from defining the rights and 
obligations of service providers, this gives the regulator the opportunity to use the licensing 
regime as an instrument to ‘manage’ a desired market structure by controlling the sequence 
and number of licences to be issued. 
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The licensing approach for fixed-line Type I operations in Chinese Taipei best demonstrates 
how the licensing regime was used to assist a smooth transition to competition (DGT 1997). 
From 1997 Type II operations in Chinese Taipei were authorised through a general licensing 
system, that is, a licence would be issued to all qualified applicants who met a general set of 
technical and consumer protection requirements, with no limitation on the number of licences 
(except ‘special’ Type II services, which were liberalised in 2001) (Table 19.2). 
 
Table 19.2: Comparison of the market opening timetable and restrictions. 
Licensing category Opening timetable Type of licensing 
Numerical 
restrictions 
Type I – full-service fixed-line 
operation 
1st round: 1999 
2nd round: 2004 
Since 2008: application is open 
throughout the year. 
Franchise 
1st round: Yes 
2nd round: No 
Since 2008: No  
Type I – individual services 
fixed-line operation 
2004 
Since 2008: no restriction Franchise 
1st round: Yes 
2nd round: No 
Since 2008: No 
Type I mobile operation GSM: 1997 3G: 2003 Franchise 
No: based on 
spectrum availability 
Type I Wireless broadband 
access (Wimax) operation 2008 Franchise 
No: based on 
spectrum availability 
Type II operation 1997 General authorisation No 
Type II ‘special’ operation (e.g., 
VoIP that requires number 
allocation) 
2001 General authorisation No 
Source: NCC 2009. 
 
The Type I mobile service was liberalised in 1997 with the issuing of four nationwide and 
two regional GSM (2G) mobile licences. However, mergers and acquisitions led to only three 
GSM operators being left bt the end of 2008, all of them declared Significant Market Players 
(SMPs). In 2002 3G operations were licensed with the issuing of five licences. Entry was 
now limited only by the availability of radio spectrum assigned to mobile operations. 
 
The issuing of fixed-line Type I licences did not take place until 2001, when three full-service 
fixed-line licences were granted. In the initial stage there were seven consortia competing for 
this pre-determined limited number of new licences. As a result, an assessment based on 
technical innovation, financial capacity and past experience had to be held. The numerical 
restriction on fixed-line licences was removed from 2008. 
 
Type I licences are issued by the regulator in conjunction with a concession franchise, a 
privilege granted by the government as opposed to a de jure right that Type II applicants are 
entitled to. 
 
The Telecommunications Act specifies two categories of telecommunications operations, 
namely, Type I telecommunications enterprises (Type I) and Type II telecommunications 
enterprises (Type II) (Table 2.3). Type I operations are network-based operators that install 
telecommunications network facilities in order to provide telecommunications services. Type 
II operations are telecommunications enterprises other than Type I telecommunications 
enterprises (Telecommunications Act, ss. 1 and 2 and §11), that is, those that do not own 
physical network facilities. Another feature of this facility and non-facility dichotomy is the 
integration of voice telephony services with facility-based operations. 
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Table 19.3: Telecommunications service classification systems in Chinese Taipei. 
Carrier categories Designated service provisions Types of licensing 
Type I (facility-based) Voice telephony and data transmission 
Full service licence 
Individual service licencea 
Mobile licence 
Type II (service-based) None except Special Type II services 
Type II 
Special Type II: voice resale, Internet 
telephony and mobile voice resale 
Note: a individual service licensees can only operate through the provision of either local, domestic long 
distance or international services. 
 
The service categories reserved exclusively for Type I fixed-line businesses are, in addition to 
their network leasing service, voice telephony connections between local, domestic, long 
distance and international destinations. These service categories are set out in the Regulations 
Governing Fixed Network Telecommunications Businesses (the Fixed Network Regulations), 
which is an administrative rule authorised by the Act. Operations in each of these telephony 
service categories, except for the holder of a full-service licence, require separate licences. 
For Type I mobile operations, the service provision includes both nationwide mobile 
telephony and data services. 
 
In contrast, Type II operations do not have a pre-determined set of service categories other 
than voice-related operations. Voice service operators that do not own network facilities, 
including simple voice resale, VoIP, international telephony through leased international 
circuit and virtual mobile network operations (VMNO), are classified as Special Type II 
operators and they must apply for Special Type II licences. 
 
In accordance with the Fixed Network Regulations, the regulator has the discretion to add 
other services to the list of Special Type II services as it deems appropriate. VMNO is the 
provision of a mobile voice telephony service by purchasing spare spectrum and network 
facility capacity from Type I mobile operators. It is the mobile analogue of voice resale. 
 
It should be noted that no additional licence is required in order for Type I operators to 
provide Type II services. 
 
In addition, Chinese Taipei adopts an asymmetric regulatory approach, whereby a Type I 
licensee classified as a SMP incurs additional burdens, especially with regard to price setting, 
interconnection and facility-sharing obligations. The qualification of SMP, as stipulated in 
the Administrative Regulation Governing Tariffs of Type I Telecom Enterprises, is judged by 
three criteria: 
• a market share threshold measured in terms of either sale value or subscription rate 
that exceeds 25% of the relevant service market;  
• dominant power over the market price; and  
• the control of essential telecommunications facilities. 
 
Currently the regulator has declared the incumbent CHT as the SMP in both Type I fixed-line 
and mobile operations. Interestingly, two new entrants in the mobile service market, Taiwan 
Mobile and FarEast Tone (FET), were also declared as SMPs for Type I mobile operations 
from 2007, making all 2G mobile operators SMPs. The consequence is that if all operators in 
a particular market are SMPs, the original intention of the Telecom Act to apply regulations 
asymmetrically to SMPs and non-SMPs becomes meaningless. The loosely defined 
qualification for SMP has been criticised for this peculiar outcome (Lee 2010). 
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19.2.2 Market structure 
 
The full market entry liberalisation policy facilitated the issuing of a total of 109 Type I 
(facility-based) and 495 Type II (service-based) licences at the end of 2009. Yet Chinese 
Taipei’s fixed-line and mobile markets remain concentrated. As at 2009, there were four 
integrated fixed-line service operators in Chinese Taipei: CHT, Taiwan Fixed Line 
Communications, Asia Pacific Telecom and Sparq Telecom. Nonetheless, as reflected in 
Chinese Taipei’s experience, regulating market dominance to foster competition is not an 
easy task. Notwithstanding the introduction of pro-competition regulatory measures discussed 
below, the incumbent operator CHT still dominates the fixed-line market (Figure 19.1). It is 
especially worth noting that CHT enjoys a market share exceeding 97% for local telephony 
services. Further, dominance in a local telephony market often provides the operator with an 
advantage in the provision of broadband access services such as ADSL and fibre-based 
access services, and this is the case for Chinese Taipei, where CHT accounts for 83.8% of 
market share for the fixed broadband (including cable modem) market (CHT 2008). Evidence 
suggests that the policy enabling access to local loops is not delivering its intended objective, 
and is hindering the broadband development (see discussion in Section 19.4). 
 
The mobile market is more competitive where the market shares of operators are less unequal 
compared to those in fixed-line services, with CHT sharing a similar market share with two 
primary competitors (Taiwan Mobile and FET) for both 2G and 3G markets (Figure 19.2). 
Reasons for this development are most likely related to the network deployment cost, network 
scalability, market demand for a mobile network vis-à-vis fixed-line and a relative lack of 
‘bottlenecks’. 
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Figure 19.1: Market share in Chinese Taipei’s fixed-line market, 2009 (% of total subscribers). (Source: 
NCC 2009) 
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Figure 19.2: Market share in Chinese Taipei’s mobile market, 2009 (% of total subscribers). (Source: 
NCC 2009) 
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19.3 PRO-COMPETITION REGULATIONS 
 
19.3.1 Interconnection regime 
 
As prescribed in the Telecommunications Act and the Regulations Governing Network 
Interconnection among Telecommunications Enterprises (hereinafter called the 
Interconnection Rules), the interconnection and access regulations in Chinese Taipei follow 
the principle of transparency, reasonableness and non-discrimination. All facility-based Type 
I operators are mandated, upon request, to interconnect with each other, either directly or 
indirectly through transit arrangements with third parties (Telecommunications Act, §16, para. 
1). The regime also adopts an asymmetric approach that places additional requirements on the 
SMP to unbundle its network elements, adopt cost-based pricing and share certain essential 
network facilities with competitors. 
 
In all cases, an interconnection agreement is deemed to be a commercial contract. All terms 
and conditions, including the point of interconnection (POI) and tariff, are subject to bilateral 
negotiation (the Interconnection Rules, §7 and §14). The regulator is not in a position to 
intervene for mediation and arbitration unless operators fail to reach agreement within 3 
months from the date of the initial request. Even if the agreement is treated as a private 
contract, it is still required to observe certain provisions. These include requirements that 
agreement on the terms and quality of an interconnection should be non-discriminatory and 
that information exchanged between carriers to facilitate the interconnection of networks 
should be considered proprietary, and thus confidential. In the draft amendment of the 
Interconnection Rules published by the DGT in mid 2005, interconnection tariffs between 
non-dominating operators are also required to follow a cost-based and non-discriminatory 
approach.  
 
Regulations for an interconnection agreement involving a SMP are different, and the POI is 
not the subject of negotiation. The Interconnection Rules prescribe a list of POIs where a 
dominating operator is obliged to offer interconnection with competitors upon request. The 
dominating operator is mandated to unbundle its network into trunk, local and switching 
components. The interconnection tariff must be calculated separately based on a Total 
Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC) pricing formula set forth by the regulator. In 
accordance with the Interconnection Rules (§2), TELRIC refers to the long run 
forward-looking cost added to telecommunications enterprises for making use of equipment; 
its functions are related, directly or indirectly, to unbundled network elements in order to 
offer network interconnections. 
 
The final tariff is subject to approval by the regulator. The dominating operator must disclose 
the formula and method used in calculating the tariff. Also, the interconnection agreements 
between a dominating operator and other operators must be made publicly available as a 
reference for subsequent negotiations (articles 16 and 26 of the Interconnection rules). 
 
Prior to 2003, the interconnection regime in Chinese Taipei did not extend to Type II 
operators. Interconnection between Type I and Type II operators is viewed as a private issue 
and arranged by commercial negotiation. A series of disputes have arisen since the 
liberalisation of voice-based Type II service provisions in 2001. These prompted the 
regulator to amend the Telecommunications Act and the Interconnection Rules in 2003 to 
include voice-based Special Type II operations under the interconnection regime. 
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The application of the interconnection regulations between Type I and Type II 
interconnections is rather limited; it only imposes the duty to provide interconnection with a 
regulatory arbitration when parties fail to reach consent within 3 months. As there is no 
requirement for cost-based pricing for interconnection between Type I and Type II operators, 
the regulatory arbitration mechanism will not be able to set the interconnection tariff for any 
interconnection disputes. This feature consequently constrains the capacity of the regulatory 
arbitration to settle interconnection disputes.3
 
 
Current regulation on interconnection tariffs (i.e., termination charges) in Chinese Taipei has 
been focused on its role in facilitating competition. Only the interconnection tariff set by the 
SMP is required to be cost-based and subject to regulatory approval. The application of the 
regulated tariff must also be non-discriminatory, so that it is applicable to all interconnection 
seekers. 
 
The DGT amended the Interconnection Rules in 2005 to introduce cost-based and 
non-discriminatory rules for the calculation of interconnection tariffs across all operator 
categories. Yet given the bilateral contract nature of interconnection agreements between 
non-dominating operators, non-discriminatory rules would only be ‘on paper’ where there is 
a dispute and parties seek regulatory arbitration. This is because current rules do not require 
non-dominating operators to disclose their individual interconnection agreements and thus 
new negotiations cannot draw reference from the tariffs as well as terms and conditions 
agreed previously. Without this basis for comparison, it would be difficult for the negotiating 
party and regulator to assess if price and non-price conditions in a later agreement were 
non-discriminatory. Still, between 2006 and 2008 the regulator intervened to assist the 
establishment of 48 co-location sites. 
 
Another unique feature of the interconnection tariff regulation in Chinese Taipei is that the 
access charge between mobile and fixed-line networks are decided by the mobile operator, 
regardless of which network originates the call. This arrangement departs from a common 
observation made by other regulators and the literature (Armstrong 2002; Albon & York 
2004); they point out that, due to the lack of substitutes, a mobile operator enjoys a 
termination monopoly over calls made to its subscribers. This provides the opportunity and 
incentive for a mobile operator to set an access price that is above the competitive level. As 
such, there are several likely anti-competitive effects in Chinese Taipei’s approach to 
regulating the fixed-line to mobile access charges. Firstly, pricing is not cost-based because 
interconnection tariffs are determined unilaterally by the mobile operators instead of 
bilaterally negotiated: this means, at the least, that the cost of the fixed-line partner in an 
interconnection relationship is not taken into consideration. In practice, all mobile operators 
in Chinese Taipei have set fixed-line to mobile access charges almost identical to each other 
through regulator-assisted group negotiations. 4
 
 Secondly, this structure encourages the 
mobile operators to set the access charge above the competitive level without the need to 
worry about losing subscribers. Overall, this structure virtually implies that the fixed-line 
operator is subsidising mobile operators. With mobile market already out-performing the 
fixed-line market in recent years, this structure is increasingly unsustainable.  
                                                 
3 In addition to the interconnection agreement, fixed-line SMP (i.e., CHT) is offering other whole services (e.g., 
leased line) to other Type I and II operators at tariffs regulated by the NCC. 
4 See the regulator-approved fixed-to-mobile tariff at http://www.cht.com.tw/PersonalCat.php?Module=Fee, 
Describe&CatID=113&PageID=1694 (accessed on 17 August 2010). 
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For these reasons, the NCC announced in 2008 its plan to cease this arrangement in 2011. 
While retail tariff for a fixed-to-mobile call is still set by mobile operators, the NCC has 
introduced a ‘make-up’ component in the NCC-approved fixed-to-mobile access charge 
formula to minimise the subsidising effect. 
 
19.3.2 Access to essential facilities 
 
The regulatory survey undertaken in this report finds that 13 of the 21 APEC members have, 
in varying forms, mandatory third-party access provisions (i.e., regulations that mandate a 
major supplier to offer access to essential facilities). 
 
One of Chinese Taipei’s third party access regulations assists new entrants to build their own 
networks by providing access to right-of-way. The regulator has declared a range of physical 
locations that are considered ‘right-of-way bottlenecks’, and the holder of right-of-way (i.e., 
the incumbent) is required to share these locations with competitors. These include public 
bridges, public tunnels, main access pipelines, distribution frame rooms as well as 
telecommunications pipelines in multi-complex buildings. 
 
A ‘Local Loop Unbundling’ (LLU) rule has emerged as a popular arrangement to foster both 
competition and broadband development (OECD 2003a). Specifically, an LLU rule consists 
of two requirements: a dominating and vertically integrated operator is required to unbundle 
formerly integrated network components in local access into separate elements, and the 
dominant operator has to render access to its unbundled network elements to access seekers at 
a reasonable and non-discriminatory price and non-price terms and conditions. 
 
In ensuring this is achieved, an access provider’s individual or reference access undertakings 
are subject to regulatory approval in some economies (e.g., Australia), while others (e.g., 
Chinese Taipei) adopt a regulatory arbitration approach so that the regulator only intervenes 
when a commercial leasing negotiation has failed to reach agreement. In essence, an LLU 
rule offers two categories of open access to the local loop. 
 
The open access regime in Chinese Taipei in essence imposes a duty on a SMP to share certain 
network elements in the local loop with rivals. These network elements have to be unbundled 
so that an access seeker can lease only the elements that are required. The Telecommunications 
Act stipulates that a SMP cannot refuse a request for leasing a network component by other 
Type I telecommunications enterprises without due cause. In addition, the Interconnection 
Rules in Chinese Taipei require that the local loop be further unbundled between the subscriber 
lines, local switching facilities and trunk network between local switching offices. 
 
The Telecommunications Act does not, however, provide authorisation for the regulator to 
determine access tariffs and the pricing model. The only exceptions are in a limited list of 
network facilities that were declared to be ‘bottlenecks’ (§37) for which leasing tariffs had to 
be cost based. In 2006 the twisted-pair local loop was added to the list and in 2009 other 
elements were added: public bridges, public tunnels and main access pipelines, distribution 
frame rooms, in-building telecommunications pipelines in multi-complex buildings and local 
access networks. Of note is that all bottleneck facilities are related to fixed-line operations, as 
there have been no bottleneck facilities declared for mobile operations. 
 
Despite frequent requests from access seekers since the LLU policy was introduced in 2006, 
it is not functioning as expected. This appears to be mainly because parties have failed to 
agree on the level of unbundling, the services that can be provided over the unbundled local 
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loop and, most importantly, the tariffs for leasing network elements. New entrants have 
reported that, as of 2009, little more than 200 lines have been leased by new entrants.5
 
 
19.3.3 Universal service obligations 
 
Teledensity in Chinese Taipei reached 171% per household at the end of 2008 (CHT 2009), 
which reflects the fact that network coverage is almost universal. This is perhaps the result of 
past policy before market liberalisation which demanded that the state-owned incumbent 
provide voice services upon request to all citizens at a uniform and affordable price. 
Traditionally, any deficit incurred by the incumbent in implementing this policy was 
compensated by a direct state budget or cross-subsidy from long distance and international 
services (DGT 1997). 
 
The prohibition of cross-subsidies, in tandem with the increased level of competition in the 
subsidising service markets post liberalisation, significantly limited the incumbent’s ability to 
recover losses in undertaking the universal service obligation. It was in this capacity that the 
then current USA regime emerged to establish an industry-wide universal service funding 
scheme levied on all eligible telecommunications operators. 
 
The Regulation on Telecommunication Universal Services (hereinafter called the Universal 
Service Rules) in Chinese Taipei defines ‘universal services’ as the provision of ‘indispensable 
telecommunications services with a reasonable level of quality provided fairly and at 
reasonable rates for all citizens’. Currently services considered ‘indispensable’ include voice 
telephony and data communications. Specifically, the scope of services set out in the Universal 
Service Rules (USR) include both uneconomic public payphone services, telephone services in 
uneconomical areas provided via a fixed-line PSTN and broadband Internet access to public 
schools and libraries at a subsidised price. The term ‘uneconomic area’ is defined as an area 
where the avoidable costs of the service provided to it by a local exchange office exceeds the 
amount of its revenue foregone. 
 
The USR designate the fixed-line incumbent CHT to be the mandatory provider of universal 
local telephony services. The reason for this designation is straightforward: it is because CHT 
has the most extensive network coverage. Still, the USR provides the procedures for other 
local network to become a universal service provider. The amount of subsidy for providing 
voice telephony under the universal regime is determined by the difference between 
avoidable costs and the amount of revenues foregone. That is, the subsidy is estimated based 
on the costs the universal service provider can avoid, and what revenues it would 
consequently forego, if it were not required to provide services in areas that are deemed 
uneconomical. 
 
The costs for providing universal services are then distributed and levied across all Type I 
and Special Type II operators in proportion to their respective annual turnovers. The 
Universal Service Rules, however, also adopt a threshold of financial eligibility based on 
market assessment, with only those operators having revenues in excess of TWD200 million 
required to make a contribution. According to the NCC’s latest survey, in 2008 contributions 
levied from eligible operators in the USA based on that monetary threshold account for 
98.4% of that economy’s total costs for that year. Inevitably, larger operators have to bear the 
costs of the levies avoided by small and exempt operators. This is a common practice to 
                                                 
5 In 2009 the NCC approved the monthly rental price per pair at TWD126, which is 10% lower than the 2007 
price of TWD140. This is to encourage new entrant operators to rent LLU owned by SMP and to enhance the 
competition of ADSL in the fixed-line market. The effect is yet to be observed. 
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reduce both the possible financial impact on low turnover and new entrants and the cost of 
managing (by minimising auditing and verifying costs) the funding mechanism without 
substantially affecting the level of equity and competitive neutrality. 
 
19.4 ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
 
19.4.1 Accessibility and price 
 
The recent performance of Chinese Taipei’s telecommunications sector has been remarkable 
in comparison with other APEC member economies. Measurements for major performance 
indicators, including fixed-line, mobile and broadband service penetration (defined as 
subscribers per 100 inhabitants), have been significantly refined over the last two decades, 
while price has been decreasing rapidly over the same period. The lack of competition in the 
fixed-line market, however, is likely to be responsible for undermining Chinese Taipei’s 
broadband development. 
 
In terms of accessibility performance, fixed-line penetration in Chinese Taipei exceeded that 
of Australia and Japan in 1998 and of the USA in 2003 (all economies with much higher per 
capita GDPs: see Figure 19.3a). Broadband performance appears to be performing well 
vis-à-vis these comparator economies (Figure 19.3b). Mobile sector’s performance is equally 
consistent that of fixed-line and broadband. As demonstrated in Figure 19.3c, a sharp increase 
in mobile penetration took place around 1998 when competitive 2G operators began, 
surpassing many pioneer economies in the region, such as the USA; Australia; and Japan. 
This trend of rapid development continued until it reached its saturation point in 2004. The 
entry of 3G mobile operators in 2003 is likely to be the reason for this rebound in penetration 
since 2005. 
 
While mobile penetration in Chinese Taipei represents a direct link between structural reform 
and performance, the relationship between fixed-line and broadband performances in Chinese 
Taipei and structural reform is less straightforward. The steady upward improvement in 
fixed-line penetration occurred before the introduction of structural reform in 1996, and no 
significant change has occurred since the fixed-line market was liberalised in 2001. On other 
hand, Chinese Taipei, once an APEC forerunner in broadband accessibility, has been lagging 
behind in broadband access since 2004. As demonstrated in Figure 19.4, the relative level of 
refinement for broadband penetration in Chinese Taipei between 2004 and 2008 is 
significantly lower than that in some other developed APEC economies. 
 
Lack of competition due to the dominance of the incumbent CHT in broadband access offers 
a possible explanation. In fact, the CHT has other potentially anti-competitive conducts that 
would reflect its strategy to deter competition. One of the recent examples was the bandwidth 
degradation incident between CHT and other Internet Service Providers (ISPs) in 2009. A 
dispute over internet interconnection charges took place between CHT and other major ISPs 
in mid 2009, with the latter requesting regulator’s arbitration. It was reported that while the 
arbitration process was still on-going, CHT unilaterally degraded the interconnection 
bandwidth with other ISPs to 75% of its normal speed when other ISPs refused to provide 
deposits before the conclusion of the arbitration.6 As CHT hosts the majority of Chinese 
Taipei’s prime websites, the impact of bandwidth degradation was felt in essence only by 
CHT’s competitors.7
                                                 
6 Report on United Daily News (21 May 2009) available at www.mag.udn.com/mag/digital/storypage. 
 
7 The bandwidth was eventually resumed a week later after the regulator’s intervention. 
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Figure 19.3a: Fixed-line penetration rates in Chinese Taipei; the USA; Australia; and Japan, 1991–2008. 
(Source: ITU 2009). 
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Figure 19.3b: Broadband penetration rates in Chinese Taipei; Australia; and Japan, 1997–2008. (Source: 
ITU 2009). 
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Figure 19.3c: Mobile penetration rates in Chinese Taipei; the USA; Australia; and Japan, 1997–2008. 
(Source: ITU 2009). 
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Figure 19.4: Percentage of change in broadband penetration between 2004 and 2008 for five APEC 
members – the USA; Canada; Singapore; Japan; and Chinese Taipei. (Source: ITU 2009) 
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Crémer et al. (2000) and Malueg and Schwartz (2001) have argued that bandwidth 
degradation can achieve the same anti-competitive outcome as pricing-based strategy. 
Chinese Taipei’s competition law authority – the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), also issued a 
statement to express its concerns on the likelihood of CHT’s degradation decision as abuse of 
market power.8
 
 Despite the swift resolution of the incident, it would possibly produce a 
chilling effect at least on future internet interconnection negotiations. 
In relation to the change in price, performance in Chinese Taipei also demonstrates a positive 
relationship between structural reform and performance. A significant reduction for mobile 
service connection and monthly subscription charges, as well as the connection charge for 
fixed-line services, took place around the beginning of the structural reform. Of note is that, 
according to ITU (2009) data, the average connection and monthly subscription charges for 
mobile services reduced to zero since 2004 after the introduction of 3G mobile services 
(Figures 19.5a and b). Yet contrary to the ITU data, charging monthly subscription fees is 
still commonly practised in Chinese Taipei.9
 
  
Similar to the situation in Viet Nam (Chapter 20) mobile operators in Chinese Taipei waive 
connection fees with the view of achieving economies of scale. In addition, the level of 
competition was significantly increased after the entry of new 3G mobile operators, and new 
entrants often offer free subscription/connection fees, bundled plan with free handset and 
possibly free on-net calls to lure subscribers to switch operators. This strategy often prompts 
existing operators to follow suit.  
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Figure 19.5a: Mobile service monthly subscription charge (USD). (Source: ITU 2009) 
 
 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
M
ob
ile
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
ch
ar
ge
 (U
SD
)
 
Figure 19.5b: Mobile service connection charge (USD). (Source: ITU 2009) 
                                                 
8 http://mag.udn.com/mag/digital/storypage.jsp?f_MAIN_ID=314&f_SUB_ID=2922&f_ART_ID=195391 
9 This observation comes from visiting mobile operator’s websites (e.g., CHT’s at www.cht.com.tw). 
410 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
19.4.2 Quantitative assessment 
 
In this section, we report on the results of independent research commissioned by Chinese 
Taipei’s telecommunications regulator (which was still the DGT at the time of 
commissioning) on the impact of liberalisation on efficiency. The report (CIER 2003) aimed 
to explore efficiency gains at both macro and micro levels. 
 
At a micro level the research examined production efficiency and the total consumer surplus 
due to price reduction. Using the Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) methodology in 
measuring production efficiency, the research found that four out of a total of six mobile 
services operators in Chinese Taipei enjoyed a technical efficiency value at 1, representing 
100% utilisation of input. But most mobile operators failed to reach scale efficiency. On the 
consumer surplus estimation, the report concluded that between 1998 and 2003 the total 
consumer surplus reached TWD222.4 billion (USD71.1 billion at the 2010 exchange rate) due 
to a reduction in the mobile retail price. For the international long distance service, the 
consumer surplus stemming from the price reduction was TWD23.69 billion (USD0.76 million) 
(CIER 2003). 
 
At the same time, the report found that the spillover benefit of telecommunications 
liberalisation in Chinese Taipei also went to the telecommunications system and terminal 
equipment manufacturing sector and the computer and information system management 
sector, as well as to the advertising and distribution services.  
 
For macroeconomic impact, the report estimated the impact of the telecommunications 
liberalisation policy with the Computable General Equilibrium model. It found that, on the 
assumption that efficiency would be improved through competition, telecommunications 
liberalisation policy in Chinese Taipei would increase 0.31% of the GDP (equivalent to 
TWD30.8 million) and TWD19.7 billion in consumer equivalent variation. That is, for every 
1% improvement in efficiency, there would be TWD2 billion and TWD1.25 billion increases 
in GDP and consumer equivalent variations respectively. At the same time, the report 
observed that there was room for improvement in telecommunications service quality and 
tariffs through international benchmarking (CIER 2003). 
 
19.5 FUTURE CHALLENGES 
 
Despite the remarkable performances discussed above, the telecommunications structural 
reform experiences in the APEC region and in Chinese Taipei suggest that policy challenges 
remain to be addressed. These challenges are likely to be common to most APEC economies. 
 
19.5.1 Market dominance 
 
Market dominance plays a dual role in the characterisation and specification of regulatory 
treatment. The first role is dominance in the local loop. The local loop is considered to be a 
bottleneck for competition in a downstream market with a SMP, where the SMP has the 
ability and incentive to deter competition when it is itself competing in the same downstream 
market (Economides 2004). Although facility-based competition is allowed at policy level, 
ensuring third party access to an incumbent-dominated local access network is viewed as the 
preferred way to encourage entry, by lowering the risks and entry barriers at the initial stage 
of a market’s opening. 
 
Nonetheless, as reflected in Chinese Taipei’s experience, regulating market dominance to 
foster competition is not an easy task. Despite the introduction of pro-competition regulatory 
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measures as discussed above, CHT still dominates the fixed-line market. Further, as 
demonstrated in the bandwidth degradation case discussed above, dominance in the local 
telephony market gives CHT the opportunity to leverage its dominance to the provision of 
broadband access services such as ADSL and fibre-based access services. 
 
19.5.2 Convergence 
 
Convergence refers to the development that, due to digitalisation and IP-based technologies, 
traditional market boundaries have been removed and both broadcasting and 
telecommunications are coming together. Convergence becomes a policy issue when 
regulatory regimes are not updated with technological and market development, thus 
becoming barriers instead of facilitators. It is becoming increasingly evident that new 
IP-enabled services that are, in most respects, ‘like’ services to their traditional counterparts, 
are not receiving non-discriminatory treatment. 
 
For example, when CHT launched its IPTV service over the broadband telecommunications 
network in 2006, it could not apply for a cable TV system licence. This is because each cable 
TV system licensee in Chinese Taipei can only offer service in one specific ‘servicing 
area’;10 there is thus no licensing category that meets the profile of CHT’s nation-wide 
network coverage.11
 
 
Another example is the debate over the legal basis for the issuance of mobile TV licences. If 
mobile TV is defined as a digital free-to-air TV on a hand-held device, the Broadcasting Act 
would be applicable. Nevertheless, Chinese Taipei’s Broadcasting Act prohibits foreign 
investment, and this would disqualify all existing mobile operators from participating as they 
all have foreign equity holding).12
 
 
19.5.3 Competitive safeguards 
 
The WTO Reference Paper stipulates that appropriate measures shall be maintained to 
prevent major operators, alone or together, engaging in or continuing anti-competitive 
practices. Anti-competitive practices carried out by operators, in particular operators with 
market power, pose a major barrier to competition and trade. Regulating operators with 
market power in the telecommunications market has been widely discussed. 
 
In light of communications convergence, issues of cross-sector anti-competition practices are 
surfacing that require further attention. For example, it has been reported that TV program 
distributors owned by cable TV operators in Chinese Taipei have refused to supply TV 
programs (or in some cases supply only inferior quality programs) to IPTV services offered 
by telecommunications operators. While most of the refusals are based on disagreement over 
price and non-price terms and conditions, some of the refusals have been argued by some to 
be with the intention to distort competition.13
                                                 
10 There are 52 ‘servicing areas’ defined by Chinese Taipei’s Cable TV Act. 
 This indicates that the concept of ‘bottleneck 
facilities’ in communications convergence needs to be redefined to address both hardware 
and ‘software’ bottlenecks (ITU 2008). 
11 To resolve the issue, the regulator amended the ‘Regulations Governing Fixed Network Telecommunications 
Business’ and defined IPTV over telecommunications networks as ‘telecom multimedia platform service’ 
instead of a cable TV system service. 
12 This issue is still pending as at August 2010. 
13 Information collected through field interviews at file with the author. 
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Unfortunately, while competitive safeguard rules are included in the Telecommunications Act 
in Chinese Taipei, there is no similar regulation available for the cable TV or other 
broadcasting sectors. While there is a generic competition law to address possible 
anti-competition measures, its ex-post nature makes it less effective in regulating 
anti-competition measures in the broader communications sectors. 
 
19.5.4 Interconnection 
 
As discussed above, major issues in interconnection regulation in Chinese Taipei include 
non-disclosure interconnection agreements between non-dominating operators and the 
fixed-line to mobile termination charges. At the same time, with the development of next 
generation broadband networks, issues of interconnection arrangements for IP-based traffic 
have come to light. There are issues relating to costing methodologies. Also, Quality of 
Services (QoS) assurance across networks with differentiated transmission technologies and 
speed, for example, would be a challenge for regulators to avoid QoS ‘Balkanisation’ situations 
(where either an individual or each of a group of networks unilaterally adopts a set of QoS 
standards that apply only to ‘on-net’ services). 
 
Three aspects of interconnection QoS in the IP-based environment are involved: standards 
and indicators of QoS; the technical performance required of a network to ensure that 
end-to-end performance standards are met; and the division of responsibility in meeting 
performance goals between interconnecting parties. 
 
19.5.5 Access to essential facilities 
 
As discussed, access to essential facilities, in particular the LLU policy, is not delivering its 
promised objective in fostering competition and broadband diffusion in Chinese Taipei. As at 
2009 only a few more than 200 lines had been leased by new entrants and competition in the 
fixed-line market was limited by comparison with the mobile sector. 
 
In light of the development in Chinese Taipei of a next generation broadband network, recent 
discussions have focused on mandatory infrastructure sharing as a new regulatory issue. 
Technically, as traditional copper wires are replace by fibre-optical cable, substantial physical 
space will be freed from existing conduits and trenches that will enable sharing by competing 
operators who are in the process of next generation broadband network deployment. ITU 
(2008) categorises this type of infrastructure sharing as ‘passive sharing’ (which includes the 
sharing of non-electrical ‘civil engineering’ elements of the network and rights of way). ITU 
(2008) recognises that passive sharing is a critical approach in encouraging the development 
of next generation broadband network. 
 
The scope of essential facilities needs to be revisited because of convergence. The provision 
of cross-sector communication services warrants that the essential aspects, in particular the 
availability of alternative elements that are able to carry out a similar set of services, need to 
be assessed from a much broader perspective beyond traditional sector boundaries. 
 
19.5.6 Universal service obligations 
 
Each WTO member should have the right to define the kind of universal service obligations it 
wishes to maintain. These obligations will not be regarded as anti-competitive per se, 
provided that they are administered in a transparent, non-discriminatory and competitively 
neutral manner and are not more burdensome than necessary for the kind of universal service 
defined by the particular economy. 
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Traditional definitions of universal service focus on the provision of a set of pre-defined 
services, the most notable of which are voice telephony and data access. Communications 
convergence has significantly altered the pre-conditions of this traditional approach. As the 
scope of technologies to be included or omitted in a universal service scheme affects the cost, 
convergence indicates that what is required is technological neutrality that takes into account 
the viability of similar cross-networking services. The delivery modes for carrying out 
universal service obligations (however these are assigned) should not be confined by 
pre-determined technologies. 
 
Such an approach would also help to identify the qualifications required to entitle operators to 
share the cost of providing universal service. Many economies tend to impose the universal 
service contribution onto a narrowly defined group of telecommunications operators, more 
specifically levying contributions from operators who provide voice telephony services via 
fixed-line or mobile networks. As an alternative, Sicker and Mindel (2002) and the OECD 
(2006) discussed the possibility of a contribution scheme based on telephony number 
assignment to ensure a more technology-neutral funding arrangement. 
 
19.5.7 Allocation and use of spectrum and scarce resources 
 
Any procedures for the allocation and use of scarce resources, including radio spectrum, 
numbers and rights of way, are important factors determining market accessing. The WTO 
Reference Paper requires that these procedures should be objective, timely, transparent and 
non-discriminatory and that the current state of allocated frequency bands should be made 
publicly available. 
 
Emerging issues in this regard include the re-allocation and re-assignment of additional 
spectrums that are released after the digital terrestrial TV (DTV) switch over and the 
allocation and assignment of numbers to IP-based telephony services. 
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Chapter 20 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN VIET NAM 
 
 
Roy Chun Lee1
 
 
 
• Vietnam adopted a transparent and predictable regulatory environment to foster 
competition, particularly in Internet-based services, and network investment.  
• Prices and charges fell and penetration rose rapidly, exceeding that in peer economies. 
• The establishment of the universal service fund made an important contribution to 
access to services. 
 
 
20.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The telecommunications sector in Viet Nam has been considered an important element in the 
‘Doi Moi’ economic reforms that started in 1986, and the economy has achieved a remarkable 
result through structural reform initiatives that depart from the traditional state monopoly 
mould. 
 
Similar to many of its fellow APEC members, Viet Nam’s market liberalisation policy is based 
on a progressive approach. Domestic entry is allowed to provide non-facility based/value-added 
services at the initial stage, while facility-based telecommunications services are to date still 
dominated by state-owned telecommunications operators, despite the fact that intense 
competition is taking place among them. The incumbent operator is the Viet Nam Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation (VNPT), which spun off from the Department General of 
Posts and Telecommunications (DGPT) after the separation of regulatory and commercial 
functions of the latter in 1990. Following the creation of a separate regulatory entity, market 
segments were opened to competition, starting with mobile services in 1995. The international 
services market, considered the most lucrative, was opened to other providers in 2000. 
 
This case study reviews the process of the introduction of these reforms and their 
consequences. A key interest is the treatment of Internet services. The next section reviews 
the licensing regime, regulation and market structure. 
 
20.2 REGULATION AND MARKET STRUCTURE 
 
20.2.1 Private and foreign entry conditions 
 
Competition in all market segments in telecommunications in Viet Nam except value-added 
services is limited to state-owned operators that are under the supervision of different 
ministries. This policy appears to reflect the government’s philosophy that telecommunications 
is a public service that the state should control to ensure equal and affordable access to its 
citizens.2
                                                 
1 Associate Research Fellow, Taiwan WTO Center, CIER (roy.lee@cier.edu.tw). 
 However, a government decree issued in 2001 exempts Internet services from the 
2 Liberalising ASEAN Telecom, 02-009. 
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state-dominating policy. 3
 
 This regulation opens up ISP business to the private sector and 
foreign investors but reserves the provision of Internet exchange to state-owned operators or 
operators where the state holds majority shares. Internet exchange operators supply local 
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) with access to the World Wide Web via their international 
gateways.  
Foreign investment in Viet Nam’s telecommunications sector was first introduced in the form 
of a Business Cooperation Contract (BCC) scheme. A BCC scheme enables foreign partners to 
provide infrastructure deployment and financing while the local state-owned partner provides 
services, with the revenue shared among the partners (USAID 2005). However, the foreign 
partner does not have an equity claim in the assets and does not have any managerial control on 
the project. The first BCC scheme was established in 1988. As at 2009 there were still a number 
of BCCs in operation (Table 20.1). Possibly some of these will become joint venture-based 
equity participation entities when Viet Nam’s Law on Telecommunications comes into force, a 
direction that is in line with Viet Nam’s WTO commitments. 
 
Table 20.1: Examples of Business Cooperation Contracts (BCCs) in Viet Nam. 
BCC partners Began (years) Areas of cooperation 
VNPT-Telstra 1988 (6) Fixed-line services 
VNPT-Sapura (Malaysia)  1993 (8) Public phone services 
VNPT-Comvik (Sweden)  1995 (10) GSM service through Viet Nam Mobile Service 
VNPT-Voice International (Australia) 1995 (9) Paging services 
VNPT-Korea Telecom 1996 (10) Fixed-line services 
VNPT-NTT 1997 (15) Fixed-line services 
France Telecom and VNPT 1997 (15) Fixed-line services 
VNPT-Cable and Wireless  1997 (15) Fixed-line services 
SPTS-SK Telecom 2003 (*) Mobile services 
Hanoi Telecom-Hutchison Telecom (Hong 
Kong, China) 
2005 (15) Mobile services 
Source: USAID, 2005 
* Built-in clause to convert into equity participation when Viet Nam passes the Law on Telecommunications. 
 
Relaxation of foreign participation took a significant step forward when Viet Nam ratified a 
Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) with the United States of America (USA) in November 2001 
in light of Viet Nam’s application to join the WTO. The USA–Viet Nam BTA includes not only 
Viet Nam’s commitments and obligations in the telecommunications sector but also a roadmap 
and blueprints for future reform. The BTA requires Viet Nam, amongst other things, to adopt 
the regulatory principles set out in the WTO Reference Paper on Basic Telecommunications, 
(hereinafter WTO Reference Paper) in order to establish a transparent and pro-competitive 
regulatory regime, with the regime maintaining an arm’s length relationship with operators. 
 
In terms of market access, the BTA binds Viet Nam to relax its restrictions on foreign 
investment with respect to US firms and specifically allows the formation of joint ventures, 
where the US partner can have an equity share of up to 49%. Viet Nam’s main commitments 
in the BTA include: 
• Value-added telecommunications – US companies have been allowed to form joint 
ventures from 2 years after implementation of the Agreement (i.e., 2003); 
                                                 
3 Decree No. 55/2001/ND-CP, 23 August 2001. 
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• Basic telecommunications, including mobile cellular and satellite – Viet Nam has 
allowed US companies to form joint ventures since 4 years after implementation of 
the Agreement (i.e., 2005); and 
• Voice telephone services – US companies have been allowed to form joint ventures 
since 6 years after implementation of the Agreement (i.e., 2007). 
The joint ventures are not allowed to build a backbone network or gateway facilities but must 
lease these from VNPT. 
 
An Ordinance on Posts and Telecommunications, Ordinance 43-2002-PL-UBTVQH10, was 
issued in May 2002 to implement many of Viet Nam’s obligations under the BTA. As agreed in 
the BTA, the Ordinance includes many of the regulatory principles adopted by the WTO 
Reference Paper to create a pro-competitive regulatory framework for the telecommunications 
sector. In particular, the Ordinance adopts an ‘asymmetric’ regulatory approach, which subjects 
only service providers with market power to certain regulations on pricing, quality and other 
market behaviour. An operator covered by regulation is also required to maintain separate cost 
accounting systems for each type of service where it has at least 30% market share, and is 
expressly prohibited from carrying out anti-competitive practices. The Ordinance enabled new 
entrants to increase their market shares as they are permitted to launch promotions to attract 
new customers, while the incumbent is prohibited from doing the same. Since the Ordinance 
mandates lower interconnection rates to non-dominant firms, it allows new entrants to gain cost 
advantages. In addition, the Ordinance’s implementing decree established a separate Ministry 
of Posts and Telematics to regulate the industry.4
 
 
A second reform milestone was Viet Nam’s WTO accession in 2007. As part of its accession 
commitments, Viet Nam in essence offered to all WTO members, on a most-favoured nation 
basis, more favourable market access conditions than those offered to US companies in the 
BTA. This allowed joint ventures with foreign partners to provide telecommunications services 
related to network infrastructure such as telephone services, packet-switched data transmission 
services, circuit-switched data transmission services, telex services, telegraph services, 
facsimile services and private leased circuit services. Viet Nam’s specific commitments are: 
(1) Basic telecommunications services  
• Non facilities-based services: The foreign capital contribution must not exceed 
51% of the joint venture’s capital; this limit rose to 65% 3 years after the 
accession (i.e., 2010), and without limitation on the choice of partner. For 
Virtual Private Networks, the foreign capital contribution must not exceed 
70% of the legal capital of the joint ventures. 
• Facilities-based services: On accession, joint ventures with 
telecommunications service suppliers duly licensed in Viet Nam became 
allowable. The foreign capital contribution must not exceed 49% of the legal 
capital of the joint ventures. For Virtual Private Network, the foreign capital 
contribution must not exceed 50%. 
(2) Value-added telecommunications services  
• Non facilities-based services: The foreign capital contribution must not exceed 
51% of the joint venture’s capital; this limit to rose to 65% 3 years after the 
accession (i.e., 2010), and without limitation on the choice of partner.  
• Facilities-based services: On accession, joint ventures with 
telecommunications service suppliers duly licensed in Viet Nam became 
                                                 
4 Decree 90-2002-ND-CP on Establishing Functions, Tasks, Mandates and Organisation of the Ministry of Post 
and Telecom (11 November 2002). 
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allowable. The foreign capital contribution must not exceed 50% of legal 
capital of the joint ventures.  
(3) BCC conversion 
• For both basic and value-added telecommunications services, foreign investors 
in BCCs have the opportunity to renew current arrangements or to convert 
them into another form of establishment with conditions no less favourable 
than those they currently enjoy.  
 
20.2.2 The Law on Telecommunications 
 
In light of Viet Nam’s WTO commitments, at the end of 2009 it formally passed a Law on 
Telecommunications to replace the existing Ordinance from July 2010. 5
 
 The Law on 
Telecommunications in essence establishes a framework for telecommunications regulations, 
with many specific regulatory items to be developed by implementation rules and regulations 
in the future (Informed Counsel 2010). For example, the Law divides telecommunications 
services into two categories – basic and value-added – without defining the scope of each 
category. 
Further, the Law offers a legal basis for foreign and domestic investors to participate in the 
telecommunications sector. Specifically, Article 18 stipulates that the forms and conditions 
for investment in telecommunications services applicable to foreign investors must comply 
with Vietnamese laws and Viet Nam’s WTO commitments, without further specifying the 
maximum foreign investment ceilings for each of the service categories. In this regard, the 
Law needs to be read in conjunction with Viet Nam’s WTO commitments. However, the Law 
formalises the procedures for participation through the introduction of the ‘Telecom Business 
Service Licensing’ regime, which requires foreign operators to obtain an additional 
Investment Certificate. With particular respect to structural reform, the Law also includes 
provisions for a pro-competition regulatory regime, covering aspects such as abuse of market 
power regulation, interconnection rules and access to essential facilities. 
 
The government retains control over fixed telephone service charges but operators will have 
the freedom to determine retail tariffs for other services. Yet for ‘important’ services, such as 
mobile services and the Internet, operators need to pre-register their proposed tariffs with the 
Ministry of Information and Communication (MIC) before applying the charges. 
 
Finally, a regulatory authority to be established under the Law will be in charge of regulating 
competition issues in the telecommunications sector and will act as a dispute settlement body 
for interconnection and infrastructure sharing disputes. The Law does not specify the 
independence of this authority; it is positioned as an ‘assisting’ body to the MIC.  
 
The major policy milestones in Viet Nam’s telecommunications structural reform process are 
summarised in Table 20.2. 
 
20.2.3 Licensing regime 
 
Prior to 2002 there was a lack of a transparent and clearly defined licensing regime in Viet 
Nam. As all new operators were established by different government departments (e.g., 
Viettel by the military and EVN by the electricity monopoly), local governments, state-owned 
                                                 
5 http://www.lookatViet Nam.com/2009/12/telecommunication-law-to-take-effect-next-july.html. 
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Table 20.2: Sequence of telecommunications reform in Viet Nam. 
Reform initiatives 
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BTA              
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Posts and Telematics               
Post and 
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Acceded to the WTO              
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Information and 
Communications 
             
Licensing of 3G mobile 
market              
Passage of Law on 
Telecommunications, 2009              
 
enterprises and VNPT itself (such as VNPT’s share-holding in SPT and MobiFone), licensing 
of new operators was more a matter of the government’s internal coordination. 
 
The first move towards modernising the licensing regime came with the introduction of the 
Ordinance on Post and Telecommunications in 2002. Specifically, Article 38 of the Ordinance 
provides for two types of licences: one for network infrastructure providers (Facility-based 
Operators [FBOs]) and one for telecommunications service providers (Services-based 
Operators [SBOs]). The FBO licence is exclusively reserved for state-owned or state-
controlled enterprises and has a maximum term of 15 years. The SBO licence can be awarded 
to the private sector and has a maximum term of 10 years. Nonetheless, as the Ordinance 
does not contain provisions concerning administrative transparency and due process, there are 
no requirements for the disclosure of licensing conditions or background information on 
decisions made with respect to an application for a telecommunications licence.6
 
 
Of note is that the Law on Telecommunications creates licensing regimes for basic and value-
added services. As mentioned, however, the Law does not provide definitions for either the 
scope of services under each category or the licensing procedures. At this time a lack of 
information means it is not clear how licensing each service category is to be carried out. 
 
20.2.4 Market structure 
 
Since the issuing of the first set of fixed-line licences to Viettel (100% owned by Viet Nam’s 
military) and Saigon Postal and Telecom (SPT; a joint venture between the incumbent VNPT 
and other state-owned enterprises) in 1995, there are now eight licensed fixed-line and seven 
mobile FBO operators in Viet Nam (Table 20.3), all of whom are owned by other government 
departments and/or state-owned enterprises. The latest example is the Ministry of Public 
Security which controls G-Tel: it was awarded 3G (2009) and FBO licences (2010). 
 
                                                 
6 Liberalising ASEAN Telecom, economy report. 
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Table 20.3: History of market opening in Viet Nam. 
Services 
Year second 
operator entered 
market 
No. of licenses issued 
Fixed-line service 
Local and DLD services 1995 (Viettel, SPT) 9 
(VNPT, Viettel, SPT, HT( Hanoi 
Telecom), EVN, GTel, FPT, VTC* 
and CMC. 
International services 
2000 (Viettel, SPT, ) 
Mobile service 1998 (GSM) 2009 (3G) 
 GSM and CDMA: 6 (VinaPhone, 
Viettel, Mobifone, EVN, SPT, HT) 
 3G: 4 (MobiFone , VinaPhone, 
Viettel, GTel) 
Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) 2009 1(Indochina Telecom)** 
Internet service 1997 13 ISPs; 6 IXPs; 10 IOSPs 
Sources: Various 
* License revoked on February 2010 due to failure to complete network construction requirements. 
** Leased capacity from Viettel. 
 
It is noted that, for fixed-line services, some of the new entrants are competing with VNPT at 
specific geographical areas. For instance, SPT operates its fixed-line local services in Ho Chi 
Minh City, while HT Telecom’s local service is confined to Hanoi City.  
 
Despite the good number of new entrants, the fixed-line FBO services market remains 
concentrated, with the incumbent VNPT dominating about 65% of total fixed-line 
subscriptions, and Viettel and EVN having 18.1% and 16.3% shares of the remaining market 
respectively (Figure 20.1). Yet this development should be considered as an encouraging sign, 
given the fact that Viettel’s market share was reported at a nominal 0.5% in 2002 (REPSF 
2004). It is also a positive performance when compared with that of Chinese Taipei, where 
the incumbent’s domination in the local market is close to 98%. 
 
 
Figure 20.1: Market share in Viet Nam’s fixed-line market, 2009 (% of total subscribers). (Source: MIC 
2009) 
 
The mobile market is significantly more competitive in Viet Nam. As of 2009, Viet Nam’s 
mobile market is divided in principle between three major operators, namely VinaPhone, 
Viettel and MobiFone. Viettel accounts for 31.6% market share with around 8 million 
subscribers; MobiFone accounts for 25.4% market share with 6.5 million subscribers and 
VinaPhone accounts for 31.6% market share with 5.8 million subscribers (Figure 20.2). In 
addition, Viet Nam issued four third-generation (3G) mobile licences in early 2009, to the 
three major mobile operators (i.e., MobiFone, VinaPhone and Viettel) and to one new entrant 
(GTel). In the same year, Indochina Telecom received the first Mobile Virtual Network 
Operator (MVNO) licence. An MVNO operator is not required to build its own network 
infrastructure but to lease capacities from other FBOs. 
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Figure 20.2: Market share in Viet Nam’s mobile market, 2009 (% of total subscribers). (Source: MIC 2009) 
 
It is noted, however, that while VinaPhone – the second largest operator – is a direct 
subsidiary of the incumbent, VNPT also enjoys a cross-ownership in MobiFone through its 
BCC contract with Sweden’s Comvik. This structure indicates how VNPT remains dominant 
in the mobile market.  
 
20.3 PRO-COMPETITION REGULATIONS 
 
20.3.1 Overview and regulation of operators with significant market power 
 
Before the promulgation of the Ordinance on Posts and Telecommunications in 2002 there was 
no clear regulatory framework: it was perhaps less urgent then, when the telecommunications 
sector was exclusively provided by state enterprises. But with the increased level of 
competition in all market segments, in tandem with private participation in the value-
added/services-based services, came the need to define the conditions for private participation 
in the sector. The current Law lacks important provisions with respect to transparency and 
dispute resolution, and it has also not defined the regulatory objectives. Nonetheless, it does 
have laudable provisions that promote new entry and ensure fair competition by restraining 
abusive conduct by dominant players, as well as ensuring universal access to basic services. 
 
Competition regulation in Viet Nam moved a step forward when the Law on Competition 
came into force in 2004. In particular, this Law prohibited enterprises with Significant Market 
Power (SMP) from taking any of the following abusive actions: 
• selling goods, or providing services at prices lower than the aggregate costs, in order 
to eliminate competitors; 
• imposing irrational buying or selling prices on goods or services or fixing minimum 
re-selling prices, causing damage to customers; 
• restricting production or the distribution of goods or services, limiting markets, or 
preventing technical and technological development, causing damage to customers; 
• imposing dissimilar commercial conditions in similar transactions, in order to create 
inequality in competition; 
• imposing conditions on other enterprises to conclude goods or services purchase or 
sale contracts or forcing other enterprises to accept obligations which have no direct 
connection with the subject of their contracts; and 
• preventing new competitors from entering the market. 
 
Under the Law on Competition, the definition of SMP is based on single-firm dominance and 
joint dominance. For single-firm dominance, enterprises are considered to hold the dominant 
position if they have market shares of 30% or more on the relevant market or are capable of 
restricting competition considerably. For joint dominance, a specific group of enterprises are 
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considered to hold the dominant position if they, as a group, take concerted action to restrict 
competition and fall into one of the following classes: 
• two enterprises having a total market share of 50% or more in the relevant market; 
• three enterprises having a total market share of 65% or more in the relevant market; 
and 
• four enterprises having a total market share of 75% or more in the relevant market. 
 
In accordance with the Implementation Decree (Decree 116/2005/ND-CP), the Law on 
Competition is applicable to the telecommunications sector. As a result, in 2008 the MIC 
published a list of business services and telecommunications enterprises with SMP (Decision 
1622; Table 20.4). Telecommunications enterprises included in the list are subject to the 
MIC’s regulation on the retail tariff: they must submit any proposal to change the retail tariff 
to the MIC before issuing the tariff, and ‘basic’ and ‘important’ interconnection charges that 
would greatly affect the telecommunications market are also decided by the MIC. 
 
Table 20.4: SMP telecommunications enterprises, 2008. 
Services market SMP operator Single or Group SMP 
International voice VNPT Single 
DLD Voice  VNPT Single 
International and Domestic leased line VNPT, Viettel, EVN Telecom Group 
Mobile services Viettel, MobiFone, VinaPhone Group 
Wireless local voice EVN Telecom Single 
Internet (leased line and ADSL) VNPT, FPT, Viettel Group 
Source: MIC 2009 
 
The anti-competition rules in the Law on Competition were incorporated into the Law on 
Telecommunications. The new provision on competition in the telecommunications business 
is Article 19 of the Law on Telecommunications. Specifically, telecommunications 
enterprises are prohibited from implementing practices that restrain competition and may not 
engage in unfair competitive practices. The Law also includes telecommunications-specific 
SMP regulations which control essential telecommunications facilities. Those regulations 
prohibit SMP telecommunications enterprises from: 
• improperly intermingling different telecommunications services for an unfair 
competitive purpose; 
• using their priority on telecommunications networks and essential facilities to impede 
market penetration, or limiting or creating obstacles for other telecommunications 
enterprises in providing telecommunications services; 
• using information about other telecommunications enterprises for unfair competitive 
purposes; and 
• providing other telecommunications enterprises with technical information on 
essential facilities and related trade information for providing telecommunications 
services in a timely manner. 
 
At this stage, however, it is not clear about the division of jurisdiction between MIC and 
other competition authorities (the Viet Nam Competition Administration Department [VCAD] 
and the Viet Nam Competition Council [VCC]) over the regulation of anti-competitive 
practices in the telecommunications sector. 
 
20.3.2 Interconnection regime 
 
Article 43 of the Ordinance stipulates that all telecommunications enterprises have the right 
to ‘link their own network to those of other telecommunications enterprises and shall be 
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obliged to allow those other telecommunications enterprises to link and access their own 
networks or services subject to fair and reasonable conditions’. Access and interconnection at 
every technically and economically feasible point is mandatory for service providers that hold 
‘essential equipment and facilities’. However, the Ordinance does not define the meaning of 
essential equipment and facilities, and unbundling of interconnection services is not required. 
Interconnection agreements are to be negotiated between operators, and where an agreement 
cannot be concluded within the time limit (45 days according to MIC regulations), the MIC 
will resolve the dispute. The MIC’s decision is final, unless the affected party appeals the 
case to the Administrative Court. Interconnection charges are still regulated by the MIC. 
 
Co-location is also envisioned in the Ordinance. Article 43(2) provides for ‘shared use of 
linking points and technical infrastructure facilities via linking agreement between two signed 
parties’. Despite this provision, the sharing of facilities is one of the contentious issues in 
forging interconnection agreements.  
 
The basis for setting an interconnection fee is ad hoc, although it is said to approximate cost 
plus a contribution to universal service (called a Community Service Obligation [CSO]). As 
required by Article 39 of the Ordinance, a service provider must maintain separate cost 
accounting systems for services where it holds the dominant market share. To this end, VNPT 
is currently implementing changes in its accounting system, so perhaps cost information will 
be more transparent in the near future. However, the cost associated with CSO remains an 
area of contention. But with the establishment of the universal service fund (VTF: see 20.3.3), 
this practice is to be phased out soon. Finally, because the Ordinance does not require 
disclosure of interconnection or access agreements, some regulation promoting transparency 
may be required in the future as Viet Nam complies with its WTO obligations.  
 
20.3.3 Universal service obligations 
 
Traditionally, VNPT has been the only operator to embrace the obligation to provide 
universal services in both the cities and rural areas. New operators have chosen to provide 
services only in areas that are profitable, such as Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City.  
 
VNPT has always cross-subsidised domestic services with revenues from international and 
domestic long distance services but with the declining price trend and emerging competition 
from new entrants, VNPT has become concerned about the gradual ‘drying-up’ of funding 
sources for universal services. The new operators, however, are concerned about being 
overcharged for universal services because the universal service obligation contribution was 
collected as a mark-up of the interconnection charges payable to VNPT. 
 
In response to calls for reform, and consistent with the WTO Reference Paper, Section 5 of 
the 2002 Ordinance on Posts and Telecommunications deals specifically with universal 
service obligations, although it does not define the scope of universal services. However, 
Article 50 empowers the government to mobilise funds for the provision of 
telecommunications services for the public interest through interconnection or access charges 
or by setting up a universal service fund. The funds may be disbursed either by competitive 
tendering or by a universal service provider appointed by the government. The Ordinance 
further provides that the government can stipulate policies and measures for the provision of 
public telecommunications services.  
 
As a result of the Ordinance’s requirement, the Viet Nam Public Utility Telecommunication 
Service Fund (VTF) was established in 2004 as a public financing institution under the 
424 The impacts and benefits of structural reforms in the transport, energy and telecommunications sectors 
Ministry of Posts and Telematics (now MIC). The mission of the VTF is to support the 
development and provision of public-utility telecommunications services in regions where 
market mechanisms fail to deliver the intended policy outcomes on a cost-effective basis. In 
2006 the government approved the ‘Program on provision of public-utility 
telecommunications service until 2010’ (Decision No.: 74/QD-TTg; hereinafter the Program), 
which specifies the following services as part of the public-utility telecommunications service:  
• universal telecommunications services, which include a standard telephone service 
and a standard Internet access service; and 
• compulsory telecommunications services, which include emergency communication 
services, telecommunications services for searching, rescuing, protecting and fighting 
natural calamities as regulated by competent agencies and fixed telephone number 
enquiries and telecommunications services serving the state’s emergent activities. 
 
Funding to support the VTF comes from industry-based levies. All eligible operators 
contribute to the VTF fund and the contribution is collected from 5% of mobile services 
revenue, 4% from international voice and leased line services and 3% from domestic long 
distance services and leased line services.  
 
The functions of the VTF are mainly: 
• to facilitate investment in and development of new infrastructure access points in 
locations where adequate public-utility telecommunications services are not yet 
available;  
• to support maintenance costs for the continued provision of public-utility 
telecommunications services in areas where those services are already available; and 
• for the development of users of those services.  
 
VTF financial support has two categories. The first is direct funding for the development and 
maintenance of public-utility telecommunications services within designated regions. The 
second is soft financing to assist enterprises in establishing, upgrading, and extending 
telecommunications infrastructure and facilities to providing public-utility 
telecommunications services within designated regions. 
 
As outlined in the program, the specific objectives of the VTF were to ensure that, by 2010: 
• teledensity in the areas provided with public-utility telecommunications services 
reaches five telephone sets per 100 people; 
• 100% of communes throughout Viet Nam have public telephone service access points; 
• 70% have public Internet service access points; and 
• all citizens have the right to free access to compulsory telecommunications services.  
 
According to VTF’s statement, these policy targets were achieved in 2009, with 10.7 out of 
100 people now using public telephones in remote areas and 4873 public telecommunications 
access areas already established. 7
 
 
20.3.4 Allocation of spectrum 
 
Prior to the Law on Telecommunications, there was no formal and official regulation relating 
to spectrum. While the new draft law may loosen government control of telecommunications 
enterprises, it still provides methods for allocating telecommunications resources. Those 
                                                 
7 http://www.vtf.vn/en/news/2010/02/4F1B6200/ 
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resources with a high value will be allocated either via public auction or ‘beauty contest’, 
while other resources will be allocated on the usual ‘first come, first served’ basis. 
 
In addition, the transferability of telecommunications resources will for the first time only be 
recognised if the resources were obtained via public auction. Unfortunately, the draft law 
ignores the transferability of telecommunication resources obtained by a telecommunications 
enterprise via other methods, such as when it makes capital contributions to form a new 
telecommunications company (e.g., a joint venture with a foreign partner under Viet Nam’s 
WTO commitments). 
 
In 2006 and 2007 a joint pilot project between Intel, the Viet Nam Data Communication 
Company (VDC) and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) was 
launched to deploy high-speed wireless broadband in remotely located villages in the 
northern part of Viet Nam, using a combination of WiMAX and geo-synchronous satellite. 
With limited mobile phone coverage and only two PSTN phone lines in the whole area, 
ShinCorp’s IPSTAR satellite is being used to provide the backbone of the Internet connection. 
These examples of technological innovation for closing the digital divide, however, require 
policy support beyond financial assistance. For instance, as Viet Nam has not decided the 
timing and spectrum band (most likely 2.3 MHz and 2.5 MHz) for the allocation of Wimax’s 
spectrum licensing, the pilot project is running under a trial licence. In this regard, 
acceleration of the spectrum licensing would facilitate not only competition for broadband 
access but also the provision of universal service. 
 
20.4. ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE 
 
Viet Nam has set many policy targets before. In 2005 Viet Nam’s National Institute of Posts 
and Telematics Strategy (NIPTS) estimated that by 2010 the total telecommunications density 
would be around 32–35%, including 18–20% for mobile services. Also by 2010 Internet 
subscriber density would be 13%, while Internet user penetration would be 50%, including 
30% broadband user penetration, and PC penetration was expected to be 10%. 
 
In hindsight, the NIPTS’ 2010 vision was too modest, as all its policy targets were in 
principle achieved by 2008, except Internet subscription, which is just half-way towards its 
target. In particular, the ‘explosive’ style of fixed-line and mobile developments during 2006–
08 underpins Viet Nam’s high quality performance in recent years. By 2007 mobile services 
had surpassed fixed-line services to become the most widely available telecommunications 
service in Viet Nam, reaching a penetration rate of nearly 80% of the population by 2008 
(Figure 20.3). The rapid diffusion of telecommunications services to rural and remote areas is 
positively a major benefit of telecommunications structural reform. 
 
Fixed-line development seems to be modest compared to the mobile growth rate, yet it is 
equally outstanding when compared with other APEC economies with similar levels of 
economic/telecommunications developments (Figure 20.4). Prior to 2003 Viet Nam (GDP 
per capita USD1042.4 at 2008) shared a similar level of fixed-line penetration rate with 
Indonesia (GDP per capita USD2237.7) and the Philippines (GDP per capita USD1851.5), 
yet a jump-start style of rapid development was observed for Viet Nam, starting from 2003. 
 
Viet Nam has since moved from an under-developed economy to join many of its developed 
peers in the region in fixed-line availability. Structural reform efforts have evidently 
contributed to this outcome, with the introduction of the 2002 Ordinance and the 
establishment of the universal service fund (VTF). The Ordinance offers a relatively 
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Figure 20.3: Changes in fixed-line and mobile penetration rates in Viet Nam. (Source: ITU 2009) 
 
 
(1) Fixed-line subscribers per 100 inhabitants  
 
(2) Mobile subscribers per 100 inhabitants  
 
(3) Internet subscribers per 100 inhabitants  
Figure 20.4: Comparison of the fixed-line, Internet and mobile penetration rates of Viet Nam; the 
Philippines; and Indonesia. (Source: ITU 2009) 
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transparent and predictable regulatory environment to foster competition and network 
investment, and the VTF offers clearly defined financial incentives to assist the rapid 
expansion of networks in under-served regions. 
 
Mobile penetration in Viet Nam represents another interesting story. While Indonesia and the 
Philippines appear to follow a more linear development approach, mobile services in Viet 
Nam again show a jump-start style of network expansion, surpassing both Indonesia and the 
Philippines during 2007–08.  
 
Finally, the rate of Viet Nam’s Internet subscribers offers yet another good example of the 
correlation between reform and performance. Two primary reform initiatives are possibly 
responsible for the sharp increase in Internet subscription: the first, when the Internet services 
sector was liberalised in Viet Nam’s 2002 Ordinance to allow private participation, which 
increased supply and the level of competition, and the second, the contribution of the VTF, 
which includes public Internet access as part of the universal service scheme. As noted above, 
however, at just halfway towards its target, this result is still short of meeting the NIPTS’ 
vision to achieve a 13% penetration rate by 2010. 
 
In relation to price, the experience in Viet Nam demonstrates a positive relationship between 
market liberalisation and performance (Figure 20.5). Monthly subscription charges for mobile 
services have been reduced from nearly USD17 in 1999 to zero in 2004 (Figure 20.5[1]). For 
the average tariff of a 3-minute off-peak mobile call, as at 2005 Viet Nam was the highest of 
the three sample economies, yet by 2008 it became the economy with the lowest rate. The 
main reason for the zero subscription charge strategy is that, as network coverage expands to 
a nation-wide level, free subscription is an effective way of achieving scale economies and 
enhancing the positive network effects. The latter, for example, gives a network with a larger 
subscription base an advantage in interconnection negotiations. From a universal service 
perspective, this outcome could be considered as an alternative and efficient way of achieving 
the universal service objective through a market mechanism.  
 
A different development, however, can be observed for fixed-line connection charges. Unlike 
usage-based charges, the fixed-line connection charge is something a potential subscriber 
cannot avoid. This has a direct impact on the affordability of a basket of fixed-line services, 
such as voice telephony and broadband. For this reason the fixed-line connection charge in 
Viet Nam has remained basically unchanged between 2000 and 2008, reflecting perhaps the 
cross-subsidy strategy adopted by the government (through VNPT) to promote affordability 
of telecommunications services in Viet Nam. This also indicates that tariff rebalancing will be 
an ongoing policy challenge for Viet Nam. Indonesia introduced a tariff rebalancing policy 
between 2000 and 2003, and this is reflected in the change in its connection charge. The 
charge is, however, too high for the Philippines. This is perhaps the result of the regional 
monopoly policy adopted in the Philippines.  
 
20.5 CONCLUSION 
 
Viet Nam has achieved great success in its telecommunications structural reform process. The 
market was liberalised to both domestic and foreign investment in a gradual, phase-in manner, 
with the contract-based BCC scheme as the foundation for future participation. This approach 
is common among other APEC economies. Indonesia’s KSO scheme and Thailand’s BOT 
project are all based on a similar rationale and policy considerations. But the KSO failed in 
Indonesia, and Thailand is having a difficult time converting BOT contracts into formal 
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(1) Mobile service monthly subscription charge (USD) 
  
(2) Price of a 3-minute off-peak mobile call (USD) 
 
(3) Fixed-line connection charge (USD)  
Figure 20.5: Comparison of selected retail tariffs between Viet Nam; the Philippines; and Indonesia. 
(Source: ITU 2009) 
 
operational licences (Lee & Findlay 2005). It appears that Viet Nam has suffered less from 
the drawbacks of these types of structural reform strategies and experienced good 
performance improvements.  
 
Yet there are still a number of issues that need to be addressed, some of which might 
critically affect Viet Nam’s ability to continue its remarkable performance. 
 
20.5.1 Continuing structural reform through market liberalisation 
 
Governments often argue that temporary control of market entry and foreign investment in 
the telecommunications sector is needed to allow the domestic ‘infant industry’ more time to 
adjust before full competition (Vickers & Yarrow 1991). However, as demonstrated in 
Indonesia and Thailand’s experiences and in the literature (Ros 1999; Fink et al. 2003), 
ownership control does not always bring about the desired policy outcomes in the long run. 
For this reason, Viet Nam committed in its WTO accession that exclusive state ownership in 
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convert into operational licences with an investment ceiling. This movement away from 
ownership control is consistent with best practice and economic theory. It also unveils many 
regulatory issues that are not of concern when all operations are state owned. A transparent, 
predictable and non-discriminatory regulatory regime would be prerequisite to further 
advances in liberalisation. 
 
Viet Nam’s WTO commitments and the Law on Telecommunications provide a good 
opportunity to grasp the benefit of its market liberalisation, but reducing investment 
uncertainty at the time when current BCC partners will be applying for licence conversion 
remains a task for the future. Before then, it would be preferable for the government to 
publish clearly defined conversion requirements and procedures.  
 
Vietnam’s status as a Newly Acceded Member (RAM) means that it has virtually no 
obligation to offer new commitments in the WTO Doha round negotiation. Yet the 
telecommunications liberalisation process in Vietnam is half way through, with many 
structural and regulatory reform efforts still needed to fully realise the objectives and benefits 
of telecommunications structural reform. To this end, APEC’s Leaders’ Agenda to Implement 
Structural Reform (LAISR, 2004) would provide a valuable mandate for Vietnam to identify 
the telecommunications sector as a priority area to continue reform.  
 
20.5.2 State dominance and the creation of an independent regulator 
 
The incumbent VNPT still dominates the fixed-line and mobile markets in Viet Nam, so 
regulating market dominance to foster competition is not an easy task. While, under the Law 
on Telecommunications, facility-based services are opened to private participation, the legacy 
of state ownership in all existing FBO operators will be an obstacle to competition and 
investment.  
 
Indeed, the Law establishes a pro-competition regulatory regime to prevent anti-competition 
practices and ensure interconnection as well as access to bottleneck facilities, even though the 
ownership relationships between the various state ministries and existing FBO operators 
indicates the importance of a more impartial and non-discriminatory regulatory environment. 
To achieve this objective, the creation of an independent regulator would be a critical step.  
 
The current regulatory structure in Viet Nam is already consistent with the WTO Reference 
Paper’s definition of an independent regulator that is separated from service provisions. 
Nonetheless, the fact that all existing FBO operators are state owned warrants a more 
demanding independence for the regulator. The independence of the regulator can be ensured 
in different forms. As a threshold, the regulator should be separated from the ministry 
responsible for policy decision making (MIC in Vietnam). Independence can be further 
enhanced by way of providing a certain degree of autonomy in carrying out core regulatory 
functions, such as investigating anti-competition activities, tariff regulation and 
interconnection/access dispute settlement. These regulatory structural reforms would 
significantly improve the quality of regulation and ensure a predictable, fair and non-
discriminatory regulatory regime. It would also reduce the concerns of policy interference in 
regulations.  
 
20.5.3 Reducing development disparity  
 
Universal service obligation schemes in developed economies are usually centred on a few 
disconnected remote households and marginal socio-economic groups, such as low-income 
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earners and the disabled. However, similar development schemes in developing economies 
such as Viet Nam are focused on improving the overall availability of basic 
telecommunications services at community level to the vast majority of the population (ITU 
2003). Given the lower deployment cost and above-cost tariffs, competition in long distance 
and international markets is more likely than competition in local telephony services. 
Furthermore, even if competition does occur in the local telephony market it will not 
automatically benefit rural areas, where networks are limited.  
 
Refinement of the great disparity in access to telecommunication services between different 
geographical regions is one of the primary reform objectives. The literature demonstrates that 
liberalisation and competition enhance overall sector performance and facilitate network 
expansion, yet market-based policy has its limitations. For instance, for uneconomic areas the 
costs of providing telecommunications services are often greater than the subscribers’ 
willingness to pay, thus preventing the operator from extending network coverage into these 
areas (World Bank 2000). Both cases warrant the implementation of a universal 
telecommunications service development scheme that often requires mandatory network 
deployment and service provisions, supported by an appropriate subsidy program.  
 
A major issue commonly faced by many economies is the estimation of the costs for 
providing universal service (DCITA 2004). Before 2004 universal service in Viet Nam was 
financed primarily by inter-service cross-subsidisation and the levy of the CSO as part of the 
interconnection charge. Yet none of these funding programs was sustainable in the face of 
competition. For instance, cross-subsidy between international and local telephony services 
or between monthly rental and per call charges offers no incentive for operators to reduce 
cost or improve efficiency, since none of the tariffs are cost-based and operators can always 
manipulate the regime by allocating costs in subsidised services. There was a lack of 
transparency in the way revenue generated from subsidised services and CSO was used. 
While network rollout in both a profitable and an uneconomic area could each be receiving a 
subsidy and CSO, revenue from subsidised services and CSO could also be used in an anti-
competitive manner to subsidise services – such as a mobile service – that were facing 
competition. But with market opening the above-cost tariffs of subsidising services often 
attract new entrants to compete in those lucrative segments rather than focusing on local 
network development.  
 
The establishment of the VTS provides an ideal starting point to implement reform in the 
provision of universal telecommunications services. The industry-based levy funding 
arrangement also appears to be self-sustainable. Indeed the rural area focus and industry-wide 
funding arrangement of the VTS creates a more competitively neutral universal service 
regime in the light of competition. Yet given that the nature of VTS is to provide funding that 
has been collected from rivals for network development that would otherwise be carried out 
on the provider’s own investment, this requires caution in order to avoid over and/or under 
compensation that could hamper competition.  
 
For previously unserviced areas, it is difficult but essential to identify genuine loss-making 
areas and to exclude areas with only temporary loss, such as emerging new housing areas. 
Also, cost estimation is affected by the scope of technologies (e.g., copper wire, satellite, 
CATV) to be included in the formula. This often requires updated understanding of, and 
prediction on, technological advancements and efficient network development over time. A 
more technology neutral approach is valuable for selecting universal service providers and 
determining the level of funding required.  
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With the proliferation of mobile and other wireless technologies (e.g., Worldwide 
Interoperability for Microwave Access [WiMax]), a wireless universal services scheme 
appears to be a cost-effective policy solution, as such a scheme has already been implemented 
in India, South Africa, Uganda, Nigeria, Bangladesh and Colombia (Oestmann 2003). 
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Chapter 21 
 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IN PAPUA NEW GUINEA 
 
 
Ronald Duncan1
 
 
 
• The introduction of competition into the mobile sector has effectively led to universal 
coverage: prices are lower and a wider variety of services are available. 
• The benefits to the many remote communities now able to interact with the rest of the 
economy are important: the availability of mobile phone services is helpful in medical 
emergencies and mobile banking initiatives are now underway. 
• The provision of market pricing information for rural commodities through mobile 
phone services will be valuable because the livelihood of the bulk of the population is 
from agricultural and fishing activities. 
 
 
21.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Telecommunications reform, specifically reform of the market for mobile phone services, has 
been adopted in five Pacific island economies in recent years. Reform of this market in Papua 
New Guinea (PNG) was perhaps the most difficult of the five cases, particularly with respect 
to the political struggle over the nature and pace of the reform. This study illustrates the 
benefits of being able to lock in domestic reforms through international commitments – in 
this case through the World Trade Organization’s telecommunications commitments. 
 
This study also illustrates the problems that regulatory capture can give rise to in trying to 
bring about reform. PNG’s Independent Consumer and Competition Commission (ICCC), 
which was initially given the power to issue licences to mobile phone providers, fought a 
gallant battle to ensure competition. However, this eventually resulted in the loss of its role as 
an independent regulator of telecommunications. This study also demonstrates the potent 
power of consumers realising the benefits of market reform and the irresistible force that 
consumer power can exert with respect to reforms. 
 
21.2 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND2
 
 
A plan for a national telephone system in PNG was drawn up in 1964 when a 
Telecommunication Division of the Department of Posts and Telegraph was established and 
‘overseas’ expert advice was sought from Australia. A telephone service was subsequently 
introduced. 
 
In 1973 the Department of Information and Communication Services was established when 
the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) was set up to take over the PNG branch of the 
                                       
1 Crawford School of Economics and Government, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australian 
Capital Territory (ronald.duncan@anu.edu.au). 
2 This section draws on Sinclair (1984, 1993) and Stanley (2008a, 2008b). 
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Australian Broadcasting Commission. The NBC became the broadcasting arm of the 
department. This was a vital event in PNG’s history. Given the very rugged topography and 
the isolation of many clans, radio played a crucial role in the dissemination of information 
throughout the land, using an extensive network of provincial radio stations. Radio has 
subsequently played a huge role in building a more cohesive society from what was then 
more than 1000 diverse tribes. 
 
After gaining independence from Australia in September 1975, the Department of 
Information and Communication Services was responsible for information services, 
communication policy, and research and development. The newly formed Department of 
Public Utilities took over the functions and the responsibilities of the Department of Posts 
and Telegraphs and became the Division of Postal and Telecommunication Services (DPTS). 
DPTS continued to function as a separate organisation until it was incorporated as the Post 
and Telecommunication Corporation (PTC) in October 1982. 
 
On 9 September 1981 an executive steering committee was set up to examine ways and means 
of making a change in the status of the Postal and Telecommunications Services Division to a 
‘legal commercial entity’. This committee presented its report to the National Executive 
Committee (NEC; effectively the Cabinet) on 16 December 1981 and the NEC gave approval 
to draft enabling legislation. The Post and Telecommunication Corporation Act 1982 was 
passed by the National Parliament on 15 February 1982. 
 
Due to a change in government policy in 1996, the PTC was split up and corporatised. The 
split saw the creation of Telikom PNG Ltd, Post PNG Ltd, and the PNG Telecommunications 
Authority (PANGTEL). 
 
In 1997 the Department of Information and Communication Services was reduced to the Office 
of Information and Communication and there were tighter constraints on its resources. This 
resulted in a situation where it was not able to implement its mandated responsibilities. After 
the 2002 general elections, however, a new government established the Department of Public 
Enterprises, Information and Development Corporation (DPEIDC). Its core functions included 
national information and communication policy, rural connectivity and development, and the 
integrated government information system. It was also required under the government’s 
Medium Term Development Strategy (2005–10) to expand telecommunication infrastructure 
and services. 
 
With the re-establishment of the Ministry for Information and Communication Services in 
2007, all matters relating to PANGTEL, NBC and the Office of Information and 
Communication were placed under its administration. 
 
21.2.1 Telikom PNG Ltd 
 
Under the Telikom PNG Limited Act 1996, Telikom PNG Ltd was responsible for providing 
telecommunication services for profit and with a consideration of community service 
obligations. Under the Telecommunications Act 1996, Telikom was given exclusive rights up 
to 2001 to provide all forms of telecommunications services within PNG and between PNG 
and other economies. Through a regulatory contract with the ICCC, Telikom was granted 
another 5-year monopoly, from 2002 until 17 October 2007, over fixed-line and mobile 
services and the international gateway. 
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21.2.2 PANGTEL 
 
PANGTEL was established on 1 January 1997 under the Telecommunications Act 1996. Its 
creation was part of the government’s policy to corporatise PTC and to divide it into three 
different organisations: two service delivery companies incorporated as public companies 
under the Companies Act and one regulatory and licensing authority. PANGTEL became the 
sole technical regulator and licensing authority of telecommunications and broadcasting in 
PNG. The telecommunications industry comprises all private and government-owned 
companies that are involved in the provision of fixed and mobile telecommunications 
services such as voice, facsimile, data, cellular phones, video and audio programs to the 
general public. The radio communications sector includes radio frequency spectrum and 
satellite orbital positions. The radio frequency spectrum is managed according to the Radio 
Spectrum Act 1996. 
 
PANGTEL’s main operational functions with respect to mobile telephony include: 
• the granting of licences to carriers and suppliers of telecommunication services and 
equipment; 
• establishing performance standards for carriers and monitoring compliance with those 
standards; 
• regulation of the telecommunications industry to ensure competitiveness; 
• protection of consumers of telecommunications services; 
• promotion of fairness and efficiency in the industry; 
• provision of arbitration to conflicting parties in the industry; and 
• monitoring the development of telecommunication services. 
 
21.2.3 Independent Competition and Consumer Commission 
 
The powers and functions of the Independent Competition and Consumer Commission are set 
out in the Independent Competition and Consumer Commission Act 2002. The ICCC was 
established as part of the government’s economic reforms in implementing its privatisation 
policy. Generally, the ICCC has very wide powers relating to price regulation, licensing, 
industry regulation through regulatory contracts, and ensuring compliance with the 
competition and consumer protection provisions of its legislation. 
 
With respect to licensing, its powers relate to giving approval either for acquisitions or new 
entrants to a market and to the administration of Part IV of the ICCC Act, which deals with 
competitive market conduct. The ICCC is required under this part of the Act to consider all 
aspects of market conduct rules. When the ICCC is satisfied that the proposed activity will 
not have any negative effect but rather will enhance competition, it may grant the necessary 
approval or licence. It is in this context that the ICCC assumed authority to award carrier 
licences to two new entrants to the deregulated mobile phone industry. 
 
As the principal regulator of the telecommunications sector, the ICCC was required to ensure 
that the provision of telecommunications services under the Telecommunications Act were 
fulfilled. The exception was any provision relating to the technical regulation of the sector, 
which was the responsibility of PANGTEL. Where the ICCC and PANGTEL were given 
concurrent powers, the agencies were required to consult before making any decision. In the 
event that they were unable to agree, the views of the ICCC would prevail. 
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However, the ICCC’s powers with respect to mobile phone licences were removed and now 
rest with the Minister for Information and Communication. The ICCC participates through 
representation on the ICT Licensing Committee and makes recommendations to the Minister 
for Information and Communication for approval and awarding of SERVCO licences. 
 
21.2.4 Pacific Mobile Communications Ltd 
 
Pacific Mobile Communications Ltd (PMC), a wholly-owned subsidiary of Telikom PNG 
Ltd, was established in 2002. PMC is responsible for the provision of Internet gateway 
services. It is also involved in the mobile phone sector, trading as B-Mobile. Since Telikom is 
the sole distributor and wholesaler of bandwidth, PMC, the operator of the Internet gateway, 
leases bandwidth from Telikom and resells it to Internet service providers under the brand 
name ‘Tiare’. As a wholly-owned subsidiary of Telikom PNG, B-Mobile is regulated by the 
regulatory contracts pertinent to competition issued under the ICCC Act. 
 
21.2.5 Independent Public Business Corporation 
 
The Independent Public Business Corporation (IPBC) came into being on 30 June 2002 under 
the Independent Public Business Corporation Act 2002. The IPBC holds all assets and 
liabilities of corporatised publicly-owned enterprises. The IPBC reports to the Minister for 
Public Enterprises. 
 
21.2.6 Universal service obligations 
 
One of the key objectives of PNG’s information and communication technology (ICT) policy 
has been the provision of access to telecommunications for all users, with particular emphasis 
on the rural population. Strategy guidelines have been set, and these include the provision of 
funding for rural telecommunications and encouraging local and provincial governments to 
improve access to telecommunications for all citizens. The rural development obligations and 
the Rural Development Fund in the Telecommunications Act 1996 focused on basic 
telephony becoming ‘reasonably’ accessible to all. Consultation between the minister and 
PANGTEL declares specific areas for rural development obligations. Operators declared by 
PANGTEL to be universal service carriers may access the Rural Development Fund to 
pursue infrastructure developments. Funding for the Rural Development Fund is sourced 
from levies paid by operators and interest from the fund’s investments. 
 
21.3 DEVELOPMENT OF ICT POLICY 
 
In December 2005 the NEC handed down a decision to open the market in mobile phone 
services. Several policies have been drafted and pieces of legislation amended or repealed 
since this decision. Prior to the introduction of mobile services, only two pieces of ICT 
legislation had been implemented. The first was a Communication Policy drafted as a result 
of a Communication Policy seminar in 1978. Then in 1992 the Department of Information 
and Communication was instructed to begin the process of formulating a coherent national 
ICT policy (Department of Communication and Information 2008 pp.2–3), the result of 
which was the National Policy on Information and Communication of Papua New Guinea, 
adopted in 1994. This latter policy was more comprehensive in setting out general guidelines 
on defining ownership, access and content. It emphasised the role of the publicly-owned 
telecommunications operator in providing access to rural communities and extending the 
network to complement economic development. Privatisation plans for the incumbent 
operator were mentioned; the introduction of competition was not. 
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The main objective of the ICT policy approved in 2005 was to use telecommunications for 
economic development. The government’s stated preference was to establish electronic 
connectivity for disseminating information to the general public and as a means of reaching 
out to the public and outside world (e-government, e-commerce and e-education); however, 
Telikom’s infrastructure through which these services were to be provided was limited and in 
need of major modernisation. Therefore, rehabilitation of Telikom was said to be a 
government priority. According to the same NEC decision, competition was to be introduced 
in the mobile sector. However, Telikom was inadequately prepared for competition. The lack 
of ability of Telikom to operate effectively in a competitive market seems to have been the 
key issue that drove much of the political intervention in the reform program that led to 
regulatory uncertainty in 2007 and 2008. 
 
The capacity of Telikom to serve rural and isolated communities was severely constrained 
due to the difficult geographic terrain, the largely rural population and the diversity of 
languages and culture within PNG. But geography and the largely rural population were not 
the main reasons for Telikom’s underperformance. A new administration had set out in 2002 
to rehabilitate Telikom. At that time poor management was seen as one of the major 
contributors to inefficiency. The Prime Minister reported to Parliament in 2005 that Telikom 
at one time had six managing directors over an 11-month period. The government stabilised 
the management structure and hired experts to assist in providing strategic direction to the 
chairman and the board. The result was a series of positive business initiatives, including the 
appointment of international firms to formulate strategic policies and further the network 
expansion of fixed-line services. 
 
There were three key statements in the NEC’s decision in December 2005: through its 
regulatory contract with ICCC, Telikom PNG Ltd was to terminate its mobile phone 
monopoly by 31 March 2006; ICCC was mandated to select, via public tender, two new 
licensees to compete with Telikom’s B-Mobile service; and March 2007 was the date set for 
open competition in mobile services. 
 
Following the government’s decision to introduce competition, the ICCC released a press 
statement in January 2006 outlining the processes it would follow in fulfilling its obligations 
(ICCC 2006 pp.1–2). There were to be four main steps: the public tender process would 
begin on 7 March 2006 and submissions would close in May 2006; the assessment of the 
applications would be undertaken by the ICCC, with the two new mobile providers being 
announced by mid October 2006 (in fact, the licensees were announced in September 2006); 
construction of network infrastructure for the mobile entrants was tentatively scheduled for 
December 2006; and licences would be issued. The licencses were issued on 27 March 2007 
to Digicel PNG and GreenCom: the former commenced operations on 17 July 2007; 
GreenCom has not yet begun operations. 
 
21.3.1 Policy uncertainty 
 
The ICCC was required to consult with Telikom on the processes to be followed by Telikom 
in terminating its monopoly over mobile services. In surrendering its exclusivity rights, 
Telikom required the ICCC to fulfill several conditions. The ICCC claimed that these were 
addressed and amended the contract agreement with Telikom to reflect the termination of 
exclusive rights over mobile services. 
 
However, in September 2006, Telikom claimed that the conditions were not fulfilled and that it 
did not consent to the release of its monopoly rights (ICCC 2007 p.1). Moreover, the 
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government released a National ICT Policy in the same month that effectively reversed the 
NEC’s decision in December 2005 to liberalise mobile services. Notwithstanding the 
uncertainty, the ICCC kept to its timeline and announced the two new licensees in March 2007. 
 
Three public entities pressured the ICCC to stall the mobile liberalisation program. Firstly, 
Telikom commenced three separate judicial proceedings to challenge the ICCC’s actions: one 
through an Appeal Panel and the other two through the court system. However, the Appeal 
Panel ruled in favour of the ICCC. The first court decision also dismissed Telikom’s claim 
for abuse of process (Supreme Court of Papua New Guinea 2008 p. 1). Telikom voluntarily 
discontinued the second court proceeding. 
 
Secondly, the IPBC—the sole shareholder of Telikom—advocated a position that would have 
prevented the introduction of mobile competition (Abe 2007a p. 4). Finally, the minister 
responsible for the DPEIDC pushed for the policy reversal in order to allow for the 
rehabilitation of Telikom’s capacity to compete effectively.  
 
This reversal attempt referred to the September 2006 National ICT Policy, which stated that 
Digicel should not be granted a licence for immediate competition but that there should be 
staged competition. However, the licence that the ICCC granted in March 2007 was based on 
the NEC’s decision in 2005, which had not been amended before Digicel began to establish 
its infrastructure network in September 2006. Although the ICT Policy was passed in 
September 2006, coinciding with the announcement of the result of the tender process, it was 
rather late as the ICCC had followed its public tender process mapped out from January 
2006, soon after the NEC’s decision in 2005. 
 
Two reasons for the policy reversal were put forward in the National ICT Policy. The firstl was 
that Telikom’s network was technically not capable of interconnecting to another carrier’s 
network and, therefore, customers of one carrier would not be able to call customers of another 
carrier. Digicel had requested interconnection with Telikom 3 months before its official launch 
in May 2007 (Joku 2008). Digicel only began testing interconnection with Telikom on 31 
January 2008 and nationwide connection was not possible until July 2008. Much of the delay 
was due to the technical capacity of Telikom to allow interconnection. Also, the numbering 
plan in Telikom’s network limited subscribers to 400 000 mobile telephone numbers. 
 
Secondly, it was claimed that the ‘ICCC has both a regulatory function under the ICCC Act 
(2002) and the regulatory authority to issue and revoke licences under the Telecommunications 
Act (1996) ... which is a conflict of interest and ought not be allowed to subsist’ (DPEIDC 2006 
p. 32). The National ICT Policy recommended that the ICCC’s power to issue and revoke 
licences return to a committee comprised of representatives from PANGTEL and the ICCC, 
with a former Chief Justice in the chair. This recommendation would have effectively returned 
licensing power to government control and not to an independent entity. 
 
The National ICT Policy was never implemented. No publicly accessible document is 
available to shed light on why this was so, although its timing does provide hints about the 
purpose of the policy. The policy was finalised at the same time that the ICCC announced the 
results of the public tender process for the two new mobile service providers. The ICCC 
timeline set for March 2007 was based on the December 2005 NEC decision. 
 
In March 2007 Digicel launched several mobile stations. In accordance with its legislative 
mandate, PANGTEL issued Digicel with a spectrum licence. However, several days later it 
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withdrew the licences, stating ‘amended ICT policy’ as the reason. PANGTEL’s Acting 
Director-General was reported as saying that under the amended ICT policy, access to 
spectrum would be restricted to NETCO, the proposed new operator of all 
telecommunications infrastructure. Digicel obtained a court order shortly afterwards that 
overrode PANGTEL’s action and allowed it to continue operations. 
 
The ICT policy was reviewed again in early 2007. A Telecommunications Blueprint was 
developed in May 2007, which was the basis for the May 2007 National ICT Policy. The 
May 2007 policy reflected the recommendations of the draft September 2006 National ICT 
Policy in three crucial regulatory areas. The first was there was a recommendation for the 
adoption of the ‘NETCO/SERVCO model’ in which Telikom retained an indefinite 
monopoly over NETCO infrastructure, whereas SERVCO would be opened for new licences. 
Secondly, that competition (SERVCO services) would only commence after 1 June 2008. 
Thirdly, the government, through DPEIDC, would establish new committees to oversee 
licensing issues and the overall ICT policy. The authority of the ICCC to issue and revoke 
licences would be ‘removed and will rest with the Minister for the DPEIDC’ (DPEIDC 2007 
p. 12). 
 
However, due to pressure from key stakeholders, including Digicel, the May 2007 policy was 
never implemented. Subsequently, the latest ICT Policy (March 2009) gave the power to issue 
and revoke licences to a new body, the National Information and Communication Authority 
(NICTA). NICTA is primarily composed of PANGTEL staff and assets. 
 
21.3.2 Multilateral policy restraints 
 
Digicel was methodical but diplomatic in how it dealt with the policy uncertainties. Digicel 
pressured the government through two main channels. Firstly, it negotiated directly with the 
government on ensuring security for its investment, meeting with the Prime Minister early in 
March and being given an assurance that its investment and licence to operate in PNG were 
protected. Digicel continued to engage in regulatory dialogue with Telikom, the ICCC, 
PANGTEL and the government to ensure that its initial licence, based on the December 2005 
NEC decision, was protected. Digicel was also assisted in protecting its investment through 
government-to-government dialogue channels between the Irish and PNG governments 
(Digicel is an Irish company) (Islands Business, 3 September 2007). 
 
Digicel’s main investment concerns up to the May 2007 ICT Policy were basically two-fold: 
the withdrawal of its spectrum licence by PANGTEL in March 2007 and concern over the 
NETCO ‘model’ through which Telikom controlled the international gateway. The chief 
executive officer of Digicel PNG was reported as saying that: 
with only one gateway operating, people will experience higher calling rates, lower 
quality of calls due to network congestion as well as limited international roaming 
services [and] to remove Digicel’s international gateway would be a step backward from 
the current open market approach. The people have tasted the benefits of competition and 
have the right to continue to enjoy those benefits – lower prices, better quality, increased 
coverage and introduction of new services (Digicel 2008). 
 
There is evidence that Digicel PNG also relied on PNG’s WTO commitments on 
telecommunications reform to protect its investment and to ensure that it was able to operate 
mobile services. Two events in the telecommunications reform process strengthen the case 
for this point. First, that the latest ICT Policy stated that the model proposed was consistent 
with PNG’s WTO obligations (Department of Communications and Information 2009 p. 22) 
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indicates that the government was trying to ensure that its policy was compatible with its 
WTO commitments. Secondly, the September 2006 National ICT Policy had argued for a 
phased liberalisation under which, in phase 1, Telikom retained its monopoly over the 
international gateways. The two ICT policies issued in 2008 adopted similar frameworks. 
There was no timeframe indicated in the 2008 ICT policies as to when phase 2 would begin. 
However, the March 2009 ICT Policy did come up with a clear timeframe and set milestones 
to be achieved. 
 
21.3.3. Domestic restraints 
 
Local business communities in PNG also put pressure on the government. The Port Moresby 
Chamber of Commerce made known its concerns that the government had not consulted with 
them on the policy. 
 
As noted above, the ICCC also resisted changes in the government’s policy (Abe 2007). 
Since the ICCC’s involvement with the reform program in December 2005, its position was 
to act as the independent regulator for telecommunications services and to provide 
competition in the mobile service sector through the granting of licences. The ICCC’s role in 
accordance with its legislation was effective during the reform program on one key 
regulatory aspect – independence. Maintaining independence amid commercial and political 
interference was achieved by the ICCC, although it may have contributed to the loss of its 
power to grant and revoke telecommunications licences. 
 
21.4 THE BENEFITS FROM OPENING THE MOBILE PHONE MARKET 
 
As mentioned earlier the government tender process was completed in September 2006. Two 
carriers were selected: Digicel, which had been successful in privatising the telephony market 
in the Caribbean; and GreenCom, an Indonesian engineering and telecommunications 
company. In March 2007 mobile carrier licences were issued to Digicel and GreenCom by 
the ICCC, while PANGTEL issued the spectrum licences. Digicel PNG commenced 
operations on 17 July 2007 and has since extended its services to most of PNG. 
 
In setting up its services, Digicel made two strategic moves. It established widespread coverage 
very quickly and put mobile phones into the hands of as many Papua New Guineans as quickly 
and as cheaply as possible. The novelty of having a mobile phone and of being able to call 
relatives and friends over large distances in an economy where physical movement is so 
difficult gave a huge impetus to Digicel’s efforts to retain its licence. Essentially, the public 
pressure from consumers to retain Digicel’s licence became impossible to resist. 
 
Digicel claims to have invested in excess of PGK450 million in the PNG mobile 
telecommunications market in 2008 and 2009 (Batten et al. 2009). This investment has had a 
large impact on the coverage and quality of domestic services, with mobile phone coverage 
now very extensive. The quality of international connections has also improved, with a 
substantial amount of the investment going towards enhancing an international gateway. 
Moreover, there are plans for an additional PGK1 billion investment in rolling out further 
services over the next 3 years (Stanley 2008b). Extending coverage to most of PNG is 
anticipated. 
 
ICCC and World Bank estimates placed the number of mobile phone subscribers (through B-
Mobile) at 130 000–140 000 prior to the entrance of Digicel in July 2007. While exact 
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industry figures are not available, Telikom and Digicel now claim to have over 500 000 
customers each. This suggests a remarkable 700% growth in the number of mobile phone 
subscribers (Batten et al. 2009). 
 
Average peak time and off-peak time domestic call billing rates have fallen by 11% and 51% 
respectively since the introduction of Digicel and average peak and off-peak international call 
rates have fallen by 40% and 38% respectively (Table 21.1). As well, calling rates for both 
carriers for both domestic and international calls have moved from 30 second billing 
increments to per second billing increments. Charges by B-Mobile and Digicel are generally 
similar, except when special pricing events are being run. 
 
Table 21.1: Average call rates for domestic and international phone calls, 2008 (PGK/minute). 
Charges Peak Off-peak 
Domestic   
Pre-Digicel K1.80 K1.60 
Post-Digicel (Sept. 2008) K0.99 K0.49 
International   
Pre-Digicel K2.45 K1.60 
Post-Digicel (Sept. 2008) K1.48 K0.99 
Source: Batten et al. 2009, Table 4. 
 
Digicel has a wide range of market products and services, such as a pre-paid handset pack, 
24/7 customer care, post-paid price plans, international text messaging, missed call alerts and 
other promotional products such as ‘talk-for-free’ and ‘Happy Fridays’. It claims to have 
provided employment opportunities to some 300 people of whom 90% are Papua New 
Guineans and indirect employment for about 500 people through dealer stores, top-up 
vendors, distributors etc. Furthermore, it has committed itself to community relations 
programs such as Operation Open Heart, Street Vendors and to providing technical support to 
St John’s Ambulance and Food for Schools, and sponsorship of the Pukpuk national rugby 7s 
team at the South Pacific Games in Samoa (The National, 12 September 2007). 
 
On 26 June 2008 the long-awaited interconnection of B-Mobile and Digicel services was 
achieved. Previously, they had been operating on separate and unconnected networks. The 
interconnection ended the rather bizarre situation where many consumers carried two mobile 
phones, one for calling through Digicel and the other for calling through B-Mobile. 
 
Mobile phone sector reform and growth has made a strong contribution to PNG’s GDP. 
Following the entry of Digicel in 2007, the contribution of the transport, storage and 
communication sector to total and non-mining GDP almost doubled – from 2.7% and 3% 
respectively in 2006 to 5.1% and 5.7% respectively in 2008 (Batten et al. 2009). The sector 
contributed just over 20% of total GDP growth for 2008. With total GDP growth estimated at 
7.16%, this means that the sector contributed approximately 1.4 percentage points to GDP 
growth in 2008. 
 
Since the introduction of competition, Telikom has adapted by selling 50% of the equity in its 
mobile service (B-Mobile) for PGK130 million. The 50% equity investment was contributed 
by a ‘consortium of companies, including the US-based Trilogy International Partners LLC 
(20%), GEMS Ltd (20%), PNG’s National Superannuation Fund (5%) and Nambawan Super 
Ltd (5%)’ (Post Courier September 2008). With separate ownership and management of the 
mobile service, it is anticipated that B-Mobile will be able to compete with Digicel. 
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21.5 LOCKING-IN POLICY THROUGH WTO COMMITMENTS 
 
The multilateral policy restraint provided by the WTO’s telecommunications commitments 
has been very important in progressing mobile telephony reform in PNG. The main 
difference between this form of policy restraint and domestic policy restraint provided by an 
independent regulator is in the domestic and international costs of policy reversal by 
governments.3
the main economic benefit to be gained … from WTO membership is help in facilitating 
policy reforms that liberalize trade and, as a by-product, support a market economy ... By 
‘locking in’ such reforms internationally, WTO accession [commitments] provide 
governments with a defence mechanism against future policy backsliding or ‘de-
liberalization’ in response to domestic protectionist pressures. 
 Commitments on telecommunication’s liberalisation reform in the WTO are 
legally binding and failure to adhere to the commitments can be challenged by member 
economies through the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body. Bosworth and Duncan (2002 p. 10) 
capture this argument in suggesting that: 
 
The telecommunications regulatory reforms in PNG encountered challenges that the domestic 
independent regulator dealt with to the best of its ability. However, the frequent policy 
changes over the past 5 years point to the limited ability of the independent regulator to 
provide credibility to the reform process. Actions instigated through various channels by the 
Irish-owned Digicel operator, including the European Commission reminding the PNG 
government of its WTO obligations, provide evidence that multilateral policy restraints can 
provide credibility to the telecommunications reform process. The government recognised its 
WTO obligations, as evidenced by revisions to PNG’s ICT policy in 2008 and 2009. 
 
21.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Notwithstanding an eventful process to liberalise the mobile telephony market in PNG, the 
benefits are already large and appear likely to become much larger in the future. Call rates 
have been reduced significantly and coverage has increased hugely and looks to become 
almost universal. In a land with a terrain as difficult as PNG’s, the benefits to the many 
remote communities of being able to interact with other people cannot be underestimated. 
Already the availability of mobile phone services has done much for social interaction as well 
as being helpful in medical emergencies. Moreover, the mobile banking initiatives now 
underway will be enormously helpful. Until now, banking services in rural areas have been 
very limited. Further, the provision of market pricing information through mobile phone 
services will be very helpful because the livelihood of the bulk of the population is from 
agricultural and fishing activities. 
 
However, the liberalisation of the mobile phone sector has been a difficult experience at a 
political level. In this there are several lessons for PNG and other economies. One of the 
main lessons is that regulatory capture provides incentives for government to reverse 
commitments on telecommunications reform. The eventual ‘internal reform’ of the ICCC 
since its involvement in the telecommunications reform process in 2005, culminating in the 
removal of its autonomous power to grant licences and essentially giving this power back to 
the minister responsible for telecommunications, shows the vulnerability of domestic policy 
restraints to vested political interests. 
 
                                       
3 International reputation, borrowing capacity, aid programs and political and socio-economic partnerships of 
economies are at stake when departing from international rules. 
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The publicly-owned telecommunications operator, Telikom, needed significant rehabilitation 
time and funding to prepare for open competition. The government may not have been clear 
about the necessary rehabilitation following the NEC’s decision in December 2005. Since then, 
seven national ICT policies were passed over about 3 years. These frequent policy changes 
created significant uncertainty about investment regulations. Nevertheless, when PNG 
authorities were reminded of their WTO telecommunications commitments, they realigned 
their policies to those commitments. This multilateral policy restraint, therefore, provided 
credibility to the reform program and gave confidence to international and domestic investors. 
 
Another lesson is that technical assistance in making the case for reforms is vital. Once it was 
seen that the introduced competition would have significant benefits, including for those in 
rural and isolated areas, the general public’s support for the liberalisation of the mobile 
service sector increased dramatically. As a result, it became much more difficult to resist or 
reverse the reform. Therefore, convincing the public that services will improve and prices 
will be reduced is critical to gaining their support for the introduction of competition. 
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Chapter 22 
 
LOGISTICS IN INDONESIA 
 
 
Lena Herliana and David Parsons1
 
 
 
• Indonesia has been undertaking major and simultaneous structural reforms in the 
logistics and transport sectors with new laws since 2007, and the detailed and final 
National Logistics Blueprint is expected to be formally released later in 2010. 
• Critical to achieving the coordination required includes: establishing a formal process 
in which all relevant parties are involved, providing funding for it and providing the 
process with relevant powers to make changes to policies and practices. 
• It is important to include all stakeholders, not only the suppliers but also the users of 
the services – public and private – from the beginning and to have a functional 
organisation as well as to monitor progress. 
 
 
22.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Indonesia has undergone various major periods of structural reform over the last two decades 
and these have brought considerable benefits and a generally strong economic growth 
trajectory, except during the Asian economic crisis of 1997–98. 
 
In this case study on the impacts and benefits of structural reform in Indonesia, the focus is 
on the logistics sector. This sector was chosen not only because the performance of logistics 
itself is vital to Indonesia’s domestic and regional integration and competitiveness but 
because the logistics sector also provides a window into a wide range of simultaneous 
structural reforms now underway in Indonesia, particularly in the transport sectors, where 
inadequate infrastructure and outdated regulations are holding back performance. 
 
This case study offers an opportunity to examine how effectively Indonesia is implementing 
structural reforms in a policy environment where connectivity and linkages are important. It 
explains why a multi-sectoral approach is required, presents an example of a project of that 
type in progress and identifies the challenges for the future. The preparation phase in 
Indonesia is just being completed but work to date provides a variety of insights and lessons 
for the design and implementation of projects of this type.  
 
The study is structured as follows. First, it outlines the unique strategic environment in 
Indonesia in which structural reforms are being considered and made. These include 
geographic and economic features. It reviews the current performance of the logistics sector 
using the World Bank 2010 Logistics Performance Index (LPI), which highlights particular 
                                       
1 Business Support Desk, Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin Indonesia). In addition, the 
team comprised I Gusti Surya Pranata, Syamsul Ibad, Lucky Andrianto and Rahmat Dani. The views in this 
paper are not necessarily the official views of Kadin Indonesia. Supporting materials containing details of 
reforms to date in each component sector of logistics are available from the authors on request. 
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weaknesses in transport infrastructure. It then provides an overview of the directions of 
Indonesia’s new National Logistics Blueprint which, as of the time of writing, is with the 
Government of Indonesia (GOI) for approval and formal release. Finally, the key drivers of 
the future structural reform process are identified and analysed in order to provide insights 
into the challenges and potential for achieving difficult and complex outcomes. A theme of 
this case study is that the international context matters to a significant degree as a driver of 
reform, both in its competitive and cooperative dimensions. Linkages to work on logistics 
and supply chains in APEC and in ASEAN are also noted. 
 
22.2 THE IMPORTANCE OF EFFICIENT LOGISTICS TO INDONESIA 
 
Logistics is vital for the economic performance of any economy. For Indonesia, there are 
particular reasons why logistics is a high priority issue and why the challenges of designing 
and implementing reform programs are more challenging. There are also reasons why 
transport infrastructure and transport services play a major role in the outcomes for logistics. 
 
As indicated in Table 22.1, Indonesia’s geography and the distribution of industry and 
resources pose a major challenge for efficient and low cost logistics. Indonesia is the world’s 
largest archipelago spanning more than 5000km. Approximately 60% of its population of 
about 240 million people live on Java; the remaining 40% are distributed among 6000 
inhabited islands which are often very sparsely populated. Java is also the centre of 
manufacturing, while resources are widely spread over the archipelago. 
 
Even though Indonesia has 25 strategic ports and 27 airports with international status, 
domestic and international transport hubs are focused on Jakarta, in Java, creating major 
challenges for inter-island connectivity and development. Many of the inter-island 
connections are conducted through small commercial and non-commercial ports and 
hundreds of small domestic airports. 
 
In the recent years of growing regional and provincial autonomy, issues associated with the 
distribution of resources, industry and people have taken on new importance, as popularly 
elected governments and officials across the economy demand a larger share of national 
development. 
 
 
Table 22.1: Strategic environment and challenges of Indonesia. 
Distances • More than 5000km across from northwest to southeast 
Coverage • 6000 inhabited islands 
• Equipped only by: 
Ports: 25 strategic; 111 commercial; 614 non-commercial 
Airports: 27 with international flight status; 100s more domestic 
Distribution of 
People 
• Total population: 240 million people 
Sumatra: 20% 
Kalimantan: 10% 
Java: 60% 
Sulawesi: 8% 
Irian Jaya: 1% 
Distribution of 
Activities 
• Manufacturing: Java 
• Natural resources: Outside Java 
Integration and 
Development 
• Integration of Indonesia’s 33 provinces now an imperative for development  
• Regional integration with ASEAN and ASEAN-based FTAs and EPA with Japan  
• Competitiveness in regional and international supply chains 
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There are high cost differentials among regions on products like staple foods and basic 
products for industry and construction, which leads to constraints on development. According 
to the World Bank, the cost of shipping of a 40ft container from Padang on the coast of West 
Sumatra to Jakarta is currently USD600, while transporting the same container from Jakarta 
to Singapore costs USD185, despite the latter being further away. In addition, differences in 
logistics costs are an important reason why rice prices in one province can be up to 64% 
higher than in another (World Bank 2010). 
 
The results of poor connectivity are evident in many other price differentials and transport 
problems. These are major issues for the achievement of the goal of inclusive growth. World 
Bank research in Indonesia in 2010 also reveals that:  
• The price of a bag of cement in certain parts of Papua is 20 times that in Java. The 
price of a gallon of water in Medan is double that in Jakarta. Oranges from China are 
cheaper than oranges from Pontianak (Kalimatan). High domestic transport costs are 
the main reason. 
• 70% of price differences in rice across provinces can be explained by the degree of 
remoteness, which in turn is a reflection of poor logistics and inadequate transport 
infrastructure. 
• Availability and prices of basic commodities fluctuate widely in remote areas. For 
example, gasoline prices in Di Kisar Island are three times higher in rainy season than 
in dry season. 
• High quality products with great potential, such as shrimps from eastern Indonesia, 
cannot be commercially processed in Java, and commodities like pineapples are 
canned abroad because it is cheaper to transport them to Malaysia than to ship them to 
Java. 
• The costs of bringing a container from Jakarta’s main industrial sites to the port are 
double that in Malaysia and Thailand. 
• Some 10% of Indonesian exports leave ports too late and consequently do not reach 
the regional transhipment ports on time. Ships destined for local destinations are 
frequently delayed. 
• Trucks transport approximately 70% of freight in Indonesia. The majority of the 
trucks on the road in Indonesia are old and poorly maintained.  
• A truck making a round-trip from Bandung to Jakarta may spend up to 75% of its 
time parked due to customs processes, warehouse delays, and lift-on and lift-off 
queues. 
• Trade and transport logistics are still mainly ‘paper-based systems’, which increases 
logistics costs in addition to illegal charges. 
 
Deregulation of the transport sectors began in the 1990s. Some of those structural reforms are 
already yielding benefits. For example, when in 2002 Indonesia deregulated scheduled 
commercial air transport passenger tariffs, the price of air tickets fell considerably. Figure 
22.1, prepared by the World Bank in Jakarta, illustrates the geographic distance between 
several major Indonesian cities and contrasts this with the economic costs of passenger air 
tickets and maritime transport costs which have not yet been deregulated. The results show 
that the economic distance measure based on the price of air transport tickets is now much 
lower than that based on sea transport costs. 
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Figure 22.1: The economic distance within Indonesia based on deregulated air ticket costs vs regulated 
sea transport costs. 
 
Indonesia has been undertaking major and simultaneous structural reforms in the logistics and 
transport sectors since 2007. Table 22.2 provides a summary of the legal and regulatory 
reforms that have been made and highlights those that are still currently underway. The 
foundations of these reforms were made through new laws for rail, shipping, aviation and 
land transport. These changes were largely motivated by the need to increase private 
investment in new infrastructure and to reduce the dependency on the state budget to meet 
growing demand throughout the economy for more modern and efficient infrastructure and 
transport related services. 
 
Table 22.2: Structural reform agenda. 
National Logistics Blueprint To be released 2010 
Transportation: deregulation of transport sector Started 1990s 
 New Laws  
Rail 2007 
Shipping 2008 
Aviation 2009 
Traffic and Land Transport 2009 
 Master Plans  
New National Ports Master Plan Underway 
New National Rail Master Plan Underway 
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In 2010 new operational plans are being developed for logistics and ports and rail. The 
structural reforms show a trajectory away from government ownership to private sector 
participation and more independent regulation. This movement is ongoing, with further 
deregulation foreshadowed in many sectors. 
 
Some of these reforms are being undertaken in cooperation with regional initiatives and 
reforms such as those in ASEAN.2 A further driver of reform is the commitment to work in 
relation to logistics in APEC. In 2009 APEC adopted its supply chain connectivity (SC) 
framework, which laid out a set of actions to create an integrated supply chain and to contribute 
to integration among member economies. The project links the work of a number of APEC 
committees and working groups. A first step has been to identify eight key chokepoints in 
regional supply chains, related to regulatory impediments, customs inefficiencies, inadequate 
transport networks and infrastructure.3
 
 Action plans are being developed around these 
chokepoints for implementation in 2011. As these plans become clear, the Indonesian blueprint 
described below can be coordinated with commitments in APEC. 
22.3 BENCHMARKING LOGISTICS’ CURRENT PERFORMANCE 
 
Indonesia ranks 75th out of 155 economies in the LPI, which is used in this study to 
benchmark the current performance of Indonesia’s logistics sector. While Indonesia’s ranking 
remains above the average performance of the group of lower middle income economies of 
which it is a part, its ranking did fall from 43 in the 2007 LPI (see Figure 22.2). This is 
explained by relatively faster improvements and reforms in other economies since 2007. 
 
Consequently, Indonesia’s ranking is currently the lowest in the six largest ASEAN 
economies. Within APEC, Indonesia ranks ahead of Russia and Papua New Guinea. 
 
The strengths and weaknesses in Indonesia’s relative performance are revealed by more 
detailed analysis of the six components which make up the LPI, namely: 
• Timeliness of deliveries; 
• Ability to track and trace consignments; 
• Quality and competence of logistics services; 
• Ease of arrangement shipments; 
• Infrastructure quality; and 
• Efficiency of customs clearance. 
 
Figure 22.3 shows the scores of Indonesia against APEC, ASEAN 6 and lower middle 
income economies for these six components. Indonesia performs relatively better in 
timeliness, tracking and tracing and international shipments and relatively worse in logistics 
competence, customs and infrastructure, even though it equals or is above the average of 
lower middle income economies. 
 
                                       
2 These include: ASEAN Framework Agreement on Multi-modal Transportation in 2005; ASEAN Economic 
Community Blueprint 2007: Single Market and Production Base; Competitive Economic Region; Equitable 
Economic Development; Full Integration into Global Economy; ASEAN Integration Protocol for the Logistics 
Services Sector in 2013-2015; ASEAN Roadmap for the Integration of Logistics Services in 2007; ASEAN 
Multilateral Agreement on the Full Liberalization of Air Freight Services; and ASEAN Multilateral 
Agreement on Air Services; and ASEAN Framework Agreement on the Facilitation of Inter-State Transport. 
3 For the eight critical chokepoints refer to Appendix 8 of the CTI Annual Report to Ministers, 2009. A 
symposium in May 2009 contributed to the development of the APEC work plan (CIE [2009]). 
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Figure 22.2: Global ranking and scores for APEC economies. (Source: World Bank Logistics 
Performance Index 2010) 
 
Figure 22.3: Indonesia’s ranking in the LPI 2010 compared with APEC, ASEAN 6 and lower middle 
income economies. 
 
This performance also reveals why the Indonesian government is placing a high priority on 
improving customs and infrastructure. In addition to the reform agenda on infrastructure, 
Indonesia has undertaken major reforms in customs to reduce corruption and increase 
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clearance times through the National Single Window (NSW), which is reviewed in more 
detail below. 
 
The business respondents to the surveys associated with the LPI 2010 scores and rankings 
show a particular concern about the quality of transport-related infrastructure (see Table 
22.3). Two-thirds of respondents evaluated the quality of port infrastructure as low or very 
low and more than 83% considered that road, rail and airport infrastructure was low or very 
low. These results point to the need to prioritise transport infrastructure in the structural 
reforms to improve logistics performance. 
 
Table 22.3: Quality of Indonesia’s transport-related infrastructure. 
Sector Respondents evaluating the quality of 
transport infrastructure as low/very low (%) 
Ports 66.67 
Airports 83.33 
Roads 83.33 
Rail 83.33 
Warehousing/transloading facilities 16.67 
Source: World Bank 2010 
 
22.4 NATIONAL LOGISTICS BLUEPRINT 
 
The response to these issues has been the design of a plan for logistics reform. The detailed 
and final National Logistics Blueprint is expected to be formally released by the government 
in late 2010. 
 
In this document, logistics is defined as ‘an operating procedure of goods-flow, information-
flow, and cash-flow via procurement, storage, transportation, distribution, and delivery 
according to its type, quality, quantity, time, and location ordered by consumers, from the 
original point into final destination in an effective and efficient way’. 
 
The vision of the Blueprint is for Indonesia to be locally integrated and globally connected by 
2025 to increase national competitive advantage and national welfare. Box 22.1 provides a 
summary of the Blueprint and Figure 22.4 its framework. The functions of the Blueprint are: 
• As guidance and direction in developing logistics for both the government and private 
sectors in order to: 
o determine the economy’s logistic policy and framework to increasing national 
competitive advantages in the global market; 
o coordinate, synchronise, and integrate respective parties on the actuation of 
national logistic policy; and 
o coordinate and utilise resources needed in an optimal manner. 
• As a tool to communicate the vision, mission, objectives, strategy and action plan in 
the development of the National Logistic Blueprint. 
 
The development of Indonesia’s National Logistics Blueprint was coordinated by the 
Coordinating Ministry of Economy with significant technical assistance from the World Bank 
and has been carried out over the last 2 years. It has involved 11 ministries, agencies and 
groups.4
                                       
4 The groups involved are the Ministries of Trade, Transport, Finance, Industry, Public Works, Communication 
and Information, State-Owned Enterprises and National Development Planning/Bappenas, representatives 
from logistics service providers, professionals and academics in supply chain and logistics, and related 
associations such as the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry. 
 It has also involved lengthy consultations with independent experts and regular 
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Box 22.1: National Logistics Blueprint in summary. 
The National Logistics Blueprint: 
• recognises a growing problem; 
• is a high priority objective in the government’s agenda; 
• is a product of public and private consultation; 
• has a commodity specific and supply chain approach that provides a framework to define distribution 
centres and to consider special treatment for products such as coal, oil and gas; 
• identifies quick wins and actions that require more substantial preparations and investments; and 
• recognises the need of a coordinating team and possibly an agency or council in the longer run. 
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Figure 22.4: Framework of the National Logistics Blueprint network. (Source: National Logistics 
Blueprint 2010, executive summary) 
 
roundtable discussions with government agencies and the private sector hosted by the World 
Bank in Jakarta. 
 
In accordance with the vision, two missions in the development of the Blueprint relate to 
inclusiveness and integration. These broad goals are aligned with Indonesia’s development 
objectives and with commitments to APEC and to ASEAN. The more specific missions of 
the Blueprint are ensuring that primary goods and services are available and affordable to the 
citizens and adding to the efficiency of material flows in order to improve Indonesia’s 
competitive advantage in the global market. More specific objectives are therefore: 
• To ensure the availability of strategic commodities throughout Indonesia at affordable 
prices to create a just and prosperous society and strengthen the integrity of the 
Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI); 
• To reduce logistics costs, facilitate the movement of goods and improve services, thus 
increasing the competitiveness of export-superior products on the global market; and 
• To prepare for achieving the targets of integration into ASEAN logistics by 2013, 
integration into the ASEAN market by 2015 and integration into the global market by 
2020, the latter date also being consistent with Indonesia’s commitment to the Bogor 
Goals of APEC. 
 
In order to clarify the Blueprint in a more operative manner, it indicates six major drivers 
which will determine and promote the success of the logistics revitalisation programs: 
1. Primary commodity; 
2. Logistics infrastructure; 
3. Laws and regulation; 
4. Logistics service providers; 
5. Human resource and management; and 
6. Information and communication technology. 
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The development of the National Logistics Blueprint is planned to take place in a systematic 
way over a 5-year timeframe from 2010 to 2014 (Table 22.4). Using the matrix approach, 
action plans have been grouped according to the six major drivers and classified according to 
priorities. This will streamline the implementation of the plans which are detailed in the 
matrix strategy and action plan of the Blueprint (Table 22.5). 
 
Table 22.4: Implementation schedule of the National Logistics Blueprint, 2009–25. 
Terms Short Middle I Middle II Long 
Periods 2009–10 2010–14 2015–19 2019–25 
Stages Preparation Phase I Phase II Phase III 
Targets Blueprint operation 
of National Logistics 
Blueprint 
Development 
Laws improvement 
HR development 
Improvement of 
facilities and 
infrastructure. 
Strengthen logistic 
facilities and 
infrastructure 
Development of 
logistic service 
providers’ capacities. 
Integration of 
National Logistics 
Blueprint in the 
domestic and global 
scale 
Direction  Strengthen domestic 
logistic system 
Integration to 
ASEAN logistic 
networks 
Integration to global 
logistic networks 
Source: National Logistics Blueprint, executive summary, 2010 
 
Table 22.5: Summary of the matrix strategy and action plan for the National Logistics Blueprint. 
Key Drivers Strategies Action 
Plans 
Timetable Ministry 
in Charge 
Related 
Ministries 
Priorities 
6 Up to 3 in 
each driver 
Up to 8 in 
each driver 
More than 10 
time periods 
1 Up to 8 for an 
action plan 
3 levels 
Source: National Logistics Blueprint, executive summary, 2010 
 
One of the principal challenges is how to ensure that the Blueprint can also be a useful and 
operational reference for implementation. The Blueprint involves a very significant number 
of strategies and actions to be implemented over a series of years. The difficulty is how to 
prioritise and sequence implementation in order to maximise the efficiency of logistics in the 
shortest possible time. 
 
In discussions between the representatives of the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry, logistics industry associations and World Bank experts, several specific issues have 
been raised to improve the implementation process. Some of the priorities that should be 
addressed in the implementation of the Blueprint are: 
1. Align objectives with priorities in implementation. 
• Create programs for implementation with various actions that are not carried 
out by a single ministry or agency alone. This will help to identify selected key 
performance indicators that are relevant. 
2. Ensure there is a clear governance structure for implementation. 
• Empower agencies and authorities to issue or change necessary legislation or 
regulations, promote their implementation as a priority, and allocate resources 
for this; 
• Create smaller teams to implement and monitor the progress of the various 
programs. 
3. Establish a clear monitoring scheme to assess the progress and impact of the reform. 
• Monitoring can be done from different perspectives: national, by program, by 
action and by the public or private sector. 
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4. Ensure that all relevant issues and relevant stakeholders are mentioned or involved in 
the reform process. 
• Include security, labour union management, environmental impact protection 
and quality and international standards; 
5. Provide private sector incentives for envisaged investments in infrastructure and 
logistics services. Provide a role for stakeholder organisations in the implementation. 
• Explore methods to encourage their participation. 
6. Develop pilot and phased implementation. 
• Ensure that implementation on key issues can be started and provide practical 
evidence of useful progress; and 
• Help to maintain expectations according to the stage of a specific initiative. 
7. Develop a communications strategy. 
• Disseminate information on progress and initiatives on a regular basis; and 
• Keep the business community informed about new developments so they can 
adapt to new procedures more effectively. 
 
The discussions among stakeholders revealed a concern about the capacity of government 
and the many agencies involved to coordinate implementation across the wide range of issues 
in the Blueprint. In the context of setting the institutional frameworks, Figure 22.5 
summarises some of the lessons learned from the past in implementing significant multi-
agency reforms, with suggestions on how to get the implementation started. 
 
22.5 FIRST STEPS 
 
The second Yudhoyono Government put measures in place in 2009 to remove ‘bottlenecks’. 
These trade facilitation measures were made to support and improve national logistics and 
they contribute to the implementation of the Blueprint. They are reported here to specifically 
illustrate reforms to date. 
 
22.5.1 One-stop shop to facilitate investment 
 
In line with the momentum of Indonesia’s improving economic fundamentals, which has led 
to the improvement of the economy’s sovereign risk rating, Indonesia is in the process of 
reforming its business licensing services by establishing a one stop service. All business 
licensing procedures in all regional branches will be linked by an electronic licensing and 
information services – also known as the National Single Window for Investment, the same 
concept used for the National Single Window for export/import activities. The chairman of 
the Investment Coordinating Board has issued a joint decree designed to expedite all 
licensing procedures for starting a business. At present the process takes about 60 days to 
complete. After abolishing 70 redundant permits only 17 permits are required now. The final 
step will be to produce one page showing that all requirements have been fulfilled for 
granting a licence to start a business anywhere in Indonesia. 
 
22.5.2 New funds for infrastructure 
 
As part of the government’s commitment to accelerate improvements in infrastructure the 
Ministry of Finance has established a PPP infrastructure financing facilities framework, 
which includes new processes for access to land, an infrastructure fund and a guarantee fund. 
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Figure 22.5: Institutional framework for implementing the National Logistics Blueprint. (Source: 
Discussions among Indonesia stakeholders, 7 May 2010) 
Setting the Institutional Framework
Implementation: Lessons from the Past
• Previous attempts to form cross-sectoral groups 
have had the following problems:
Not including all stakeholders in discussions 
and the decision-making process
No access to a multi-year budget that 
guarantees sustainability 
Wide differences on remuneration for similar 
functions
Restrictions to recruit from the private sector 
Retaining experienced personnel due to ‘Tour 
of Duty’
Teams doing similar/same jobs
Coordination without power to allocate budget 
or legal mandate 
To have a successful 
reform agenda, the 
implementation of 
these programs 
needs to be 
supported by a cross-
sectoral
Team/Council   
Setting the Institutional Framework
Implementation: How to Start
Monitoring system over all programs, with short-term 
milestones
Clear communication strategy to outreach  businesses 
and international players
Produce and publish regular statistics 
 Legal support and mandate from the president or 
the vice-president
Empower to issue/change regulations and 
recommend budget allocations
Appropriate funding
Formalize 
Be Inclusive All stakeholders from beginning of the program
Private Sector Participation for financing, 
coordination and feedback
Functional 
Organization
Organisational structure, including scope and main 
jobs, functions, personnel, management and 
supporting
Ability to recruit private sector personnel and retain 
officials beyond the ‘Tour of Duty’
Monitor 
Progress
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The infrastructure fund serves as a strategic partner of the government to expand and accelerate 
reliable infrastructure development by cooperation with third parties, including private 
business, local government, state enterprises and multilateral organisations. The company, 
which started operating in April 2010, will have several subsidiaries to help in the task. The 
company will be a catalyst to encourage infrastructure financing – making first moves in 
financing risky or expensive projects, which the private sector might avoid. Thus, it will not 
compete with firms in financing infrastructure projects in the economy. Furthermore, it was 
designed to focus on specific projects without ‘crowding out’ business opportunities for private 
financing firms. The company has initial capital of IDR1 trillion (USD110 million) allocated 
from the 2009 state budget, and will get up to IDR2 trillion (USD220 million) more in financial 
support from the Asian Development Bank and World Bank.  
 
The objectives of the guarantee fund PT PII are: 
• To reduce the cost of financing of PPP infrastructure projects by improving their 
quality and their creditworthiness through the provision of guarantees for government 
obligation in the PPP contracts;  
• To help the government manage its fiscal risk better by ring-fencing government 
obligations related to guarantees; and 
• To improve the quality of PPP projects and establish a comprehensive and consistent 
framework for appraising projects and making decisions regarding the provision of 
government guarantees to PPP projects.  
 
22.5.3 Changes to the negative list for investment 
 
In 2007 a new negative list for investment (Daftar Negatif Investasi; DNI) was released by 
the government to provide greater transparency and certainty to investors. The DNI reflected 
current laws in the transport sectors and further amendments to the list were foreshadowed as 
these laws were amended or new laws were enacted by the Indonesian legislature. After 
much discussion with stakeholders and some interim changes, a final revision of the DNI was 
released by the Government on 25 May 2010. The revision satisfactorily addressed many 
business concerns about the hierarchy of the law, compliance with international commitments 
and issues relating to mergers, acquisitions and consolidation. According to the DNI, all of 
the transport sectors have become more open to foreign investment. However, the 49% 
foreign ownership cap on transport sectors may dissuade some foreign investors. This rule 
makes the process more complicated as foreign businesses will need to find local partners. 
The direction of change in the DNI has been debated. For example, the Indonesian Ship 
Owners Association appealed publicly to the government that in implementing new 
regulations on ports it should prioritise local investors over foreign ones.5
 
 
22.5.4 Six new economic development corridors 
 
The government has planned six economic development corridors in Indonesia: Eastern 
Sumatra–North West Java, Northern Java, Kalimantan, Western Sulawesi, East Java–Bali–
East Nusa Tenggara and Papua (Figure 22.13). These are intended to connect hubs and 
industries between regions in order to accelerate infrastructure development, foster foreign 
investment and spur economic growth. Each corridor will be cross-provincial and have its 
own focus industries. The two fundamental attributes for growth in the corridors are lower 
distribution costs and more access to land to support economic activities in that location. In 
                                       
5 http://berita.liputan6.com/ibukota/200109/19746/Ratusan.Pengusaha.Perkapalan.Mendesak.Pembatalan.PP.821999 
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Figure 22.6: Six economic development corridors across Indonesia. 
 
order to achieve this, physical links and logistics facilitation must be available along the 
corridors. 
 
Indonesia has offered two special economic zones to Japanese investors, which will serve as 
pilot projects. The first corridor will connect locations in the eastern part of Sumatra Island 
and the northwestern part of Java Island to improve the palm oil, rubber and coal industries. 
The second corridor will connect locations in the northern part of Java to improve the textile, 
food product and transport equipment industries. 
 
22.5.5 National Single Window implementation 
 
The main driver for the establishment of a National Single Window (NSW) for trade 
facilitation is the broader initiative to create an ASEAN Single Window. The agreement to 
establish an ASEAN Single Window was signed by economic ministers of ASEAN in 
December 2005. In December 2006 the finance ministers of ASEAN signed the ASEAN 
Protocol to Establish and Implement the ASEAN Single Window. Based on this protocol, the 
six ASEAN members were required to set up their own NSWs by 2008. 
 
The purpose of establishing an NSW in each ASEAN member is to simplify export and 
import procedures by allowing traders to submit a single document and receive a single 
approval. The challenge is to link the various agencies related to export and import approvals 
in one agency. NSW will facilitate the development of customs and electronic cargo 
agreements, allowing paperless trading and eliminating the necessity for direct contact 
between employers and entrepreneurs. 
 
After an initial start at Indonesia’s main port of Tanjung Priok and further trials and 
implementation at other sea and air ports, the NSW in now underway in Indonesia. Five 
major ports will have NSW facilities and be integrated into the ASEAN NSW by 2012. While 
some government agencies are not yet fully integrated into the system and some 
administrative problems have been identified by exporters and importers in outlying ports, 
implementation of the NSW has already led to significant improvements in efficiency. 
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22.5.6 Round-the-clock port services 
 
To give importers and exporters simpler access to services, the government has launched a 
new policy called ‘24/7 programs’. All ports will need to operate 24 hours a day for 7 days a 
week in order to speed up customs clearance and reduce logistics costs. The government 
began running Indonesia’s ports around the clock in January 2010, supported by the NSW. 
However, this out-of-normal business hours operation of ports and port-related services has 
raised several new questions about pricing of services, incentives for service providers to 
make use of the longer opening times, the capacity of factories to coordinate production with 
the new transport flows, and so on. 
 
22.6 CONCLUSION 
 
Indonesia has a long-standing record of successful structural reforms but these were carried 
out either under more autocratic regimes or under International Monetary Fund conditionality 
associated with the economic recovery programs following the Asian economic crisis of 
1997–98. 
 
The structural reforms in the logistics and transport sectors in Indonesia today are part of the 
wider economic reform agenda of the Yudhoyono Government. They are being undertaken in 
an entirely different context – one of democracy and open debate, pluralism and regional 
autonomy. 
 
On the one hand this makes the policy reform agenda more complex and challenging. On the 
other hand it enables new drivers of reform to press for change in a way that they were not 
able to do before. The emergence of these drivers of reform is critical to the ambition of the 
structural reform agenda and to timely implementation, especially in the difficult areas of 
logistics and transport.  
 
The activism of some of these groups is also driven by the urgency of infrastructure reform 
after many years of delays in progress. The lack of quality infrastructure, especially in the 
transport sectors and in the provinces, is now a clear constraint to growth and improved 
competitiveness. It is holding back domestic and foreign investment that is critical for 
Indonesia’s long term growth and development objectives. 
 
Substantial reforms are already in progress in the component transport sectors. It has also 
been important to coordinate reform across these sectors. The response has been the 
development of a national plan for the development of the logistics sector. This plan is 
challenging in its scope – in the number of sectors involved and the number of agencies 
involved. The formal plan is about to be released but a substantial amount of work has 
already been completed. Key principles for the design of its implementation have already 
been identified. 
 
The next steps are the schedule of measures of implementation. During these stages the 
momentum will depend on some key drivers of reform. The key drivers of structural reform 
in logistics and transport in Indonesia now are:  
1. Domestic business and foreign investors who are concerned about the cost of doing 
business in Indonesia in existing areas and who believe that opportunities are being 
missed to expand business in the potentially lucrative regions. They stress the urgency 
of action and the importance of finding short-term solutions along with the longer 
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term programs. Foreign investors are also concerned that Indonesia cannot be 
integrated into their supply chains without efficient logistics. 
2. The 33 provinces of Indonesia which often face the consequences of the high cost of 
domestic transport and logistics and which are constrained in their ability to attract 
more domestic and foreign investment in other sectors without adequate transport and 
logistics. Popular elections and regional autonomy mean that the provinces are much 
more active in domestic political debate. 
3. The Ministry of Trade which oversees both domestic and international trade and 
views the poor performance in logistics as a constraint to export growth. 
4. The Ministry of Industry which is developing an ambitious agenda for the 
revitalisation of industry, including in the provinces. The share of manufacturing in 
GDP has not returned to that seen before the Asian economic crisis, and the lack of 
good infrastructure and logistics is seen as an impediment to markedly increasing this 
share. Cutting the costs of logistics and domestic transport is a pillar for the Ministry’s 
regional development policy. 
5. Obligations under the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint commit Indonesia, 
along with the other major ASEAN economies, to open the logistics sector by 2013. 
While there is some concern about foreign competition in parts of the logistics sector 
there is also pressure to prepare for the target date set by ASEAN. This commitment 
in ASEAN is being reinforced by the development of the Supply Chain Framework in 
APEC. 
6. Stronger international competition brought about through free trade agreements is 
already putting pressure on manufacturing sectors that are intensive users of logistics. 
There is a clear understanding in business and government that logistics performance 
remains critical to Indonesia’s ability to integrate through global and regional supply 
chains. 
 
There is also a fiscal dimension to the drivers of reform. State-owned enterprises and others 
who have enjoyed monopolies in the sectors associated with transport and logistics have 
often been reluctant to give up their exclusive ownership, but the government’s inability to 
fund sufficient infrastructure from the state’s budget means that they are now less active in 
opposition to reform. 
 
Finally, these changes take place in an international context. The last two items on the list 
above highlight its importance. On the one hand the international context places competitive 
pressures on the Indonesian economy. But on the other hand it also provides various forms of 
international cooperation, including commitments to ASEAN and through APEC’s focus on 
trade facilitation and connectivity through its supply chain initiative. This informational 
context provides both encouragement and credibility for the components of Indonesia’s plan. 
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